Nuclear Disarmament: Great Game of the 80s

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During the annual meeting in April 1983, the Naval Institute President responded to a question from a member about the nuclear freeze debate then under way in Congress: “We are dealing,” said Admiral James D. Watkins, “with the ‘Soviet Empire,’ a group of people who I guarantee is not debating

the morality of nuclear weapons.”

When Lavrenti Beria was one of only three Soviet leaders to deliver an oration at Stalin’s funeral in 1953, this chief of the secret police was clearly a front-runner to succeed Stalin. But, four months later, he was stripped of all power, arrested, and on 23 December 1953, it was announced that he had been executed. Gilbert and Sullivan were right: “The policeman’s lot is not a happy one.”

But times change. When Brezhnev died almost 30 years later, the first thing the Politburo did was to name as his successor the man who for the previous 15 years had been the head of the KGB, the Soviets’ top cop: Yuri Andropov.

As times change, so do the equations of power within the Kremlin. It now appears that Andropov was elected to the highest office in the Soviet Union, that of General Secretary of the Communist Party, by a new political co­alition inside the Politburo—a coalition strong enough to displace the Party bureaucracy from its traditional policy­making responsibilities.

Conditions in the Soviet Union were ripe for such a change. Experts characterize the Brezhnev regime as one dedicated to the preservation of the domestic status quo. The result was immobility of policy, endless debate to

arrive at consensus, and a general stagnation of lead^e ship. As Brezhnev’s health declined, indecision increase ■ Action on time-sensitive issues was postponed. .

Meanwhile, the Party hierarchy became more d^ete sive, taking advantage of Brezhnev’s last years to cond a rear guard action to protect the privileged position ot bureaucracy. As for the Soviet people, they had long si¹¹ concluded—privately, of course—that the Party was o^e adent, inefficient, and corrupt. Party doctrine, discredit^ since Khrushchev’s 1956 denunciation of Stalin, has much credibility as the emperor who wore no clothe*- Even within the Kremlin, political coalitions are bu around constituencies. In theory, under the commun¹ system, the Politburo has but one constituency, the P^j But there are at least five that are competing for nation resources: the Party, the military-industrial complex* nationwide KGB police, the consumers, and the farmed The Party consists of 17.5 million card-carrying rob­bers and the Party bureaucracy. The latter is made up ^ Party cadre, collectives, local Soviets, and the KomsoU¹ and Young Pioneers. Their total strength comes to so'¹ 51 million.                                                              . .

The military-industrial complex includes the SoV^L armed forces of 4.8 million backed by another five mil'¹

Well

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^as the humble. To the man on the street, it is

kn.

_pl0^ts, and the several million trained workers em- _try ^bY defense production plants throughout the coun- lish ^{6 s}P^ace industry, and the supporting research estab- Sov^^entS' whole complex absorbs 12-14% of the 1*5 gross national product each year. b_er: ⁶ police, Andropov’s constituency, while num- f_ui !!? !^ess than 500,000, is nonetheless politically power- inteli•  *^{S because} it i^s in charge of both internal counter-

£_v '®^ence and external foreign intelligence operations. a_{s w} ^a_l^10re important, it maintains dossiers on the mighty

^enci ^{n 3S} Ministry of Fear. It keeps the other constitu- tn line.

cal|_v\^{COnsumers are} numerically the largest, but politi- tient h ^{6 Wea}^^est constituency. They include all the pa- q_Ueu ^aousewives and husbands who stand in the eternal ^clotly^S °^{r ne}2^0t'^ate in the black market to buy food and a_n(j _f^ln§ ^b)r the family and vodka to deaden the dreariness their ^rUstrati°ⁿ of their existence. In Politburo meetings, they ^needs have received scant attention. Why should sj]_e ^not’ The Soviet people are accustomed to suffering in lce_er,^Ce' P^eriods of shortage, it is assumed they will ^°n tightening their belts. ^s f°r the farmers or peasants, they stand where they have always stood—at the end of the line. They are the poor rural consumers saddled with the task of feeding the nation. They are the most patient of all, stoically enduring the vagaries of the Soviet Union’s weather and the whims of the largest, most inefficient Party bureaucracy, the Ministry of Agriculture.

Among these five constituencies, the military-industrial complex has become a powerful rival of the Party within the Politburo. For some years now, the two have been on opposite sides of the debate over the allocation of re­sources between military and domestic needs. Concerned with the Soviet economy’s alarming decline, the Party has sought to put the brakes on military spending, particularly the armed forces’ costly overseas ventures in places like Cuba and Afghanistan, which have yet to produce any tangible material returns for Mother Russia.

