This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Baseball. You know what’s amazing about baseball? So few people get on base and even fewer score. So often the batter is trying so hard for a home run that he fails even to get in scoring position. The home run goal is a valid model of the American psyche. We are always looking for a dramatic fix, the quantum leap forward. We need to learn to hit singles, doubles, and even to bun consistently. Looking for a single big fix for Navy train'11? is wrong. No home run will win the game. However, by gradually changing our game plan to a long-range or strUj tegic plan, we can achieve consistently a well-trained an combat-winning U. S. Navy team.
e„ any unrelated or isolated programs will not be very end'll6 ^°°d people and a lot of money will not be stn ^ There must be a cohesive vision, which gives mn Ctr t0 eff°rts °f training a 600-ship navy with jnre t'lan 270,000 people. The strategic plan for the train- e(^ucat'on the Navy requires must recognize the to or c°mbat efficiency and bond individual programs of inn ^ must evo*ve as requirements change. The goal eVer Y/° combat efficiency is a continuing one and cannot mr e reached;” therefore, all training and education S adapt to new technologies. In the fluid environment els3n lncreasingly high-technology Navy, rising force levis ^ ^ a decreasing recruit population, a plan with vision
towSor»e °f °ur best people have been nudged recently oritard Gaining community as a result of the high pri- Ch ^f^ace<f on these jobs by both the current and former this S ^ava* Operations. Detailers have implemented to T** Push; yet’ toe fleet people are still uncertain as in ”ere training billets rank among shore jobs. Is teach- tha COrn^at information center (CIC) procedures better a (,n recruiting, better than being an aide, better than being |.(r^*a|lCr’ better than a billet in the Office of Naval Ward tOP-095)? Most fleet lieutenants have some serious alb tS °nly Prom°tion boards will tell the true story, tra'61110° ^ate or tc,day’s decision. The strategic plan for s(a!njn8 must affirm a rational role for training and bring it ton essent'al detailing problem is that the true
bill ^ °fficer or enlisted is “required” in 80% of Navy (jeets- These front-runners may be good, but they cannot edu'n tW° fl'aces at one tone. Fortunately, the training and Pe()C|lt'°n se8ment °f the Navy does not need all top 10% WelP e to succeed. It does need good people, themselves cle tra'ned and educated, in a stable environment with a futar *^ea of what is expected now and a plan for the enf ^ ^'S strategic plan for training must permeate the ,‘re Navy, not just the schoolhouse ashore. Often, and is 'Cally * d is forgotten that the only purpose of training ^rational effectiveness: to win in combat.
°Pe nVln® ships and airplanes is fun and exciting. Pure atte aP°nal efforts are easy to concentrate on and attract be htl0n naturally. Other vital, yet less sexy, areas tend to esS Unt°d off the main track. Training joins other areas that ‘ ^ 'n wartime such as logistics and mine warfare On] ln Peacetime are not as dramatic as ships and planes, baj ^ W'^ a strategic plan for training can we begin to Soance fun jobs with other vital areas. Simply detailing Thie °f °ur best people to training is going for the big hit. hot a°me mn philosophy will produce a nonevent: a few VVjtjirunnei's sacrificed for a quick splash and much hoopla n° follow-up. We owe ourselves more if we are to ln >n war.
Th
fUne Plun for training can be divided into two parts: Atonal and philosophical. The functional area deals °so 1a"0c‘to°n of people and the physical plant. The phil- t0 Pbical concern addresses methods by which we choose sl —eet our mission, or indeed how the mission itself fjea be shaped. For example, should we employ recent sailors as instructors (functional) using a classical textbook approach (philosophical), or are there more efficient functional and philosophical means available? There is no natural dichotomy between these two groups; in fact, function and philosophy should complement one another in any successful strategic plan. Each of these extremes in the training area must be addressed fully, although each will take different talents. Functionally, the thrust of this plan is to develop a cadre of semipermanent professional teachers to conduct the Navy’s training and bring it as close to the fleet as possible. Philosophically, the objective is to incorporate training as closely as possible with operations, maintenance, and repair.
