Two If By Sea

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

At least two services will now be needed to control the seas where once the Navy/Marine Corps team could have done the job alone. Such land-based aircraft as these two Air Force fighters, seen saying hello to the Soviet carrier Minsk, are needed to give us the maritime superiority that is the cornerstone of our national security.

Until recently, the U. S. Navy possessed sufficient forces to perform its primary wartime mission, sea control, unassisted by the other services. Today, that is no longer the case.

The reason? Over the past 20 years, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov has transformed the Soviet Navy from a coastal defense force into an ocean-going fleet numbering more than 1,400 combatants—almost triple the size of the U. S. Navy.

In attack submarines alone, the Soviet fleet outnumbers its U. S. counterpart by a ratio of two to one. Its “Back­fire” bombers and “Oscar”-class guided missile subma­rines, both impressive tributes to Soviet technology, are premier examples of Soviet sea-denial capability.

Spurred on by the belief that this impressive Soviet naval power has become too great a threat for the U. S. Navy to handle by itself, on 10 September 1982, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Charles A. Ga­briel, signed a joint declaration pledging to enhance the Air Force’s supporting role in maritime operations.¹ The document fulfills Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Wein­berger’s wishes as outlined in his annual “Defense Guid­ance.” Civilian and military leaders of the Navy and the Air Force have roundly supported the new effort at joint

operations, and it has been well received by                     of

latest^c

This is not a precedent-shattering effort, but the A*-- _ofl£ four such memorandums dating to 1971. Why is . j_atesl different? What are the factors that have driven this _t

ee . .                                          , ■                             il _  ! 1; i   _n                                   .           •

effort at cooperation among the military services^

new capabilities does land-based air power bring ^lu

time operations? Can land-based aviation provide cient additional combat power to counter th^e^_eretit

threat? Finally, what are the underlying problems

in such an agreement which prevented its consum ^ cause it to come unraveled at the very time it ^|S

.o»

111 auui till U^lVV/lllVlll vviliwi pivrvinvu                                         — -                          . qO*

in the past—parochial interests aside—and whic ^ ^t

ide

needed? The answers to these questions will p^r° perspective from which to determine what the future for land-based air in support of maritime operatm •

• ft carh^

The U. S. Navy owns 13 large-deck aircraft ^ which form the nucleus of the aircraft carrier battwj^d-

(CVBGs), the Navy’s striking force. Four are ^

deployed at a given time, an insufficient number t° out the Navy’s required missions. Recent records j jd

UUl 111V^ IIUVJ J I^IJUIIV/U IIUOJIUUJ. novviu » ^                                                                                                                    otrO*

tinuous days at sea attained by aircraft carriers on P ^ ^

iO*¹'

the Indian Ocean attest to that shortage. The tion is that 15 large-deck aircraft carriers are the mi necessary to carry out current peacetime tasking ■

34

Proceedings

/ Novcn^lb‘^;r

These

^°ⁿsider_SUD , ’                     outers, nave driven the Navy t

,^0rriPlishinp i'^mentary ^and complementary means of ac 3^Sed air i_n    ⁱ⁰ⁿ’ ^ginning with the use of land

.^ecretary ₀f ^{6 e}‘^ense of sea lines of communication '^{Ve a}Ppro_ack ? ^avy ^°bⁿ Lehman articulated this collec ^,dl Air For,- °, ?‘^{lV;d strate}gy in a May 1982 interview ^e Magazine:

“Th,

^^ean, wher^k¹^ ^areas 'ⁿ the world, such as the Carib

^ePartment of r>_af ,

^l0nal Ninth? | ^{C ense} (DoD) budget programs two addi §°^aI. Plans in?!,' ^a’^{rcndt caf}riers to meet the Navy’ ^u'lt ^around th ^U^^{C                   sur}f^ace action groups (SAGs

P^r°^vide f_0ur ^{6 recom}missioned Iowa-class battleships t ^ack all-imp_or?.^10re ,^^att*^e groups. However, these wouf 'ⁿ *he Falki., f^{nt a}’^{r cover}—a necessity hammered horn' The probi ^{dS C}°^nflict-

^triers i_s P^resente(J by the limited number of aircraf i' Navy w lfr, ^cornP°unded by two factors. First, thi , ^es'gned to '• ,^e 'ⁿ combat against a fleet that has beei ,,^nion does not h ^a'^{rcraft carriers}- Second, the Sovie Navy _w „³r ^ready access to the open sea, and thf ^“tters as the c ^{1avc t0} operate in the same restrictet ^rtla'ntain com °^Vlet ^^eet if it is to destroy that fleet an< f_ac^^mand the sea.

