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If the Navy were to concentrate on increasing the speed of the amphibious warfare ships—maybe by employing surface effect and SWATH ships at no small price—the amphibious force could deploy with the carrier battle group and give new meaning to “rapid”—as in Rapid Deployment Force.
In his Fiscal Year 1983 Marine Corps Posture State. e„. before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Commandant of the Marine Corps General R°be Barrow said: js a
“In order to achieve maritime superiority, jVjl- compelling need to produce ships, military and^ ^
ian, so we may maintain freedom of the seas,
sea
deterrence at sea, and project that power front i ,
UKIWIVIHV t ' " . , pel
should deterrence fail. Equally compelling is 11
to enhance our strategic mobility and sustainai
ibility>
currentd1^-^Ur Amphibious Warfare Ships: Although Pr°jecti0<)t,trine a(fdresses the size and capability of power of mobin °rces: '*ltle consideration is given to the degree Vance of* ^ nTclu're<J or desired because the speed of ad- ‘‘enhanced” lb'0U^ f°rCeS tends to be “8iven ” How are
fitted?^'] Stratc8'c mobility and “rapid” response de- • mle moving ships from point “A” to point “B,”
do we want only a direct transit or also a loiter capability? What is the desired transit speed? How does a “given” transit speed impair our options?
The subject of mobility enhancement has received little attention since the close of World War II. Top speed for all U. S. Navy amphibious ships in 1945 went to the fast transports with ex-destroyer escorts capable of 28 knots and former-World War I destroyers of 25 knots. Slowest was the landing ship, medium, at 12 knots.
A comparison of today’s amphibious fleet with that of
vance) as one example of high-speed sealift, CMMS yses showed that a reduction of baseline shortfall cou
anal' Id be
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recogni- ^
1
key to our rapid deployment planning, but our abihO
ited iaflt
- .. {flC
means of transporting our forces and equipment an r
first few weeks of a deployment. During the early a conflict, however, before sealift takes effect, aid1 prepositioning would be our only means of rapidly d®P ing and sustaining our combat forces.”3 Although S tary Weinberger was speaking in terms of the Rap10 ^ ployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), his awareness o value of rapid projection of power by sea is particu applicable to amphibious forces, which are an integra t of the RDJTF. ^
The Mayaguez incident also serves as an exampie 0
,mentw
bility. On 12 May 1975, the SS Mayaguez, a U-
worth of speed to an integrated “rapid” deployment1
containership, was captured by Cambodian gu° about 35 nautical miles from the coast of Cambodia
► Air strikes on Cambodian gunboats by the and land-based aircraft
► Limited retaliatory air strikes by F-l 11 and A-7 al
base51
Proceedings / Nov*1
niber
1944—1945 reveals only a slight increase in speed over the average for all amphibious ships of that period. As Seymour Deitchman wrote in the November 1982 Astronautics and Aeronautics:
“If the data . . . convey any lesson it is the high probability that our defense forces and the industry are most likely to continue the directions of the past in developing and renewing our naval power. Enormous resources are consequently likely to be spent to buy forces whose equipment is technologically highly advanced within its own framework even while they become obsolete in concept."1
Speed and Survivability: Because the major threat facing the navies of the world has changed from the gun to the missile and other precision-guided munitions, the need for speed in surface combatants appears to have diminished. Although precision-guided munitions may be unaffected by the speed of a target once it is effectively acquired, speed does reduce vulnerability. This is reflected in the findings of a study by the Navy’s Surface Effect Ship (SES) Project Office in September 1981.2 The study concluded that an SES traveling at 50 knots has:
► A 20% probability of avoiding detection by an aircraft compared with about 2% for a conventional ship
► About a 99% probability of evading a torpedo compared with about 65% for a conventional ship
► A 20% probability of evading a subsonic antishipping missile launched from 175 nautical miles compared with about 10% for a conventional ship
► About 4.6 times the probability of evading detection by a low-orbiting satellite than a conventional ship Although the subject of mine survivability was not specifically addressed, a shallow-draft SES traveling at 50 knots would be significantly less vulnerable to mines than a conventional ship.
A Really "Rapid" Deployment Force: Today, the word “rapid” is frequently used in discussions of our defense policy and our power projection capability. Although there is no doubt that maritime power must play a key part in our overall strategy, can a speed of advance of 20 knots by naval forces be considered “rapid”? On the other hand, reducing response time from Norfolk, Virginia, to Bandar Abbas (via Suez) from 19.1 days to 8.9 days (at a transit speed of 50 knots instead of 20 knots) would lend far more credibility to a “rapid” response force. The eight SL-7 fast—33-knot—sealift ships scheduled for conversion to a roll-on/roll-off configuration by 1984—1985 for transport of heavy forces to any theater already signify the direction in which our maritime projection forces must move.