Several of the most pressing overall problems will be addressed. First, what should be the composition of the group that will carry out our training? Should it be fleet sailors ashore for the first time on a two-year tour or some other group or mix? Second, how can the training establishment be brought closer to the fleet? Should the school- house ashore help with tactics and innovative war fighting? Third, how should the Navy keep up with the most recent educational methods and what does this mean for the educators themselves? Fourth, what methods can we use to reduce the amount of training required to achieve high combat efficiency? Finally, is it possible to thoroughly integrate training with daily operations? These elements will be the structure for forming objectives over the next decade.
A ten-year outline of the plan is a good starting point. Modifications are not only inevitable but also desirable under future changes in technology, force strength, and resources. Changes can be incorporated easily within the phased nature of the plan. By targeting specific actions far enough in advance, each phase should be implemented smoothly. There is no practical way to meet all training objectives immediately. If the Navy tries to surge strongly to training now, there will soon be an inevitable surge away, as neglected areas weaken and call for attention. Nevertheless, some actions can be started now with a completion target of five years. Others will fill in the ten- year strategic plan.
The first area to address in improving Navy training is the educators themselves. Philosophically, there are three goals in this area:
► Stability of method
► Stability of system
► Stability of change
Using shore-based enlisted training as an example, each of these areas can be met functionally with a different group of educators. To stabilize the method of teaching, junior college and seasoned high school teachers should be hired in a phased program over the next five years. To preserve a military atmosphere and to administer and balance the Navy training system, a cadre of good officers and enlisted almost fully dedicated to the training field must be created. Since technology will increase fast and require constant fleet feedback, the stability of change must be protected by recent fleet sailors stationed in training commands. By migrating gradually to a mix of instructors who are experienced, military, and current, stability with progress and balance is possible. Exact ratios of
Five years of the ten-year strategic plan have
each group are not critical; however, no single area snuuiu be significantly stronger than the other two.
Five years is not too long to achieve balance between civilian educators, military cadre, and fleet sailors. As an immediate step, a moderate number of seasoned professionals—high school vice principals, for instance— should be hired and placed in responsible Navy training positions. The talent cut should be high, thus the offered compensation must be able to draw them away from good jobs. By hiring now, these civilians should begin to reach the higher positions as more instructors are hired later. The billet structure should change gradually to allow them to progress professionally. Although they would always be subordinate to the military cadre, they should have significant teaching and some administrative responsibilities. At the end of five years, several should have already reached their senior positions in training organizations.
Now is also the time to select members of the Navy training cadre. These officers and enlisted can be recruited from the general unrestricted line officer cadre and some warfare specialties. Some are already qualified high school or junior college instructors, but this fact is lost to a personnel system that does not record these important skills in automated personnel records. There are many talented specialists who, although passed over for promotion, would make up a perfect cadre of experts. This group would trade the excitement and challenge of sea duty and its attendant higher promotion percentages for geographical and job stability and satisfaction of educating the fleet. As military officers and enlisted, this cadre would share teaching responsibilities with the civilian staff and a few of the fleet sailors. As specialists in military education and training, this new professional group would be primarily responsible for implementing the gradually changing architecture of Navy training. For example, training received at boot camp, basic electronics school, and an advanced technical school must be carefully and continuously integrated. This stable blue-suited cadre will provide the administrators and planners and some teachers for Navy training and will ensure stability of the education and training method.
The fleet sailor who comes ashore for an instructor tour continues to play a vital role in this strategic plan for training. Only the emphasis changes. Gradually, this operationally oriented individual will be given fewer tasks of instructing students and will spend more time educating the civilian and military cadre. In other words, a tactically sharp electronic warfare operator or proficient machinist’s mate is used as a living link with the fleet. The major job of this third group is to stay current in how the fleet is using their professional speciality and to help educators mold these facts and practices into the curriculum. Thus, the stability of change will be ensured.