Traditionally, defense has always had priority over other sectors of the Soviet economy. But as the cost of modem weapons escalated and as the United States em­barked on its five-year $1.6 trillion rearmament program, the Soviet armed forces became worried. They could see that, given the deplorable state of the economy, a simple priority might not be enough. What they wanted was a national commitment to match the U. S. buildup regard-

less of cost. This proposal must have provoked many in­conclusive discussions during Brezhnev’s declining years. The result seems to be that the Politburo became increas­ingly polarized between Defense Minister Marshal Dimitri Ustinov, representing the military, and Konstantin Chernenko, representing the Party.

As the internal political struggle over this question grew more intense, it gradually became clear that it was Andropov’s KGB that held the swing vote. When he cast it for the military, the Party threw in the towel. It was Chernenko himself, the senior spokesman for the Party, and the choice of many to be the man to succeed Brezh­nev, who nominated Andropov for the top post of General Secretary. The appointment was then unanimously ap­proved by the Party’s 319-member Central Committee.

These events have important implications for the West. In the first place, the Soviet military has finally come into its own. After 65 years of taking orders from the Party, the military, the most powerful member of the Andropov co­alition, is now in a position to shape policy.

Second, unless the Soviet economy collapses, or the long suffering consumer begins tearing up the pavements to build barricades—both unlikely—the long debated question of Soviet priorities for the 1980s has been settled. Guns won; butter lost. Even if Andropov should pass from the scene for reasons of health or internal Kremlin politics, there is little doubt that resources will continue to be made available to exploit the favorable correlation of forces abroad. Domestic requirements, consumer goods, etc., will have to wait. The Soviet masses will grumble as they always have, but they will be the first to cheer when the world acknowledges the Soviet Union as the mightiest of the superpowers.

Third, the protracted, indecisive Politburo debates that were the hallmark of Brezhnev’s rule by consensus are likely to be a thing of the past. Soviet military journals indicate that the Defense Ministry’s General Staff has al­ready prepared a global strategy based on certain “objec­tive realities.” A mixture of Soviet logic and pragmatism, the strategy is intended to provide a long-term frame of reference for national policy to help expedite the deci­sion-making process. It has four central premises.

►The Soviet numerical preponderance in nuclear weap­ons and total megatonnage has been acknowledged pub­licly by the United States. This fact has created a percep­tion of Soviet strategic supremacy, which provides a dependable deterrent to a U. S. nuclear attack.

►The present strategic advantage is tenuous and unstable. Some unforeseen U. S. technological breakthrough (in space or antiballistic missile defense, for example) could suddenly wipe out the numerical preponderance. There­fore, regardless of cost, the Soviet Union had no choice

but to keep pace with the U. S. arms buildup. . ► The perception of the Soviet Union’s superiority arms is its most important foreign policy resource.

care-

activi-

asset must be exploited fully, but, at the same time fully. Under no circumstances can Soviet military ties be allowed to set in motion a chain of events might lead to unintentional nuclear war.

built

► Thus, an aggressive political action strategy around the skillful handling of the nuclear disarman¹^. issue has the best prospect of enhancing the perception Soviet strategic supremacy while bringing the U.S. tea ament program to a halt.

Sincere, dependable nuclear disarmament is not P°^sS’_a ble in today’s world. The Kremlin recognizes this to fact of life; the West refuses to accept it. But the re^⁵^ are there for all to see—stark, cynical, and as

tangible ^aS

the Berlin Wall. Neither wishful thinking nor

further

Western concessions on the altar of unilateral disarmam® will make them disappear. Let’s examine each of tne ^ First, there is no agreed definition of peace. For West, peace means the renunciation of the use of f°^rce . the settlement of international disputes, noninterference the internal affairs of others, respect for human rights freedom, and an end to the threat or reality of war. ^ The Soviet definition cannot be reconciled with that the West’s. As Moscow sees it, peace and peaceful c°

■ istence are conditions that do not and must not inhibit

continuing worldwide class struggle against capitalism allow them to do so would undermine the doctrinal jus¹ cation for communism and weaken the very foundations the Soviet political system. Brezhnev himself spelled t out as national policy in a speech to the 25th Cornmun Party Congress in 1976. It remains so today.

Second, there is no common goal in arms control neg tiations. The West’s objective is to reduce the burden

tifi-

of

Averell Harriman has been carrying important messages between Moscow and Washington for almost a half century, and when this great public servant visited President Andropov in June 1983, he was felt out about U. S. interest in a possible summit meeting.

