The Role of Escalation in Sealift Planning

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Like the flag on Suribachi that told the Japanese garrison “Iwo is ours,” the land­ing signal flag on a beach may one day tell the Soviets “We are coming ashore.” Once this gauntlet has been thrown down, our sealift—which will be required for victory— could become a leading candidate target for deliberate enemy escalation.

theater transportation? Is the intensity of fighting

likely¹

change? What kinds of economic support, domestic

carg°-

and other “indirect” lift requirements have claim⁵

available carriers? After taking these factors into

■ot

acco'

reqt>^ire'

over time, we can develop dynamic net payload -- ments; and by comparing these with available cap³ we can predict lift shortfalls.

Third, given a baseline transportation “balance she^et/.

Sealift will undoubtedly play a key role in any signifi­cant U. S. military contingency. And adequate ship­ping will be required early in a conflict. If a regional confrontation should evolve into a protracted conflict, our success could depend on our ability to move sustaining payloads by sea. Airlift would certainly play an important role in a conventional conflict, but as much as 90%-95% of total tonnage would still travel by sea; 96% of war cargoes was transported by sea during the Vietnam War.

U. S. strategic lift planning traditionally has revolved around four considerations. First, we must analyze the overall deployment situation before we decide to reinforce forward units, deploy new forces, or both. This analysis would consider prepositioned materiel, lift assets in hand, schedules for mobilizing reserve fleets, any allied mobility contributions, the availability of critical support en route (such as aerial refueling), basing, overflight, transit, and other access approvals.

Second, we have to reconcile lift needs with available capacity. What demands do deployment schedules and requirements for filling attrition impose? How efficient is the total system? Are goods getting through, or are they stacking up on piers and at air bases for want of intra-

we must account for any wartime weakening of °^u^ posture. Just how fast could we win a third Battle ⁰ j, Atlantic? Have ports and sea lines of communic^. (SLOCs) chokepoints been mined? Have we made P ^ sions to withhold or evasively route convoys pending ;

camp< ■ae^

successful first phase of an antisubmarine Have sea and air points of debarkation come under ; attack? Depending on the magnitude of the threat, iK^j

pabilities that seem adequate on paper may prove

in the real world. (True, we might offset some

requisitioning foreign ships, capturing hostile

lift C3'

losses¹

vessels’

moving supplies earmarked for adjacent theaters to^

immediate scene of fighting; but these gains would P^_sj_c bly be marginal compared with the destruction of our lift posture by enemy action.)

Finally, in an extended conflict, we must know ho new lift can be brought on line. The World Wars o century involved a race between German submarine^ duction and Allied ship production and antisubm warfare efforts. In April 1917, for instance, Germa f

nm^e.

boats sank 881,000 tons of shipping, and in the ^surn,.jiiei 1917, it was estimated that by October, available ,jy shipping would fall below the level considered mm¹ adequate if losses were not reduced or replaced. Con ^ ing eventually saved the day. During World War ’jfr story was the same: our net shipping losses for ran to about 5,300 ships, yet the U.S. shipbuilding try alone produced nearly 5,600 ships between

1942 ^

Recent trends render continued neglect of enemy

risen-

United States might have to fight concurrently has

all the escalatory shots. The ability of potential advert to escalate in ways most inimical to U. S. fortunes increased dramatically. It is now imperative to through the escalation threat in some detail. True, tion is not guaranteed, even if the United States an ^

ad-

situations, both sides would probably appreciate th^e vantages of tight restrictions on the scope and means°^.,_t fighting. In fact, a future U. S.-Soviet regional con j_t may be subject to a bewildering array of formal mm restraints.    _(e„.

Yet while curbs on escalation may be strong, the p° _s tial results of intense attacks on our shipping are so s^erl .

‘smash-and-grab” Soviet offensive had stalled ^

•                                                                                              So'

U. S. reinforcements seemed sufficient to erase-a _}

gains. In these and other situations, sealift should

leading candidate target for deliberate enemy ^eS. ^a._any

U. S. lift might be a doubly attractive objective in ¹¹

replace mobility assets might induce the United States

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guish between “vertical” and “horizontal” ^esC" 0' Vertical escalation entails an increase in the intens

1945. Our post-World War II fixation on sudden, intense, and, above all, short wars has blinded many to the possi­bility of another extended competition between attrition and replacement; but such a scenario is feasible.¹

To develop formal lift posture blueprints, we design a few canonical scenarios and select planning factors that can be plugged into models that characterize these four considerations. We wind up, figuratively speaking, with a family of curves that we can plot on a payload-versus-time chart to see if a given mobility posture is adequate to meet postulated challenges. By varying pertinent assumptions and planning factors, we change the shape of the curves and translate them along the time axis. What we would usually expect to see is a “bathtub” of lift data. At the start of a war, for instance, we might make do with pre­positioned mobility resources. But eventually attrition and other forms of lift degradation might reduce effective ca­pability to the point where net logistic requirements cannot be met. Eventually the curves would tilt upward again as the counterlift threat is eliminated, as stabilization of the combat situation leads to reduced needs, and as new lift becomes available from new construction and contribu­tions from new-found allies. As was the case in both World Wars, our victory could depend on the width and depth of this “bathtub.”

