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nce upon a time, an enterprising or convinced an Emperor that a cloth ou d be woven with magic thread to s a. e a r°be that would be seen in all its cndor by wise people—but invisible to e unwise. Not wanting to appear un- th^e’ Emperor paid a large sum for garment and paraded through the eets of his kingdom. Not wanting to Ppear unwise, no one would tell the
The excerpt is from “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” a fairy tale. The sea story corollary is: the robe of torpedo defense is draped protectively over our merchant and military vessels, and only the unwise cannot see it. Descriptions of the garment—antisubmarine warfare (ASW) screens, direct support submarines, high-speed transits, area sweeps, leapfrog tactics, et al —are as elaborate as personal interests dictate. But when the ASW screen is penetrated and the torpedo is in the water, the vulnerability of our shipping is exposed. Then all of our
cargo carriers, oilers, ammunition ships, troop carriers, tankers, communication platforms, and aircraft carriers become lucrative targets, depending on someone else for warning and defense against torpedo attack.
Various plans have been postulated to
Em,
bo
Fortunately, it was a friendly torpedo that “hit” this Navy ship. But “fish” fired by Soviet submarines will not be for practice; does our fleet have adequate defenses to stop them?
deal with the problem of torpedo defense. Many have been technologically unsound or excessive in cost. But no single program has emerged to provide warm feelings of comfort to the commanding officers of high-value units. Underwater weapons have improved without commensurate counters and, despite the sinking of the General Belgrano (ex-USS Phoenix [CL-46]) by tactics and weapons surviving from the 1940s, torpedo defense remains low on the list of funding priorities.
The General Belgrano was sunk from close range by a submarine employing an approach technique that matched the antiquity of the weapon. The tactic of launching a spread of straight-running, nonacoustic torpedoes at ranges of less than 2,000 yards is eminently suited for employment against ships that have no sonar, concealment, subterfuge, countermeasures, or decoy ability: e.g., our 700 or so oceangoing merchantmen, 65 amphibious warfare ships, and 125 auxiliary vessels. While we have phased out the Mk-27, Mk-16, Mk-45, Mk-14, and Mk-37 torpedoes from service use, the Soviets have resisted the urge to decorate their officers’ clubs, mess halls, and headquarters entrances with their old torpedoes. Instead, weapons of the same efficacy that impacted the General Belgrano have been stockpiled and are estimated to number in the tens of thousands. It is unlikely that the General Belgrano's sailors reflected on the lack of weapon sophistication while in extremis. The Argentine reaction was to mount a torpedo defense that consisted of keeping ships in port, intact and ineffective. As a result, land forces a day’s sail away went unsupplied and unsupported.
The shock waves of the General Belgrano explosion reached naval planners the world over, but their effect was not lasting. Just two days after torpedo defense proponents had sharpened spurs and pencils to reenter the budgetary battle ring armed with figures attesting to loss of life, limb, and national pride, a single missile that failed to detonate caused the abandonment of HMS Sheffield. By claiming such a casualty, the Exocet missile diverted our gaze from the fate of thousands of torpedo victims on the ocean floor.
Despite the devastating effect and presumed numbers, nonacoustic torpedoes are not the principal underwater threat facing the battle group formation. Strides in signal processing and sonar sensitivity have forced the submarine to approach an ASW screen with ever-increasing respect and at ever-increasing standoff ranges. Complementary long-range passive- and/or active-homing torpedoes have been developed to meet this expanded attack range. Here, our submarines share the same arena of danger as the surface craft. If the unwary have not detected the enemy prior to launch, there is little hope of consistent, effective torpedo detection and evasive action—even among our most capable ASW vessels. The threat does not stop here. Soviet technology has not paused to rerefine their acoustic torpedoes, as we have done. Instead, bigger weapons with more sophisticated target detection means are being designed, produced, and deployed. The Soviet intent is clear: coalesce a force that can wear down allied surface shipping, using technology as an adjunct to overwhelming force.
Three elemental reasons explain why torpedo defense has not attracted more interest, innovation, or funds, despite the enormity of the threat.
Political: Champions for systems of defense, rather than offense, are fewer in number and less strident in tone than their power-projection peers. In the fight for funds, the weapon is easier to second than the counterweapon. The realist, in the same arena, knows that both must be preceded by a weapons platform. The acquisition cost of the platform, in order to increase the number of platforms by just one or two, must be for the basic model. Add-ons and options follow in order of perceived or actual threats. At the base price negotiation phase, admission that a multibillion dollar platform may be vulnerable to a single weapon that was bought and paid for 35 years ago is a subject to be avoided or vigorously denied. The admission of need for torpedo defense implies some degree of vulnera
bility in the platform as well as those as signed for the protective screen. This position is considered unwise. However, some form of minimal collision insurance seems wisely prudent, even for the basic model. . .
Mental: To assume the correct politic® posture, some mind-sets are require- One is to deny possibilities of vulnerabt ity by “proof positive” of survivability- e.g., the carrier vulnerability issue is de fended by citing the Enterprise (CVAN-65) return to flight operations capability within several hours, atter su fering the explosion of nine 500-p°un bombs on her flight deck. It would also be significant to assess the effect of 03 500-pound bomb exploding under • c keel if mission accomplishment is e°n sidered in context with ship survival.
By denial of probable consequences- sea war studies which recommend tn only vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft be on board carriers as a hedgc against propulsion loss can be relegate to the same pile of lessons learned as tn reports of sea exercises wherein subma rines launched multiple attacks. Throug a reluctance to lose training time, the realization of the cost of ship damage or sinking is lost. Forces are regenerate after time out to replenish, feed the battle station parties, and open datums—th submarine’s last known position. Chant' pions for defense might be found among carrier air wing commanders, squadron staffs, and commanding officers if aIJ umpired loss were carried out to its tu consequences: aircraft being diverted to alternate landing sites, fuel deliveries terminated, mail stopped, teletypes secured, communications halted, and movies an coke syrup undelivered. The cure, however mentally and physically unpalatable, is far more preferable to the mortality rate of the disease.
Physical: The traditional approach tot air defense—detect and destroy—is serl’ ously flawed by sonar’s inability to be a radar. Wind, wave, machinery, hull, an cavitation noises combine with biologic3 ones, spreading the attenuation losses,
an sound velocity profiles to deny tori’6 0 detection by even the best surface ■onars in the best of environmental con- 110ns- Detections, when occurring, “st then be classified and localized, and ecisions of action made. The only pro- ®L'tion available now (and into the unde- ‘ned future) is an attempt to evade r°ugh a combination of course and Peed. Non-ASW vessels do not have this Partial chance for evasion. Sonar ad- ances are being made, but the applica- ^°n is numbers-limited to ASW ships— lisp’*0 n0t aPPear on “top ten target • Submariners want tonnage without
harassment. Ships with sonars, weapons, and high maneuverability are attacked in frustration, desperation, or self-defense.
If ships are put to sea to sail in harm’s way, there will be losses. A commitment of purpose and plan is required to protect our investments from as much loss as possible. A defense better than that of a frigate on station in a carrier’s wake acting as sacrificial protection against stern attack needs to be found. While there is not an immediate solution with which to address torpedo defense, successes can be realized in a stepped process. First, admit that our shipping is unclothed beneath the waterline. Next, provide a modest robe of defense that covers the most vulnerable and vital areas. Thread for such a robe is available; it must be gathered and woven with purpose, and the tailor must be paid. The survival of both the Emperor and the parade he may be called upon to lead depends on it.
Commander Thaxton is a 1962 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. He served in five submarines, including the USS Tang (SS-563), which he commanded. His current position is in program development for Rockwell International's Undersea Warfare System in the Autonetics Marine Division.
NgUiist Buoy Tenders_______________________________
S. Coast Guard Reserve
y Captain Richard Fremont-Smith, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve, and Captain David Pearl, U.
quate
'“shore
practically every respect.” This
the Navy’s harbor defense and underwater program is inade-
“lenient, made in March 1980 by the °rnrnander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is 4 °ted in the introduction of the Marine Defense Zone Study, which was tN?Sente<^ t0 tde Navy-Coast Guard T^Gard) Board on 18 February 1982. (IVtn ProP°sed maritime defense zones sh St'd under study by NavGard, u|d be implemented sometime this r(?ar; Once they arc, their operation will 4“'re many resources, to f I)6 <~oast Guard asset which can help 2s * need most readily is a fleet of Vg Sea8°ing buoy tenders (WLBs). These ssels are quite suitable to perform t y °f the missions which may be s ed to the MDZs: mine countermeasures, defensive mining, coastal defense, light salvage work, surveillance patrol, inshore underseas warfare support, and search and rescue (SAR). In addition, WLBs can deploy overseas in support of mobile inshore underseas warfare (MIUW) units, or act as command, control, and communications (C3) platforms for mine warfare operations. Other task- ings might include “mother ship status for patrol boat flotillas, overseas aids-to- navigation support, or setting and maintaining buoys in overseas channels once they have been cleared of mines.
The Navy has continued to concentrate on a forward defense strategy, prompted in part by the need to deploy assets worldwide. This strategy has increased the vulnerability of ports, harbors, and littoral sea approaches to the United
States, and heightened the potential for damage and disruption of wartime deployments and resupply operations.
