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stand
Provide sufficient funds for an out-
Somersnand deC^ en^ste(* personnel, larily ^ .S^PS have participated volun- mate • ,US'nS standardized instructional Nava? b!, devel°Ped by the Chief of Naval Ifducat'on and Training. And the tecre .• ddaiY Personnel Command’s fillin'°n headcluarters (CNMPC-65) is dinat^ neW d'dets "eet recreation coor- it ca°rSh'n major ports all over the world; nrno" c°nimands institute such a P °jfram in their ships. obvjeyoad tdese teaching techniques, we offlCeUsly cannot afford to assign inept billet^/0 Spec'a* services or recreation a,,.. . ’ instead, we need one of the most job j>Slye Jfnior officers available in that lead? reicrahly he should be the kind of athW W0ldd be elected captain of an ate” 1C team> the kind who can “oper- tion '^e muitifaceted world of recrea- abro’a imagination at home and And1* fand maPe efficient use of assets, a ink ° C0Urse, he must be rewarded for J°bwell done.
g0 j nimanding officers must exercise over the recreation s °f their commands. Good ships’ aged "tf recreati°n program if well man- in o ^Ut t0° oPten tbc profits are blown Party6 t tW° ni§bts of an all-free ship’s y' fhe stakes of stress management
are too high to allow these scarce assets to be frivolously expended by the whims of the recreation committee—or by a lack of imagination. Recreation committees make recommendations and recreation councils comment and forward, but commanding officers decide how to spend recreation funds in their ships.
New language in the Navy Comptroller Manual (Volume VII, Change 40) provides for substantial use of appropriated funds for recreational activities in fleet units, and should be well known by a ship’s command structure. Yet most ships don’t carry Volume VII, and some shore comptrollers are reluctant to admit that Change 40 was intended seriously, because it is a significant change to most previous interpretations. To keep the recreational fund useful in the expansion of the scope of activities, or to support ventures overseas when stress is higher, small fees can defray part of the cost of expensive activities. Some ships sell booklets of tickets for these activities in the ship’s store, where they are accounted for separately from other stock. The coupons can be used for various programs offered through the recreation agenda. This scheme provides a needed distributive element in the system, prevents a small group from monopolizing a free good, partially pays for upkeep and replacement to maintain the equipment in first-class condition, and also gives us a means of assessing the popularity of various programs. Prices are adjusted with experience, to keep them at the breakeven point or just below.
All these techniques can build a good program and keep it going. But the desired end should be kept firmly in mind, and the snickers pushed back into our pasts. We are seeking valuable and healthy recreation for our men and women, which will refresh them mentally to do the jobs that must be done if our ships are to fulfill their commitments. Imagination, initiative, efficient use of assets, and command interest are essential elements in any good program. But they won’t work until our personnel have the skills required to participate. If Navy life is going to be “more than a job,” then we’ve got to help our sailors share in the adventure.
Captain Bonds was commissioned through the NROTC program at Rice University in 1962. During his career, he commanded an ocean minesweeper and an ammunition ship. Currently, he is the first Director of Navy Sailing; as such, he is the cognizant staff officer for the fleet’s sail training program on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Education and Training and the Chief of Naval Personnel.
ll^ther Words . . .
By (j' ' "
tenant Commander Mark R. Lenci, U.
that 'i'CS tde Navy have an officer corps incrS adec)uately trained to meet both the ernasinS lechnical demands of the mod- redu' eap>on ^sterns in the fleet, and the vv0ri'fed social-political understanding of rectl S'tuat'ons to employ that fleet cor- i°us ft0 meet bb S. objectives in the var- jn th °rrns of peace and war, everywhere Hern Woidd? These awesome require- offics mean that the Navy must have an
CorPs that is equally at home in the at, , rn combat information center or in„ ^ Propulsion plant as it is at a meet- Co NATO defense ministers, or while state lnating dc'cnsc efforts of various \yes ln the Persian Gulf. In other words, in /'Ccd officers who can speak and think ^ords other than English. fjCerV|°Usly a midshipman or junior of- |jncaonot be expected to have the same jUst'St'C *eve* as a ^eet commander, but for US warfare skills, the foundation |ai(jlnternational relations skills must be velat 'he beginning of a career and de- C() Tcd throughout it. The naval officer 'his f CUrren,|y has a crucial weakness in n0rjt0Undation in that only a small mi- y °f midshipmen are required to ob-
S. Navy
tain a foreign language ability.
A set of grammatical rules and a body of words are normally associated with learning a foreign language, but properly instructed, one also acquires a means of communication that provides invaluable insight into a people, their country, and their culture. This insight is not provided by pure information about the culture during language instruction (which could be gained simply through English language texts) or even by time spent “in country.” The insight intended here is gained by learning to express oneself as a German would to another German, or as a Pole would to another Pole.