The value of high-speed sealift was shown in the results of the 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS). CMMS determined overall U. S. mobility requirements (airlift, sealift, and prepositioning) for contingencies in the Indian Ocean area and other areas of potential conflict during this decade. It examined four contingencies in detail—two in Southwest Asia (SWA), one in NATO, and one in SWA with a concurrent precau42
tionary reinforcement of NATO. CMMS evaluated di ^ ent types of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning syste ’ and recommended programs to ensure rapid deployme^ support of U. S. strategy, as well as adequate mid-3 long-term sustaining support. Using a Navy SES man prepositioning ship concept (a cargo SES of 15,0001° ton displacement, 686 feet long, 50-knot speed o a.
* J
as much as: four times better than airlift; twice as g°° maritime or land-based prepositioning; and three better than conventional sealift. gjo
In his annual report to Congress for fiscal year ,he
lized w
need for high-speed sealift, as well as the price we P3^ not having it, when he stated: “Strategic mobility !* (0
project forces overseas is currently constrained by l*1!11 airlift and sealift resources. Sealift would be the donUn‘
flag boat8 During the 67 hours that transpired from the time the guez was seized to when the Cambodians release crew, U. S. actions included: ^
► CH-53 helicopter lift over water of Marines fr01^
pao, Thailand, to Koh Tang Island (near where the • guez rested at anchor) ,nf-
► Dispatch of the destroyer USS Harold E. Holt
1074) to the scene ur'lsO11
► Dispatch of the missile destroyer USS Henry B■
(DDG-7)—after refueling from tanker—from the 1 pine Sea to Kompong Som „to
► Redirection of the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) en r°u
Australia j
irC3
from U. S. Air Force bases in Thailand
► Threat of B-52 raids against Cambodia from air Guam
► Surveillance by P-3 aircraft
► Alerting of Third Marine Division in Okinawa ^
► Marine infantry unit ordered to Utapao air base . je Maritime force was critical when air power was u ^
to rescue the Mayaguez or her crew. The relative y speeds of today’s surface ships still limit the resp°n5 tions of the National Command Authority to s
l*3
forces ^r°''ect'on a^ets on scene or close by. Although air or resPond rapidly, they may be no more suitable
S than in.the Mayaguez case, have cn .W,°u^ high-speed, enhanced-capability ships ah-groj1 7 UtCC^to rescue °f the Mayaguezl A Marine embark h f°rce °f Marine amphibious unit size, Okinaw- UP°n amPh'hious SES shipping deployed from (speed if C?U^ have made the 1,877-nautical mile transit 38 hou°- a Vance: ^0 knots) to Koh Tang Island in about 20-knotS ff8 °PPosecf to 94-plus hours for conventional c°atained *PS wou^ have placed a powerful, selfScene so ^ersat'*e “rapid” deployment force on the at the time 7 t0 ^ hours sooner than any ships available
naWa ttrPle’ tbe task f°rce deployed from Oki- empioVm 1 ~ advantages of speed would have permitted naval fo Cnt ^r°m 3 numher of other locations where U. S. Garcia W0U^ he operating, like Subic Bay or Diego enhanced*366^ Sei?/es as 3force multiplier, the high-speed, greater r CaOah*hty task force may project power with force Th^' °Ver tw*ce the area of the conventional acc°rd w>hCcPability woufo certainly be supportive and in Year ioo'-j ^ecretary of the Navy -John Lehman’s Fiscal 83 Posture Statement:
“Maritime superiority does not mean that we must seek to be omnipresent on all oceans .... It means only that in those areas of our vital interest that we can prevail if challenged by the combined military threat of our adversaries. Geography, which strongly favors the United States and its allies, sets the parameters of our task.”5
Figure 1, as taken from Mr. Lehman’s statement, shows those ocean areas (outlined) identified as “vital.” Figure 2 shows those areas that can be covered by conventional shipping and by the SES. In about 40 hours, strategically placed SESs can cover more than 60% of the world’s oceans which are open to year-round navigation. By comparing Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that an SES- equipped force, operating from randomly selected locations, could operate with great effectiveness in these vital areas. In addition, the rapid deployment SES amphibious force, through loiter and/or speed, could provide and support a flexible response to regional aggression.