In wartime, around-the-clock operations will stretch both Navy and Coast Guard assets to the limit. Generally, the larger Coast Guard cutters are tasked to complete a variety of wartime missions. High-endurance and medium-endurance cutters will be used in antisubmarine warfare, surveillance, and interdiction missions. The icebreakers would continue in their current role, with additional responsibilities in surveillance, and command and control. Patrol boats would perform SAR, IUW, surveillance, and interdiction. They are all tasked to deploy to new assignments in wartime. The 13 coastal buoy tenders, which range in size from 133 to 175 feet, would be needed to assist in expanded operations in and around major U. S. ports, especially if the WLBs are being used for other than aids-to-nav- igation tasks.
A majority of the Coast Guard’s larger vessels (approximately 56) may be used in missions which will be conducted in advanced areas at considerable distances from their present home ports. But the Coast Guard’s seagoing buoy tenders will remain as one of the most capable floating assets immediately available for diverse military tasks.
In World War II, the USCGC Papaw (WAGC-308)—still in service today as WLB-308—carried a three-inch gun aft of her stack, depth charge rails, and machine guns on the bow, flying bridge, and fantail.
A brief description of each proposed area of need in which the WLBs can function effectively in wartime (and should train for in peacetime) follows. These proposed tasks have been developed after researching the need and the WLB capability with Coast Guard Headquarters and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and after reviewing the appropriate tasking requirements of the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Coast Guard.
Surveillance Patrol Ship (Coastal and Offshore): Surveillance is an essential function of coastal defense and, as such, is an important mission of all levels of the proposed MDZ organization.1
Mine Countermeasures (MCM): There are three categories of mine countermeasures: avoidance, hunting, and sweeping. Hunting and sweeping normally require the use of minesweepers. A WLB can be used as a C3 ship for a group of minesweepers operating in an area. This would free a minesweeper which might otherwise be used exclusively for com- mand-and-control functions.
The minehunting process can be divided into route survey and channel conditioning. Route survey is done along
In her present-day configuration, the seagoing buoy tender Papaw (WLB- 308) is outfitted for peacetime chores. But with some modifications, she and 27 other WLBs could be ready to perform a variety of wartime missions.
precisely designated ship routes to and from designated harbors. Using sidescanning sonar, the route survey ship carefully plots material on the bottom of the sea (which might later be confused with a mine) along the route. Ideally, this is done prior to the onset of hostilities. By locating the existing mine-like objects presently buried in our harbors and channels, it is possible to greatly decrease the amount of time required to perform minehunting. Channel conditioning is the task of removing mine-like objects which tend to confuse the mine field picture. Craft to accomplish this function must be able to support divers and be equipped with precise sonar equipment, winches, and booms to locate and remove such objects. When mines are located in wartime, the ship and her personnel must be able to deactivate or destroy the mine safely.2
WLBs are already tasked with a wartime role in mine countermeasure activity, including the functions of route survey, swept channel escort, and the buoying of swept channels. They are being considered for the following additional mine warfare functions: logistical support, minehunting, and minelaying.
Mobile Inshore Underseas Warfare: MIUW consists of worldwide naval surface and subsurface surveillance, and operations in inshore and offshore areas, including the approaches to ports and harbors. It includes the use of sophisticated surveillance and navigation systems, and C3 support. Assistance is provided to mine warfare helicopters and surface craft, and in the control of ship movements within harbors and anchorages. One major function is to deter enemy mining.3
The U. S. Navy harbor defense assets and personnel reside in the Naval Reserve program, with a Naval Reserve Group Command on each coast of the United States. They maintain readiness to deploy anywhere in the world to protect waterways from surface and subsurface enemy threats.
The Navy group commands are composed of a headquarters staff and a number of MIUW units. Each unit is a separate component command with a world wide air, sea, and land capability. There are 16 such units nationwide, l°cal® along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacin'3 coasts.
The Navy has recommended that the Coast Guard be tasked with providing surface patrol/attack craft in support o MIUW. The WLBs are well suited for the worldwide deployment and support o this mission. Their 20-ton boom capability and deck space would permit them embark an MIUW unit with its associate equipment; the WLBs could also embar a deck-loaded craft to be used by me MIUW unit for fast surface transportation and support.
Preventive Salvage and Diving $UP port Ship: Marine safety zone sectors an local area commanders need to develop contingency plans for the removal o stranded, abandoned, or battle-damage(3 ships or craft, wrecks, and other obstructions to navigable waters, and for the sa vage of vessels or recovery of other valuable assets when necessary. Wartime salvage in the offshore environment wt be a Navy responsibility of the fleet commanders in chief.4
The WLBs’ role in salvage, if proper!) equipped, could include: temporary ri3 pairs to vessels, support for Navy mobu salvage and diving teams, assistance m extinguishing fires on ships or craft • distress, conducting salvage and towing training and readiness evolutions, assis tance in clearance and salvage demoliti°n of underwater obstructions from rivers- harbors, and other restricted waters, an maintenance of a capability to dewater flooding ships or other vessels. Who properly equipped WLBs would be excellent platforms for these tasks, there are other alternative platforms available which may be more practical.
Minelaying: The maximum effectiveness of mines is achieved only when they are accurately positioned in their selected areas in time to be armed for the transit o the first target—there are no active Navy
which
can launch a Mk-46 torpedo).
‘g-range seagoing cutter able to handle
surface minelayers. Surface ships offer e advantages of a larger payload than e,tner aircraft or submarine minelayers and have greater accuracy than aircraft.5
Almost any surface ship or craft can be jigged t0 lay mines by hoisting or rolling e mine over the side, or by using temporarily installed tracks. WLBs would be excellent platforms for this purpose, es- Pcerally considering their long-range, oellent sea-keeping abilities, precise avigation equipment, and the crews’ ^xPerience and skill in setting and re- Heving large, heavy objects at sea. In .'lion, they are one of the few types of ,.! ltary vessels that are capable of han- ]e'n8 (he CAPTOR mine (30 feet in gth, it is a sophisticated moored mine
earch and Rescue: If, as previously .^cussed, most other Coast Guard float- j{" assets are to be tasked with other milary m*ssions in wartime, there will re- lon'n 3 reclu>remcnt for a capable,
• Sl()re search and rescue. WLBs are ready being used frequently for SAR in ^eacetime, and should be able to handle 's additional wartime task effectively. I( . Verseas Aids-to-Navigation Support: ls difficult to determine exact require- "ts< but experience indicates that there . be a need for aids-to-navigation ves- s ln overseas areas in support of miliary operations. And this will be at pretty the same time that home waters Perations will increase in tempo, u, °8'stical Support: As was the case in Usef a§a'n will be
10 .. as small, long-range combat an^|1St'Ca* S*1'f>s (w*th their own loading f Unl°ading capability), capable of ef- oth 'Ve^ handling vans, small boats, and er awkward cargoes. Such service jnay be particularly effective and useful p, S*icb areas as in the Aleutian Islands, Cl lc islands, the Caribbean, and in
areas where ice may be encountered.
In order that the WLBs might be more effective, combat-ready support ships, their offensive and defensive armament should be upgraded and modernized; this matter is under study. Weapon systems being considered include the possibility of antiair/antisurface missiles (such as the U. S. Army’s Stinger missile or the Penguin combat missile), a missile defensive package, and a computerized navigation and action information system (such as the CANE I or CANE II).
Additional comprehensive liaison, coordination, and study should be carried out with the Navy to. complete specific tasking of the outlined potential wartime functions for the WLBs. Once the specific tasking is completed, the WLBs should be modified and equipped to carry out these tasks, and their crews should be trained in these functions in coordination with the U. S. Navy. Both Naval Reserve and Coast Guard Reserve resources should be used to augment the peacetime crew. This will provide a new, viable tasking for Coast Guard Reserve personnel and assets.
Many, if not all, of these ships should be retained and gradually modernized through a continued service life extension program (SLEP), in order to extend their service lives for an additional 20 years. The WLBs should be used to perform various missions in future readiness exercises to provide training and experience in their wartime tasking.
The seagoing buoy tenders (WLBs) are well-designed, effective, proven, multimission vessels which can be effectively used in a number of DoD readiness programs. While instantly ready to serve in wartime missions, these ships are active in a necessary peacetime function, and are thus cost-effective. Like the Soviet fishing fleet, which is closely allied with Moscow’s defense establishment, Coast
Guard seagoing buoy tenders contribute to the economic security of the nation during peace as well as in war.
If the number of WLBs is reduced, or if SLEP is curtailed, the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its readiness mission will be considerably reduced. The Navy does not have the assets available to take over these necessary functions once our country becomes involved in a large- scale conflict. The smart thing to do is to upgrade these World War II-era vessels, so that they may perform much-needed multimission roles without delay.
'Maritime Defense Zone Study (draft), Navy-Coast Guard Board, 18 February 1982.
2Berry, Russell E., Jr., and Bing, Roger W., Wellington Cafe, A Joint Navy I Coast Guard Approach to Surface Mine Countermeasures, (Newport: Naval War College, 1975).
3IUW and the Maritime Defense Zone Study (point paper), OpNav-372GR, 21 September 1981. 4Meetings, discussions with, and written material supplied by the U. S. Navy, Op-375, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 1982.
5U. S. Navy Mine Warfare Summary, Op-374, 9 July 1980.
