Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

Reorganization of the U. S. Armed Forces FFG-7s: Square Pegs?

The Return of Tactical Thought You Must Be Yourselves Cruisers and Destroyers: Losing Out In Defense of the Homeland The Flying Frigates

Military Retirement Pay: A Time of Crises The Unique Hardships of Sea Duty My Dear Canada Leadership Again?

A Matter of Principle An Old-Fashioned Modern War The Odyssey of a Skyhawk Pilot EUUA

The Malvinas Campaign Ride With the Seas Their Carrier Battle Group A Little Bit of Reality Space Race

Iowa vs. Yamalo: The Ultimate Gunnery Duel

Sealift

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

“Reorganization of the U. S.

Armed Forces”

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 68-75, January 1983;

A. J. Walter, p. 26, March 1983; P. R. Schratz,

May 1983 Proceedings)

Captain Kenneth H. Wieschhojf, U. S. Navy—I read Commander Byron’s arti­cle with some consternation because I had a similar article getting ready for the typewriter, but my thoughts would have added little to the author’s erudite compi­lation of arguments. In view of former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General David Jones’s, quite explicit comments on the need to reorganize the armed forces and, inter alia, a recent Newsweek article enumerating perceived shortcomings deriving from interservice rivalry, it is becoming apparent that the ideas expressed in the article are unlikely to go away. Further, the absence of any thought-provoking pieces refuting the article’s conceptual premise leads your readership to the conclusion that the entire problem, although valid, is too hot to handle, and that the services would prefer to leave sleeping dogs lie for paro­chial reasons. From the naval side, the Air Force’s recent proposal to establish the Joint Aerospace Command and the follow-on naval proposal to centralize its space activities only reinforce the conclu­sion that the services are eager to pre­serve the status quo and fight rear-guard actions to forestall unwelcomed initia­tives. For those of us who work beyond the Pentagon sanctum, the silence fol­lowing General Jones’s suggestions has been deafening. And his thoughts were substantially more conservative than those of Commander Byron.

The requirements of modem warfare have precipitated or crystalized a sub­stantial overlap in service responsibili­ties; the Vietnam experience demon­strated that this was most obvious in the air control and airspace management area. Yet, doubtless, the strategic weap­ons and transportation areas, inter alia, are equally rife with service conflict.

General Walter’s somewhat emotive comment suggested that Commander Byron undertake a joint assignment to leam how the services can and do cooper­ate. I am afraid that from such duty he would leam equally well how they won ■

If Congress picks up on this need ° reorganize and forces the services acquiesce, the results may well be su stantially different from those ^w"^lC would derive from willing service partici pation in the debate, and the compr° mises which would ensue.

Although I could be persuaded that t e Canadian uniservice approach is not a inappropriate way of providing maxirn^urn defense for the service dollar, I am vinced that the four services need actively pursue the debate. Prefera Y they should do it in the public forum, determine, for the next decade at least, our current independent service appro³ is the best compromise or to initiate steps needed to form a strong j⁰¹” approach where the lead is taken in 1 joint arena on all military matters and t services are truly subservient to the JC • I applaud Commander Byron’s article a most timely and a conceptually soun strawman for the debate.

“FFG-7s: Square Pegs?”

(See B. R. Linder, pp. 38-43, June 1983 Proceedings)

⁶‘The Return of Tactical Thought”

CSee R.C. Powers, pp. 21-27, June 1983; N- Brown, R.R. Harris, p. 24, August 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Thomas S ■ Sh^ U. S. Naval Reserve—Can it possibly e that the Navy has built 50 ships withou knowing precisely what it is going to do with them? Can our Navy’s long-rang® weapon system planning be so poor tha “frigates [which] will account for almos 30% of U. S. surface combatants Y 1990” will be difficult to integrate in^t0 our existing force structure?

In the post-Vietnam years, under R^e publican and Democratic administra tions, military procurement has not a ways had first priority in the federa budget. Resources have been scarce- Civilian corporations frequently estabbs long-range planning sections to achie^ve the effective allocation of scarce ^re' sources with the least possible waste ⁰ precious assets. Success or failure ^lS gauged by such ephemeral measures as

1983

often at odds in our military service the one hand, you as lieutenants

On will be troops have

stock prices and return on investment. Poor performance in long-range planning for corporations results in financial losses or changes in management.

The consequences of inadequate or ineffective long-range planning for mili­tary forces are more drastic. Poorly inte­grated force structures result in ineffec­tive combat operations and loss of life or sovereignty in the most extreme case.

An example of ineffective planning was the lack of airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft on the British side in the Falklands Conflict. Royal Navy planners evidently failed to take into account one of the missions evident in the force struc­ture and the geopolitical environment of Great Britain, resulting in the needless loss of men and material which put the entire operation’s success at risk.

There is no substitute for effective long-range planning. With evermore rapid changes in all types of technology, even more attention must be paid to the effective integration of different genera­tions of technology and combat capability in the Navy force structure. It is signifi­cant that Captain Powers’s article should appear several pages before Commander Linder’s. Unless the tactical implications of the mix of forces and technologies in the fleet are thought out years in advance of the arrival of various units to active duty, our officers will constantly be try­ing to make do with less than appropriate weapons.

No civilian corporation faces as much of a challenge of transformation or adap­tation of capital assets and personnel as our armed forces. Thus, it is even more important that the Navy has effective planning and superior management of plan implementation. No other navy in the world has the intellectual resources available to the U. S. Navy, either on or off budget. I only hope the next time Commander Linder asks his questions that the ships are not already a part of the fleet.

“You Must Be Yourselves”

(See J. Lehman, pp. 73-74, August 1983

Proceedings)

James H. Webb, Jr.—Secretary Lehman and I shared an honor this year: the opportunity to address the military offi­cers of tomorrow. I enjoyed Secretary Lehman’s remarks to the Naval Acade­my’s graduating class. I was encouraged to share with Proceedings’ readers my remarks to the West Point Class of ’83 at the 100th Night Banquet:

In a hundred days you will all shed the gray clothes of your youth and put on the Army green. I don’t need to embellish that significance; it will be the most dramatic transformation you will ever undergo. In A Sense of Honor (Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1981), I wrote several times about the Academy being “the womb of one’s adulthood,” and I can think of no better analogy. Your commissioning will be a form of birth, an entrance into the full accountability that goes with military command. This total responsibility for the performance and well-being of other human beings is unique in our society. It’s a scaiy thing in one sense, and an unmatchable reward in another. Since leaving the Marine Corps, I have worked in several professions—law, politics, academia, writing-—but none of those changes approached the drama or the completeness of my becoming an officer after spending four years in intense and often agonizing preparation.

What does it mean to be a lieutenant? What is so special about it that I can say with a straight and earnest face that there is no more important responsibility in this country for anyone of your age? Consider first where you will be in the structure of things. Everyone above you is officer. Everyone below you is enlisted. The higher up you go, the more you will deal with policy and theory. The further down you explore, the more you will see nuts and bolts, rubber meeting the road, the

implements of policy and theory.

This of itself makes you the linchpj of the military service. You will be connective device that locks together idealistic and the realistic, which ^are „

1983

the closest representatives to your of the grander values which you embraced at West Point: the i3jl^a^^srn service; the notions of Duty, H°ⁿ ’ Country; the importance of principle belief in a free society. On the ^ot ^’i- will be your job—indeed, y°^{ur w}. existence—to motivate and direct l viduals who are quite often more c cemed about their next paycheck they are about the next war. You wi required to transmit these values, ¹⁰ the very symbol of them, and at the ^sa time to develop a rapport with P^e " who may never have considered j You must, through personal example the instrument by which your tro become educated toward high princip It will be your responsibility to mak® ^ reasons for service come alive, wni the same time demonstrating that yo^u ^ a person who can empathize wit*¹ day-to-day problems of the soldiers y lead. You must understand General ^ von Clausewitz. You must understa

President Ronald Reagan. You must also understand the job of every single person under your command, for if you don’t, you will not be respected, and if you are not respected, you cannot lead.