Changing the makeup of the educators should be completed within the first five years. As mentioned, hiring some civilians can be done immediately. Other actions can be implemented within two years. Philosophically, the Navy needs a plan to bring training closer to the fleet. As a functional example, the Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG) in Norfolk, Virginia, should be relocated
to the Surface Warfare Officer’s School (SWOS) in NeW' port, Rhode Island. This move would act as a double cata lyst. First, since every surface department head, executive officer, and commanding officer spend significant time' the school, there would be a superb bank of talent on which to draw for innovative solutions to problems. SeC ond, the SWDG can provide a catalyst to students to take fresh ideas to the fleet with them. ,
Even if a physical move such as co-locating SWOS an SWDG is not possible, the philosophical goal is stl achievable. Training commands must be tasked with Pr° viding the rest of the Navy with more than just training- By using a combination of student and educator talent^ new ideas or revised procedures can be nurtured, deve. oped, and then sent to appropriate bureaus for analysis an adaption. Again, using the example of SWOS, this tin3- without the SWDG move, every student should be re quired to write a constructive paper on a tactic, pJanne maintenance system procedure, equipment improvemen ■ or some such detailed topic. After class presentation1' which would ensure peer pressure, the staff c°u . strengthen good papers and pass the ideas on in their ra state. Training must be a living, vital force that is an >nl portant part of the mainstream Navy.
been
sketched. Although the following actions could be imp e mented in the first five years, the home run temptat'0 must be resisted. The long-range, measured approach is important as many specific actions. .
Six years from now, the Navy should have phased m program for educating our military educators. Philosop111 cally, the goal is to provide quality instruction to the fi£ using modern methods. Luring experienced civilians ^ Navy training will help; however, we must have enoug intellectual perspective to plan, integrate, and operate o own training establishment. Functionally, an education3 plan with a strong subspecialty field is needed. In the an nual allocation of graduate school quotas, the new field 0 educational specialists must be supported.
Primarily, these students will be the military cadre r£ ferred to earlier: the professional military educators. ' long-range education plan must increasingly encoura^ pursuit of masters’ or doctorate degrees in education af associate degrees. To keep current with modem educ tional advances, civilian universities and colleges sh°u be used. There should be a proportionally higher perce.n age of subspecialists with advanced degrees in educati0 than there are now in other fields. We have many techm degrees, but is human capital any less important than m3 chines of war? Of course not. Without proper training-' machines will not be operated properly. The educati0 subspeciality, if carefully developed, is an ideal care path for general unrestricted line officers or for otn members of the military cadre.
The next phase of the strategic plan should be met ; the seventh year. The goal is to meet some of today • objectives by not training. That is, training is not the so 1 tion to every problem. For example, the Navy should st°P training junior officers for technical jobs that others can
•ning
tech6r" other words, we should make better use of our list 1'Ca^y an(l professionally qualified officers and en- c "Promote instead of train. In the surface warfare Ele rnUy’ Philosophy has already paid dividends. fargC r°a'c material officers (EMOs) used to be junior war- caf tlcers w’th no required technical undergraduate edu- elec?n Their Performance on ships with highly complex Was r°n'CS su‘tes was predictably lacking. Better training Wanot the answer. Instead, experienced limited duty and d ant officers were substituted in this billet. This move pro^!at’cally increased the EMO’s level of knowledge and ers '^1 upward mobility for some fine enlisted perform- anie “ter areas such as main propulsion and safety are of t ■ . to 'he same type of solution. Promoting instead effi rain,n8 personnel will create more specialists. More USC ^aval War College and enlisted acade- car Shou^ help provide broadening perspectives at mid- cj j. r ancl senior levels. The gradual transition from spe- traj'St to generalist is inevitable with seniority, but the C(ain8 burden will be lightened if the broadening push es later rather than earlier in a career. ere are other ways to achieve high combat efficiency