Captain Fremont-Smith was commissioned in the U. S. Coast Guard in 1959. He served in the cutters Casco and Tamaroa, and commanded the USCGC Cape Kiwanda. During the Vietnam War, he was the .first U. S. Coast Guard liaison officer at Saigon, and later commanded the USCGC Point Orient (WPB- 82319). Since 1966, he has been active in the Coast Guard Reserve, most recently as Deputy Commander, Reserve Group Central Zone, at Boston, Massachusetts. In 1969, he earned an M.B.A. degree from Columbia University.
ter H&Va' arcdl'tects often have encoun- ons • Pro^ern °f fitting more weap- Can.?nc* sensors in a ship without signifi- ke y increasing the ship’s size. This has rtle 0rne especially true with the develop- hav <4 ship-based helicopters, which rtl, e now become invaluable for antisub- surlne’ over~the-horizon targeting, and eillance operations.
s( recent Falklands Conflict demon- nav T' l^C corr,bat value of helicopters to a forces. Secretary of the Navy John
Lehman, in his statement before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on 3 February 1983, stated; “Helicopters were without question the most valuable aviation asset of the British forces. They were used successfully as anti-ship missile platforms, for at-sea replenishment, logistic support, troop lift, equipment lift to battlefield, command and control, commando raids, and many utility functions.”
But how can full helicopter support
jj^Hide-Away Help______________________________________________________________
y Commander Amnon Saly, Israeli Naval Reserve
capabilities be provided to older warships, or to small combatants, without significantly increasing their size and cost? Even the U. S. Navy’s new Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers have been denied full helicopter facilities in order to reduce ship size and costs. In response to this situation, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) has developed the ship- borne helicopter landing platform/hangar (LPH-292) concept.
The LPH-292 can convert ships of 400
Captain Pearl holds a B.S. degree from Salisbury State College and an M.S. from the University of Delaware. Receiving his direct commission in the U. S. Coast Guard Reserve in 1959, he went on to command Reserve Group Cape May and Reserve Group Base Gloucester. Currently, he is the commanding officer of the Philadelphia Volunteer Unit.
and
officers to study engineering in the United States,
Now you see it—now you don’t! The LPH-292 system is designed to provide smaller warships with air capability— without taking up a lot of space. The landing platform is the hangar’s sun roof.
tons displacement or larger to effective “helicopter carriers.” It can also be emplaced on oil rigs and other offshore installations. The LPH-292 provides full facilities for day and night landings, storage, and maintenance of almost any type of helicopter. The landing platform hangar is designed to be raised above the ship’s deck, enabling installations of weapons and other equipment around the hangar.
Because of its design and optimum landing deck height, the LPH-292 assures a safe helicopter landing with minimum turbulence, and no obstacles to endanger main or tail rotors. The landing platform hangar provides full protection from sea and weather, permitting complete helicopter maintenance. In addition, with the ship’s own helicopter stored, a second one can land on the closed landing deck.
Built only of marine aluminum, the LPH-292 facility is designed for minimum weight and maintenance. It may be permanently attached to the ship’s deck, or it can be a bolted assembly for easy dismantling if required. The basic structure consists of watertight sidewalls roofed by center-opening sliding panels. These panels and the elevator panel comprise the entire landing platform. The LPH-292 has built-in hangar operation mechanisms, ventilation, and illumination. The hangar is designed to be connected to the ship’s electrical, firefighting, water, and compressed air systems, as well as to a separate ship-mounted helicopter fueling system.
In normal landing procedure, the helicopter approaches the ship with the LPH-292 in “ready” condition: port and starboard landing panels open, elevator up, and folding safety net horizontal. The helicopter touches down on the landing deck, and the deck crew fastens the “chopper” down to built-in fittings; the helicopter then is shifted mechanically to the elevator panel, or a recovery assist securing and traversing-type system can be used. However, there is no requirement for such a system in the Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. For traversing the helo horizontally, only hauldown is recommended. The fore and aft panels are opened, the elevator is lowered, and all panels are closed, making a protective roof above the hangar.
The mechanisms used for storage and lifting operations are electrically driven. If the ship’s electricity fails, they may be operated by an optional secondary mechanical system. The lifting and sliding arrangements are based on existing techniques. The entire operation, from landing position to storage (or vice versa) takes less than two minutes.
The following is a summary of the system’s highlights:
► Converts almost any ship of 400 tons or more into a helicopter carrier
► Requires minimum deck area for storage and landing of a helicopter
► Provides the opportunity to install weapons and other equipment adjacent to hangar
► Creates no obstacles on deck to damage rotors when landing
► Reduces air turbulence from forward superstructure of a conventional hangar
► Can be fitted in a relatively easy way on existing ships without major changes in ship structure and can be easily inc°r" porated into new designs
► Can be recessed inside deck, thus re' ducing its height above deck (no othef system actually reduces hangar heigh*/
► Allows for one-man control station f°r landing and helicopter operation
► Provides for very short times between takeoff position or landing position |° storage (less than two minutes): even *n rough seas (With a conventional hangar arrangement, the operation takes about 15 minutes.)
There is a requirement to get more hel' icopters to sea on naval vessels—even relatively small ones. The LPH-292 meets this requirement and provides f°r great flexibility of deck usage.
Commander Saly was one of the first Israeli Navy earned his B.S. degree in naval architecture mechanical engineering from the University of Mich' igan in 1954. Currently, he is a naval architect etn ployed by Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.
Lighter and Stronger Ships
William A. Crump and Dr. Paul G. Riewald
Kevlar’ ’ aramid fiber was developed the3 '5°nt CornPany research team in l<f 1960s. Introduced commercially in st i ^ev'ar is five times as strong as 0 anci ten times as strong as aluminum tjn an equal weight basis; it is up to three thges as stiff per unit weight as E-glass, fib 111051 commonly used reinforcing an ?r' Kevlar is inherently flame resistant does not melt. It provides superior ites*StanCe comParecI wit*1 other compos- to damage, fatigue, vibration, and aok propagation.
b Nomex” aramid also was developed av 'i ^ont and became commercially ina'ahle in the mid-1960s. It is produced °th fiber and paper form. Nomex trud paper is a mechanically tough eet structure that withstands high tem- atures. This unique paper produces a
A study by Gibbs & Gox, a naval archi- ect consulting firm in Arlington, Vir- l 11J'a’ showed that lightweight panels, ? *lstic plating, and mast structure made aramid fibers can have a major impact ?.n future design and construction of u- s- Navy ships.
The study found that the resulting Weight savings from the substitution of aramid materials for aluminum and steel components could increase a ship’s comat capability, stability, and survivabil- that & Cox report concluded
^ Interior bulkhead panels made of a ^'mposite of Kevlar aramid fiber sand- tching a honeycomb core of Nomex aramid paper weigh about a third as much s aluminum panels. Yet they provide jNual impact resistance, superior flame distance, and cost less to install and maintain.
Masts and quadripods made of a composite of Kevlar and a viscoelastic tape utd reduce a ship’s weight by more fo311 pounds. Also, they outper-
rm aluminum masts because of their Perior vibration-damping characteris- lcs, greater resistance to fatigue failure, nonconductivity.
Qf Vpnibination structural/ballistic panels Kevlar and Nomex provide the same ^ngment protection at about 60% of the |ght of aluminum and nearly half the height of steel plating.
I these potential applications for mid fibers were incorporated into a ^ypieal naval destroyer, along with ac- mpanying ship envelope reductions, lQe sMp could weigh about 241 to 309 ng tons less than an all-metal ship.
strong, lightweight, corrosion-resistant, flame-resistant honeycomb core. When the core is bonded between two surfaces, the resulting sandwich structure has exceptionally high strength-to-weight and rigidity-to-weight properties—nine times stiffer per unit weight than solid steel.
The outstanding strength-to-weight ratio and flame resistance are major reasons why Nomex is so widely used in aircraft. It has been used in many types of commercial and military aircraft, including helicopters, blimps, and spacecraft, as well as military shelters.
Because of their characteristics, honeycomb core composite sandwich structures of Kevlar and Nomex have potential applications in many areas of a ship. These materials can reduce weight and help cope with reduced margins brought on by the U. S. Navy’s efforts to fit maximum capabilities into minimum-sized hulls.
Three principal tasks were defined in the study. The first involved component identification and design. Here, various areas of the ship and individual systems were examined to arrive at the most beneficial uses for Kevlar and Nomex. Specific components using these aramids were then developed to be used in the second and third tasks of the study which were called ship system analyses.
To investigate possible impacts on the total ship system, two baseline destroyer-type combatants were developed. Both ships were based on current U. S. Navy trends in terms of mission capability and structural arrangements. These hypothetical destroyers can be described as 7,000-ton ships with mid-range weapon systems, including Aegis combat
Table 1 Ballistic Panel Characteristics
Type Unit Weight (Ibslft2)*
| Grade A | Grade B |
Steel (HY-80) | 25.5 | 35.7 |
Aluminum | 22.2 | 29.1 |
Steel & Kevlar | 19.8 | 31.2 |
Aluminum & Kevlar | 16.5 | 21.8 |
Kevlar & Nomex | 13.5 | 20.5 |
* Includes allowances for removal of insulation and stiffeners where applicable
systems, VLS missile launchers, 76-mm. gun, and LAMPS III helicopters. Baseline No. 1 ship was designed with a steel hull, aluminum superstructure, aluminum mast, and a combination of aluminum and steel ballistic protection. Baseline No. 2 ship had the same payload, but with a steel hull and superstructure along with an aluminum mast and all-steel ballistic protection. Using these two baseline ships and the components developed in Component Identification and Design (Task I), a Ship Size Study (Task II) and a Combat System Study (Task III) were undertaken.