There is something else you must understand, an intangible that cannot come from a textbook: the chemistry of human motivation. We are a multicultural society, and nowhere else do our differ­ences become more clear than when people from all the different elements come together in a barracks. At the same time, I know of few places where those differences can be so successfully over­come than in a well-led unit. How do you lead soldiers who come from all segments of our society, and who often have con­flicting views of what it means to be an American? You do it first by understand­ing each of them. You must study their personal histories. You must assert your­self onto your command in a way that creates a personal relationship with each of them. You do it second by creating a military environment which insists on the overriding importance of the mission you are performing as a unit, and by making each soldier an equal participant in that mission. Some you must allow to be equal. Others you must demand to give an equal measure.

These distinctions are the essence of leadership, for a military officer is more than a boss, in the civilian sense. He is a commander. This makes him tutor, comrade, and judge. This is what Napo­leon Bonaparte meant when he said that “the General’s reward is not a bigger tent, but command.” You have earned a position of trust that cannot be duplicated in civilian society. To me, that is the special importance of a military salute. Each time you render one, or return one, you are celebrating the uniqueness of your calling.

All of this might sound like an awe­some task to those who are not familiar with your training regimens, but I know that the overwhelming majority of you are more than ready. You have spent four years not only studying theory and abstract principles, as with most of your contemporaries in traditional colleges, but their application as well. Few others in your age group have had to apply knowledge gained in the classroom. Few others have had to deal with the situa­tional ethics brought on by the military structure of the Corps of Cadets, and by the demands of the Honor Code. Few others will have gained the insight into themselves and into this country that you will experience almost routinely by coun­seling recalcitrant soldiers about du y> and motivating them to reach beyon themselves toward a greater good.

So let others study law and business 1 their youth. You have a whole lifet^¹¹ for that. Knowledge, facts, and C ures—things—can be learned and ⁰ gotten and relearned and unlearned W eternity. But values are learned early- sharpened through conflict. This is w you are doing. This is why your expe ^ ences at West Point and as officers wi carry you wherever you wish them to * you.

The widest horizons of technology. FROM THE HEART OF MAN TO THE HEART OF SPACE.

But there is a catch, and I will lea' you with this, because I believe it is most important rule of life. You nu|^ never, ever abandon your values, first question you should always ^consj_w0 in any controversy, whether it is soldiers fighting in the barracks or 10. Iranians asking for your head on a P ’ is this: What is the principle involve • Once the principle is clear, then so is ^ decision you must make. There is , person more invincible than a man uncompromising ethics. You can him, but you can’t defeat him. d'hink ^ Saint Thomas a Becket. Think of ^ Hale. The Japanese have a saying- ^ life is a generation, but reputation is

And there is no person more hated than man without ethics. I don’t care how ^mart you are, or how good an athelete, _c^r ,^{w We}H you can fire a weapon. If I _Q^an 1 ^trust you, I don’t want you over me, ^Unt'^cr me, or covering my flank. Never °^rget that, no matter what kind of pres- ^re you face. A person who violates his nnciples not only does an injustice to ^e_n^System> but he forever soils himself. j_n course, you don’t have to be stand- g somewhere with a noose around your ®ck for these thoughts to apply. In a few onths you’re going to be off on one of _a ^e ar edges of the earth and you’ll have ? ^ato°n behind you and an operation ^er m your hand. You’ll be tired and will vf’ ^°^{Ur troo}P^s will be carping—it eith ^C'*^^{er t0}° hot or too cold and at tt?^{r t0}° ^{wet or t0}° dusty—you’ll look Pat T P^atr°i order and you’ll say, “This it m *^{S t0}° '^on8- I’^m going to sandbag . *1 cut off two checkpoints. 1 mean, _s ,^{at arC two} checkpoints? How is the _af,^ety °f the Free World going to be ccted if I bag two checkpoints?” th ^nt*. 'hen you’ll ask yourself, ‘ ‘What is ^eP^r‘^ncipl^e involved?" tra h^r'^ncipi^eis. you’ve made a con- °f honor with your commanding r!5^er> ^and it has been relied on. he principle is, there’s no such thing

as telling a little bit of a lie, any more than you can be a little bit pregnant.

The principle is, if you lie to your commanding officer, your troops will lie to their commanding officer.

When I was a plebe at the Naval Acad­emy, my classmates and I were required to memorize a book called Reef Points. One of the sections of that book was called “Famous Naval Sayings,” and one of those sayings especially affected me. I’ve tried to live by it since the first time I read it, when I was 18: “Where principle is involved, be deaf to expediency.”

So finish that patrol, all of it. Be prin­cipled. Be brave.

“Cruisers and Destroyers: Losing Out”

(See N. Polmar, pp. 97-99, April 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander J. W. Stratton, U. S. Navy, Engineering Officer, USS Virginia               (CGN-38)—The              CGN-42

should not be built based on a Virginia- class hull. The alternatives of combina­tion nuclear and gas turbine propulsion or combination nuclear and conventional steam power, which Norman Polmar mentioned, are not attractive and should not be considered. Perhaps the CGN-42

should not be built at all.

As currently planned, the CGN-42 will displace about 12,000 tons. If the CGN- 38-class Hull is used, then the CGN-42 would have about the same shaft horse­power as the USS Bainbridge (CGN-25), which displaces only about 8,000 tons. More propulsion is needed, because the ship’s maximum speed would certainly be less than 30 knots. The nuclear reactor plant can probably be altered to accom­modate the increased power demand, but the main engines should be almost dou­bled in shaft horsepower. Fitting such an engine into the CGN-38-class hull would be difficult. The Navy should not build slow cruisers.

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\\^^,te?^ant Ourt Orchard, U. S. Navy—I p^{C tlrcc} bones to pick with Dr. Adams. >n h'^¹’ ^^{as ta}*^<en 8^reat literary license terr *^{S ernot}t°^nal portrayals of mutual de- tion ^nCe' ^aS 'ⁿii^ucnciⁿg “Soviet percep- any^S *ⁿ °^rc^^{er t0} deter them from taking <j_e ^action inimical to our interests,” as tenti^! “on Soviet goodwill and in- tcrrc^<)nS’,, ^{aS a} "bankrupt strategy of de- t_0rt ^Bce’ and as the “twisted and dis- j-j_r l°gic of deterrence.” t[_le Adams has not adequately defined and eterrence theory which is “failing” for t^^{0n w}Di^ch he builds his arguments tnntu ^rf^te^i^c defense. He should refer to light ^t'^cterrence more in terms of en- the s'"^{611 se}lf‘interest. No one expects Path °^v'^ets to act in our best interests, are ^Cf’ ^ratl°^nal Soviet decision-makers ^expected to calculate the risks to their

own interests. Dr. Adams has ascribed far too little of this in his rather skewed, emotional, and partial definitions of mu­tual deterrence.