Such an analytic process drives, at least in principle, U. S. strategic lift planning.² But too often, some factors are omitted that could strongly influence, or even domi­nate, our four basic considerations. From the vantage point of a planner concerned with less-than-worst case scenarios, one of the most important of these factors is the effect that deliberate enemy escalation would impose.

Why hasn’t this threat figured more prominently in U. S. lift planning? So far we have not focused much analytic attention on how to compensate for deliberate enemy escalation in many areas, among them sealift, for several reasons. First, the United States entered both World Wars after the fighting had been under way for some time. The wars had, in effect, already escalated about as far as they were going to go, and in both cases the United States had had some time to warm up its sealift mobilization base. Second, postwar U. S. defense strategy has, to varying degrees, been based on the assumption that nuclear weapons could serve as an all-purpose deterrent to enemy escalation. Third, the same focus on nuclear deter­rence has fostered a “short-war” attitude in which only the assets already in hand when war began would be rele­vant to large-scale fighting. Fourth, in our recent “limited war” experience, the apparent threat to sealift has seemed, at worst, trivial. (Only a few ships were lost in Vietnam, for instance, all to sabotage.) Finally, with the chronic absence of political and budgetary support for strategic mobility forces, it has always been difficult to satisfy lift requirements for a war fought by our own rules—never mind a more demanding scenario.³ In sum, there has been no room in our postwar planning for escalatory threats. In major scenarios, it is supposed that lift will operate in an already escalated environment; in limited war scenarios, the escalatory threat would suppos­edly remain negligible throughout the conflict.

esca­

lation intolerably risky. In an era of strategic parity ^,l^ some have said, inferiority), the United States cannot^e pect nuclear threats to deter many kinds of escalat¹¹ Technological trends, the proliferation of sophistics weapons to many nations, and the increasingly reach of Soviet military power suggest that sea l'^neS_s) communication will not be as easy to secure as in the P At the same time, projected equipment consumption^r3 ^ have steadily increased, U. S. forces have become ‘ n^e^ ier” over time, and the number of locations in which

The U. S. lift posture is composed of fewer ships of h>». value, and while more productive, often less self-^sUS ^ ing than ever before. Thus, individual ship losses—°^f ₍₀ destruction of logistic infrastructure—are more lik^eo be catastrophic. Perhaps most important is that a new^SL nario—one falling between the canonical short wan¹¹ ■' all-out NATO-Warsaw Pact war and a limited, i^ncren1^ tal Third World operation—has become grimly pl^aU* over the past few years. A likely case would be a con tation in the Third World in which U. S. and Soviet f°^r find themselves in direct conflict.         j

In all, the United States should no longer expect ^t0^p

hipf

#

Soviet Union are in direct confrontation. Even in ^{in 1}

that we should not overlook such threats in our pl^aI,n' Indeed, if a deteriorating theater situation (and the P j pect of uncontrollable escalation to a nuclear di^saS^.. loomed, strong pressures might emerge to invest in a ^ imum conventional effort to settle the issue            y

point of no return had been 'reached. Similar esca _} pressures, possibly nuclear ones, would emerg^e^ jf

,vi^et

third-area scenarios, because the destruction its allies to fall back in order to avoid jeopardizing important theaters, particularly Central Europe. ^ 5.

In what ways might the threat of action against ^ sealift resources influence planning for convention^¹ ^ contingencies, particularly in third-area scenarios? ‘ sake of analysis, some theorists have attempted to ^₀([.

fighting, perhaps resorting to nuclear weapons in a P

tvould be t ^{n tareatenec}k One vertical escalatory option the United c.^USe f.^ndful of nuclear weapons to shatter t'me needed f^teS ’ⁿ~^lF^eater port infrastructure. Given the ^s*tortag_{e 0}f        ^reconstruction of port facilities and a

strike might a ^over‘the-shore” logistic resources, this ^en°ugh f_0r ,i ^{e a}y tF^e arrival of the main U. S. force long Similarly h ⁶ ^^ov*^ets to seize their primary objectives, stacks on T?ⁿ^^0ntaJ ^escaf^ation could include widespread F’ulf/Arabi-              o Upping outside the immediate Persian

ttumber of ^dI|^l f^{3 area}‘ Oruise missiles deployed on a ^okepojm^. P^{:0115 cou}l^ci be fired at ships in transit, and

^ comiTv,^ ?^na barbor areas could be subjected to attacks utttandos and mines.