A wide range of potential applications of Kevlar and “sandwiches” of Kevlar and Nomex was analyzed for shipboard use, and three applications which would have a major impact on the overall ship system or subsystem were chosen for detailed study. These were light and nonstructural bulkheads, ballistic plating, and the ship’s mast structure.
Various design and fabrication schemes were developed based on the requirements of currently used components. For example, performance criteria for interior bulkheads included shock and impact resistance as well as fire control and maintainability. Based on these criteria, an interior bulkhead panel consisting of a honeycomb core of Nomex (0.585 inch thick) sandwiched between face skins of Kevlar (each 0.02 inch thick) was selected to replace the standard allaluminum panel. This aramid panel, weighing 0.5 pounds/feet2, is comparable to an all-aluminum honeycomb panel of 2.22 pounds/feet2 currently in use on board the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate, and a 1.66 pounds/feet2 aluminum panel developed by Gibbs & Cox, Inc., in a study of hull equipment items for the strike cruiser (CSGN).
Ballistic plating is another area where the application of Kevlar will have a major impact on the overall ship system. The high strength fiber forms a barrier which is extremely resistant to high velocity fragment penetration when woven into a fabric and formed into a manylayered laminate, using a low amount of resin. This ballistic resistance has been demonstrated in many tests by the Navy over the past several years and has led to the use of Kevlar in some vital areas of ships.
Such laminates also are very blast/ shock resistant as illustrated in published results of a simulated nuclear blast test conducted by the U. S. Department of Defense at White Sands, New Mexico in September 1981. In the test, an electronic equipment shelter built with Kevlar survived exposure to a thermal pulse of 40 calories per square centimeter.
For the baseline and variant ships examined in the study, three systems were developed as alternatives to all-metallic protective plating. The first two consisted of Kevlar bonded to either aluminum or steel. The third alternative was a nonmetallic sandwich panel of Kevlar and Nomex which combined the structural and ballistic requirements for deckhouse structure in one material. All panels were sized according to the level of protection required. For example, the vital spaces located in the superstructure and hul were given a minimum Grade A protection, while all of the magazines received additional protection to Grade B. Table 1 lists the new unit weights of each type 0 ballistic plating for the two levels of Pr0" tection required.
Top masts and quadripods represent a third area where Kevlar can play a major role in future naval surface ships. With its low weight, high strength, and good vibration-damping characteristics, it is Par' ticularly suited for both a top mast and supporting mast material. In the study, a composite of Kevlar fibers encasing a viscoelastic material (for additions damping capability) was substituted fora typical aluminum top mast and quadn- pod. The net result was a mast structure weighing a third as much (11,389 pounds compared with 36,432 pounds) with far greater resistance to vibration, fatigue, and shock.
Table 2 Baseline #1 (Aluminum [Al] Superstructure) Materials Substitution Matrix
Component Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Interior | Al | Kevlar & Nomex Al | Kevlar | Kevlar | |
Bulkheads |
|
|
| Nomex | Nomex |
Ship Mast | Al | Kevlar | Al | Kevlar | Kevlar |
Superstructure | Al | Al | Al & | Al & | Kevlar & Nome* |
Protection |
|
| Kevlar | Kevlar |
|
Hull Protection Steel | Steel | Steel & | Steel & | Steel & Kevlar | |
|
|
| Kevlar | Kevlar | Kevlar & Nome* |
|
| Results |
|
| |
Weight Savings (lbs.) |
| 138,880 | 239,680 | 383,040 | 539,840 |
Length Reduction (ft.) | 1.92 | 4.35 | 4.29 | 8.57 | |
Beam Reduction (ft.) |
| 0.43 | 0.54 | 0.97 | 1.08 |
Table 3 | Baseline #2 (Steel Superstructure) |
| |||
| Materials Substitution Matrix |
| |||
Component Baseline Option 1 | Option 2 | Option 3 | |||
Interior Bulkheads | Al | Al | Kevlar & Nomex | Kevlar & Nome* | |
Ship Mast | Al | Al | Kevlar |
| Kevlar |
Superstructure | Steel | Steel & | Steel & Kevlar | Kevlar & Nome* | |
Protection |
| Kevlar |
|
|
|
Hull Protection | Steel | Steel & | Steel & Kevlar | Steel & Kevlar; | |
|
| Kevlar |
|
| Kevlar & Nome* |
|
| Results |
|
| |
Weight Savings (lbs.) |
| 306,880 | 445,760 |
| 692,160 |
Length Reduction (ft.) |
| 7.32 | 8.47 |
| 12.40 |
Beam Reduction (ft.) |
| 0.08 | 0.36 |
| 0.56 |
The second and third portions in the study focused on the potential impaCl these lightweight materials might have on
Table 4 Baseline Ship Combat Systems Options Summary—
Effect of Additional Weapons Systems on Center of Gravity
Mission Areas Covered' Weight Center of Gravity (ft)
| AAW | ASW | ASUW | STW | IT | KG (Al) | KG (steel) |
Item |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Baseline ship | — | — | — | — | — | 21.62 | 22.20 |
Modified baseline | — | — | — | — | — | 21.28 | 21.86 |
31-Cell VLS | X | X | X | X | Ill | 21.20 | 21.83 |
Tomahawk ABL (2) |
|
| X | X | 41 | 21.37 | 21.99 |
Harpoon launcher (2) |
|
| X |
| 35 | 21.61 | 22.21 |
ASROC |
| X |
|
| 27 | 21.34 | 21.97 |
Mk-32 torpedo launcher (2) |
| X |
|
| 7 | 21.30 | 21.93 |
5-inch gun2 | X |
| X | X | 25 | 21.33 | 21.90 |
76-mm. gun | X |
| X | X | 8 | 21.30 | 21.88 |
CIWS (2) | X |
|
|
| 13 | 21.34 | 21.97 |
Mk-99 illuminator (2) | X |
|
|
| 2 | 21.29 | 21.92 |
Seafire | X |
| X | X | 3 | 21.30 | 21.93 |
‘AAW: antiair warfare; ASW: antisubmarine warfare; ASUW: antisurface warfare; STW: strike warfare includes effects of 76-mm. removal and moving of CIWS
e ship system. Using the two baseline S 'Ps or>e with an aluminum supers ructure and one of steel—Task II deter- ^lned the extent to which a ship’s size c°tild be reduced by substituting various opponents made of Kevlar and sand- |ches of Kevlar and Nomex while main- lning constant combat capability, ^Peed, and endurance. Tables 2 and 3
summarize the results of the Task II Study.
Results of Task II showed that ships quipped with Kevlar and composites of uvlar/Nomex could have capability, d ability, and margins equal to the stan- ard vessel, yet be slightly smaller in size ren J’ghter in displacement. The volume quirements of the various weapon sys- eius limjt the size reduction possible, of Set oul t0 determine the impact
be aramid fibers on a ship’s margins capability while maintaining a con- stam hull envelope.
ue total weight savings from the full implement of components made with . CV ar for ships of equal length were de- rmined to be approximately 269,000 ounds (120 LT) for baseline No. 1 and No Pounds (145 LT) for baseline 0 la reduction in the center of gravity of f°ot was calculated for both the alu- e'num ship and the steel ship. With the po'mated weight savings, it becomes bvSSlh|u to increase the combat capability adding or substituting more capable fe ,!P°n systems without adversely af- SyC'n8 stability. Table 4 lists ten combat c S cuis that could be added to increase Paoility with minimum impact on sta- 1 y or the hull volume in the various ad'dSl°n areas' p may also be possible to to C£rta'n combinations of equipment or ba Use some of the weight savings to en- ar HCe. survivability through increased
In summary, results of this study show that the use of Kevlar aramid fiber and Nomex aramid paper in surface combatants has a favorable effect on ship performance and characteristics. Interior bulkheads made with these high-strength, low-weight fibers provide several benefits, including cost savings in material installation and maintenance. Masts made of Kevlar not only reduce topside weight but also provide added protection against fatigue failure. Ballistic plating with composites of metal and Kevlar/ Nomex provide protection for vital space at reduced weight when compared with all metallic plating.
Incorporating lightweight panels, masts, and ballistic plating made of aramid fibers, therefore, can significantly impact the future design and construction of U. S. Navy ships in three ways; (1) allow the building of smaller, lighter, equally capable ships; (2) enable ships to have greater margins for growth, or (3) give ships greater combat capability.
Mr. Crump earned his B.S. in chemical engineering and naval science in 1950 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He also earned a commission through the NROTC program and served in the USS Kidd (DD-661) during the Korean War. He has been involved in research for uranium technology, process development for silicon, and new product development for Du Pont. Currently, he is a senior marketing specialist.
Dr. Riewald earned his Ph.D in metallurgical engineering at the University of Michigan in 1968. He is a research associate in the Textile Fibers Department for Du Pont, and is also involved with new product research and development. He has published numerous technical articles, and holds patents in the area of fiber reinforced metals.