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Win ⁿ -^{S nuc}*^ear superiority. If they can achieve this, they S_0v^{gain t}^^le ultimate weapon of coercive diplomacy. The (|_Cst'j^{Cls w}dl then have the capability to shape the political

'ⁿy of the world through nuclear blackmail.

tions^T ^^ere'^{s no} accepted “code of conduct” __________

b|y ,^_n , ^e. West expects the great powers to act responsi-

that^{3lllentS w}^^de maintaining a balance in strategic forces, a r> ^V'I^0U,(1 deter superpower conflict from escalating into ^{3 n}_T^Uc'ear exchange

_ne ^e Soviet objective is different. Their goal in these 11*;              is to create a credible perception of the Soviet

_ConJ^{nd w}hh restraint, to reduce the possibilities of armed l_enCe'^ct ky maintaining conditions of stability and nonvio- conse'_n^an^ ^{t0 ac}^'^eve poetical changes through peaceful

lion*^{16 Conce}Pt °f ^a code of conduct for U.S.-Soviet rela- M_qS was accepted by both Nixon and Brezhnev at the tiah^C0VV ?^ummit °f May 1972. It was subsequently for- ^Sa *^{n 3} I'ttle-kuown “Agreement Between the \y_a ^and the U.S.S.R. on the Prevention of Nuclear do’ ^which entered into force on 22 June 1973. In this o_r ^Unient> each party pledged to “refrain from the threat _oth;^e_tf force against the other Party, against allies of the Whj ', ^arty and against other countries in circumstances As f-      endanger international peace and security.”

lhat ^a[,^aS ^^{est was} concerned, the concept recognized tw_e ^{taere ex}'^{sts a} “linkage,” or direct relationship, be- as _a ° ^{3 nat}’^ons conduct in world affairs and its reliability Partner in nuclear arms reductions. ^calli^^a,n’ ^^ovi^ets disagree. They see such a code as j_s ■ for the maintenance of the status quo. To them, it of „^{St an}°ther “capitalist trick” to justify the suppression 0utl °^mmunist-^{led na}ti°^nal liberation movements and to W₀ ^aw other forms of the class struggle. To use their own °f th^S' '^t.^stands “little practical chance of success in view th_e | objective factors leading to revolutionary changes in ficuli  • ■ • As experience shows, it is very dif-

incf °^{r one s}'^{de t0 s}h°^w restraint when the other side is a_n(j ⁿ to interpret such restraint as weakness which can Thj should be exploited.” (Henry Trofimenko, “The Vj ^r y°rld and the U. S.-Soviet Competition: A Soviet p?' Foreign Affairs, Summer 1981.) t_ive⁰^. since these necessary preconditions for effec- ^reductions in nuclear arsenals simply do not exist, drafting a disarmament treaty becomes an exercise in se­mantics and political warfare. The only way to bridge the unbridgeable gap between the two philosophies is to resort to Orwellian double speak. Treaty provisions must be written so that black can be called white, or white black as may suit the respective purposes of the signatories.

Fifth, until a system of reliable verification has been devised and agreed to by both sides, the Soviet paranoid insistence on a closed society will prevent substantive progress in disarmament.

For more than 30 years, the West has offered open, on-site inspection—a proposal the Soviets have consis­tently rejected. Up to now, the only types of verification the Kremlin will accept are those they cannot prevent. These include such sophisticated techniques as satellite photography, seismic monitoring from stations outside the Soviet bloc, and communications intercepts. In treaty lan­guage, they are called “national technical means.” In an effort to keep the disarmament process alive, the United States has, as a matter of policy, agreed that they provide “adequate verification.”

Sixth, even with such limited detection capabilities, vio­lations have been observed. In such cases, evidence of these attempts to circumvent the SALT I Interim Agree­ment has been put before the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission, a body established by that treaty to “consider questions concerning compliance.”

Commission meetings are held in camera, and their proceedings are classified. Consequently, it was not until former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird revealed in the December 1977 Reader’s Digest that Soviet violations “have increased progressively, in both numbers and seri­ousness” that the U.S. public began to appreciate the na­ture of the problem.

Experience with compliance procedures confirms that without a sincere common interest in peace, disarmament agreements with the Soviets are neither self-enforcing nor enforceable. In fact, the only way to ensure compliance is to be prepared to go to war to stop violations.

Although meaningful nuclear disarmament may not be possible in today’s world, disarmament negotiations are another matter entirely. They provide an ideal interna­tional arena for the new leadership in Moscow to do battle for their two highest priority political objectives: to con­vince the world that the Soviet Union is the most powerful superpower and to bring the U.S. rearmament program to a halt.