Second, Dr. Adams has abundant trust in the yet undeveloped technologies of active strategic defense. The Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) suffered from technical failings, as well as politi­cal pressures. Dr. Adams refers to active measures which will “shield the home­land” and a “complete missile defense system.” But what research and develop­ment program is he betting on to solve all our comprehensive ballistic missile de­fense (BMD) requirements? We have observed dramatic improvements in the offensive capabilities of strategic forces: multiple independent reentry vehicles, penetration aids, sharply improving accu­racies, greater throw-weight in sea- launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and “stealth” technologies for bombers and cruise missiles. Offensive technology is not going to suddenly stop. Even if Dr. Adams’s “shield” is erected, it will not be a complete defense capable of shutting out all weapons. And, of course, there is likely to be a period of asymmetry favoring offensive forces. This could create some frightening pros­pects, including encouragement of a first strike while one side has a temporary of­fensive edge and constant arms racing to stay ahead in defensive systems.

Third, Dr. Adams does not squarely deal with the historical nature of Western defenses. A mammoth active “shield over the homeland” that Dr. Adams propounds couid likely succumb to fiscal and psychological pressures and become a Maginot Line. Active strategic defenses must be constantly updated to provide a “shield.”

There are many merits to strategic de­fenses, both active and passive. But it is foolish to bet everything on defensive forces or to, as Dr. Adams does, make strategic defense and mutual deterrence mutually exclusive; they should be mutu­ally reinforcing. Finally, Dr. Adams be­lieves the review of strategic defense opportunities must be “unencumbered by the constraints of deterrence and arms control.” However, arms control and deterrence are critical justifications for strategic defenses—especially once we give up on Dr. Adams’s idea of an all- encompassing and infallible "shield. Partial defenses can make our retaliatory forces that much more secure, discourag­ing escalation and encouraging us to re­examine requirements for prompt, hard target-capable ICBM/SLBM forces.

Strategic defenses offer prospects for more stable doctrines of deterrence, based upon greater security of retaliatory forces. They do not offer a panacea of protection.

(Continued on page 90.)

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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 27.)

“The Flying Frigates”

(See R. Artigiani, G. P. Harper, June 1983

Proceedings)

Windsor R. Purdum—The “flying frig­ate” concept seems to be another P6M Seamaster with modifications. However, it could well be the “vision” that is re­quired for obtaining and maintaining sea control. Considering the increasing naval budget with its increasing ship construc­tion costs and decreasing numbers of ships, it is obvious another answer is needed.

Considering costs versus firepower, only a state-of-the-art seaplane design with a full suite of offensive/defensive capabilities, an application, of “stealth” technology, a short takeoff and landing capability, and an inverted “V” hull would enable the performance of antisub­marine warfare and antiair warfare mis­sions at sea—(surfaced or airborne)— that have never been achieved. Who can question the proven survivability of sea­planes when some have flown for 30 years?

“Military Retirement Pay: A Time of Crises”

(See T. M. Hale, pp. 108-111, April 1983;

M. J. Clowes, F. L. Brady, p. 76, July 1983 Proceedings)

“The Unique Hardships of Sea Duty”

(See T. M. Hale, L. D. Pappas, pp. 67-73, November 1980 Proceedings)

Captain Thomas M. Hale, U. S. Navy, Head, Compensation Policy Branch, (OP-134)—Frances Brady mentioned that civil service retirement is computed on basic pay, not including overtime pay. I stated that overtime was included in the averaging. I was referring to the special civil service annuity which includes within its legal definition of basic pay, “premium pay.” Premium pay substi­tutes for unscheduled overtime work for law enforcement employees. It ranges from 10 to 25% of GS-10 pay—currently a maximum of about $5,500 per year. Regular civil service annuities do not in­clude averaging overtime pay.

The issues that Mr. Clowes raised merit further discussion. His first point—that I went too far in trying to make the case that military, police, and firefighter plans compared unfavorably with private sector plans—missed the mark. Many police and firefighter plans are more generous than the military re­tirement system. The military member living in Washington, D. C., does not have to look further than the District of Columbia police force and the neighbor­ing counties of Fairfax, Virginia, and Montgomery, Maryland, to find higher early retirement annuities for similar lev­els of final salary. The comparison of these plans with private sector plans was not to make the case that private plans were more attractive, but to dispel the notion that there was no basis for com­parison—a point many of the critics of military retirement like to make. For ex­ample, it is fashionable to point to the non-contributory feature of the military plan as a distinct advantage. Yet non­contributory plans are the norm in indus­try. The 1980 Banker Trust Company report indicated that 81% of plans studied were non-contributory, up from 67% in 1975.

I plead guilty to Mr. Clowes’s criti­cism of my argument that military per­sonnel deserve special treatment because they can be forced out after 20 years. I also believe military personnel deserve special treatment for many other reasons: prolonged enforced separation from fam­ilies, frequent involuntary relocations, limited spouse career opportunities, a controlled lifestyle, a sometimes danger­ous work environment, and long work hours without overtime or premium pay.

In “The Unique Hardships of Sea Duty,” I noted that Navy members with fewer than four years’ service on sea duty reported working an average of 56.7 hours per week. Those on shore duty re­ported working 47 hours per week. Mem­bers with more than four years’ service on sea duty reported working 59.6 hours per week. Those on shore duty, 47.8 hours per week. Assuming a modest 50% sea/shore duty split over a 20-year career and a standard 40-hour private sector work week, we find that during a more than 20-year career the Navy member works the equivalent of 26.7 private sec­tor work years. Add to this the myth of

the “half-pay” retirement after 20 y^ca‘^s (actually it comes to about 37% °f ^clV'_to ian equivalent salary), and one begins ^ get a different perspective on the value o the benefit.         .           ^

Even one of the strongest critics _° military retirement pay, Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), understands. In press release issued 7 July In­stated, “The retirement system is * ^ (sic) primary benefit received by the c reer military. It is also a key driving R^,r<^ in determining career length, whtc turn drives promotion eligibility and ^eve^ the frequency of assignment changes- has a high level of visibility and any ^ta^ of changes understandably arouses g^r fears among the career force.”            .

The are no simple answers, only toug trade-offs.

“My Dear Canada”

(,See J. L. Byron, p. 124, March 1983; J- ^A' Keeniiside, J. M. Sullivan, pp. 19-20, l^l‘^ac,y 1983; J. A. Fulton, H. H. Hill, PP- 78'⁷⁹-                        ¹

1983 Proceedings)

Dear Admiral Fulton,

I have had the opportunity to view y°⁹ letter to the editor of Proceedings reg^ar ^ ing my March essay on Canada's Navy-^ deeply regret any implication that I _ denigrating Canada; a heartfelt ^conce y for Canada’s defense future prompted ^ piece. Its wording was designed to ens ^ that its ideas were considered, hu quickly admit that it all got out of con t in the Canadian media. My sincere h°Pj now is that, with most of the fuss be ¹ us, there will remain a residue of cone in Canada for your Navy that is streng , ened because of my words. I also Canadian force planners weigh the marine option as better than a frigates.  _Dr.

To the latter point, let me quote ^ Muguizur, from his February 1983 a cle, in International Defense Review-

“It is difficult to understand why • ■ ^ countries . . . with limited finan^c ^ resources order or build small- s warships. For a country to esta itself as a naval power, it worn ,, more logical to procure submarines-

1983

,^mass °f one of these modem, small

navies will small

ment

sense

dian.