SSBN vs. the Shore
y Commander Martin L. Cover III, U. S. Navy
n his book, Sea Power of the State, pre|H,ral °f the Soviet Fleet S. Gorshkov Po Cn'i' an historical analysis of naval ^ 'er- This analysis provides the West the rat'onale which has influenced S0 CornPosition and organization of the t^.viet Navy and clearly states three naval tionS10ns: ricet against the shore, protec- and anC* a^vancernent of state interests, fle ~~~*east important—fleet against the dev'i ^s'n8 this insight into Soviet fleet Vanel0Pment, a hypothesis may be ad- Ced for Soviet use of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in their “fleet against the shore” role.
The essential points to be derived from Gorshkov’s view of naval history are; the dominant position at sea is vital to the outcome of the war; fleets play a decisive role; the decisive fleet battle is not necessary for victory; the role of the submarine will continue to the last day of the war; submarines require surface and air support to ensure success; and, the longer a war lasts, the greater the naval influence on its outcome. In addition, Gorshkov has argued that victory over an enemy’s fleet merely creates the prerequisites for territorial gains on land. This implies that operations against the shore override all other naval operations.
The development of the Soviet Navy after World War II appears to have followed the main tenets of Gorshkov’s thinking quite closely. Early postwar naval construction was aimed at protecting the coastline of the Soviet Union and extending the size of the coastal defense zones as technology allowed. Current
It is equally important to note Gorshkov does not make such a case
that
for
Hidden beneath the Arctic ice cap, protected by surface and air forces, this Soviet “Delta-Ill”-class submarine could represent a sizable strategic “reserve” with her 16 long-range nuclear missiles.
shipbuilding trends indicate that protection of the submarine is a primary Soviet objective.
According to V. D. Sokolovskiy, “A certain number of surface ships are . . . necessary to safeguard the activities of submarines . . . .”2 And Gorshkov states that “Surface ships remain the basic and often sole combat means of ensuring deployment of the main strike forces of the fleet.”3
It is easy to infer that the Soviets will employ surface ships to protect their SSBNs, using the Arctic Ocean as a defended bastion. Just as the West hopes to use the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap as a choke point to facilitate submarine detection, the same choke point can be used to keep the West’s antisubmarine warfare forces away from the Soviet SSBNs. The “Delta”-class SSBN with her SS-N-8 or SS-N-18 missile, with an 8,000-plus kilometer range, does not have to be very far from the Soviet coast to fire at targets in the United States.
Gorshkov claims that the SSBN has become “the main component of the fighting power of the leading fleets of the world . . . ,”4 Of particular importance in his notion is that he believes SSBNs have introduced a “qualitative” change to war at sea.5 Low vulnerability and the difficulty of detection have given the submarine the capability of solving “major strategic tasks and of exerting a direct influence on the course and outcome of a war.”6
The key word is qualitative, because “qualitative changes” in weapon systems require a reevaluation of how war should be waged. Military doctrine may have to be revised to answer the question of “what goals and missions might [armed forces face] in a [future] war [and] what armed forces are needed to perform the assigned missions . . . ,”7
The Soviet military planner is influenced by Lenin’s expansion of Clause- witz’s view of the relationship between war and politics to read: “. . . war is simply the continuation of politics by other, that is, violent, means.” Therefore, the planner must not lose sight of the political goals that are the reason for war. Because Lenin’s premise would be inoperable if nuclear wars were unwin- nable, and if a nuclear war meant the destruction of politics, the Soviets believe “There is profound error and harm in the disoriented claims of bourgeois ideologues that there can be no victor in a thermonuclear war.”8 The idea is to develop a strategy that makes nuclear war winnable. The Soviets believe that a future war will be short, but they also plan for a protracted war.
While there is no question that the Soviet SSBN will have missions against our military, political, and economic might in the initial stages of the war, two points are important. First, the submarine, especially when protected by surface and air forces dedicated to the task, has a comparatively low vulnerability. Second, a navy is particularly important in the later stages of a war. Therefore, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) will be withheld in order that they might be employed later in the war. Such a strategy would put the Soviet fleet in the position where it could “. . . merely by [its] presence or even simply existence . . . [exert] a definite ... . influence on the outcome of the struggles in land theatres by acting as a threat of further continuation of a war . . ,”9 Employment of the SSBN as a strategic reserve could certainly be the “major strategic task” that must be solved by our naval forces. Certainly, such a mission fits what the Soviets see as a capability of the American SSBN: . . [it confronts]
a potential aggressor with the need 10 solve himself the very problems which is creating for our country.”10
This withholding option is now witnin the capability of the Soviet Navy. R 111 creases the antisubmarine warfare pr° lem, especially if the SSBNs operate in a bastion mode. The range of Soviet rWs siles makes forward deployment unnec essary. The SSBN is easier to control a communication problems are reduced
the SSBN himself. Soviet writing do®j not talk about sanctuaries or withhold:11» strategies. There is also little to be foun that makes explicit reference to a straj® gic reserve. However, such an option t ^ Soviet capabilities and makes sense light of their warfighting strategy- Such a strategy has certain imphca tions for the United States. Is there now, or will there be in the future, a strategy reserve role for U. S. SSBNs? What >s the future, or is there a future, for strate gic ASW? Questions such as these are deserving of some good answers.
*S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the Slate, ( napolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979). ,
2V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, c Harriet Fast Scott, 3rd ed. (New York: Crane, Russ11 and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 254.
3Gorshkov, p. 196.
4Ibid. p. 192.
5Ibid. p. 171.
Tbid. p. 162. . .
7A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the State, (Moscow: 1975), p. 275.
®A. S. Milovidov, ed.. The Philosophical HeritaS1^ of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary (Moscow: 1972), p. 17.
9Gorshkov, p. 153.
10Ibid. p. 155.
g 1
Commander Cover is a 1967 graduate of the U- ' Naval Academy. He has served in minesweeper^’ destroyers, and amphibious warfare ships, most cently as executive officer of the USS San Berna ^ dino (LST-1189). He is currently a training officer a the Naval Academy.
flection Board Dynamics
By Captain Torrey A. Sylvester, U. S. Naval Reserve
aval officer selection boards are a rouc*ed in mystery. Their proceedings never disclosed unless such action is j^U orized by the Secretary of the Navy. to°Wever> board members are encouraged 0 inform their commands about the pro- ures of the selection board, including:
ow the board is constituted and its charge
task°W ^oar^ performs its selection
^ .^hat the board used for its selection cntena
Membership on the board is secret n 1 the board convenes. Once the board embers have assembled, the board anr|SIv!ent ®*ves °ath t0 all recorders, tir k 6 rccorc*ers §iye 'be °ath to the en- e board—both unrestricted line (URL) restricted line (RL) members:
You, and each of you, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will, without prejudice or partiality, and having >n view both the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service, perform the duties imposed JJP°n you as a member of this board, help you God.”
Duhi°arC* merribers’ names are routinely Co 'shed during the first week the board sul^eneS' It is then that the dynamics and m 1 f*'es °f a board begin. URL and RL Wo W erS are seParated int0 different re H areas equipped with microfiche are- ^ reasons f°r such a separation
^ 'pi
be f members have a larger num- on k rec°rds to review, and so must vote ex em in the “tank” more often. (For bo H? e’ on a recen' inactive line captain in ariJ’ "bout 700 URLs and 200 total RLs a 1 communities were considered for
Promotion.)
RLs cannot review or vote on a URL otiicer.
conduct the second review on all
e RRs have fewer numbers of records in don C0mmuni'y ar|d when their task is e’ 'hey may depart after their records act'6 ^een vo'e<f on (“tanked”) and ■°n completed on selection.
"su ner ^r’e^ introductions, the president sen/ ^ mahes a few remarks about board etL. 1Ce> a sense of fairness, the work gen'6' Rours 'he board will work, and eral procedure to be followed. ers h 6 mernbers are assigned fiche read- the ^ Seniori'y wi'h a briefing number on giveln<^'v'dual reader. Then the members a brief personal history to better enable the board to be aware of its own collective experience. This is important to set the stage for a later development—the credibility of the individual briefer as he briefs a record orally for the rest of the board in the tank prior to the vote.
Then, for the first time, voting tank procedures are explained and tried in the tank. This is vital, because each person’s record is displayed in four or five fiche (see Table 1).
The briefing sheets are prepared beforehand by the staff of selection board services, a vital task conducted by the board members prior to 1960. This saves time and sets up the marks graphically, clearly showing the trends from ensign to captain.
By the time this is accomplished, the assistant recorders have pulled the first of many records to be reviewed and placed them by the readers along with colored felt pencils, scratch paper, and fiche error correction sheets. The board receives an officer summary record with the fiche. The summary record was designed for use only by promotion boards, and is destroyed at the completion of the board. The summary record consists of three parts: automated professional history (top sheet); manually prepared performance grade summary (middle sheet) for periods of active service ending prior to 31 January 1974, and periods of inactive service ending prior to 30 September 1977 (it may consist of one or more sheets); automated performance summary (bottom sheet) for periods of active service ending on or after 31 January 1974, and periods of inactive service ending on or after 30 September 1977. (it may consist of one or more sheets).
After lunch on the first day, the real work begins. The 0-4 (lieutenant commander) and 0-5 (commander) boards are programmed for three weeks, and an 0-6 (captain) board usually runs two weeks. The work is arduous; hours usually run from 0700 to 1900. Saturday requires at least a half-day of work, and occasionally an entire day. Sunday is usually a day of rest.