^an exnan ,^Ventl0na^ ^conflict. Horizontal escalation refers to ti_Ves ^{Slon a cor,}flict to include new regions or objec- This ^stnc% related to previous developments.⁴ Nation³*°ⁿ°mic distinction is not very useful in naval key asym ” P^art*^cu*^ar> this taxonomy fails to allow for ^tal escahf^metneS *^{n man}y scenarios: one nation’s horizon- There is ^10arnay ^{seem a} vertical affront to someone else, forces to¹¹⁰ °^U*^3t’ ^moreover, that were U. S. and Soviet ^exPansio ^C_t°^me '^nto direct confrontation, the specter of sideratio ⁿ ° ^^enera^ ^{war w}°uld cast a pall over other con- be in force ⁿ° ^{matter w}h^at theoretical inhibitions might

Ttenace^{61 3                 SC0}P^e of the antilogistic escalation

^Scenario ?^ns.A^ertwo variants of a popular Persian Gulf have man ° ^0t^’ ^^ov'^et forces have attacked Iran and But \y ⁶ ^°°^cf P^rogress south to the Zagros Mountains, vading f.f™tensive elements are able to slow the in- ^ginningT³!)¹⁰¹¹⁸’ ^anc* Soviets’ logistic network is Point, \j e° ^Ck.^ter’^orate under heavy air attack. At this ^area, whi _h , ^re'ⁿf°^rcements approach ports in the Gulf ^engineers^C Al h^{Ve S}*^nce been greatly improved by U. S. capable of ,! •    these reinforcements are probably in­

P^erimeter ^r° ^^ack Soviet echelons, a Western defense ^SecUre vit ^<]^0U^ ^estahlished sufficiently far inland to Faced w' L^{eS0urces anc}* communications. ^ets contempt P^rosP^ect of a costly stalemate, the Sovi- hav_e assum^ h*^{6 esca}'^ati°ⁿ- Throughout the conflict, we °f op_eratj ⁶ ^^{lat onl}y targets within the immediate area f^a'^rgamef^nS’ ^n0t f^ncf^uding the Soviet Union, had been ^Used or r.,.°.^{r at}f^atF ^anci that nuclear weapons had not been

These illustrations suggest how grave the threat to the U. S. strategic position a deliberate Soviet conflict-widen­ing maneuver against sealift could be. Many other consid­erations would be involved, but such threats obviously should be considered in our peacetime mobility planning. We must also face enormous tradeoffs and uncertainties. For instance, if we were certain that the Soviets would never use nuclear weapons first, we would naturally ex­ploit every possible economy of scale in developing just one “super beachhead,” convoying our ships and build­ing our posture around intermodal containers. If, on the other hand, nuclear strikes seemed likely, we would de­sign our posture around fast, self-sustaining sealift—at a much higher cost per delivered ton. To improve our ability to cope with escalation, we would, in short, have to com­promise between taking advantage of available lift capac­ity and tolerating the inefficiencies that would follow from compensatory measures.

A final decision in every case will be arbitrary, since it is impossible to know what the probabilities of some So­viet actions in certain scenarios will be; indeed, the odds of some Soviet choices are influenced by our own deci­sions about which scenarios are more likely. In addition, many elements of our sealift and sea-lane defense posture exist, and so our freedom to conjure up some ideal future mobility force is quite limited. Even so, some actions can help hedge against a reasonably broad spectrum of threats, and many of these can be incorporated into the existing and future lift posture. Therefore, it is useful to list some approaches which can help deter enemy escalation or cope with it if it does come about.

Let us first consider the possibility of Soviet vertical escalation, or the first use of nuclear weapons against our sealift resources. This is a very narrow, if significant, threat. Because of the uncertainties of maintaining control over nuclear fighting, it is clearly in our best interest to try

To disrupt U. S. logistic support, the Soviets might exercise the escalation option of employing nuclear weapons to at­tack ports. Our use of ad hoc sea points of debarkation— e.g., two U. S. RolRos and a tanker are seen in the Indian Ocean—could help deter their use of nuclear weapons.

■                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       U. S. NAVY (P. RICCI)

^dingi /

November 1983

77

resources against nuclear attack will remain

ensi^vet

sume the availability of ships from many of °^ur_x^^-ld endowed maritime allies. However, in some Third- ^

" be u 0'

afl^u unih¹'

friends. When it comes to strategic mobility, one _e eral U. S. solution to a “logistics gap” is to procure ^ capacity; but if the political context permits, preposj¹ .j stocks may often be more cost-effective than addi bottoms.    . jfl-

Even more important, horizontal escalation cou ^ elude attacks against ships at all geographic points ¹¹¹ |y operational cycles. Mobility “sanctuaries” ^c6fl

Under the cover of a superpower conflict, some third nation that has acquired advanced offensive weapons—like the Libyan “Nanuchka”-class missile patrol boat—might pur­sue its own ambitions by taking some escalating action.

to deter the use of nuclear weapons. However, if deter­rence fails, we are left with two tasks: appropriate retalia­tion and containment of damage.