P dive, and I associate the

sens °f those few moments with my ^e °i involvement in matters Cana-

he trend in navies seems to be toward mal, high-tech forces embodied' in ’§ -speed patrol craft, coastal subma- off⁶ k ^ *^and"hased air, all armed with _w hie-shelt smart weapons. The blue _n ^a.^er has been left to the seapower land°^nS’ *^{3Ut naV}^ ^aPP^roaching the

pay dearly for being there. A _a( ^{1 nay}y comprised primarily of frig­id *^{S PPet}i^u'PPed to threaten either in that^{6 Water} or along their coast. Given fu .. anada’s current defense policy/ mv !^{s op} *‘^srnall navy” variety, suh ^taes'^s '^s that Canada should buy pannes. And it saddens me to see the _s ^an(i Gudgeon go to Turkey for a _u ° V'hen you gentlemen could clearly Barb /^6rri—^w^^en the Darter and the eh also go elsewhere, the show will (li,^0Vi^{Cr as} i^{ar as} Canada buying gap-filler ^e^^e boats dirt cheap.

sec a ^USe °i Canadian submarines is a (he°^n<aary *^ssue, but please do recognize since^^mrnetI7 of such an arrangement—- ^ce HMCS Rainbow went out years bee' ^^anaci^a’^s West Coast units have maf ^t0ta*^ ^reliant on U. S. diesel sub- thi_rf!^ne.^{[1] [2] [3]} ,f°^r training and exercises. As cer ' °^'^cer 'n the Trout, executive offi- in th'^[4]T^ang, and commanding officer j_nv ,^e Gudgeon, I have personally been Di_v° ^Vet* 'ⁿ Providing services to Training _ancj^1Sp⁰ⁿ.C^ne> Destroyer Squadron Two, sine ?^C^'^C ^rgus and Aurora aircraft H_Mcs ⁷⁵—*^ots                         services. In 1976,

denth Kootenay wrapped her variable and ■ ^SOnar l^DS) cable around our hull foll₀^Snapped off- In ^a test-depth dive tio_n°^W!ⁿ8 this, we collapsed our induc- face ^and to emergency sur-

th_e • ^ae incident had not damaged dp_p^PlP^ln§’ hut it was the reason for the

excite­their ships and mine, in their homes and mine, have made me think about your affairs. Last year, I visited Canada with a National War College group. As the group member designated the Canada expert, I studied hard with our State Department and your embassy to try to become that knowledgeable person. When I was in Canada, I was able to talk off-the-record with Ministry of Defence officials as senior as flag rank on the thesis my essay presents. Had I not found resonance, I would not have presumed to offer advice. Of course, your government has a record of shooting the messenger in the defense area—“early retirements” are a noted phenomenon. It may well be that only an outsider could say what I said.

I suspect that the strong reaction to my words stems not from concern that I’m spreading gossip, to use your phrase, but rather from a deep-seated fear that I’ve broken the code and said the truth. If what comes from all this is better support for naval forces in Canada and a reap­praisal of force planning, I am glad to have been of service.

Very respectfully,

John L. Byron

Commander, U. S. Navy

Commander Keenliside has criticized Commander Byron for suggesting that a fleet of modem diesel submarines would cure our navy’s ills. In doing so, he has shown a naive interpretation of our navy’s tasks and a lack of appreciation of the capabilities of modem diesel subma­rines. What would be the makeup of his balanced maritime force for Canada?

The Canadian Navy’s role is to provide operationally ready maritime forces to meet Canadian defense commitments. Surely, our main task in peacetime is to acquire suitable equipment and train our personnel so that we can fight in wartime. Peacetime tasks, such as fishery protec­tion, economic zone protection, and drug interdiction, if they must be assigned to the navy, must not be allowed to interfere with the acquisition of the proper equip­ment we need to fight a war.

Commander Keenliside has questioned how diesel submarines would counter an air-missile threat in Canadian-controlled waters and how these submarines would counter modem nuclear submarines in deep unrestricted waters.

In Canadian waters, a major air-missile threat would be missiles launched from enemy surface ships and submarines or aircraft from the enemy’s newly acquired carriers. The modem diesel submarine, equipped with long-range detection sys­tems, wire-guided heavyweight torpe­does, and sub-surface-to-surface missiles (Sub Harpoon), could counter this threat by sinking these ships before the missiles and aircraft were launched—a most effective method of air defense.

The quiet diesel electric submarine has always posed a threat to her nuclear counterpart. Fitted with long-range sonar, including towed array, and wire- guided weapons, a modernized diesel boat would do well, especially if she were used in cooperation with maritime patrol aircraft.

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1944

By Harry A. Gailey A new look at the September 1944 invasion of Peleliu, one of the bloodiest but now nearly forgotten campaigns of the Pacific War. 300pages, maps, photographs. $17.95

U.S. NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS

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An informed overview of our complex fleet in the throes of significant modernization, with a foreword by Norman Polmar. 288pages, 160photos, $19.95

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1UIN 1912 tothe Present

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I agree that our navy needs balanced maritime forces to meet its commitments

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as it is very much unbalanced. The required balance will only be achieved when some of our aging surface ships are replaced by a fleet of modern diesel elec­tric submarines. That is what the Cana­dian Submarine Acquisition Project is all about.

Leadership Again?

A young naval officer, requesting ano­nymity for obvious reasons, gave us this comment for addition to our discussions about leadership—On 24 April 1983, Commander Ray L. Bunton, then-execu­tive officer of VAW-123 (currently com­manding officer), reenlisted a first class petty officer on board the USS America (CV-66). After saying a few words about the man’s important and personal deci­sion to remain with the Navy, Com­mander Bunton administered the oath— from memory. I was immediately touched by this act of personal dedication. Look­ing the man right in the eye while admin­istering the oath was his way of saying, “I care.”

I hope I can find within myself those qualities of leadership so simply, yet so profoundly demonstrated by Commander Bunton.

tion of some of the “principles” seems faulty, and the article contains a certain smugness that prevents a sufficient rec­ognition of the importance of “chance in war—a la Clausewitz.

A fundamental assumption underlym? the plan for the rescue was that the opera­tion could have succeeded. The Ameri­can culture and the U. S. armed forces tend to think that all problems are solubk if only the proper energy and science arc applied. That notion is false, and the sol­dier who would avoid wasting the lives o his men would do well to recognize that- Another assumption which Major Ear made, but not the planners, was that the mission was possible for five helicopters instead of the six Washington considered the minimum. It is well to remember that Iran is not Uganda, and what was possi­ble for the Israelis at Entebbe may have been completely out of the question ha they tried it against another enemy.

Major Earl misapplies the one princi­ple that he credits the planners for pr°P' erly implementing. He seems to confuse the importance of the principle of the “offensive” to mean that defensive tac­tics and strategies are somehow inher­ently inferior to offensive ones. That leads to the kind of decision that Genera Ambrose Burnside made when he sent the flower of Union youth up the hill a the Confederate entrenchments at Freder­icksburg. Defensive tactics and strategie^s pursued with an offensive, or aggressive- spirit also resulted in earthshaking °^ut' comes at Midway, Stalingrad, and in the Battle of Britain. Neither the offensive nor the defensive is inherently supe­rior—it depends on the situation.