In order to keep pace, a member reviews between two and six records per hour, depending upon his reading speed; the first review usually takes longer than the second. As records are reviewed, each reviewer assigns a grade of A, B, C, D or No:
A Outstanding officer, should be selected. Career pattern includes responsible and challenging assignments. Preponderance of information is indicative of excellent to outstanding performance.
B A promotable officer, lacking one or more elements of A
C An effective officer, qualified for selection
D Has only little potential for promotion
No Unpromotable
All summary briefs are projected and voted on in the tank.
The most important function of each board member is to thoroughly and accurately brief each record assigned to him. Each member does not read every record but relies on the two briefers. A record will get two reviews or “looks” with marks assigned based upon each reviewer’s overall impression of the officer’s record. This comparative grading system
Table 1 Officer Microfiche Personnel Record Format
Fiche Row
1 | A-E | Fitness Reports |
| F-G | Commendatory/Awards/ Citations |
2 | A | Educational Data |
| B | Qualifications/ Classification/ Designation Data |
| C-D | Appointments/ Promotions/ Commissions A & O |
| E | Reserve Status USNR Appointment |
| F | Retirement/Separation/ PEBD |
| G | Miscellaneous Active Duty Agreements Training Requests, Applications |
3 | A-B | Security Investigations, Clearances |
| C | Record of Emergency Data |
| D | Record Changes |
| E-F | Citizenship/Casualty/ Death/Biography |
| G | Miscellaneous Insurance/Medical/ Physical |
4 | A-G | Orders |
5 | A-G | Privileged Information |
6 | A-G | Enlisted Record |
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Confidence Factor
Figure 1 Selection Board Vote Distribution
No
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
(Impossible result)
(Impossible result)
Crunch
Zone
Yes
and
the
is tracked through to the voting machines in the tank with buttons marked A, B, C, D, and No. If the two reviewers are two or more grades apart in grading an officer’s record, such as A and C, then a third review is required, usually conducted by the board president or vicepresident, both flag officers. The computer takes all letter votes and translates them into a numerical confidence factor.
For example, if 18 members of a board vote A, that equals a confidence factor of 100. If nine vote A and nine vote No, that record gets a confidence factor of 50. Depending on the ultimate total of all candidates in a particular community such as URL, all records with a confidence factor of 80 and above with 17 positive votes may be selected, and those with 30 and below will not be selected. Those records between the two numbers usually will have to be voted on again until the quotas assigned by the Secretary of the Navy for promotion are filled. As a result, this “crunch zone” often has to be managed with more votes until the required numbers are reached, and the board is satisfied.
Many factors make up the composite of an officer’s record, but the most important document is the fitness report. It is tipon the aggregate of all fitness reports, from ensign to captain, that promotional potential is based.
For a Selected Reserve board, a current photograph in present grade is important along with a current Annual Qualification Questionnaire (AQQ). The AQQ is a vital document—long overlooked—and should contain a wealth of personal information not found elsewhere such as employment, education, reserve unit, active duties for training (AcDuTras), and civic responsibilities assumed by the officer. Obviously, a leadership position is weighted heavier by the reviewer than just membership in an organization. AQQs are sadly given short shrift by many officers. If all other aspects of two records are essentially equal, the presence or absence of an AQQ and photo can tip the scales.
By reading the fitness reports and tracking the trends on the brief sheet, an accurate path of an officer’s career can be traced. Naturally, it is not held to be derogatory that an ensign “fell on his sword” as long as he later gets fitness reports which show a better track of high grades. Back in the 1960s narratives were limited to a paragraph and marks were harshly assigned.
By the time the first few records have been briefed, group dynamics have started to formulate and interaction between members is generated. Similar
18 17 16 15 » 14
ffl
| 13
0
0 12
<0
O 11 CL 1 1
10
9
8
7
communities and ranks tend to congregate; these group dynamics may determine the course of the board’s voting.
Many items have a subtle influence on a board’s deliberations. Among them are the individual briefer’s abilities to explain accurately and swiftly the salient points of a candidate’s record during his presentation in the tank.
Naturally, most officers are strong willed and will brief and vote according to their convictions. Realistically, however, subtle influences can sway an individual board member and thereby an entire board. Psychological studies have shown that their rank, uniform, physical size, personality—even facial expression—influence the attitudes of others.
With improper influences, injustices can be done. But let me hasten to add that my service on three line boards—with participation by all sizes, shapes, and grades of officers—has proven to me that the selection board is the fairest, most democratic process available to choose officers for promotion.
Consider the tank, where the secret ballot is the rule. A voting machine is by each chair, and every member votes his conscience. But records are tanked at different times of day and when fresh in the morning a jacket may get different treatment than late in the evening. However, the members have taken an oath to fairly consider all records, and they do.
One member briefs a record and another may pick up on the comments and emphasize strong or weak points. If the two briefers are good, they can assist in subtly persuading a board’s voting.
Naturally, the two A marks by the first and second briefers usually will get a high vote of confidence once board members have looked at all five screens to sat
isfy themselves the marks are a correc reflection of the record. Likewise, tw° No marks take little time.
In the tank your record is flashed up°n the five screens using the computer she graphing the fitness report marks as signed from ensign on in chronologic^ fashion. Hopefully, they track le smartly and remain there.
It is in the crunch zone, where the re viewer assigned B, C, or D marks, ma the influence of a strong briefer, the time of day, friendship, and group dynamics have the greatest influence. Once tn obvious selectees and nonselectees have been determined, the rest of a board quota must be filled by those in me crunch zone (see Figure 1).
Therefore, one vote differing in degree by the subtle shade of a B, C, or D can determine whether an officer getting a second vote in the crunch zone is se.
lected. Fitness reports, the briefer, accuracy of the brief sheets portraying officer’s record are the key ingredients 1 the mix that determines selection or non' selection.
The personality of a briefer can cer tainly influence the selection board, p good, sharp brief can subconscious1; sway the board to cast a somewhat higher vote. But a biased briefer who hits only bad points as he briefs his way across the five screens can ensure the displeasure o the board for his candidate.
At this point, some rise to protect cam didates from their respective commun1' ties in an effort to educate the others about a typical career pattern; this par°" chial approach can harm the candidate-
While a board member may do a mag' nificent job on a brief for an officer from another community, he may plod labor*' ously through the record of one of “his
an idates as though he needed to justify e officer’s selection to the rest of the d°ard. Such treatment can be the kiss of fa'1 lesson 's: brief all records
t lr y on 'be fiche reader and orally in the . : ^on 1 dwell on - them, state your Pinion with precision, and keep still. Let e members look at the screens and vote eir Consc'ence- The longer you give em to look at the minutiae in a record, CQC i=reater the chance that they will dis- Ver a chink in your candidate’s armor.
so°h Want 3 *3*r s^la*ce f°r y°ur candidate, o not do him or her the disservice of
excessive oral brief.
as 0Ur credibility is the most important EPect °f your service upon the board. 3C member brings to the board a CiclciUe set of qualifications. These quali- ations will serve you well and assist
others in voting on candidates’ records.
Previous board experience and flag rank can be two impressive credentials that may initially give one a “leg up,” but only so long as credibility holds up through good performance. Some board members never attain the credibility they should, while others achieve more through their superb performance in briefing and tanking the records.
Healthy competition usually exists among board members to be adept at briefing records, and that is good. Occasionally, there will be competition between communities such as air versus surface or surface versus submarine, but my experience has been that this competition does not deter board members from doing their duty as their oath requires. But when one designator alienates the rest of the board by an indiscriminate comment, excessive brief, or a bias, the results may hurt a good candidate.
A board can prevent injustice, remedy an injustice done by a previous board, and—most importantly—ensure that a top-notch slate of selectees is presented to the Secretary of the Navy for his approval. The Navy Selection Board is the most democratic process available to fairly and accurately select naval officers for promotion.
Captain Sylvester, who has considerable experience on selection boards, served as Inspector General for Commander, Regional Readiness Command One. Currently, he is the command’s mobilization planning officer. He has commanded five Naval Reserve units, and attended the Selected Reserve Officer Course at the Naval War College in 1979.
I^jearch of . . . Patrol Combatants
■' '“*eutenant Commander R. D. Jacobs, U. S. Naval Reserve
nav >|Cef)t f°r the recent show of U. S. fyj^a strength in the region, the Gulf of
to thIC°’ ^'e Caribbean, and our sea-lanes nav e Panama Canal have been bare of prVa. Protection in recent years. If the ln^ent were to ask for a naval presence art CSe Waters’ specifically to discourage ns traffic between Cuba and Nicara- a> what forces would likely be called °n to carry out these orders? the ha'rcraft carrier? Not likely. And, in the Ma"OW an<i poorly charted waters of icaraguan Shelf, the prudent U. S.
destroyer captain might well refrain from cruising his $600 million ship.
It is obvious that our current force structure is not particularly appropriate for such a mission.
The Navy is currently evaluating several alternatives. The September 1981 Proceedings article, “Pegasus: Winner or Also-ran?,” discussed the patrol hydrofoil (missile) (PHM) program. The PHM has a very sophisticated engineering package, along with a complex logistics train to maintain her. We are clearly dealing with the “high end” of small boats in terms of cost; this is reflected in a program which entailed the construction
Craft like the 120-foot, aluminumhulled Canmar Tingneak (in use by a Canadian oil company as a utility boat/ferry) are excellent candidates to fill a neglected gap in our naval force structure.
of a mere six (very expensive) boats.
