Leadership Forum: The Critical Link: Junior Officers and Strategic Thought

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Second Honorable Mention:

Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest

The Critical Link: Junior Officers and Strategic Thought

By Lieutenant Terry C. Pierce, U. S. Navy

great deal of expertise, and strategy thinking is one of the most important if' tellectual ingredients of this skill. , Strategic thinking is a complex art an science involving the study of politic® goals and the means to achieve them-

that

war and society is such a close one,

There is no substitute for the experience one gains at sea. However, if this were coupled with exposure to strategic think­ing, it would have more meaning.

The junior officer is the critical link in the Navy’s efforts to develop strategic thought in the art of war. This does not mean that he should be the product of an elaborate educational process which creates strategic planners. Rather, he should have an adequate “exposure” to strategic thinking. The typical training program for a junior officer does not place enough emphasis on this vital as­pect of professional development. Cor­recting this deficiency ought to be a major priority.

Strategic thought is a skill that every professional naval officer should con­sciously develop. Morris Janowitz de­fined military professionalism in The Professional Soldier: A Social and Politi­cal Portrait (Free Press, 1960): “a pro­fessional, as a result of prolonged train­ing, acquires a skill which enables him to render specialized service. . . . Profes­sionalism is a concept which implies an element of desired behavior.” Janowitz goes on to say, “It is not enough for the civilian population to recognize its de­pendence on the military profession.” The civilian community has the right to expect the naval officers they support and trust to be professionals. Naval officers are assumed to be skilled in the art of war. This military function requires a also includes the study of all means protecting the nation whether by negoti®' tion, propaganda, economics, or mili^tar> force. Finally, strategic thinking is coⁿ cemed with the political, economic, ^an cultural restraints of achieving politic³ and military objectives. In a 1955 addre^sS at the Naval War College, Professor Got' don B. Turner stated, “Military affa^irS and civil affairs are so intimately ^en' meshed, indeed the relationship between

132

Proceedings / September

1983

to think of war solely in terms of its mil¹' tary aspects is not only misleading b® may lead to dangerous miscalculations- The Navy is often charged with no training its officers to become strategy thinkers. Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, a ^se' nior fellow at the Center for Strategic an International Studies, Georgetown U^nl' versity, believes that much of the U- ^ failure to achieve a successful result fr°^nl its armed forces (e.g., Vietnam and th<- abortive Iranian hostage rescue attempt is because of deficiencies in strategy thought and action. In his article “Should Naval Officers be Strategists?” (P^r0’ ceedings, January 1982), Berend D- Bruins states, “The need for strategists- then, is a real one. But do they have to be uniformed?” The current officer corps is highly trained and specialized in numef' ous disciplines, except one—strategy thinking. Commander Thomas Bum writes in “The Education of a Warrior {Proceedings, January 1981) that ”°^ur officer corps could well become a group of highly skilled technicians who by d^e' fault are forfeiting the destiny of th^e Navy to others who will do their thinking

'^Ufe for ^Forti

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°^r them.” Captain John E. Lacouture » °^mrr|cnt and Discussion, Proceedings, une 1981) echoes Buell’s arguments ^^en he states, “the officer corps is ^Undantly provided with highly compe- ^{ent en}gineers and scientists and with many skilled managers in all fields. Only ^ne field is missing: competence in the art of war.”

to ⁱ\^nava^ °ft '^ccr cannot think of aspiring ° the peak of his profession without a astery of the substantive, methodologi- th' V^{and att}*tndinal aspects of strategic s'.fhtg. Substantive deals with essential j-. ^{s suc}h as geographical, military, po- **cal, economic, and cultural knowl- ge. Methodological is a heuristic enter- P^r>se which is the essence of the art of ^tategic analysis. Albert Clarkson, in ovvard Effective Strategic Analysis: New Pp ications of Information Technology twestview Press, 1981), writes, “Strate- ■^Ic analysis seeks to anticipate foreign ^nations that will critically influence a ion; to envision conditions which will cisively affect an economy or an indus- i ^to grasp the likely consequences of rrent policies of a government. . . and th_e^reconn°it^er the future.” Attitudinal is of ^{fd s}y^nth^esi^zing, requiring a sense ■story and a tolerance of cultural di- inui^ty ^^htudinal skill is basically the j ^{e ec}tual cornerstone of strategic think- j A lack of these skills causes a break- ⁿ m the transmission and receiving _n °^^ess between officers. Chester Bar­g ^r > in his book The Functions of the 19fiS^W!Ve iH^arvar(l University Press,