Thus, for the Soviets, nuclear disarmament negotiations have become the Great Game of the ’80s—a fascinating political warfare contest played for the highest stakes. The object is not to reduce nuclear arsenals (especially theirs), but to influence international perceptions of power.

Assured Survival: An End to MADness__________

President Ronald Reagan’s 23 March speech on                    than 80% supported his decision to eliminate “the

72

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short

aean-

pub'

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ation

. En-

tt anted by oversimple capsulized solutions, the result of ^eir efforts is to create dangerous political pressures for ^m^re unilateral disarmament.

fnree slogans that have received the Kremlin’s seal of approval are playing havoc with the Reagan Administra- •°n s efforts to negotiate dependable arms reduction agreements. They are effective because they offer a tempt- ^mg booby-trapped solution to a complex problem. They ^are best answered by a counter-slogan. Examine them carefully.

first-use of nuclear weapons: Endorsed by a distin­guished quartet (McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Rob­ert McNamara, and Gerard Smith) who should know bet- ^er, this would deprive the West of its sturdy shield of ^nuclear deterrence; it would take away NATO’s option to augment its inadequate conventional forces with nuclear uepower if forced to do so in self-defense. Should it be­come policy, the Soviets might logically assume that the West acknowledges their superiority in strategic nuclear forces and concedes it can no longer actively oppose the Politburo’s efforts to expand the Soviet empire. The net effect would be to increase the risk of war. Counter-slo­gan: “No first-use of aggression.”

Ratify SALT II: Since both the United States and the Soviets have announced they are abiding by the terms of SALT II, many ask, “Why not ratify it?” This question overlooks the fact that after careful analysis, the Reagan Administration made the determination that the treaty was “fundamentally flawed.” It limits only launchers, not numbers of missiles. This ignores the Soviet “cold launch” capability, which permits them to reload their launchers, thus making launcher numbers irrelevant. It al­lows them to retain their 300 multi-megaton missiles. Nei­ther the long-range Soviet SS-20 mobile launchers nor

By Brigadier General Edwin F. Black, U. S. Army (Retired)

As permitted under the treaty, a large ABM complex as been installed around Moscow. It is equipped with ,^e X-3 phased-array radar and the most modern ver- ^S|on of the high-altitude SA-5 intercept missile. The '''hole system is fully manned and on constant alert. In ''> our intelligence services became aware of Soviet P ^forts to build a high-technology, particle beam de- ^ense. This and other related ABM programs have high Priority and cost the Soviet Union an estimated $3 to billion a year.

. Expensive though these programs may be, the real- ‘^s‘^s *ⁿ the Politburo recognize they have no choice.

. though the Soviet Union has an ABM Treaty with ^e United States, it has no similar bilateral agreement ^Wlth the People’s Republic of China. Despite its many economic and social problems, China began its own strategic weapons program in 1964, with no disarma­ment constraints.

In 1980, Peking gave the world a glimpse of its progress. In May 1980, China announced the successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Fired to a range of about 7,000 kilometers, it carried a dummy warhead large enough for a thermonuclear weapon of five megatons. In early October 1982, the Chinese tested a 2,500 kilometer-range intermediate range ballistic missile. Then on 16 October, they con­ducted a high-altitude atmospheric test of a four-mega­ton warhead. Its fallout was measured as far away as Canada. China has an ever-growing capability to launch multimegaton intercontinental nuclear strikes. The So­viet Union simply cannot afford to neglect its missile defenses in view of the increasing capabilities of Chi­na’s strategic offensive forces.

The United States has continued to rely on the doc­trine of mutual assured destruction for security. The MAD concept starts from the premise that nuclear war is unthinkable because it would destroy civilization. Given a world with two opposing superpowers, both armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, it seeks to maintain a “balance of terror” as the best guarantee against nuclear conflict. This balance would be achieved by negotiating a condition of nuclear parity where both sides are convinced that, regardless which one launched the initial attack, the victim could absorb this attack and still retaliate, inflicting intolerable

Calling for a defense against Soviet ballistic missiles during his 23 March national address, President Reagan used aerial photos showing Soviet-built aircraft at a western Cuban airfield to support his request.

their supersonic, refuelable “Backfire” bombers are counted. And finally, verification remains limited to “na­tional technical means,” which have proved inadequate. Counter-slogan: “Better a dead treaty than a red treaty.” Nuclear Freeze: Considering the size of U. S. and So­viet nuclear stockpiles today, this is, at first glance, a tempting idea. But as President Reagan pointed out in his 31 March 1983 arms control speech, freeze proposals do more harm than good. Specifically, they would:

►  “Preserve today’s high, unequal, and unstable levels of nuclear forces and, by so doing, reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate for real reductions”

► “Pull the rug out from under our negotiators in Geneva. Why should the Soviets negotiate if they’ve already achieved a freeze in a position of advantage to them?”