°^rs’ ^arn°ng others, have driven the Navy t(

> where K       ^{m me worlt1}’ ^such as the Ganb

attleship battle groups could be give:

^dln8^s / November 1983

sufficient land-based air cover—involving in the main F-15s and EGAs—to carry out their military tasks even though they lack the indigenous airpower of carriers. Our battle group tactics have been widened immensely by AW ACS ... in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf areas as well as in the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) gap . . . there has emerged a well-integrated new range of tactics using AWACS and land-based interceptors in concert with naval combatants, thereby enhancing U. S. Military effectiveness.”

The joint memorandum specifically recognizes that there are insufficient Navy and Marine Corps assets to meet the threat in all areas. It acknowledges that increased interservice technical exchange and training, identification of joint development and procurement opportunities, and development of joint doctrine are necessary to improve the effectiveness of all services.

In planning for the possibility of combat with the Soviet Navy, the U. S. Navy must be concerned about the threat to its forces from Soviet long-range bombers, submarines, and surface combatants. Warfare missions to combat these threats are categorized as antiair warfare (AAW), antisub­marine warfare (ASW), and antisurface warfare (ASUW). Contributions from the land-based aviation assets of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps fit into one or more of these areas.

U. S. Navy Capabilities: The Navy’s land-based avia­tion contribution to maritime operations resides princi­pally in the venerable P-3 Orion. There are currently 24 active and 13 reserve P-3 squadrons operating around the world. Their range, speed, and payload make them an ideal complement to submerged sonar systems in the ASW role. With the capability to perform a three-hour patrol at an operational radius of more than 1,400 miles, P-3s from Diego Garcia can provide coverage to the entrances of the Arabian Sea without relying on other foreign bases.

While generally recognized as the finest land-based air­borne ASW platform in the world, the P-3 has capabilities in other less-advertised but still impressive roles. One such role is in ASUW operations. The P-3 equipped with the Harpoon cruise missile poses a threat to every current Soviet surface combatant, including the Xiev-class aircraft carrier. With the ability to cruise at low altitude for long periods, Harpoon-equipped P-3s could avoid radar detec­tion and approach Soviet surface ships, launch their weap­ons beyond the range of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and depart prior to interception by “Forger” aircraft. The P-3 can also deliver up to six CAPTOR mines to assist in passive ASW operations.²

U. S. Navy Limitations: The P-3 is at once the begin­ning and the end of the Navy’s land-based aviation contri­bution to maritime operations. Many other naval aircraft types have the capabilities to make substantial input to maritime operations from land (notably the F-14 and E-2C in the AAW role, the F/A-18 and A-6 in the ASUW role, and the S-3A in the ASW role), yet the Navy has not purchased these assets beyond the numbers necessary to support the active fleet requirements. If these aircraft were available from land bases, their usefulness would be mark-

edly enhanced by large land-based tankers for aerial re­fueling, an asset also not currently available in the active Navy.

Reasons for the limited effort to procure land-based air­craft for support of maritime operations include restric­tions by law on roles and missions and a lack of available funds.

Marine Corps Capabilities: To complete the coverage of naval aviation it is necessary to examine the Marine Corps air-ground task force (MAGTF) contributions to the equation, particularly the aviation combat element.

The MAGTF can be task-organized to both seize and operate from an advanced naval base. In such a role, the MAGTF would possess the components to conduct auton­omous air operations in all-weather conditions around the clock. The components include organic ground combat, SAM, and air-refueling capability; redundant and pro­tected command, control, and communications (C³); all air base support necessities; and sufficient logistics load (all classes of supply) to keep it functioning for 60 days without resupply.³ As with all MAGTFs, it would be sized

for the expeditionary role. However, as an air-h^ea X

nild

MAGTF tailored to support maritime operations, it demonstrate the unique flexibility the Marine Corps , _up- to naval missions. The ground combat element woul port the aviation combat element rather than vice ve And the aviation combat element would be weights Marine aircraft most capable in maritime operations. , list of Marine aircraft includes most of the Marine tactical air assets, as well as some helicopters. ^ In AAW, Marine F-4s—soon to be replaced y ^ more-capable F/A-18—refueled by organic KC-13 ®’ tegrate well into fleet air defense plans. Marine A-6® * larly practice for the aerial mining mission, and M CH-53s can also perform a minesweeping role. N* •

v^n-jjs can ai»u pciiuiin a uuuv/ow^mg *—

AV-8Bs, A-6s, and A-4s are capable in the ASUW

sion; the A-6 will be especially potent when equipped ^ the Harpoon antiship missile. Marine EA-6Bs and K ,

me narpoon aiiusmp missile, raamc cn-uuj *•*—      . „(o/

also provide extensive electronic warfare (EW) and p reconnaissance capability. g₀th

services.

