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defense projects, the concept of one orn1^ shiphandling simulators being opera ^ for the Navy by a professional train' - organization would appear to be via
knowledge of the rules of the road. Wrong answers are indicated immediately, and the correct answer is presented with an explanation. If he scores less than 90% on the test, he begins a tutorial exercise in that category of the rules. He is retested and, upon passing, goes on to the next category. Reactions of officers exposed to the program have been extremely positive.
Currently under investigation is the desirability and potential for the training of additional categories of officers, including those at the junior and department head surface warfare officer levels and additional surface warfare PCOs/ PXOs. This training would require courses and exercises designed for specific experience levels, from basic to the most advanced. The courses would use computer models of additional combatant ships and service craft, including those with twin screws and auxiliary power units. Special exercises and effects, such as Mediterranean-style mooring and mooring to a buoy, could be presented. Ports used most frequently by Navy ships would be modeled to provide port familiarization and to augment piloting experience. An adjunct to these additional courses would be computer-aided personnel qualification standards instruction and testing, and an augmentation for the accomplishment of practical factors.
Seven-days-a-week availability could also provide Naval Reserve personnel with shiphandling training on weekends and during active duty tours.
In keeping with its approach to aircraft pilot training, MarineSafety is willing to establish one or more ship’s simulator training centers for the Navy’s exclusive use. The centers would be owned by the contractor, and operated by MarineSafety and Seacor under Navy direction, with training being provided on a contract basis. Under this approach, which has been successfully employed by Flight- Safety for more than 30 years, the contractor would be responsible for providing a simulator center that meets the Navy’s training requirements.
The risks involved in the design, integration, and acceptance testing of the simulator system would be borne by the facility contractor. As with other FSI/ MSI training centers, the client’s requirements must be satisfied or the facility will not be used. Which is the better motivator for a well-designed, well-maintained, up-to-date simulator—thousands of
pages of parts and procedures documentation, or a commercial service which might not be used if the customer (in this case, the Navy) is not satisfied?
Funding for the purchase of such facilities necessary to accomplish the expanded, exclusive, Navy training dis
cussed here would probably cost nl0 than $20 million—an almost insurmou11 able problem in today’s tight-budget en vironment. Even when put into the prl grammed objectives memoranda higher priority items become overrid'c considerations, and the line item s " from outyear to outyear into the ne ^ arriving future. Usually the project kept alive with continuing reseat which eats up funds that could be use address new requirements. . j
Considering these factors, combine with the current administration’s thrus involve private capital investment in
Captain Latham retired in 1980 after a 38-year c ^ he served in five ships, and commanded DcS jn_ Squadrons 12 and 24. His shore assignment ^ ^ eluded tours in OpNav and as a project manag^ Naval Sea Systems Command. He received h,s in naval science from the Navy Postgraduate i>c and attended advanced nuclear power school rently, he is employed by Systems Engineering ciates Corporation (SEACOR).
Mr. Garrigan earned his B.S. in physics from ^ phi University, and a master’s degree from ^ land University. He has been involved with 1 (
sign and use of marine training simulators lor ^ six years, and is currently the director of Pr(t development for MarineSafety International-
Damage Control Primer
By Rear Admiral Frederick C. Johnson, U. S. Navy
fittings, fixtures, and appurtenances
dur^
sub'
nec
stances: In addition, safeguard those
in priority, cleaning out, disposing of, and prop1
erfy
Unsolicited advice is usually worth the price paid. Let’s hope that the following is an exception to the rule.
We are engaged in a variety of damage control (DC), engineering, and shipboard safety programs; most of our effort is devoted to crash program corrective casualty control actions. But a balance is needed between preventive and corrective actions. We need to encourage preventive measures fleetwide in order to attain the level of readiness desired. This philosophy, if pushed diligently, would raise the level of readiness more than any other single program, because it is equally applicable to all ships. The recommended program consists of the systematic correction of 11 categories of common shipboard deficiencies which preclude the attainment of good engineering practices and a safe, combat-ready ship. These preventive steps should be included in any program developed in support of shipboard readiness. If a ship’s commander were to take the following steps and sustain the effort, most shipboard examinations and inspections would be a snap:
Eliminate old dirt: Old dirt is embedded dirt, grime, corrosion, verdigris, etc., which has been around so long that one is accustomed to its presence and oblivious to the multitude of sins it covers. Deep, intense, serious removal of old dirt and critical inspection of all systems and structures will—or should—reveal the presence of many of the following conditions, thereby indicating the sequence of action needed. While at it, check the accuracy of all damage control compartment check-off lists, all DC firefighting, and emergency equipment for presence and operational readiness, and the integrity of all DC fittings.