Another fault is the implied assertion that a want of drill as a unit somehi"* prevented the success of the joint task force. Sometimes such drill is too costly in terms of either money or security. The failure of the rescue attempt—if success was possible at all—had nothing to do with the state of unit training. Perhaps the crash of the helicopter on the C-13 might not have occurred had a joint train­ing exercise been tried beforehand, hu^l the decision to abort the mission had al­ready been made at that point; hence the crash had nothing to do with its failure except to raise its cost by killing g°^ol) men. There are some special operations Air Force helicopters assigned to the same organization as the ill-fated C-l^O- and they had proven their capability ¹⁰ operate from carriers during the evacua­tion of Koh Tang Island to the USS Cora Sea (CV-43). The reason why their join¹ training with the C-130s did not result in their assignment to the mission is beyonu my knowledge. As desirable as a fuE"

ls Well to remember that the largest of all

, pnmious operations—Normandy in -1944—did not have the benefit of ^m2 ^aPproaching a full-scale drill.

none has been more successful than

rie ^{CW 10 thc serv}i^ce who are more expe- ;_s ^nced at that kind of operation—yet he ^ln no way qualified to physically lead

ihan he,

tact'¹ °ⁿi^{y one man} *^s iⁿ charge of a not^1Ca' °P^eration at one time—it does char*¹⁶³¹¹ *^^at °^{ne s}h°^uid put an airman in fort f^{2 an} infantry assault against a nian Pi^{ace or} that a Marine infantry oe put in charge of an air operation.

author asserts that an excessively adherence to a plan is a bad thing.

The

Wh,

0 can

argue with that? Yet, he does

nothi

adhe;

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and

^ltlat landing.

Major Earl makes a similar mistake on ⁶ niatter of security. No doubt an ob- _bu^SS‘^on with security can be undesirable, e does not make it clear that the want communication had anything to do re' h ^m'^ss'°n’s failure—unless the a ^er grants the unspoken assumption ach' **^VC helicopters were likely to bln'a''⁶ the mission without excessive bv ° . ^e£h He compounds the difficulty itv ^SaMⁿg that “The principle of simplic- _m^y_e ^Was obviously violated. This judg- ^nt presumes, however, that a simpler _IT1 ⁿ was feasible.” Yet, the article’s >.^aJ°^r thrust was that the planners chose a Minimalist” plan when they should selected a “maximalist” one. fic I ^a'°^r h‘^lrt further compounds the dif- ^u ty when he comes to the principle of _Se ^ni,y of command.” That principle ₀ ^6ms d^ear enough: at any one time, only _at|^{E 111311} ought to be in charge of an oper- p_a°ⁿ' he twists that to suggest that the an tif® command from one man to odd ^ *^S dl-advised. That seems rather Pr- ^COm'ⁿ§ from a Marine since the ^lce in amphibious operations since _Co°^r d War II has been that the Navy man J^nds the operation until the troops

elivered to the beach at which mo­ment tb

j ^lne ground commander takes over. ^ know the man who commanded at

.... ^scrf One, and it seems to me that there are f_ew i_r

Her

is i

p¹¹ Mfantry assault against a prepared find¹'⁰¹¹- Nor do 1 think it was possible to p_r. ,^an infantry man better qualified to dian h^C °^{Ver the} °P^erati°^{ns at} Desert One see tu ^Was' Onity of command means to

deal operation at one time—it does ⁿgid

^ ⁿg to prove that in this case such To"^{erence was} responsible for the failure. With° ^assert i^{s to} suggest that proceeding Scl. five helicopters was likely to Wo ?^{VC success}- We cannot know what p0 d have happened. Nowhere is the b]_e>, 'hty considered that such a “flexi- r_es . ^modification of the plan would have a. ^ted in the annihilation of the rescue force and the slaughter of the prisoners. What is proven is that economic and dip­lomatic measures did result in the release of the prisoners unharmed.

Major Earl’s conclusion that “Leader­ship lacked drive and determination in the execution phase. ...” betrays a smug­ness, even an arrogance. As President John F. Kennedy once quoted: “Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.”

The smugness of youth discounts the Clausewitzean “fog of war” and the role of pure chance. Lee at Chancellorsville knew his adversary, Joe Hooker, very well. They both were West Pointers and had served in the tiny peacetime Army. Lee’s intuitive judgment of Hooker’s character enabled him to fly in the face of the principles of security and concentra­tion. The result of that intuition and luck was brilliant victory.

The point is that one cannot use single cases to illustrate sweeping generaliza­tions; the sample is far too narrow to be scientific. Rather, the study of case histo­ries can only serve to broaden the per­spectives of the aspiring commander which will reduce the odds against him when he comes to the moment of truth in battle.

Drive and determination are fine, but it would be well for the student of war to remember that both Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant had ample doses of humility too. Perhaps, just perhaps, the commander at Desert One will remain forever unsung for a wise decision that saved his troops from annihilation and the prisoners from slaughter.

“An Old-Fashioned Modern War”

(.See T. J. McKeamey, pp. 117-120, November 1982; C E. Zartmann, p. 87, February 1983; T. L. Clancy, p. 92, April 1983; M. V. S. Hall, p. 64, June 1983 Proceedings)

“The Odyssey of a Skyhawk Pilot” '

(See C. A. J. Philippi, pp. 111-113, May 1983 Proceedings)

Lester G. Paldy, Dean, Center for Con­tinuing Education, State University of New York at Stony Brook—I have been surprised to observe Proceedings’ will­ingness to provide a forum for the com­ments of Argentinian officers regarding their participation in the Falklands Con­flict. Under the guise of objectivity, you are making it possible for officers of a murderous and repressive regime to ap­pear as worthy opponents of dedicated British units committed to action by a democratic government in defense of its citizens. In view of the Argentinian Gov­ernment’s illegitimate ends, those who serve it in any way should be condemned to ignominy.

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EUUA

Anthony C. Santore—As one who taught writing for many years, and a sometime writer myself, I have developed a high regard for the literary style in Proceed­ings, which is second to none. However, there is one significant area where criti­cism is necessary—the excessive use of unnecessary acronyms (EUUA).

Acronyms have genuine literary value (GLV) only in limited applications. One example is the full, unacronymized term (FUT) which is so long, complex, or hard to spell or pronounce, as to render its re­peated use (RU) bothersome. In this cate­gory would be RNA or DNA. A second is the FUT which is so frequently used that the acronym has itself acquired wide­spread general recognition (WGR)—a more WGR, in fact, than the FUT it­self—such as GNP or ASW. Note, please, that I did not have to give the FUT for DNA, RNA, GNP, or ASW, because the reader does not need them.

When viewed in the context of GLV, the EUUA is, or should be, in the same state of editorial disgrace (SED) as the contraction. Both are informal uses of the language (IUL) and more appropriate to oral than to written speech; both are in­tended to ease the speaker’s burden; and both are lazy. Contractions at least have the virtue of familiarity.

In written speech, the eye flashes across familiar groups of letters (FGL) and familiar groups of words (FGW) without stopping to spell them out. All speed-reading courses (SRCs) are based upon that principle—one of the first les­sons is that one can read an entire line of printed text (LOPT) in a single glance. It does not take the reasonably skilled reader (RSR) any longer to read these three words than it does to read TTW. More important, if the acronym is one without WGR, it takes longer because the reader has to stop to recollect what the FUT was, or to search back through the previous text (PT) to find it, or, worse still, to ignore it and read on.

Another sometimes dubious advantage (DA) to the use of the acronym is that it saves space. If the expression gross na­tional product were to be used 20 times in an article, then the use of the acronym GNP would save about 19 letter spaces each time (LSET), or about 380 letter spaces overall (LSO). I use the expres­sion “about” because the first time it is used the FUT, the acronym, and two pa­rentheses would be used, cutting into the saving. However, where a FUT is to be used but once, or even two or three times, placing the acronym behind it is not only wasteful because it distracts the reader, but it is redundant. This is not just a silly nitpicking observation (SNO), because the point of the acronym is to conserve, rather than to waste, reader time and en­ergy (RTAE). I typed this entire piece to the end of the previous sentence, omitting unnecessary acronyms (UAs), with a net difference of about one line of typescript, but with a marked increase in readability.