In doing this, one notices differences that are invaluable clues to the understanding of a culture. Examples of these clues are numerous: Why is there no direct translation for certain words? What is different about America and Americans, that a need never developed for these words'? Why is there no easy way to say some common English expressions in the foreign language? What is different about a foreign culture that causes those expressions never to occur in it? The answers to questions like these provide crucial keys to understanding other countries, and to seeing the world and events in it from their perspective. Quite simply, foreign language ability is a valuable key to international relations.
This foreign language key is not limited to dealing with the culture whose language is learned. Once one has had the experience of seeing the world as a completely different culture would, this experience is carried to dealings with all other cultures. This is difficult for Americans to grasp, because the United States is relatively isolated from foreign cultures on its continent, and because Americans have persisted in assuming that English is the international language.
English is, in fact, common in many fields where the United States has led the world, but it is not a substitute for foreign languages. This condition has long been recognized throughout the rest of the world. The Helsinki Accords call for the signatory states “to encourage the study of foreign language and civilization as an important means of expanding communication among peoples.” This communi-
■Weed
">RS / October 1983
147
cation is especially important today, because the United States depends more than ever on its allies. This increasing dependence, compared with the growing wave of nationalism in the world, is defining new relations with our allies. In these relationships, U. S. allies are clearly looking for American leadership. But U. S. leadership often appears arrogant in the eyes of the Third World governments because our senior personnel seem to make no effort to communicate in a foreign language. The fact that the majority of Americans do not recognize this tendency (or when they do, cannot understand it) goes a long way toward explaining the “ugly American” image abroad. A foreign language ability on the part of U. S. officials would greatly improve this situation.
It should be noted that most other countries have accepted foreign language abilities as a fact of life. For example, a member of the Japanese Foreign Ministry will routinely receive his training in both Soviet and American universities, and then in the country or area of his spe
cialty. Similarly, a glance through any major European newspaper will reveal that the large majority of offers for management positions—even secretarial positions—require a minimum knowledge of one foreign language; very often, a second is required.
In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is understood that all partners will have the ability to communicate in English. The United States should not, however, view this understanding as justification to relegate foreign language abilities to the sidelines. The opposite is, in fact, the case. In NATO, it is even more important that American officers have a solid understanding of their counterparts and their respective cultures.
Unlike many problems facing the Navy, significant progress can be made toward correcting our deficiency in foreign language abilities without major impact on existing training and advanced education programs. Rather than discussing a Navy-wide solution, let us focus on one of its high-visibility educational institutions; the U. S. Naval Academy.
Studies recommends that a language t quirement should be reinstated at all c° leges and universities. In accordance w ^ the commission’s recommendation,
for the reasons cited here, a languaj^ proficiency should be required at Naval Academy for all midshipmen’ gardless of their majors.
Because midshipmen carry a full at- demic load, at least two science/e11^ neering courses would have to be changed for the same number of f°re s language courses. Midshipmen who quire specific engineering or scien abilities immediately upon grauua)n_
(i.e., for nuclear power training or gr
ate school) receive the special
radu-
trainif-
they need in the form of special Two less technical courses at the ^ .
Academy will not make a significant
dif'
i,
ference in performance at these sch or in the fleet.
Although a junior officer may have ^ initially intense engineering oriental1
" ir a c
to
come of3
he or she is also being prepared for 3(£) reer and must obtain the groundwor ' handle the challenges that will
later. In this respect, the acquisition foreign language ability shares iw. tance with the acquisition of a good ifr nical background; the two abilities are mutually exclusive. on
As much as possible, all personfl® ^ staffs or units (both shore-based
afloat) that are based in non-Eng * speaking countries should receive guage training. This could take the . at a minimum, of a six-to-eight'WL course at the Defense Language Inst* or, preferably, a full language cour- (nine to 12 months). ue
Thought should also be given to expansion of our exchange progra This “two-way street” has the additi0*^ advantage of expanding the understa ^ ing of U. S. military services by °ur lies. These allied officers could bly enhance U. S. language programs * exchange instructors. ^
A foreign language background c play an important role throughout onL
Words cannot describe the feeling of a Navy skipper who, while docking his ship, suddenly is unable to communicate with his foreign pilot.
Current Naval Academy policy requires that 80% of the midshipmen choose a scientific engineering major. Only the remaining 20%—those majoring in English, economics, history, or political science—have a language requirement. The President’s Commission on Foreign Languages and International
naval career. A member of the U Navy cannot be expected to step out cockpit, combat information center control room and perform in the 11a tary-political arena successfully with0 . solid background that has been develop throughout his career. This backgr°u ^ must include a foreign language abihty- can only result in the better accompjj ^ ment of the Navy’s mission arm stronger, wiser America.
of 3 , °{ mi1*'
Lieutenant Commander Lend is the engineering cer on board the USS Tullibee (SSN-597).
off1'
148
Proceedings / October