Eliminate electrical problems: Electricity kills, starts fires, initiates explosions, and causes a host of other life-threatening problems. Unfortunately, electricity is an absolute requisite in today’s Navy. Hazard or not, we have to live with it. The first step, then, is to make all dangerous or marginal electrical
safe-
Second, safeguard operator and machin (and ensure the continuity of vital si- vices) by operating and maintaining trical systems within their design li|Tlljj Other electrical system problems sh‘lU be corrected according to need; m®3 while, strict compliance with approp11 safety precautions and tag-out procei is mandatory.
Eliminate undesirable explosive
essary for ship’s combat missions. In1111, diate elimination of unwanted substanc which are explosive, or produce P°te^ ially explosive liquids or gases, should ^ an obviously high-priority action. Yet frequently see numerous violations of1 basic practice. ,.
Eliminate projectile hazards: Imnie ate elimination of any item which c^ become a projectile hazard to persoitne j equipment, stores, or structure she11 equal the reduction of explosive haza ' This is done in two ways-1
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belongs within the system it a
corroJ; damages
thrn!?\ a" ^00sc and adrift hardware fixIUr8hout the ship, and (2) making all e|ernCS’ aPPurtcnances, and structural plateCntS *aSt and secure- Bolt fast floor secure doors,
signedS’iiind 3,1 flttin8s snugly as de- (]Uce ' Use correct materials. Don’t in- |enis ^similar metals corrosion prob- d0w ’ Ctc' Don’t fool yourself by wiring item Wl*^ haywire. Don’t pile a heavy Elimi°n ,t0P’ as an anchor—do it right. finim'3*10'1 °* Pr°jectile hazards will c®n h IZC ^ numt>er of “things” which sion C i,roPeiled by an explosion, colli- injurc°r S”*P'S motion in heavy waves to spre . ffrsonnel. damage structures, or altv wthc after-effects of an initial casu- show7hCd‘Cal records from World War II CuTed h m°re Personnel casualties oc- ffom iu CCause of secondary causes than he initial explosions. are ‘^n‘nate potential fire hazards: Ships st0re;>U . °^ cornbustibles, fuel, ammo, these ’ and Personal effects. Most of n0( b arc.csscntial to operations, and can- their h C*'m‘natcd without detriment. But pro azardous nature can be reduced by dang f Sa^e8uarding. Assuming (always htineif011^ d'at sutdl items are main- |°Caf ln desired quantities and in proper Pres1<>nS’ t^lc r'shs associated with their focnnCC are acceptable. We need to WeuP°n the unacceptable risk sources, oil -CCd '° elirninate fuel oil, lubrication ^hydraulic fluid leaks, eliminate rags ° Stora8c practices (e.g., bales of mm-(>n steam lines), and clean out accu- mavd'0ns °f other combustibles which Prec r 'gn'ted by failing to do any of the quate stePs- We need to ensure ade- minj .Vcr|tilation and fume exhaust to exPim!Zc spontaneous combustion and test °i|1Ve vaPor accumulations. We must Cntgd , v°ids, storerooms, and seldom- lati0C< sPaces for explosive gas accumu- has n,routinely. and always after damage g^ccurred to adjacent spaces. ter- lrn'nute smoke- or gas-yielding ma- fjre° 1' Where there is smoke, there is SUch here may be other problems too, mac[)as a lack or excess of lubricants, of. Incry and electronics operating out v^ces, and so on. Smoke reduces c-i,. I'W’ displaces air, and spreads the al‘y to adjoining areas. prev l,ninate steam leaks: This is both a ter v?llve measure and an economy mat- pCcres' Blowing steam results in engi- hurpln^ Inefficiencies, hazards people, corr0’- ^amages equipment, expedites S()UrSl°n, and is one of the principal |Ca^Ccs °f heat stress. A viable steam efit ftrevention program reaps huge ben- eXnp’ direct|y proportional to the effort nded to contain the steam within its
appointed bounds. A valve, flange, and fitting program pursued diligently pays off. A small steam leak is a sign of weakness which has the potential to grow spontaneously if left unattended, and can be the source of additional damage in connection with another casualty.