Let us analyze the PHM’s suitability for interdicting enemy vessels in an unconventional environment. Again, we can look to Central America for a realistic scenario. The Navy would be operating in waters common to fishermen, legitimate coastal traders, and other indigenous personnel. One would expect contraband to be carried in native boats typical of the region. One must halt a suspect vessel, have her come alongside, and put on a boarding party for a search. Thus are peaceful fishermen discouraged from more exotic pursuits. (The “Market Time” forces in Vietnam offer a case in point.) Speed is a real asset, but a proper search will still take up to 30 minutes. Ten trawlers moving at 15 knots present an insurmountable problem for one or two boats, regardless of their speed.
The high costs of the PHMs make it unlikely that they will be acquired in strategically significant squadron strength, say 24 to 48 boats. The cost would be $1.2 to $2.4 billion; that would compete for capital funding at the CV level. Along with major expenditures for the Iowas, the Aegis program, and the F-18, it seems that we would be unlikely to have such amounts for PHMs in the next few years.
There has been much talk of the “window of vulnerability,” and the concern it causes military and diplomatic observers. This window exists not only for manned bombers and SS-20s; we are presently vulnerable in the area of unconventional warfare for both covert and low-profile scenarios. Diplomacy and circumspection often recommend that we support our allies in a low-key fashion; we may wish to quietly deliver a few cases of arms, rather than a dozen C-5 loads of material. A certain sense of urgency is justified in filling the patrol combatant role in the U. S. fleet. Because of high costs and time required for financing and construction, the PHM is simply not a satisfactory option.
Another ongoing project is the surface effect ship (SES). The Coast Guard has studied a 34-meter version, the Dorado. Her wide beam and large deck space can accommodate a variety of facilities, and she will maintain 27 knots in a state five sea with excellent stability. Let us again consider missions, keeping in mind what is appropriate for a naval vessel.
Interdiction of illegal civilian water traffic is a typical Coast Guard role, and the SES is very attractive for encountering lightly armed smugglers. But for the Navy, there is a crucial concern in lift versus payload. The Dorado will do 33 knots with 7,000 gallons of fuel on board. Any substantial increase in weight (e.g., additional armament), and the boat will not rise from the water to take advantage of the “surface effect” design. Hull down, maximum speed is 14 to 16 knots. While a few 50-caliber machine guns are sufficient to halt the average marijuana smuggler, they may not command much respect from a Cuban captain in a 60- meter fast patrol boat.
The Navy may be called upon to hau 30 or 40 tons of material into shallop water against opposition. Or we nug wish to mount out appropriate surface to-surface missiles and electronic suited Although the SES can be designed t°r greater lift parameters, there is a certain inflexibility inherent in the design- n military matters, ability to respond to tn unforeseen is a valuable asset, and one sacrifices it only at the expense of jeopat dizing the future.
As an aid in selecting the proper ves sel, history provides the example of 1 fast patrol craft (PCFs), which werti widely used along the coasts and rivers ° Vietnam. The low cost of acquiring an maintaining these boats enabled the Navy to operate them in the numbers necessaO to inhibit substantially the enemy’s free dom of operations. This is not to i®Pv that they alone did this task, but to P0,n out the contribution of the “Swifts” an similar boats to the effort. The curren version of the PCF is typified by l20-f°° aluminum-hulled crew/supply boats- These have been built by the thousands in the boat yards of Louisiana, and operate in waters around the world. They are a ready being manufactured in suitably large quantities for economies of scale t° be realized, and parts are available aim0* anywhere they might sail. Their capabi ity in rough weather is well known; they can maintain 27 knots in a state four sea- They can be expected to operate unsup' ported for three weeks at a range of 2b miles.
Commercial diesels are available in the United States which will drive the boats at more than 40 knots. A 5,000-horse' power version of the 120-footer 'v’
and 'cnots w‘th 5,000 gallons of fuel, bn i t0nS °P weaPons and supplies on ,, ar ■ the load is increased to 90 tons, am >Wl" St'" make 22 knots. There is k■ ? e ^et'k space for an interesting com- cln‘Jtl°n Harpoon missiles with fire n r°l, a 76-mm. Oto Melara gun, a mni. Emerlec or Phalanx close-in aP°n system, etc. A modular concept combat loading would allow powerful ectronic countermeasures (ECM) and
rieH-tr°k*C- war^arc (EW) suites to be car- c ,’ hchcopter and ASW operations the r 6 suPPortec* by such a platform, or the S pghtly 'ar8er 160-foot version. Like Wo I \ research and development rK,U °e minimal, thus reducing cost and bilit°’’ 1a’*ure- The “window of vulnera- Un /a C0U*C* he quickly closed, and the wht ^tates given flexible tools for a ever struggles may confront us in Coastal/riverine waters.
Pack 6 *33S*C 'a0at—w'th a 40-knot engine ele tW'n 8enerator sets, and suitable Sat' r°n’cs h)r communication and navi- bou10h~^WOU^ cost about $4.5 million, rjl£ ® * individually. Depending on arnta- $6-4! C^0sen- this cost would increase to the 8 mill'on, and with EW, ECM, etc., ou ,PnCe ta® would be even higher. Obvi- such^h Sav'n§s could be made if 12 or 24 boats were ordered at one time, tea Canr|ot be overemphasized that to tj0rP .u,,y the benefits of such an acquisi- bou h *S convenllona^ craft that must be and without substantial modification mai n'ilspec-ing.” The quality and (]emnlCnance of the product have been bo- .°?Strated 'n the market where these a s have been bought and operated. We must not waste our time and resources in search of some elusive, ultimate design in patrol combatants.
The theater viability of the boats can be seen in the narrow waters of the Mediterranean, the Straits of Malacca, the Sea of Japan Straits, and wherever there are restricted waters. A suitably armed squadron of patrol combatants could deny free passage of the Kattegat/Skagerrak to the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The PCFs could impede the use of Soviet Naval Infantry to seize the Kiel Canal, substantially upsetting Moscow’s timetable for an invasion of Western Europe. We would force the Soviets to take valuable time to root out this nuisance, and they might well lose a major combatant or two in the passage. One could envision a modem version of the Battle of the Surigao Straits, with EW and ECM suites added to augment the capacity of the small boats. They would be the aggressive eyes and ears of the fleet, going forward, as only low-cost assets can, to where the risk is highest.
There is a school of thought which believes that the United States can safely allocate such a role to our Scandinavian allies. One problem with this theory is that they may choose not to fight, e.g., Norway will pursue its own interests as the Norwegians interpret them to be. Events might develop so that the Scandinavians would already be controlled by powerful Soviet land forces before the Soviet Baltic Fleet attempted to pass into the Atlantic. Furthermore, one of the best inducements for support by an ally is to be physically with him. If we would like to see the Norwegians meet the threat head-on, and would like the Soviets to worry that much more about their chances of success in such a military adventure, then the best thing to do is to put some U.S. patrol boats alongside those of the Scandinavians.
Let us not squander what may be a limited amount of time in which to arm against small boat contingencies. It is deceptive to believe that because the Navy could acquire such vessels in a 12- month span, that we would necessarily have a year in which to react to the initiatives of our foes. Nicaragua fell in less than 12 months; over a similar period of time, El Salvador could be armed to the teeth by a flow of arms across the Gulf of Fonseca from Nicaragua. The Navy is traditionally a very persuasive weapon, often influencing events solely by its presence. A force of a dozen patrol combatants might be sufficient to deter such a logistics buildup, thereby saving greater effort later.
History clearly shows us the utility of smaller vessels in support of major fleet elements; we can have this small boat capacity at a cost which does not force us to weaken other vital defense projects, and we can have it quickly. For less than $175 million, the Navy could have 24 new patrol combatants by early 1985.
Commander Jacobs graduated from Officer Candidate School in 1968, and served in the USS Forrestal (CV-59). Since 1975, he has served in the U. S. Naval Reserve with Special Boat Unit 22 at New Orleans, and is the unit's executive officer. He is currently a marketing representative for the computer distribution firm of Hollander and Company.
^j^phibious Warfare: Whose Responsibility?
By Captain M. J. Stoffel, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Wav'1 6SS ra(^*ca* changes are made in the
Phib W£ P*an’ mana8e’ ant* man our am- goi 1°US War^are forces, these forces are a8 to remain the Navy’s stepchildren, xh ^ Way of background, three factors be kept in mind:
jnt n Edition to being an area of primary 0Us,cst t0 the Marine Corps, an amphibi-
rnentSSaUB rec)u'res support of all ele- f0 s °f the Navy: surface amphibious finesS' a'r e*ements’ and even subma- WhLh *'1'S 's t'le one naval operation tyj., . Places demands across the board ► D'n t^le Navy and Marine Corps, the es?lte fhis broad involvement—and no ln"erent complexity of command—- phicm8le Point of responsibility for am- tar 10Us warfare exists below the Secre- °f the Navy level, either operation-
pr
ally or at the headquarters level. The current amphibious warfare organization (almost an oxymoron)—see Figure 1 — illustrates the problem. As long as responsibilities for amphibious warfare remain distributed under competitive warfare areas, amphibious requirements will be subordinated.