The MAGTF offers divert fields for carrier

where, because of aircraft similarity, maintenance ^

> 

support are readily available. It provides interopera ^ C³ through Marine air command and control

in

Navy tactical data system (MACCS/NTDS) links- ^

interoperability permits the MAGTF to be the na'

force’s landward projection, increasing the f°^rce_o0pet^a'

bilities significantly in both offensive and defensive

36

Proceedings / Novel"

ib«^f

tioris M •

'ⁿ °ne extr-P™’ ^t*^le MAGTF offers this capability

*^c£^^y.^pa‘*^,*^e-

^a'^rborne earl imitations: The Marine Corps lacks an early wamin ^ ^Warn'ⁿ8 (■AEW)/C³ platform to enhance its AAty _roi„ ^and command and control capability in the •- ^U1C- it does — •          --

>8s /

'^din

nt*

^not currently possess a stand-off AS\V capabip?       mission, nor does it have an active

^heavy min- 1 ^y' finally, it does not possess a long-range

^s4S I C^UrVeiltoc'“Pability.

^tw° are pro ^ ^l^^ese imitations are available. The first from Navv   P^r°h*^ems, with systems available

^F/A-l 8 _Wj_{th H}^nded Programs (i.e., E-2C and both A-6 and Jhrough _tu„ , ^arp°on). A second AEW option is available imitations do°^{C 1Ced} ^EW C-130 proposal. The last two handled bv ,kⁿ⁰_N^t_T^re^^u'^re correction as they are adequately

fJ. S. Air p^{6 Navy and} ^ir Force, respectively. ^tential ASUW°^rCe ^^aP^a^‘^^es: Air Force assets with po- A'^r Com,pan we?^{ility include the B}'^{52s of the} Strategic A'?s, F-4_S .  ^{and l}h^e tactical Air Command’s

^ the GRim/" ^16S- The B-52 has the capability to *^ed to carrv th ^tacdcaEguided bomb and can be modi- ^ran8ed sister /h %^Harpoon cruise missile or its longer ^refueli_ng _a ’ ^e Tomahawk. When combined with aerial _a^an§e and ]₀j_f„^S’ P°^ssesses a virtually unlimited

^ev‘ce, the us" fT' (While primarily a public relations ?‘^{Se in} Egypt h ^{0t B}"^{52s durin}§ ^{the 1981} Bright Star exer- ^and-based avi ^ramadcaUy demonstrated the long reach of ^ E-52Hs ont-^IOn * ^8jAC strategic projection force of ^Kapid Deploy ^8anized Primarily for employment with the ^CaPabili(y ^ment Eorce, also has a potential maritime • The B-52 „ •

mining _pi_a^^{Ies a}*^rcraft also hold great promise as aer- .^0rce bombers °J.^ms’ ^by no means a new mission for Air ^aPanese hom P^eration Starvation, the B-29 mining of ^rcme]y effi_c; ^Waters during World War II, was an ex­^nation’s w_ar ^^{nt tb}ough little-publicized attack on that ^lyP^e mines °^norny- B-52Ds can carry 18 CAPTOR- ^lnefield ₀V .     a six-aircraft detachment to lay a

., *Tcean suiwn¹⁶ mines in three days.

^e B-52 i_s ^ance i^s another ASUW mission for which 5^Can surveill ^SU1.^ted‘ Training for SAC B-52 crews in

cmr ^maintainsⁿ60 ^{1S kn}°^{Wn aS} ' ^{BuSy 0bserver}>” ^{and rd}'ⁿg to one • i ^crews Proficient in that mission. Ac- ana yst, a pair of B-52s can cover 112,000

November 1983

square nautical miles in two-and-one-half hours with mis­sion times of up to 17 hours.⁴

The Air Force’s most immediate and tactically signifi­cant contribution to maritime operations lies in the AAW mission area. The use of E-3A AWACS (airborne warning and control system), F-15 fighters, and KC-135 tankers expands the defense-in-depth approach to CVBG power projection and sea control operations. In the absence of CVBGs, these Air Force assets, strategically positioned to cover the G-I-UK gap, could provide timely response to Soviet air and surface threats to friendly shipping.

Other mission areas in which Air Force assets could provide a valuable enhancement to maritime operations include C³, EW, and delivery of Navy special warfare forces. In each instance, Air Force-specialized aircraft, such as the E-3 AWACS, EF-111, TR-1, SR-71, C-141, and EC-135, already perform similar roles over land. With additional specialized training and some equipment modi­fication, they could perform the same missions over water.