Eliminate liquid leaks: Eliminating fuel, lubricant, and hydraulic leaks, and paint and flammable liquids is an obvious benefit. But the insidious dangers and damages of saltwater, feed, condensate, and potable water, and—more recently—sewage go almost unrecognized. Leaks induce moisture, decrease reserve buoyancy, degrade protective coatings, expedite corrosion and erosion, and contaminate fuels, lubricants, and hydraulics. Saltwater increases electrical conductivity because of its electrolytic characteristics, and degrades the protective qualities of most insulations, lagging, and similar coatings and covers used on board ship. The benefits of containing fluids of all categories within designed systems are so significant, one would think that even the newest recruit would bust his tail to stop the continuing floods which will cause him so much extra work, degrade his living style, and endanger his life, limb, and machinery if left unchecked. Yet, observe the number of experienced senior personnel who adamantly insist on heavy leak-off rates on pumps to show that proper cooling is available. Nuts—chances are they don’t know how to pack a pump, either.
Eliminate corrosives: The number of corrosives on board ships today and the damaging effects produced when used improperly should cause deep concern. A positive identification, controlled use, and intense monitoring program should be instituted and maintained. Control of abrasives is a parallel effort which goes hand-in-glove with corrosives control. These substances destroy many materials used in the manufacture of equipment which is vital to engineering plants, damage control, and safety. Soap, hot water, and elbow grease can be a substitute for most corrosives and abrasives, maybe not as easily or quickly, but a lot better in the long run. Encourage it: the crew might like the results.
Control heat loss: Elimination of undesirable heat losses by proper ventilation, circulation, and insulation may not prevent combat action damage. But such action can minimize disadvantageous and debilitating heat stress on people working in hot spaces and may deny one of the basic ingredients of fire, smoke, explosion, and gas generation—namely, heat. The cooling of electronic equipment, hydraulic systems, and hot spaces prolongs manpower and machinery life. A hot, humid engineering space is an indication of an improperly operated and maintained plant. A viable program to eliminate heat loss will reap large day- to-day benefits as well as pay untold dividends during combat operations when the ship is “buttoned up.”
Eliminate new dirt: Timely elimination of new dirt will preclude regeneration or extenuation of the old dirt problem, and all that goes with it.
It seems logical that prudent people would seek out and eliminate shipboard deficiencies in a systematic and methodical way; paper programs won’t do the trick. The ship’s organization needs to work at it and apply dynamic action to prevent the accumulation—and expedite correction—of these deficiencies. Each CO has his own ideas about how to make that happen, but there is no easy way which is effective for long. A workable path reflects a return to basics, namely: ► Set X-ray/Yoke and maintain it through dynamic control. Use a watertight integrity log to regulate this.
7
it
:v
U. S. NAVY (F. PEAK)
A
By scrubbing down her four-acre flight deck, the USS Ranger’s crew prevents damage that can be caused by dirt and foreign objects.
operational readiness.
The foregoing is provided for gma . in day-to-day training functions. Itcan ,, be set forth as policy, but it is log
ical and Use i*
► Assign every part and piece of the ship to specific individuals by name. Make them responsible for routine cleaning and maintenance on a daily basis. These are called “cleaning hull” and “responsible supervision,” respectively.
► Conduct dedicated, deep-cleaning sessions weekly and preventive maintenance according to schedule. This is called a “field day.”
► Conduct detailed lower deck and material inspections periodically, using the same inspection teams per zone for several continuous inspections before rotating assignments. This is called a “zone inspection.”
► Conduct weekly hull inspections by division officers, and report findings to the commanding officer on a logically prepared form called a “hull report.”
► Tabulate discrepancies identified by the previous two items: record details precisely. You can call this a “current ship’s maintenance project.”
► Conduct frequent living, messing, and berthing inspections in order to pay proper attention to our people and their living conditions. This is called a “personnel inspection.”
► Identify corrective action and commence systematic correction of critical deficiencies, according to the priorities set by the previous steps. Include structural repairs and those pertaining to watertight, light-tight, and fume-tight integrity, according to criticality, and schedule corrective actions for immediate work. Include other repairs in work, planned maintenance system, and training schedules developed by the planning board for training. Then do it right the first time.