I know that a key explanation for the extensive use of acronyms is that this is a professional journal, and the readers rec­ognize the acronyms. Examine any issue of the Journal of the American Bar Asso­ciation, the Journal of the American Medical Association, or the Journal of the National Education Association. You will find more acronyms in one average Proceedings article than in all three of the other journals combined. (You just read an entire paragraph without an acronym and understood it.)

In a journal with GLV, the FUT will be the standard, ending the EUUA.

“The Malvinas Campaign”

(See R. L. Schema, pp. 98-117, May 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander George F. Nafziger, U. S. Navy, Commanding Offi­cer, Naval Reserve Submarine Support Facility, New London, Detachment 505—Dr. Scheina’s article is the first I’ve read that provides a perspective other than that of the British and, as such, it is a valuable contribution to our understand­ing of what transpired around the Falklands. However, the level of political bias that crept into his reporting of the Argentine perspective concerns me. His attempts to justify the Argentine position have some serious, unsettling flaws.

The implication that the entire episode started solely because one Argentine scrap worker raised his national flag over a salvage operation seems a little far­fetched. The Falklands and South Geor­gia are internationally recognized, with a few exceptions, as the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom, and it seems unusual that the Argentine armed forces would mobilize solely to protect 41 scrap collectors. At the very least, that state­ment makes some damning insinuations about the level of maturity of the Argentinians, to the point of incredulity.

This flawed logic is carried even fur­ther as Scheina states on page 103:

“Although tactically separate from the Malvinas operation, the landing in the Georgias was linked strategically. In fact, one might say that the Georgias confrontation caused Argentinia to land in the Malvinas. When Argentina had determined on a

course of military support for the con­tingent of scrap workers on the Georgias, it realized that it would be in no position to maintain a force in the Georgias alone. They are 7 miles east of the Malvinas an roughly 1,100 from the Argentine mainland. Thus, in order for the Ar gentine position in the r^em° Georgias to be tenable, Argentina could not afford to leave the Malvinas under British control. As a result, t ^e landings in both groups of isl^an were part of the same whole, even though undertaken independently-

If the support of the salvage group °^a the Georgias was so important, why w the Argentine garrison there so small. it was so important, why did tD Argentinians make no obvious effort provide further military support of the is land when it was approached by the Bri ish fleet? It seems odd that the entire °P eration was designed to support a attempt to salvage a few thousand dolls of scrap and no effort was then made hold that precious scrap.          .

I am particularly delighted by the clai that 130 years ago the Malvinas were p of Argentina and because of that they should be returned to the Argentinians- Extrapolating that same logic would pr° vide justification for the Argentine mam land to be returned to the Spanish, ° even the indigenous Indians, whom tn present-day Argentinians have long sine® supplanted by using the same force they so quickly criticized the British for using- It is a serious case of double standards-

If, as Dr. Scheina states, the first Ar gentine forces, the Drummond and Gran ville, were dispatched to the Falklands on 26 March, how is it that in late March t ^e naval task forces were prepared and di patched to seize the Falklands? As any professional naval officer knows, prepan ing an amphibious assault force, loading material, and preparing assault plans a not things done overnight. It requires great deal of planning and practice to p^u off an amphibious operation successful¹) - even if the operation is only an “adminis trative landing.”

If the first Type-69s were dispatched m late March, then the Argentinians were able to organize and dispatch an amphib'. ous assault force in four days! A l^Qt U. S. amphibious experts would find tn difficult to do.

Indeed, if the flag-raising incident oc curred in March, as Dr. Scheina states* then the Argentinians had less than month to gather their forces together an pull off the invasion. For a third-wor navy to execute such an operation ^lS nothing short of phenomenal.

“Ride With the Seas”

(See W. K. Earle, pp. 78-79, February 1983; J.

Cadwalader, p. 80, July 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander D. J. Ramsey, U. S. Coast Guard—Captain Earle is recognized throughout the Coast Guard as a master seaman, and I certainly en­joyed his fine piece on the old Coast Guard. However, before our young sail­ors take his advice to heart about weath­ering a storm or gale at sea, a note of caution is in order. In his story, Ensign Earle was serving in a marvelous old “Secretary”-class cutter, 327 feet in length, displacing 2,500 tons. They were and still are fine ships. Four remain in service awaiting replacement by Sear- class 270-foot medium endurance cutters (MECs) soon. By comparison to modern naval engineering designs like the Coast Guard’s 210-foot MEC and the Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, they are steam ships, relatively heavy and with a deep draft for their size . Their design reflects an appreciation for sturdiness and the advantages of a beamy, heavy vessel with a counter stem.

Unlike our diesel or turbine-powered modern cutters and frigates, the “Secre- tary”-class cutters have a stem and bot­tom-aft which can usually handle heavy stem or quartering seas with comfort and security. The new light, shallow-draft designs like the 210-foot MEC have little draft or bottom aft and square or near­square transoms. Risking the maneuver Ensign Earle’s captain used in the storm would likely be disastrous in one of these modem ships. The best method for most of today’s naval vessels is bow into the seas, adjusting speed and steering as best as possible to survive or to reduce the likelihood of damage. The bow is built to face strong seas; the stem of the so-called modem ship designs is likely to betray one in a quartering or stern sea, leading to a near broach, or in the trough, heavy rolls and severe pounding. Sometimes I wonder if we have advanced forward or regressed in our ship designs for smaller cutters and frigates. Our skippers and crews have to be more careful, with a keener eye to the weather, in a new ship than in one of those old classic ladies like the USCGC Campbell (WHEC-32).

Recent articles in the Proceedings comparing the differences between So­viet and U. S. naval designs indicate that we have something to learn about design­ing ships to accommodate something other than fair weather. British and Euro­pean small ship designs also reflect awareness and concern for the heavier weather routinely encountered in the North Pacific or North Atlantic. I hope

that we will remember this next time we build a new cutter or frigate. Returning¹⁰ sea duty this summer, I don’t look f°^r' ward to the ride I’ll be experiencing again in a smaller cutter of recent construction- And the new ships are hardly efficient o^r effective in six-to-ten-foot seas on patr° • let alone in a major gale. Although on paper the modern diesel or turbine-pow ered cutters and frigates appeared le^sS expensive to build and operate than heav ier ships or small ships built for roug seas, it could be a false economy-

“Their Carrier Battle Group”

(See T. J. McKeamey, pp. 71-81, December 1982 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Carl 0■ Echu ster, U. S. Navy, Survey Section, preme Headquarters, Allied Powers, E^u' rope—Lieutenant Commander T. McKearney’s article was both timely an thought-provoking. The day of the Sovie carrier battle group (CVBG) is coming’ and now is the time to examine its po^ssl ble makeup. The Soviets will probab y construct their aircraft carrier (CV) an her battle group much differently fr^orn the way we do it in the West. The varia tion could well be somewhat greater than Commander McKearney suggested, h^e cause Soviet naval traditions and mis

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^S1(>ns are so radically different from ours.

. ^lrst, the Soviet Navy’s primary mis- ^S1°n has been to defend the homeland Against the major naval threat at the time, urrently, this consists of submarine- aunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), so ^e Soviets have built numerous antisub­^marine warfare (ASW) ships, aircraft, P submarines. As Admiral Sergei ^orshkov has pushed his fleet farther out ^sea, a second more offensive mission as expanded—denying the sea to their °PPonents.

