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We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our “Nobody asked me, but ...” column.
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $60.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest.
Proceedings / September
Logistician: Linchpin or Luxury?
For the line officer, assignment to a logistics billet is the kiss of death. It’s an area to which “comers” are seldom assigned and it’s not a job volunteered for unless one is bent on retirement. Some look upon it as time spent in the penalty box!
Yet, logistics is certainly the linchpin of success in combat situations. This vital lesson is relearned in every war. Regretfully, it is quickly forgotten during peace as we are immersed in the development and procurement of new and exotic weapon systems. We valiantly fight for procurement funds at the budget table, yet ignore Navy operation and maintenance budget lines, which are seldom able to support missiles or ammo that exceed an extremely short war’s requirement.
We have failed to emphasize the indispensable role of the logistics-oriented line officer during war and especially in peacetime, when winning resources are built.
Does the Navy have an identifiable professional logistician? Some say yes, it is the supply officer, the all-knowing, all-responsive tactical commander’s burden bearer. Others argue that the responsibility is split between the supply and the engineering duty officers, while others would cavil if the Civil
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Engineer Corps’ specialist was excluded. Chaplains and lawyers plus limited duty officers would then have reason to feel slighted since they, together with medical, dental, and medical service officers, also contribute to the logistics equation.
The man empowered to spend his career learning how to evaluate requirements, establish priorities, discipline, encourage, correct, train—in short, lead—is the unrestricted line officer. And so it is in logistics. The logistician must be an unrestricted line officer, a person who may not be acquainted with the detail paperwork supply officers have long prided themselves in, but one who knows where this important factor fits in the logistics equation. He must be one who understands maintenance and repair because as an operator he recognizes how vital readiness in all systems can be at the moment of engagement, one who understands the essential morale role the chaplain plays and the necessary contribution the barrister, dentist, doctor, etc., play. Since he is the one who is ordained to command in battle, he, better than anyone else, knows what is needful, and he knows also the disastrous consequences of being inadequate in any factor of the equation.
We spend much time and effort training ship, squadron, and battle group commanders; why then, if logistics is indeed critical to victory, don’t we invest at least a portion of the effort we spend developing combat leaders on our future logistics leaders? Why do we perpetuate such a lack of understanding on the part of our line community about the value of logistics?
Some might argue that as we train the combat commander we are training the logistician. There is no disputing this fact; without command experience, a logistician is as ineffective as a whale stranded on high ground at low tide.
The issue remains, regardless of how effective a command specialist the unrestricted line officer may be, until he has done tours in the logistic slots on
r
fleet/force, type command, or Office o the Chief of Naval Operations staffs, he lacks understanding of “the system” and how it must be played in order to make it work. There he learns about budgets, selling Congress, defending spares and ordnance levels against warfare barons who are pushing for the maximum number of hulls and fuselages, and the latest state-of-the-art weapon systems—those tangible imple' ments of war which represent capabH’O during peacetime—but which fall short without fuel, rounds, or spares during war.
He must learn that having oil avail' able in the continental limits of the United States is not the same as having it in the Sea of Japan or Indian Ocean- He must learn the prepositioning of material configured to unit sets in Europe is just pig iron and plastic if y°u have no runways on which to land the combat troops. He must also understand that having a research and devel' opment end item in the budget is not quite as formidable as having it on board ship, in the submarine’s missile tube, or tucked under the wing of a supersonic jet. These are the facts of life staff logistics duty teaches.
Most unrestricted line officers perceive, and we do little to dissuade this perception, that assignments to logistlC-s billets—say, Op 04 (Logistics); Log'S' tics, Pacific (LogPac); or Service Force, Atlantic or Pacific fleet—are the kiss of death. Translated into promotin'1 parlance, it means you are a substantia “staff type” with little career potential- The “comers” are assigned to 01 (Manpower, Personnel, and Training). 02 (Submarine Warfare), 03 (Surface Warfare), 05 (Air Warfare), and 06 (Plans, Policy, and Operations), where the leadership is concentrated.
Regretfully, many of the essential elements of logistics are parochially reserved in the vitals of the warfare barons, stipulating that they are much too important to be left to the bean counters in 04 or the Defense Logistu^ Agency (DLA). Note the percentage o
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community averages only a
" hu of its joint DLA billets!
Eareer military personnel who pos- css the motivational steam to get lngs done, in view of the real and Wceived lack of promotional potential, 1 normally avoid logistics billets, csultingly, those assigned to logistics ^ en *ack the drive to do little other an plan their post-service careers, and is r ^'S term>nal tour mind-set, there title a leader can do to motivate them.
The ‘break out thinkers’
who could
do
me officers assigned to the 04 and A organizations who retire from that
theT'03' t0Ur Equally s'8n'^cant *s as so much to sell logistics as a vital de ^ of winning wars are elsewhere veloping tactics, new weapon sys- UikT' ,an(f fighting to sell the Navy’s fir ,6rlable importance as our nation’s ?hne of defense to Congress, hat a desperate and unprofessional c m.e °f chance we play when we send ter battle groups to the Indian ^ean knowing full well they have lit- bi|**°nd or third strike logistic capa- j 1 y’ or Plan for a Rapid Deployment >nt Task Force (RDJTF) with insuffi- tecL1 seahfi to support it. With current n°l°gy, it is high time we create a total force concept which includes adequate logistics to assure not only survival, but supremacy at sea, and support for forces ashore for which we have mission responsibility.
As a step toward solving this logistics dilemma, assign a fair share of the “comers” to logistics organizations— Op 04, Op 40 (Logistics Plans Division), Military Sealift Command, DLA, LogPac, and Service Forces, Atlantic and Sixth fleets, with the assurance that these are not dead-end assignments. Ensure they get the specialized postgraduate training required to use the computer and manufacturing technology so vital to a logistics organization.
Stress the need for cost-effectiveness and productivity in the area of acquisition, training, shipbuilding, maintenance, and repair.
Create career paths for line officers which include logistic tours equal to operational assignments in order to give future Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs), and fleet and type commanders the respect for the essentiality of logistics. Promotability must be a part of this package.
If Op 04 is to be the Navy’s top logistician, give him those elements which will cause his warfare peers to deal with him as a powerful equal. A total package approach would do wonders to reduce waste and arbitrate inequities by the man who must live with the results—the CNO!
Finally, this total career package must be protected at budget time.
While the Chief of Naval Material reigns over an empire of details, he is not in the best position to be the CNO’s logistician. He is the super “den daddy” to the various warfare community program managers, but Op 04 should be the shepherd who articulates requirements and the priorities thereof.
We have survived previous conflicts by virtue of our island insularity and ability to mobilize an industrial base which has not been subjected to devastation or harassment by enemy bombs and missiles. We may not be so fortunate in future confrontations.
A sound logistics base can provide the vital foundation for such essential principles of survival in a world divided. It needs adequately trained, motivated, and respected line officers experienced in logistics to create and manage this effort. They indeed are linchpins, not luxuries.
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