.   °). sums up this problem by explain-

_e ° ^ttlat the executive has many experi- es which he cannot communicate be- _s, ^Se he lacks a general theoretical th' ?^{Ure to or}g^ani^ze them. Strategic •nking serves as the theoretical struc- the professional naval officer, unately, our senior naval leaders se v ^recoSⁿi^/ecl this problem and are inf ^to incorporate it into their own E ectual inventories, early exposure is an essential require- ₍L.ⁿ* l°^r the development of strategic nking. Corrective measures have been '^rected at the mid- and senior-level _a ^Val officers. These new efforts include ^ greater involvement of the Naval War *^ege, which has instituted new pro- ^^ams i_n strategic studies. Attendance ^s already increased for selected post- ^tommand officers.

he Navy’s strategic thinking reform _n-^easures do not include training its ju- .^r officers, because it is assumed that ^ls need will be satisfied at a mid-career

Point.

^Almost all junior officers believe that current career patterns are sufficient

to prepare them to become effective se­nior leaders. During much of a junior of­ficer’s career, his qualities of leadership are measured by how well the officer and his division perform. His skill in giving direction and generating motivation is all-important. The Navy has instituted various programs such as Leadership, Management Education, and Training (LMET) to develop these operational skills. In addition, numerous schools and mobile training units teach and develop basic and advanced tactical skills, e.g., the Surface Warfare School which offers a tactical action officer course for surface warfare department heads.

These avenues are so important that all junior officers must master them to be successful. There is no substitute for the experience one gains when applying these skills in an operating environment at sea. However, if this were coupled with exposure to strategic thinking, it would have even more meaning.

Many believe that the responsibility for strategy rests with senior officers and ci­vilian executives who deal with the use of military power. Once these elites deter­mine a strategy, it is up to subordinate officers to ensure the plans are fulfilled, since the junior officer is not yet at the planning end of things.

Also, some say that the need for train­ing junior officers in the area of strategic thinking is unnecessary because the Navy’s need will be taken care of at the mid-career point at the Naval War Col­lege. But, because the intellectual devel­opment involved in synthesizing the complexities of strategic thinking takes a long time and because it is advantageous to have junior officers who appreciate the implications of the broad strategic pic­ture, this argument is invalid.

Strategic thinking cannot be taught in a “six-week period” because the many vital prerequisites to this intellectual en­deavor must first be met. One such pre­requisite—a solid background in military history—is a never-ending process. Much more difficult concepts, such as defining success or victory in a limited war, are very real and important ques­tions that senior military leaders must answer. These questions make up a large part of the curriculum at institutions such as the Naval War College. But junior of­ficers who have already begun their stra­tegic studies before attending the War College will be in a better position to concentrate on strategic issues if they are ready to cope with matters of substance.

If the junior officer is not exposed to strategic thinking before mid-career, his development as a professional may be limited. In addition to creating a higher level of professionalism, early exposure to strategic concepts can provide the ju­nior officer with an intellectual frame­work that can help him better understand the importance of his early career experi­ences. Carl von Clausewitz clearly per­ceived strategy as the critical link be­tween war and peacetime policy. Naval officers must be constantly aware that war and the training for war must be waged to obtain a particular aim, not for its own sake. Junior officers in particular should start as soon as possible to study the relationship between tactics and strat­egy. It is grossly inadequate for junior officers to limit their vision to the tactics they are taught to execute.

Understanding strategic thinking will give the junior officer the intellectual courage to look beyond the present. Stra­tegic thought is the compass that guides all tactics and operations. A junior officer not well grounded in strategic thinking will have a greater propensity for em­ploying tactical concepts that might not serve the overall strategic ends which could be harmful to our national interest. For example, officers who deal with the Soviet threat must have a knowledge of strategic thinking so they can understand and predict Soviet tactics. A junior offi­cer has to cope with the Soviets on a very real basis. He may encounter a single Soviet unit on a tactical operation which may seem baffling. Realizing that strate­gic calculus structures every tactical op­eration, he may more quickly perceive what the Soviets are up to if he has a rea­sonable appreciation of the strategy un­derlying their tactics. Without this appre­ciation, he may make the critical mistake many officers make in mirror-imaging their own operational and tactical leader­ship views onto their Soviet counterparts.

A junior officer with an appreciation of strategic thought will understand the im­portance of including in his thoughts the cultures of the two countries. Many ju­nior officers ignore the cultural differ­ences between the United States and the Soviet Union and miss the connection between Soviet military strategy and doc­trine. By examining the cultures, he is better able to understand the differences in military terms, objectives, and meth­ods which make each country’s strategy unique. Since understanding a new cul­ture is a rather long process, the process should start at the junior officer level.

Strategic thinking is the common de­nominator that links all branches of the Navy. It is a strong bond between junior and senior officers. The sooner the junior officer is introduced to this art, and the deeper he probes its depths, the better for him and his profession.