►  “Raise enormously complicated problems of what is to be frozen, how it is to be achieved, and, most of all, verified”

► Put political pressure on the United States, but not on the Soviet Union.

►  “Reward the Soviets for their 15-year buildup while locking us into our existing equipment, which in many cases is obsolete and badly in need of modernization

The Soviets have never accepted the McNamara con­cept of “nuclear sufficiency.” To them, numbers of weapons in their stockpile create the perception of strate­gic superiority they are trying so hard to achieve. Even it a freeze were agreed to, there would be no way to verify it without on-site inspection. Counter-slogan: “Nuclear thaw; not nuclear freeze.”

All of these proposals to reduce the possibility of nu­clear war have been subsumed in the widely publicized draft pastoral letter to 51 million Roman Catholic faithful- God knows, the world needs all the help it can get to find its way to true nuclear disarmament. But He also knows

damage on the other. The mutuality of this assured de­struction was ensured by an ABM treaty whereby both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed not to build nationwide defenses against incoming missiles.

This doctrine was formalized in 1972 when President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the “Moscow peace package.” This consisted of three documents: the SALT I Interim Agreement, a statement of “general principles of mutual relations between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.,” sometimes re­ferred to as the Charter for Detente, and the ABM Treaty. The first expired in 1977, and the second has never been observed by the Soviets. But the ABM Treaty, being of indefinite duration, remains in effect to perpetuate the present “balance of terror” for as long as possible.

The United States has entered into many treaties since it became a nation—treaties to define borders, to facilitate trade and commerce, to promote the peaceful exploration of outer space, to limit armaments, and to end wars. But in August 1972, the Senate for the first time gave its consent to a treaty with an adversary state that pledged not to defend the American people.

Three years later, as if to underline its point, Con­gress cut off funds for our only ABM installation. Au­thorized by the treaty, it was built near Grand Forks, North Dakota, to protect our Minuteman ICBMs lo­cated in that area. This was done against the recom­mendation of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Department of Defense, and the White House. Never­theless, only three weeks after this multibillion dollar missile defense facility had been completed, and even before the technicians could gain any practical experi­ence from its operation, it was closed. Thus, incoming ballistic missiles—whether fired by the Soviet Union, China, or some other nuclear-capable state, or even if fired by accident—will have a “free ride” into the undefended targets of the United States.

Even though the ABM Treaty is of “unlimited dura­tion,” it contains, like all good legal documents, an article allowing either signatory to withdraw if it de­cides that “extraordinary events” related to the strate­gic balance between the two powers “have jeopardized its supreme interests.” To clarify this phrase and to emphasize the necessity for progress in disarmament, the U. S. negotiating team appended to both the SALT I Interim Agreement and to the ABM Treaty a unilateral statement identifying two specific develop­ments that would justify U. S. withdrawal. They are: (1) the failure to reach agreement “for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations within five years,’ and (2) the failure of such negotiations “to reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our re­spective strategic retaliatory forces.”

Regarding the first point, the specified five years expired in 1977. As for the second point, the progress in arms control negotiations has been, if anything, neg­ative. In 1974, two years after the SALT I agreement was signed, then-Secretary of Defense James Schles- inger warned that the Soviet Union was actively build­ing an offensive strategic force that could soon launch the equivalent of 7,000 one- to two-megaton warheads against the United States. This, he emphasized, would give the Soviets “a major, one-sided counter-force (i.e., first strike) capability.”

In 1980, when Harold Brown was the Defense Sec­retary, he released the results of Pentagon war games, which showed that a successful Soviet surprise attack could “destroy 90% or more of our ICBM warheads.” Moreover, the Soviets could do this and still retain enough weapons to destroy our major cities and the bulk of our population if we decided to follow the MAD doctrine and retaliate after the initial Soviet as­sault. According to the London Economist (16 August

^at His bishops are able to talk to only half the world ^°ⁿgregation, the free half. Unfortunately, there is no ^atnoIic constituency in the Soviet Union capable of influ-

encing Politburo decisions.

The bishops are correct in trying to stimulate greater efforts to curb the arms race, but they are wrong in imply-