late °Ut ^ra'n>ng- Philosophically, the Navy must articu- Prec*se training standards to ensure consistent imple- etl • dtlon. As a functional example, consider destroyer Cea!|aeer'ng problems over the last decade. After the Plain ~^re *n Vietnam, the Navy focused on engineering age(jS 'hat were below standards, ill run, and poorly man- Illoti nsteat* °1 dramatically increasing training or pro- °ni n8 Personnel, inspections of plants were held. Since traj . "e final exam of the extensive nuclear engineering program was crudely adapted, destroyers were forced from hot combat to combating heat stress. The goals were correct, but the quick-fix plan was wrong. The Propulsion Examining Board’s (PEB) reign of terror is still not over. Only within the last year have the standards of the East Coast PEB and the Fleet Training Group in Cuba approached each other. Even today, those standards are not the same for the West Coast or for the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv). Training to different operational standards for the same equipment is ludicrous. One solution for remedying this problem is to use the Planned Maintenance System to run standardized systems tests. Already in use on some combat systems, this approach would integrate the goals of all inspectors in a single set of instruction cards. System tests would be conducted from once a day to every three years and would be understood and expected by all. With fewer areas left to interpretation of an individual inspector, InSurv, PEB, and refresher training should become more routine. Both inspectors and fleet commanders should agree on standards for the plants such as safety, efficiency, combat capability, and consistency. These goals should be institutionalized in an Engineering Systems Operational Test
U. S. NAVY (K HARRISON)
Training commands can and should provide the Navy with more than training. They should create an atmosphere where new ideas are generated and exploited by the fleet. Students should write and present papers on a tactic, planned maintenance system procedure, or some such detailed topic.
program. Unfortunately, no one ranking lower than the three-star Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare (OP-03) can force such a consensus.
When presented with a similar proposal for conducting inspections, one squadron commander initially gave his support to the concept. Then, because of his wariness of fleet perceptions and how his seniors would react to the idea and because of his inability to kill the new idea with an intellectual coup de grace, he allowed it to starve to death in the “too-hard” box. With that type of response to fleet innovation, training will become much harder indeed. Training standards must be as universal as possible, and the fleet’s efforts at combat efficiency should not be diluted by trying to please too many masters.
Within eight years of the implementation of the strategic plan, the training community should be using technology to solve many of today’s tactical training problems. The high cost of technology has prevented buying enough smart weapons with which to practice routinely realistic battle scenarios. Phoenix and Harpoon missiles are so expensive that in a five-year period, any given crew cannot hope to fire as many weapons as they would in the first day of war. Commodore Thomas Truxtun’s admonition to “practice daily with the guns” has metamorphosed into “try to get one shot off every year or so!” And get a shot off at what? A realistic all-weather, supersonic, electronics countermeasure-capable target? Not likely. The fleet has called for realistic targets for too many years. Procurement priorities clearly lie elsewhere. We must train against realistic scenarios, for the most sophisticated missile or platform will not win the war by itself.
The training community can help. With eight years’ experience, the military cadre should have expanded its charter to play a primary role in solving fleet tactical problems using innovative training and advanced technology. Aircraft trainers and some isolated combat systems trainers are starting to push technology. Electronic warfare, which should have been a major tactical and training effort since the late 1960s, has only recently started to provide realistic simulation. Soon, however, monopulse trackers, and spread spectrum, phased arrays will be used in increasingly complex emitters, causing difficult emulation problems. Trainers must be prepared to change rapidly if they are to respond realistically to a wide range of scenarios. Technology will push trainers toward digitalized mass storage to synthesize audio and visual effects processed by computer to give integrated cues to the student. If the training community can manage this advanced technology to keep trainers realistic, the trainers will lend themselves to a valid evaluation of tactics.