Whether it be the interdiction of West- ^eru sea lines of communications (SLOCs) ^r u*^e destruction of the West in a nuclear ^change, through SLBMs, the Soviets e ieve that their submarines will play the ain strike role. ASW capabilities have before dominated Soviet ship designs ^Ver *be past 15 years. Even general-pur- P°se ships, such as the Kiev class, have ^au a predominantly ASW role. It is ⁿ y in the Kirov-, BlackCom-1-, and uvremennyy-class units that the ASW ^lssion has ceased to be the primary de- gn criteria, possibly representing a ,^r<?ⁿd toward a more balanced fleet capa- tty as Soviet task groups operate far­

,        ■ **j wuiu lauu-Uascu all LUVCl

become particularly important ^estern maritime patrol aircraft and ^yal units began carrying cruise mis- '^eibforcing the Soviets to augment their 'Ps air defense capabilities.

econd, as the Soviets have become ^0re active in the open ocean around the th ^ft’ ^the>' ^^{ace two} primary threats in at environment: Western submarines th /^Ur P^owcr- The Soviets have opposed ^e former with a combination of helicop- ^^ers and surface units. The latter has tra- tonally been countered by long-range C!}‘^lsc missiles launched against the allied .    ■ This is not likely to change with the

reduction of a Soviet CV, since a su- bef^S°nic ^cru'^se missile can reach a target ^c°st. There is also no need to recover _e(s ^^ruise missiles after attack. The Sovi- have not attempted to match us in our °ng areas but have concentrated on as we neglect (mine warfare, cruise ^tssiles). Further, the Soviets have

cha^{Wn 3} P^rel^ercnce l°^r evolutionary anges in tactics and weapons rather an revolutionary ones. Thus, after 25 ^rs of centering their surface fleet So^>Und ^surface-action groups (SAGs), a SAp^Ct ^ will probably support its in w ^rat*^{ler l}b^an the other way around as Western practice. The CV’s air wing

veillance helicopters.

The potential candidate for such a car­rier air wing would not include the Su-24, which is far too big and complex for the predominantly defensive carrier air wing envisioned here. The Su-22, on the other hand, is much too old an aircraft to serve on a ship ten years from now, and it has little capability as a fighter. The MiG-23 is a more likely candidate. It is an excel­lent fighter-interceptor and can also carry some bombs for the power projection role. The Soviets do not need a special­ized ground-attack aircraft to provide air support suitable to Third World “power projection” operations. After all, they only need to counter the Western naval presence.

The close-in escorts for this CV will probably consist of several Udaloyy-class guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and other ASW units, possibly supplemented by a Sovremennyy-class DDG. The mo­bility, striking power, and communica­tions capabilities of the Kirov preclude her being wasted as a positive identifica­tion radar advisory zone (PIRAZ) unit for the CV. A more probable candidate would be a “BlackCom-1” guided miss­ile cruiser, freeing the Kirov to operate as a mobile strike cruiser. A CVBG com­posed in this fashion and supported by several guided missile submarines would present a U. S. CVBG with a wide array of targets, all protected by a combination of fighter aircraft and a layered defense of surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft guns. Such a Soviet task group need not have as good a carrier as the U. S. CVBG because her mission will be easier. Her air wing need only provide protection while her SAGs do the attacking with cruise missiles, supported by shore-based aircraft (if in the Mediterranean or North Atlantic) and submarines.

Further, such a carrier would not have to dedicate as much of her air wing to her own defense, since she would not be the central offensive strike platform in the Soviet battle group. The target selection process against such a Soviet CVBG would prove quite a challenge since its primary offensive firepower would be dispersed over a wide area while the fighter component protecting it would have to be countered by a fighter escort for the U. S. strike group. How many fighters should the United States retain over a CV to intercept incoming cruise missiles and cruise missile-carrying bombers and how many should be as­signed to escort the U. S. strike force? Which is the highest priority target; the highly mobile Kirov, the larger CV, or the “BlackCom-1?” Is it realistic to ex­pect them all to be together at once?

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“A Little Bit of Reality”

(See E. F. Passero, pp. 100-101, April 1983

Proceedings)

Captain G. Russell Evans, U. S. Coast Guard       (Retired)—Lieutenant              Com­

mander Passero has provided powerful ammunition for use against the religious pacifists promoting unilateral disarma­ment and, in some cases, peace at any price. He confronts head-on the bishops’ proposed pastoral letter that denigrates national defense and condemns nuclear weapons, even as deterrents.

Commander Passero’s penetrating and Christian analysis concludes that the bishops are causing chaos and confusion in a time of great national peril. Well said. However, the most glaring paradox for the bishops and other religious paci­fists is their disregard of the scriptures to back up their ideas for unilateral disarma­ment and freezes. But there is a reason: The Bible does not support their panaceas for peace and surrender.

In 150 pages or so, the bishops offer no convincing scriptures to support their case. Nonetheless, they declare that nu­clear arms “threaten the sovereignty of God.” Is this blasphemy?

The church leaders have answers, of course, but none to disprove the Christian virtue of self-defense. A favorite of the pacifists is Jesus’s admonition to Peter, “Put up again they sword ...” (Matt. 26:52). Peter had sliced off the ear of Malchus in a fit of rage when Jesus was about to be arrested and crucified. Jesus did not tell Peter to stop wearing a sword; this just happened not to be a time to use a sword.

Earlier, Jesus had said, “. . . I came not to send peace, but a sword” (Matt. 10:34). Many call this the sword of right­eousness for fighting evil, the very heart of Jesus’s ministry. What greater guard­ians of peace than the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) and other U. S. military units designed to deter aggres­sion and enslavement?

Accordingly, the bishops shy away from the Bible for one-way pacifism: They cannot use the commandment, “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” because “kill” here really means “commit murder.”

In the 14th century, B.C., on the Plains of Moab, battleground of many ancient conflicts, Moses taught the Chil­dren of Israel the laws of warfare, saying, “When thou goeth out to battle against thine enemies, and seest ... a people more than thou, be not afraid of them: for the Lord thy God is with thee ...” (Deut. 20:1). It was as if God were the field marshal, leading the faithful to vic­tory. This biblical chapter can be read as

a kind of war operations plan.

In the 10th century, B.C., we find David beginning his military career by cutting off the head of Goliath with a sword. David ruled Israel as the beloved king and slayer of “10,000 enemies,” and remained in God’s favor. Jesus Christ came from the line of David. David never was deluded about war and unilateral disarmament; nor was his son, Solomon, who told his people, “To everything there is a season ... a time of war, andatimeofpeace” (Eccles. 3:1,8).

The beating of “swords into plow­shares” (Isa. 2:4) is perhaps the most misused passage in the scriptures in de­fense of unilateral disarmament. Actu­ally, it is a part of Isaiah’s vision of the coming Kingdom when wars shall be no more. Later, the Prophet Joel had a vision about beating “plowshares into swords” (Joel 3:10) in preparation for the Battle of Armageddon. Pacifists skip this verse.

Jesus criticized neither the military nor defense. He healed a Roman centurion’s servant and marvelled at the soldier’s faith without lecturing him about his war­like ways. The Apostle Peter had a simi­lar close contact with a warrior in the conversion of Cornelius and his entire family, the first Gentiles to accept Chris­tianity; God chose a soldier above all oth­ers for this distinction.

The religious pacifists want U. S. disarmament and a weapons freeze, but would they consider the tragic scenario offered by columnist Victor E. Jacobson in the 11 December 1979 Lutheran Standard, “Whatever nation manages to retain its guns by one pretense or another . . . will have achieved what Nebuchad­nezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Attilla, Saladin, Caesar, Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin nearly got, but couldn’t keep”?