Speed and New Concepts For Employment: Another reason for reappraising the design of amphibious ships is that increased speed and enhanced performance might offer dynamic new employment concepts to further the
43
Destination/ Port of Embarkation | Distance. NM | Response Time, Days (1-day delay) | |
20 Kts | 50 Kts | ||
Bandar Abbas/ Norfolk (Suez) | 8.370 | 19.1 | 8.9 |
Norfolk (Good Hope) | 12.330 | 27.3 | 12.3 |
Azores (Suez) | 5.887 | 13.9 | 6.7 |
Azores (Good Hope) | 10,352 | 23.3 | 10.5 |
Perth, Australia | 4,932 | 11.9 | 5.9 |
Philippines | 4,711 | 11.5 | 5.7 |
Okinawa | 5,450 | 13.0 | 6.3 |
San Diego | 11,096 | 24.9 | 11.1 |
Beirut/Norfolk | 5,357 | 12.8 | 6.2 |
Port Said'Norfolk | 5,537 | 13.2 ■ | 6.4 |
Gibraltar/Norfolk | 3,349 | 8.6 | 4.4 |
Pusan/San Diego | 6,251 | 14.7 | 7.0 |
CHARLES M. RAGLAND
{^Philippine ' <3 Islands
row
limitations in moving with carriers or battleships m seas. For seakeeping and stability at these higher sp ^
new designs such as SES and SWATH could be built
effectiveness of amphibious forces while significantly improving power projection capability. An example of such a new concept is the deployment of an amphibious force as an integral part of the surface action group.
Amphibious task groups usually are deployed independently. During the course of their deployment they may operate with a carrier battle group, but the two task groups will then go their separate ways. Perhaps in the next century the amphibious task group will be integrated with the battle group.
A recent study by the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council, “The Implications of Advancing Technology for Naval Aviation,” addressed the impact enhanced marine designs such as SES and small water- plane area twin hull (SWATH) could have on the Navy as it entered the next century. The Board appeared to envision a concept which would optimize force projection utility by a combination of air, amphibious, and surface assets into one organization.
“. . . there is both need and opportunity for provision of diverse new platforms that can be small enough to be economical, yet maneuver with the carrier in heavy weather. These include:
► “SWATH, missile-carrying ships, some of which may be air capable.”
► “SES ships to act as air-capable auxiliary ships suitable for rapid over-the-beach and roll-on-roll-off deployment and other support operations.”
► “V/STOL [vertical/short takeoff and landing] aircraft able to operate as sensor and missile control platforms from the above ships, and others suitable for combat and transport missions in amphibious operations.”
► “Long-endurance sensor carrying aircraft, which may or may not be manned or even ship-based, to comprise a part of the Navy’s total information and control network, along with other airborne and space-based
assets.”
44
. . naval task force structure (and the aVia j within it) is visualized as evolving not only t0 ^ greater distribution of information and combat a over all elements of the fleet, but also toward c°veanj much larger geographic areas, including ocean land, than has previously been operat'011 feasible.”6
Secretary Weinberger said in his annual report: linchpin of our naval force projection capability contt ^ to be the multipurpose carrier battle group. The m tactical aircraft on these carriers, together with acc° nying surface combatants and submarines, provides ? bilities across the full spectrum of naval missions- ^ fortunately, one vital capability is absent fronl ^ “spectrum of naval missions”—the capability of an jgr phibious force to extend the will of the naval comm3 ashore. If, however, amphibious shipping could oper i part of a battle group, it would fill this void by crea' j a dynamic force that offers the battle group comma11 force presence/force projection capability on land, at j and in the air. This would provide the National Com ^ Authority with increased options for dealing with c°n tional limited wars or exercising naval diplomacy- ^ As General Barrow said in his Fiscal Year 1984 P°s 0f Statement regarding Marine Corps support for the g° st a 600-ship fleet: “A balanced maritime capability f. provide not only the formidable air, surface, and sU jyair face dimensions of naval warfare but also the gr°ua:0uS power-projection dimension inherent to the amp111 taskforce.” ^
Enhanced ships would be required to integrate » pt phibious task force effectively into the battle 8r a| Smaller ships of monohull design would suffer opem 1
Navy’s current ability to integrate amphibious ^^0- ships into a battle group is uncertain because of 1
j$
Proceedings / NovemW
Platfor ° S^ee^ ant' seakeeping qualities of the principal riers cmS [1] [2] 6 ’ ^~P'US knots for the battleships and car- °us shi0^^61* W't'1 ^ ^nots sustained for most amphibi- Th *
rier task ^tuc^‘es ®oar<i noted in its discussion of car- fortunat i°rCe suPPort sh‘Ps that these limitations are un- e Y not confined to amphibious ships:
as r* S^’PS °ther than carriers . . . have continued been u^211!'00^ ^cs*£n combat ships because that has there 6 ^nown technology, it was convenient, and °PeratTaS n° ComPe^*n8 reason for modifying habitual ships 10ff ' ' ' ' Currently, these conventional support states n Er ^'sa<^vantage that even in modest sea suppn t cann°t keep up with the carriers they