Considering the asymmetries in the superpower posi­tions, planning a nuclear riposte to a Soviet strike against U. S. shipping raises grim questions. The United States is very dependent on its sealift—unlike the Soviets. In fact, in many nuclear scenarios, sealift plays a much more im­portant role in overall Western mobility. The reason is that prepositioned overseas materiel and the airfields used by large airlifters represent a limited number of very vulner­able targets, and also that resupply and replenishment needs could skyrocket and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would probably dedicate our aerial tanker force to Strategic Air Command, not Military Airlift Command. To respond “in kind” could require substantial attacks against a broad spectrum of high-value Soviet military targets, including targets in the Soviet homeland. This first round of nuclear use would lead to an extremely grave situation; so the best way to prevent the Soviets from concluding that gains could outweigh losses would be for the United States to issue a policy—now, in peacetime—that we refuse to confine a nuclear fight to any one narrow setting, naval or otherwise.

In an age of nuclear parity, however, we must not rely totally on automatic retaliatory strategies that might prede­termine the rapid expansion of a limited nuclear confronta­tion. We must raise the Soviets’ costs of escalating to the nuclear level, but we would do well also to diminish the gains they would achieve from a small nuclear attack on our shipping. It is impossible to harden large port com­plexes; moreover, in most locations, it would be politi­cally impossible to undertake many defensive preparations in peacetime. Therefore, we might look to a well-devel­oped and redundant logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) capa­bility to enhance deterrence. (A comprehensive LOTS program would, of course, be extremely valuable in a number of conventional scenarios, since the logistic net in many theaters of interest is poor.⁵)

Similarly, as we design and acquire new mobility forces, we should recall that some ship types (roll-on/roll-offs, barge carriers, and lighter-aboard-ships) may be better suited for operations in times of grave nu­clear threat than others. These might be used as hedges against nuclear attack on ports, as well as in Third-World conventional scenarios. By the same token, concentrated targets could be prevented by rapid ship turnarounds and quick movement of materiel into the intratheater logistic network. If the Soviet Union estimated that the United States would have some ad hoc sea points of debarkation open even should they take the ghastly step of escalating to the nuclear level, they might be dissuaded from going nuclear in the first place.

Ships in the SLOC pipeline can be somewhat protected against nuclear attack in both active and passive ways.

afar, and they also may not require convoying, ^[h^ere ^ avoiding creation of high-value target concentration⁸ sea. By observing proper emission discipline, by c°° ^ nating a range of Navy, Air Force, and allied asset⁸’ by routing forces effectively, the United States would ther complicate Soviet efforts to target shipping ^w long-range nuclear forces. Conventional U. S. ^sUPP^r„,_s sion of suspected shorter-ranged, en route nuclear tnr would be a vital adjunct to these other measures. ._fl We do have a few steps available to anticipate—^arl .’ _t so doing, help deter—Soviet nuclear escalation ^aS^a^ ₃ U. S. sealift. Yet, while our reliance on shipping can sound pivot of our deterrent strategy, nuclear threats still two-edged swords. Our ability to defend our shipP

limited "

matter how much we spend. Along with being expe**-'' f nuclear defense of shipping would reduce the effici^enrf_e. what will inevitably be an overburdened fleet. Thus, . vant procurement efforts should probably be driven V marily by other considerations, such as the need to prove cargo handling in areas when port facilih^eS marginal.    . _ta|

Now let us turn to the more likely problem of horf escalation. This could involve potential or actual e*P ^ sion of the number of active theaters, perhaps cate U. S. shipping out of position. If multiple conflict • possible and if available shipping is insufficient, then P^ orities will have to be laid out. Just as in World War * > , might have to rely on the strategic defensive in some ^ ters. Temporary abandonment of some regions might be necessary. Wartime relations with friends and ^a would be crucial at this time. NATO’s defense pl^anS P.<

________________________________ ₇________ Third-

scenarios, or in situations in which our allies might un erally try to localize or retard a crisis, ships might n withheld; U. S. “flags of convenience” may even ^ available. But since this would reduce our ability to > spond to threats, the result is a vicious circle: the ³                                                                                                    ,

reluctance to get involved decreases our ability to de ^ which in turn further aggravates the anxieties of alh^eS

some        ^^{aVC t0 conten}^ with the longer reach of     pay to err on the side of caution in heading off incipient

important P°^wers (some of whom are located near escalatory threats—particularly a worldwide logistical

November 1983

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