► Although a primary warfare area, amphibious warfare has suffered by being a low priority within the Navy. Although this was understandable in times of general disinterest and small budgets, recent events have brought about a dramatic reversal in status. The current emphasis on quick response has raised visibility of amphibious warfare at all levels—especially congressional-—and the budget has grown rapidly to multibillion-dollar dimensions. Amphibious warfare is too important and has received too much high-level interest, money, and visibility to continue leaving its management to liaison officers and numerous coordinating committees.
It is difficult to fault the past decisions which have made amphibious warfare absorb a disproportionate share of budget cutting within the Navy. There has been no large-scale opposed assault for 30 years; in the meantime, other elements of the Navy, such as the strategic and attack submarine force and battle group components, have continued at an intense, often harsh, pace of operations. Furthermore, reductions in amphibious warfare capabilities were cheerfully encouraged by many Department of Defense (DoD) pro-
the
no denying that readiness suffers from
lack of the latter. But the poor reading in the fleet primarily is a reflection of1 low priority that amphibious warfare eI\ joys in OpNav, and the reluctance Headquarters, Marine Corps, to max
initiatives to fill gaps left by the NavT 6 p tab
led
fessionals, in keeping with their jaundiced view of amphibious warfare.
The Marine Corps must shoulder its share of the blame as well. After formally documenting lift requirements to the Navy, the Marine Corps has been content to let the Navy grapple with the problem, even though it knows that amphibious warfare is at the bottom of almost everybody’s “in” basket.
Although one can sympathize with past decisions, forthright action is now required to resolve two interrelated problems: the lack of central responsibility and authority, and the consequent absence of comprehensive planning.
Lack of organization and planning has led to gaps and discontinuities in our amphibious warfare posture; some of the more unfortunate examples are worth reviewing.
Image: The Marine Corps (1981) concepts and issues book contains the following statements:
“The Fleet and its Fleet Marine Force constitute this nation’s primary military forces for response to distant crises. The Navy/Marine Corps team constitutes a force with the means to exercise sea control, provide off-shore presence, and to execute power projection and influence .... Fleet Marine Forces embarked in amphibious shipping represent the ultimate in force mobility . . . their [Marine Corps] training, loading, and logistic packaging are aimed at preparing for a single objective—readiness for combat on arrival ....
“This crisis response ability to rapidly combine forward deployed forces, prepositioned/airlift configured
forces, and MAGTFs in amphibious shipping is a capability uniquely Marine in the U. S. defense establishment.”
Supporting statements and positions run throughout the book, and inescapably lead the reader to ask: If this is true, what is the purpose of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)? I suspect that if the Navy/Marine Corps team had been able to present a unified and compact command structure, and strong contingency planning, the RDF would not exist.
Planning: Under the present organization nobody within either the Navy or Marine Corps has day-to-day responsibility for all amphibious warfare programs within their respective service, much less overall responsibility for both services.
Annually, the Marine Corps formally advises the Navy of the surface lift requirement. This is the only formal tasking across the service boundaries. Whatever coordination exists takes place under the Navy/Marine Corps Board and the amphibious warfare coordinating committee, both of which meet periodically.
Many problems referred to in recent articles lamenting the poor posture of our amphibious warfare forces—e.g., mismatch of lift capability, the impact of diversion of amphibious ships to other tasks, the steep-sided ricebowls of the various competing programs—can be laid properly at the doorstep of poor planning. Other examples abound:
► No attempt, until recently, was made to formulate a realistic landing craft (ait cushion) (LCAC) operational concept-
► The Naval Facilities Engineering Command has responsibility for severa crucial programs such as causeways, ship offload, petroleum-oil-lubricant (POL) systems, and the like. Yet a detailed plan laying out how these systems are to be employed or transported to the assau area has yet to be made. For example, the current POL system by itself would oc cupy the capacity of three well decks m the LSD-41 class of dock landing ship5-
► No new LSTs are programmed to re place current ships. How are their curren functions in an assault going to be per formed? How is the assault follow-on echelon, consisting largely of a mix commercial shipping, going to offloaded? Are conventional landing era (i.e., non-LCAC) required?
► And what about medical facilities, th continuing helo/surface mix question,1 changing threat, employment of small assault teams, etc.?
Readiness: The line between reading and planning is not distinct, and there
As expected, consolidation of amp1 ious forces within other surface forces to subordination of the former and, even tually, neglect. The Marine Corps ha questioned—with mixed effect—the o version of amphibious resources to oth uses; such actions would not have g0/1 unchallenged with a dedicated amph'b ous organization. 9
What is needed to correct the problem1' Two changes: .
First, there must be a change in attl tude. The Navy must acknowledge tha amphibious warfare is a primary warta area. This, of course, cannot happe without at least a few flag officers in b1^ lets requiring an amphibious warm ^ background. In this way continuity 0 support, reinforced by tradition, of a1’1 phibious warfare can exist within 1 Navy. Such a development can revers the perception by many in the Navy m amphibious programs are resources to looted and pillaged at will.
The Marine Corps cannot be content t update lift requirements at routine m(tr vals. A continuing dialogue must be es tablished, and the Marine Corps shou act positively to assist and prod the Na / to meet the many management proble" - in the amphibious warfare area.
How can we take advantage of these Un|que resources?
eally, formation of a joint amphibi- W(^|^artare sponsor at the platform level
tunately,
econd, a sensible organization to support amphibious warfare must be struc- red a single person must be responsive and held accountable for amphibious ar are. This means a joint Navy/Marine '“Orps command.
^ traditionally, no matter how piously c/H'fr ’ or8an>zati°n is not based
acte iCienCy' ^ut on a carefid division of fu,;vity *n an attempt (usually unsuccess- im f° avoid the appearance, real or agined, of the subordination of one ca^hf t0 anot^er- Although this is ines- ah i 6 *n most joint commands, there is th S° ,ute*y no need for it to exist between e Navy and Marine Corps. t n^e other services, contacts be- s een Navy and the Marine Corps per- CQnnel occur frequently in the normal tei.UrSe.0^ business. In addition, many inservice friendships exist because of a nimon education and training back- nicf111^ ®ut’ best of all, there is no con- anri *n .rn*ss'on> and personal suspicions ^ antipathies do not exist to any great
seem to be the best course. Unfor- (L. .—y> one must quickly conclude that itie 'S *mPract'cal because of budget reala S" itj general, budget line items for lishP tbious warfare have been estab- Witv and suPPorted over many years q 'n the many Headquarters and Port,aV sPonsors- Unraveling the proper u ,’°ns °f these lines and placing them 0nf*fr a single sponsor at the
P ^/Headquarters level, if possible at ’ Would take years.
that0 a*ternat*ve, which has the virtue est u!could be done quickly, would be to Am ish a j°*nt Navy/Marine Corps jy Pbibious Program Office within the pjy Material Command. Several such pr ®rarn offices already exist, and the tabredUres ^or budget flow are well es- nin 1S^ed and consistent with the Plan- tgjj®’ Programming, and Budgeting Sys- i„ JPPBS). The proposed organization ^bown in Figure 2.
0 ae program office is a management ini ]IZat'on wb*ch can be formed and p P ernented to manage programs of 1 importance or complexity. The ^ st notable example is the Strategic ovf™ Project Office (PM-1), which, du btnny years, has developed and pro- WeC6d P°iaris, Poseidon, and Trident p aP°n systems with great success. The Ji®ram office is administratively an ad- anjCt °f the Chief of Naval Material staff, f0r . e management style varies. PM-1, distance, has a large technical staff and manages efforts directly; others delegate most direct management to the cognizant systems command, thus using a smaller staff limited to planning and coordinating the various efforts.
Applying the proven management and organizational concept of a program office to the amphibious warfare system appears to be a practical, promising solution to the current dilemma. Success could be achieved best if the amphibious warfare program manager were to be given certain powers;
► With across-the-board responsibility for amphibious warfare acquisition, accountable to the Navy/Marine Corps Board, he would be the only individual with day-to-day insight into all amphibious programs. Therefore, he also would inescapably pick up many sponsor-type planning and coordination responsibilities, and frequently be required to make broad amphibious program recommendations to higher levels.
► Under the various individual program sponsors, he must have budget authority over all Navy and Marine Corps development and acquisition programs for amphibious warfare. This will be the hardest pill to swallow, but the most crucial to success. The program manager can plan till hell freezes, but to no avail unless he is given the budget club to make the program mesh.
► Unlike other program offices, which generally work with a single sponsor, the amphibious warfare program manager will have to work with many if he is to take advantage of the existing PPBS lines. Again, he can operate successfully only if he is accountable directly to the Navy/Marine Corps Board, with appeal rights to SecNav. Some stepping on sponsors’ toes must be expected, which implies a requirement for a “three-star” manager to avoid undue buffeting.
An equally important matter is how to staff such an office. Initially, the program manager should be a Marine Corps general, with a Navy deputy. This is a dramatic way of providing an experienced, involved leader in a position where he can correct long-standing problems. This officer could act as a focal point for all amphibious warfare matters.
Staffing is always a problem, but simply removing all of the liaison and coordinating officers from existing billets and placing them in the program office would provide a substantial nucleus.
I do not expect this proposal to be universally admired, but it has not been formulated inside of a vacuum. This proposal is the result of many discussions with interested officers and individuals. Now is the time for further discussion and actions.
Captain Stoffel is a 1954 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. After serving seven years in destroyers and submarines, he became an engineering duty officer. His last tour before retirement in 1980 was as commanding officer of the Naval Electronic Systems Command in Portsmouth, Virginia.