“Space Race”

(See J. E. Lacouture, pp. 51-57, February 1983; C. B. Stevens, p. 89, July 1983; R. S.

Dickman, p. 82, August 1983 Proceedings)

James D. Craig—Captain Lacouture’s highly informative and well-researched article exaggerates the laser’s military potential. No matter how large a laser weapon the Soviets were able to place in orbit, we would always be able to counter that threat with a larger, more powerful, ground-based laser which would kill the Soviet satellite before it closed to its own operating range. A dozen nuclear-pow­ered lasers ringing the United States would probably prevent any Soviet ag­gressor satellites from passing overhead close enough to damage the surface. De­fensive laser weapons could also be placed on nuclear-powered Navy ships to protect our sea-lanes against such attacks^

Equally important, a ground-based

laser could be much more heavily fort¹' fied than an orbiting laser, giving it ^an insuperable advantage. Orbiting l^aser weapons would be extremely expensive, by comparison, and would be knocked out in huge numbers, making the offen­sive use of lasers a potential economic fiasco. It is likely, then, that our military strategists will reach the logical deduc­tion: laser weapons should be deployed only in defensive positions on the ground, or as killer satellites deployed only against other satellites and space­craft. However, since no effective laser weapon capable of attacking the Earth from an orbiting position has yet been designed, our development of defensive laser weapons remains at the contingency planning stage.

Our scientists’ original projections ot the devastating potential of orbiting space lasers were based upon the hypothetic^ possibility that all laser weapons would need inexhaustible natural sources ot energy, such as solar energy, to power the laser’s huge, sudden bursts of energy- This need gave orbiting lasers a signifi­cant advantage, since their energy cells would be closer to the sun, its rays undi­luted by the Earth’s atmosphere. How­ever, given the successful linkage of ^a laser weapon to a nuclear reactor, as sci­entists now predict, the strategic advan­tage reverts to the ground-based laser- Consequently, our laser research and development should be directed toward this mission.

“Iowa vs. Yamato: The Ultimate Gunnery Duel”

(See T. Hone and N. Friedman, pp. 122-123,

July 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Lawrence E. Hoskins, LJ■ Naval Reserve—This article was of p^ar' ticular interest to me. I served in a con­verted “four piper,” the USS ElH^ot (DMS-4), during the war and spent many months towing high-speed targets. were engaged in firing practices morning, noon, and night with everything from ^a little sub chaser to the /own-class battle­ship. The only class we missed was the Alaska-class battle cruiser of which there were only three, and they arrived late id the war. These practices involved indi­vidual units as well as entire formations- There were also carrier air groups with their dive bombing, ship bombing, torpedoing, rockets, and machine g^un strafing. For further diversification there were submariners, armed fleet auxih²'

[^Ies> Patrol aircraft, Marine Corps artil- ^ery- ar>d Army shore batteries. Towing speeds varied from five to 27 knots. (We ad concerns about the stress on the tow- ^lng cable at any speed above 27 knots.) I ^c'te the foregoing merely to emphasize ¹ at of all of these practices, the lowa- ass battleship long-range practice (over ^e horizon) was the most eerie. Our con- ^Cem, of course, was whether they had the ⁿght target? We towed the target at 1,500 yards. Hone and Friedman question the 0Was ability to distinguish between tar­gets with a combined length of less than .400 yards. This would seem to be cutting it a little close.” 1 am just as 8 ad we were not aware of this at the hme.

The Iowas always fired nine-gun ^alv°s, and the opening one usually ^straddled the target.

As best my memory serves me, the ships equipped with the then-state-of- ^e-art fire control radars were very accu- tjde and consistent in their performance, he only occasion when they “missed” y ^any great degree was when they had ,, wrong     target—us.               We were

straddled” five times one night in a Practice with three Cleveland-class light ^cruisers and three times during a daylight Practice with a Juneau-c\ass antiaircraft cruiser.

the Iowas are beautiful ships whose Power and speed are impressive. Long ^may they steam!

“Sealift”

t L. Holloway, pp. 28-37, June 1983 Proceedings)

Earvin O. Miller—Admiral Holloway’s ^article stated that the United States will ⁿced a sealift force of 350 dry cargo mer­^c ant ships to support a Korea- or Viet- harn-size conflict in the far reaches of the hdian Ocean. He used this scenario to ^ejtplain the difficulties the U. S. Mer­^chant Marine would face in meeting this military sealift requirement. With only 250 U. S. flag dry cargo ships currently in private operation, the other dry cargo ships needed for the sealift would have to come from the dry cargo ships now laid up in the National Defense Reserve Fleet. However, the admiral stated that 140 of the 180 reserve ships were built before 1945, so the sealift value of these old ships in our reserve fleet is slim today and decreasing rapidly with time.

In addition to the actual number of merchant ships needed to carry cargo, Admiral Holloway noted there will be a requirement for additional merchant ships to allow for losses from hostile action. What kind of losses are we talking about? Perhaps it would be helpful to look back at World War II for some indications. In the Atlantic during 1942, German sub­marines were sinking more than 100 al­lied merchant ships each month—more than three ships per day! Replacement shipping was fortunately provided by the United States through the efforts of rug­ged industrialists like Henry J. Kaiser whose shipyards were turning out simple, dry cargo Liberty ships in a matter of days. For example, the Kaiser Shipyards in Richmond, California, laid the keel for the SS Robert E. Peary on 8 November 1942. Four days and 15 hours later, the ship was launched; three days after that the ship completed outfitting and steamed across the bay to commence loading cargo. Kaiser achieved this capability in less than a year after Pearl Harbor and this included his construction of the ship­yard from which the SS Robert E. Peary was launched.

Discussing the suitability of merchant ships for military sealift, Admiral Hollo­way indicated that the 18 U. S. flag Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro/Ro) ships are ide­ally suited for the shipment of tanks and trucks. However, it should be noted that unloading Ro/Ro ships requires a harbor and pier space for the Ro/Ro ramp. Going back again to World War II for lessons learned, in the summer of 1944 there was a desperate need for ports in France to support the Allied advance after D-Day. The Germans fortified and heavily de­fended the channel and port facilities and clogged the inner harbor with scuttled ships. For a long time. Allied merchant ships at Cherbourg were limited to un­loading cargo into barges while anchor­ing in the outer harbor. The barges had been brought from Southern England, which was only a day’s tow away from Cherbourg. The loaded barges were then moved near shore within the harbor, at high tide, and unloaded into trucks at low tide (fortunately, the tides were big and the harbor bottom hard).

The 21 existing U. S. flag LASH/ Seabee barge-carrying ships have great potential for sealift because they can un­load their own barges in any protected water. There is a big difference in mili­tary potential between the 18 LASH and the three Seabee barge ships. The LASH carries barges the size of Navy Mike boats and the Seabee carries barges twice as big—the size of a YC barge. Admiral Holloway noted an advantage of barge ships is being able to carry floating cranes that could be used to unload container ships in unimproved Indian Ocean ports. (It is obviously a big advantage to carry a floating crane long distances at 20 knots instead of towing it at five knots.) How­ever, only the three Seabee ships can carry floating cranes because they are too big for LASH ships.

Developing techniques to use the exist­ing limited resources of the U. S. Mer­chant Marine for military sealift may be the best the Department of Defense can do for now, but will there be time to crank up the modem equivalent of the Kaiser Shipyards in a future war?

In 1942, the Kaiser Shipyards con­structed the SS Robert E. Peary in four days and 15 hours. Would it be possible to match such a feat today?