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We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our “Nobody asked me, but ...” column.
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $60.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest.
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lieved for cause. But when a
President Harry S Truman’s famous desk-top sign, “The buck stops here,” carries special meaning for the commanding officer (CO) of a ship or squadron, who knows exactly where the buck stops—with him.
The Chief of Naval Operations recently addressed this point, citing a Wall Street Journal editorial of 31 years ago which explained that “The captain of a ship ... is given honors and privileges and trust beyond other men. But let that ship set the wrong course, let it touch ground, let disaster fall to the ship or its crew, and the captain must answer for what has happened. No matter what, he cannot escape.” The editorial went on to note that “When men lose confidence and trust in those who lead, order disintegrates into chaos.”
Admiral Watkins reinforced his “call to accountability” with the affirmation that “Every man is answerable to his conscience for his own behavior. . . . Most military people seem to grasp this concept of responsibility early on. But the same is not true for many of our civilian colleagues.”
This last point is felt particularly keenly by today’s commanding officer. Any captain worth his salt knows that he is responsible for his command and accountable for its readiness to carry out assigned missions. Indeed, one of the satisfactions of command at sea is fulfilling its unique responsibilities.
However, the CO has to deal with many external forces which directly affect his command, but over which he has only indirect or even no control. The approximately 650 ships and squadrons of the Navy are backed by an immense shore-based establishment, which is linked to an extensive civilian industrial base. The seagoing captain normally has little contact with industry, but deals at great length with the Navy shore establishment—which includes a high percentage of civilians.
In other words, the CO at sea is at the narrow end of a large funnel, which supposedly exists to assist him in attaining the best possible state of combat readiness.
As commanding officer of a ship, I welcome the shore establishment’s expertise as a better means to attain combat readiness. But the shore-establishment funnel deposits a great deal of output on my ship, much of it dross.
Why is this so? To a degree, the very vastness of the shore establishment—itself a term so all-encompassing, yet nondescript, as to defy accurate definition—determines that a significant percentage of its product will be useless or even counterproductive. The number of Navy and civilian personnel ashore, compared with the number at sea, is so disproportionate it makes one wonder how anything useful ever reaches the fleet.
The shore establishment nominally exists to support the fleet. The critical problem with this relationship is accountability. Who is responsible in the shore establishment at a working level, especially on the civilian side of the house? Where are the points of accountability? They are not readily apparent to the fleet commanding officer.
A flag officer once told me that there are 105,000 engineers in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea). Not to pick on NavSea, but this is an awesome figure. Even if only one-tenth this number of engineers is working for NavSea, it is an astounding proportion of engineers per fleet unit. Shore-based personnel are not assigned or hired on a per-ship basis, of course, but the comparison is enlightening, and indicative of a serious im
balance in the overall Navy struc When the Navy procures system which demonstrates sen°^jefnS maintenance or performance Pr0 , [ern. at sea, the CO must solve the Pr ^£fe In doing so, he may discover t a p0rt is no effective supply system to ^e5 the gear, or that its construction ^ it subject to immediate, extensiv rosion in salt air. Does anyone a “pay” for these mistakes? Is s0 fired or demoted? nS his
When a commanding officer fe. ship aground, he is, quite Pr°Pe „„
based engineer or manager make ^ ^,s. decision which imposes a marg1cor. tern on the fleet, and is costly jjsCi- rect, I seriously doubt that prope plinary action occurs. . en a
Where is the accountability uSjng contractor constructs a gun mou ^ fasteners that are approved un tary specifications but will not ^
the corrosion-inducing sea air- ,
individual in the material cotnrnsea use’ approved those fasteners for a and does he suffer for his poor formance? The fleet CO sees nO^^. swers to such questions, only frustration and evidence that t ^ ^ establishment’s credo to “supP0^ gjoVv fleet” is, on the working leve ’ and chancy proposition. (,jiity
The perceived lack of accoun^ ^ and shirking of responsibility ar limited to the Navy shore esta . ment. When the British Govern ^ was surprised by the Argentine of the Falklands, the British gj(,jlity> Secretary recognized his respon ^ acknowledged his accountability^
had the good grace to resign- the remember no such resignations unsuccessful Iranian rescue nljned
(The Secretary of State had de ^ to resign before the mission t0?pjCjals place.) Surely, some civilian ® were responsible and should ha held accountable. s(
As the CNO averred, “We jn- raise our level of sensitivity to .jjty separable principles of resP°Jlsluarters and accountability ... in all Q ^slt- of government.” The shore es ment would be a good place to
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Proceedings / Nove1"1*