Tactical evaluation in a training environment or at least
The fleet’s long-standing request for permission to routinely fire smart weapons—like this Harpoon—in realistic battle scenarios will continue to be denied because of the high costs of these weapons. Yet, the first day of a war will see more such weapons launched than would be fired in five years of peace.
with training equipment must be an integral part of atl'? strategic plan for training. The high cost of aircraft, sup' port facilities, and fuel for all operations will lead to in creasing use of simulators. Training functions should Pe integrated in new equipment so that training can be done on site. More important, tactical teams must be able to practice routinely without access to off-unit facilities- In particular, use of video-discs and microprocessors with several hundred million byte storage will provide *** teractive tactical simulators, which respond realistically10 a student and react to incorrect and even correct moves as an opponent might. Only through the integrated use 0 hundreds of microprocessors can the training commum. amass enough elements of a battle group to make train11*5 realistic and tactically important. Today, admirals occa sionally play war games in Newport; in eight years, 1 training community must have them standing in line 1 time at Fleet Combat Training Centers. ,
The final goal of the ten-year plan, which is also 1 most difficult to fulfill, encompasses much. Philosopn cally, the objective is to integrate thoroughly training w‘ daily operations. Functionally, the Navy must link con* puters with sailors under a program that allows instruct* to become indistinguishable from operation, maintenance’ or repair work. In fact, training should become a pad operating. ,
For someone with six or seven thumbs who nea* •* failed seventh-grade shop, I have nevertheless built a co*
1 .-nONNELL
bUsj Isi0n> rebuilt a car transmission, wrote and sold a in„ ySS So^ware program—all without a speck of “train- aCted Ct’ 'n eacb case, I studied detailed publications that signed^ guide, doctor, and crutch. With carefully de- tjncf tecbnical support in the form of manuals, the dis- rePai'°nS between training, operating, maintaining, and lUxur'n§ become hazy. In a wartime mobilization, the is Unp,0^ a half-year electronics pipeline for a new sailor kj)0 ! The training community must press as much Ten vC(^C UPon the fleet sailor as he can possibly grasp, goal ^rS may not even be enough time to meet such a Sp ’ ecause computers must be integrated into a wide TodUrn every sailor’s activities, eight ’ 3 Spfucmce-class destroyer may have as many as Only computers performing operational duties,
biiity 3 ract*on °f that power is used for any training capa- t°n - ’ anc* even that is limited to rudimentary tactical butt° sit b 'f1^' ^ sa*lor assigned to fix a widget must be able pr°Vj, ^orc a console and use the interactive program pr0vide by the training community. The computer will troub] 6 r,aS mucb training as the sailor requires as the Womd Sf °°!in8 Progresses. For example, the computer Wavef Urn'sb only circuit diagrams and oscilloscope dem0n<>rniS to a Tirst-class petty officer, while it would applj . rate resistor-capacitor resonance characteristics as Should l° w*^8ct to a less-knowledgeable sailor, bin nu "!^art be needed, the computer would provide a elec. rnber where the part could be found or prepare an Ward i/1'0 SUpp’y document with little assistance, then fort° inte l° boss s terminal. Pushing electronic manuals grate planned maintenance, training, supply, operational theory, and tactical practice is an important goal. It seems impossible now. It will remain so until a long-range plan for training is developed, accepted, and pushed by the top ranks.
The overall goal of this ten-year strategic plan for training is to win in combat. Many people will disagree with individual programs; few can find fault with the goal. Moreover, without some agenda, without some vision, without some cohesive goal, Navy training will continue in its fragmented fashion. The Chief of Naval Operations is right; training is important. It is too important to employ the home run philosophy in developing training programs. The U. S. Navy must be so well trained that any opponent will be deterred from ever trying us.
This is not baseball. We need vision.
Commander Libbey earned his PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy as the first Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar in Naval History. He was a member of the Naval Institute Board of Control and CO of the USS Nicholson (DD-982). Currently, Commander Libbey is assigned as a planning, programming, and budgeting coordinator in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.