U. S. Air Force Limitations: Air Force limitations in the maritime role are reflected in three main areas: lack of effective equipment and weaponry for maritime missions, lack of aircrew training in maritime operations, and the requirement for secure base facilities. The first area in­cludes limited C³ interoperability with the Navy, lack of suitable navigation equipment, lack of stand-off ASUW weaponry, and an absence of an active ASW capability. The second area reflects a dearth of joint Navy and Air Force doctrine and tactics for the conduct of maritime op­erations. The third area precludes the use of Air Force units at other than established, protected airfields without recourse to allied or U. S. Army ground and air defense units, and logistics support infrastructure.

Solutions to these limitations are available. The first can be solved with money; the necessary equipment and weap­onry are available today if the services can agree on pro­curement. The second is being solved by the joint memo­randum. The solution to the third limitation may be found in employing the Air Force at established facilities while looking to the Marine Corps to provide the capability where a self-sustained expeditionary package is required.

However, these seemingly easy solutions lead to the far more complex problem of Air Force operational limita-

A Marine Corps KC-130F demonstrates that the Navy/ Marine Corps team is intact as it refuels two Navy F/A-18A Hornets. But the “team” needs more players if it is to meet and defeat the threat.

tions. The Air Force’s strategic and tactical aviation assets are already overcommitted for their primary missions. Provisions to make them operational in yet another mis­sion area, while clearly feasible from a technical stand­point, are but a shell-game without a change in mission priorities or an increase in force structure. The Air Force has opted for the latter as it offers the opportunity to build capability. But with a fixed ceiling on the current DoD budget, increased Air Force capability in a collateral mis­sion can only be had at the expense of other service capa­bilities in its primary missions. This dilemma is the key issue in the joint maritime venture’s ultimate success. If it is to buy more capability to perform the maritime support mission, the Air Force must first be given the primary mission of maritime support. Under the Authority of Title 50, United States Code (National Security Act of 1947, as amended), DoD Directive 5100.1 Section E.3. states:

“As for collateral functions; while the assignment of such functions may establish further justification for stated force requirements, such assignment shall not be used as the basis for establishing additional force re­quirements.”

Most visible among the several interrelated factors which have driven the services to a joint approach to mari­time operations is the continued impressive growth of Soviet naval forces and the equally precipitous decline— until the Reagan defense initiatives—in the size of the U. S. Navy. As former Chief of Naval Operations, Admi­ral Thomas B. Hayward, stated, “ . . . our narrow margin of superiority has vanished—for any reasonable estimate of the naval balance between ourselves and the Soviets falls well within the range of uncertainty.”⁵ This inescap­

able fact has forged a consensus among DoD civilian leaders that the Navy can no longer “go ^{!t a} in all maritime operations.    . . _y of

A second factor is that the strength and capab’¹^,, land-based air power in maritime operations. have ^ rediscovered. In areas within reach of land-bas^ power, the aviation assets of the Air Force and _a Corps, used in cooperation with the Navy’s, P^rG g# significant increase in flexibility. The three service⁵ ^ _flf a balance of combat capabilities across the sped ¹ ^ maritime requirements. The Navy contributes the ^ aviation ASW asset in the world; the Marine CotP^s J^jl vides AAW/ASUW from advanced expeditionary ^ bases; and the Air Force brings significant AAW, A ^ and long-range surveillance and mining capability established airfields.                                                                                p₀P

Third is recognition of the economic reality of tn ^

budget. Already under fire in Congress after years of the Reagan defense recovery program,

only

it cal’¹

- _vy

support the level of spending required to build up th^e^ ₀f

to combat the Soviet naval threat by itself. Econ¹ force is the order of the day. And the use of existmg

omy

lati^u

role¹

based aviation assets to perform in the maritime superior example of economy of force.

The unified commanders in the field, having o' recognized this factor, were conducting joint tr^a’ⁿ feV land-based and sea-based aviation units in maritime Y ^ tions even before the latest initiative in Washington' ^ know well that without such training in peacetim ^ effectiveness of the respective service’s land-base _(C. assets in this mission in war would be sham

ac­

tion

duced. However, even when they are trained, mains one last hurdle—they must be made availab and where needed.               jlabl^e'

The Navy’s land-based aviation assets will be a^va _uSe

The P-3 is capable in ASW/ASUW missions, has

arit"

in other tasks, and is assigned exclusively to the m mission.      _aVji

Marine land-based aviation assets should also be -j able. As an element of the MAGTF, they have a P^r

il'

38

Proceedings

/ Nover"***