► Repeat the previous cycle for the ship’s life, and don’t let up.
A program such as this should ensure that DC, firefighting, and emergency equipment and fixtures are located properly and ready for use. It should also contribute to a quiet ship, reduce unwanted
electromagnetic interference and sPurl^t, emissions, reduce excess weight and accumulation of combustibles, and ^ F maintain watertight integrity. Furtri more, a preventive damage control p gram will contribute to improved e ciency by planning work for system accomplishment, rather than in a hap*13 ard way. This will make day-*0' ^ ship’s work and preparations for inspections easier while contributing
aidant
effective when pursued diligently- - ,
within the context of the damage con awareness course, the unit safety super sors course, or wherever else it fits-
Rear Admiral Johnson is Commander, Train Command, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
ASW Upgrade and Shipboard Training
By Lieutenant Alan Maiorano, U. S. Navy
often rationalized by erroneous ■■ j logic: if this were real, then we w°^j
Until recently, submarine “invisibility” was accepted as fact, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training was given little more than token acknowledgment during U. S. fleet exercises. Underwater acoustic technology, in the 1960s and early 1970s, was in its youth, and submarine detection was as much the result of luck as skilled sensor employment. Officers in charge of fleet exercises questioned the training value (with unquestionable frustration) of locating an exercise submarine “a la green flare.” Receiving an eight-by-ten-inch glossy photo of the flagship circumscribed by periscope cross-hairs did little to raise their enthusiasm.
Today, surface ASW is effective, reliable, and capable of long-range, active/ passive detection. Cooperation with naval aircraft, ship quieting, and significant improvements in acoustic technology have reduced the traditional advantages of the submarine. Frequent incorporation of fixed-wing ASW aircraft, in conjunction with a shipboard light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS), has facilitated the employment of passive sensors as the norm, greatly easing the counterdetection problem associated with active search tactics. Recent fleet exercises consistently have shown improving detection rates and increasingly effective single and multiplatform ASW prosecutions.
The trends reflected in the most recent developments in the Soviet attack submarine force magnify the seriousness and complexity of the antisubmarine problem faced by battle group commanders. The Soviets’ emphasis on the attack submarine as a key component of their naval order of battle is well documented. Collectively, the five main Soviet shipyards have delivered nearly 12 submarines per year since 1976 to create a current force of about 220 nuclear- and diesel-powered attack submarines. Since 1960, no less than ten new classes of attack submarine have been developed by the Soviets.
Recently, two new versions of the “Victor” nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), the high-speed “Alfa” SSN, and the massive “Oscar” nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN) have been added to an already formidable lineup. Special features include inertial navigation, highly directional passive sonar, and modem electronic detection equipment. The guided missile submarines can fire an array of SS-NX-19, SS- N-3, SS-N-12, SS-N-7, and SS-N-9 cruise missiles—the first three types from ranges estimated to be in excess of 200 nautical miles. These developments, viewed in light of the strong Soviet naval strategy of anticarrier warfare, demand that U. S. antisubmarine warfare be a high priority.
We should not let our recent successes in ASW cloud the gap which remains between current ASW capabilities and their
potential. Surface forces have ccrU!lIjn enhanced detection probabilities and creased the potential for successful pt°s cutions with the application of better ^ tics and technology. But there are still many missed detections and lost conta ■
if-then
would
have a P-3 Orion; or, if the submarine played by the rules, then we would ha found her. Too often we are lulled in*0 false sense of security by an accompan- ing direct-support submarine. The s face community cannot rely on the attack submarine force for battle &° antisubmarine protection. Precious * of the direct-support submarines will available strictly for battle group AS w a “hot” war. Unfortunately, the trans tion from peacetime steaming to a cr - is not governed by rules and regulati0 and may be breathtakingly quick.
The means for improvement lie in^ aggressive and ongoing shipboard AS upgrade program, the resources for wm are available. Knitting an ASW squa^ into an effective and confident team Is easy task and requires hard work, Pra jj tice, and—most of all—enthusiasm at levels of command. Once a ship S under way, it is too late to whip thete into shape. By definition, a deploy1^ ship is at near-peak performance leve' ’ leaving fine tuning as the main task the deployed period. Nondeployed 11,1 j must be heavily filled with training an