ciUcjeT f "°Se l^at ^ave l^e caPah*lity are often pre- ASW r0IT1 °Perat'ng their aviation complement for inder»»IniSSIOns 'n e*ther the carrier-escort mode or for "dependent assignments.”8
SecrePirf^ l.^e deployment Force: In his annual rept ry Weinberger said:
hilit'f,enera' terrns> we need a ‘rapid deployment ca] the U *°r lh°se areas of the world in whi
or, in s US or no nearby military infrastructi are nm°nit| Cases’ maintains no presence at all. Thi force °Cat.'ons where we might need to proj Africa p°n^ 'n SWA and the Middle East, but also bean 1 entral America, South America, the Car n’ and elsewhere.”9
The fact th* t
military ;nf. a nava' forces require “little or no nearby their great/u^™011^6 ' ■ • or presence at all” is one of arrange” 0l.S uttr‘butes. Today, however, we “place or notes, we h °rC^s *n locations which, based on best esti- nient of the°^efW'^ aPProPriate for the future employ- according t( Sfi1 °rces'. Most deployments are scheduled 3rea- If anoth Cjransil l'me to and from the deployment er Mayaguez crisis occurs unexpectedly in an area where we have not deployed our forces, we may choose to react with less than appropriate forces or wait while existing forces redeploy or new forces deploy. Because of this necessity to be deployed “on station” in order to react in a timely manner, our amphibious forces spend a large percentage of their service lives at sea. Scheduled deployments affect the number of ships needed, their life-cycle cost, and the sailors and marines who must meet these requirements. What if it were possible to deploy as required instead of “as scheduled?” One last point: strenuous deployment schedules adversely affect morale and retention rates; the “reactive” deployment capability of the high-speed ship could improve this situation.
‘Seymour J. Deitchman, “Turning Point for Tactical Naval Forces?,” Astronautics & Aeronautics, November 1982.
2Amphibious Assault Ship (LSES) Feasibility Study, Surface Effect Ship Acquisition Project, Naval Sea Systems Command, September 1981. The data appearing in this article are taken from a briefing based on this study entitled “SES Amphibious Assault Ship: A New Approach to Rapid Deployment.”
'Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the fiscal year 1984 budget, fiscal year 1985 authorization request, and fiscal year 1984-85 defense programs, 1 February 1983, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), p. 199.
4LSFS Feasibility Study, p. 2-15.
'Statement by John F. Lehman, Jr., before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Department of the Navy Posture, 25 February 1982, pp. 4—5.
'Panel on the Implications of Advancing Technology for Naval Aviation, Naval Studies Board, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources. National Research Council, “The Implications of Advancing Technology For Naval Aviation” (Washington. DC: National Academy Press, 1982). pp. 6-8. 'Secretary of Defense Report, Fiscal Year 1984, p. 142.
“"Implications of Advancing Technology,” p. 24.
'Secretary of Defense Report, Fiscal Year 1984, p. 191.
Colonel Thompson received a bachelor of arts degree in economics from Centre College of Kentucky and a master’s degree in international affairs from George Washington University. He was commissioned in 1964 and has completed several joint service tours. Recently, he was Marine Corps Liaison Officer, David Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center. He is currently the Head of the Amphibious Requirements Section at Headquarters, Marine Corps.
A Distinguished Group of . . .
In 1967, Mr. Nitze, then-Secretary of the Navy, assembled a group of naval officers to give him an 'ndependent assessment of the progress of the war in Vietnam. Because he wanted the assessment as 9a'ckly as possible, each officer was assigned an area of analysis and gave a bi-weekly briefing °n his findings to Mr. Nitze, the CNO, and their most senior assistants. The oral briefings were later transcribed by the team members and then integrated into a more formal report.
j he pace was fast, and the presentations of the briefings were tense affairs. Another team member and I would meet several hours before our presentations and critique each other’s effort.
in one of the final briefings my partner told me that he was going to address ASW operations and P armed to begin by stating, “Far be it from me to tell such a distinguished group of admirals about aVV; but . . . When he stood in front of the long table occupied by this very select group of naval heavyweights, it came out, “Far be it from me to tell such a distinguished group of animals
Tt,’ 3nC* ^‘^n t 8et any further.
[2] here were no snickers or titters; there was a spontaneous explosion of uproarious laughter that was reignited each time he tried to explain what he really meant. From that point on, that was our mellowest session.
Colonel John C. Scharfen, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.) eedlnBs / November 1983