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soon intensify. The leadership
these
of the 1980s will be to integrate^ new capabilities within the frame'*' to traditional leadership so that the acc ^ information becomes an asset rat a liability. . -t:ative
The first stumbling block to >n ^ created by advanced technology 0f- degree of control afforded by s ^g{l the-art communications and int°r 8, systems. In the most recent crisis^ ^ tions involving the employment 0 tary forces, the recapture of the stage guez in 1975 and the abortive .^t rescue attempt in 1980, the Fr ^ controlled- events halfway the
globe from the Oval Office- 1 c0lll- continuing refinement of satelh s munications, global positioning sy
and integrated tactical display
Time Magazine's selection of a computer as “Man of the Year” would have come as no great shock to George Orwell, author of 1984 (New American Library, 1971). As we approach the year 1984, the system Orwell described in his futuristic parable is coming ever closer to our grasp—no great surprise to those of us in today’s military. Automation has permeated every area of the military.
Almost daily, we hear of some new automated, digital-downlink, microcomponent system which has been proposed or introduced to increase our forces’ capability. Soon a commander will possess the ability to communicate with units and agencies in any part of the world, access large parts of the tactical data base of his service, and assess his personnel and material situations instantly through a | display on his “command terminal.” Unfortunately, our infatuation with the 1 dynamic innovations the computer offers us has kept us from fully recognizing that there are also undesirable side effects which, if left unchecked, could gravely damage our military structure. No one has an accurate idea of the effect technology is going to have on warfare. Few people appear to have stopped to consider the effect computerization is having on leadership.
Two perceptions concerning the ability of our officer corps appear consistently in our professional forums: the lack of initiative which creates a “careerist” mindset, stifling the traditional exercise of leadership; and a glaring lack of tactical proficiency demonstrated by all ranks in all services. Both of these deficiencies are at least partly the result of the automation present in almost every facet of military life. The computer and its associated components have placed unprecedented information at the commander’s disposal, and since we must cont'^jll improve our capabilities, this tr®aj|enge
na"
tional leader or theater-level con1I^ctjo!i-‘; is able to influence and direct the ^re- of his subordinate units in a manne s< the tofore impossible. If this contm*^ foe a
local commander will no nnme anoI^er commander at all; he will becom -cation cog in the information/comrnun^^ system, passing data to some .0„s headquarters and relaying the ^d and instructions of the superior co ^ ^j- to the operating forces. The effeC -ffe tiative is clear: there will not be arjjt(je o< subordinate commander will have no control over his organization-^ tive will be neither encouraged n ^ mitted. The officers who succee l(l- those who provide the most Tw h#! formation, defer the decisions olit headquarters, and faithfully ca those decisions. Those who att^nt0 the insert their personal prerogative ^ system will be selected out as ,e
eivA1’ “unrpliolil*' ” The eXa
140
Somp u eQ ln that direction. be enc0.iJiht,.Sa^ that this trend should
t strom, a~ “ ^'questionable need for are ultima,°* control hy those who
ln extremp"-'- :w>P”,,s|oic—particularly ^ayagup? ■ CnS,'S sltuations such as the based on nl"!Lf"tTa mili‘ary structure
on ^ “itiuoiy Mruciure
ive n allZed contro1 and limited
mander can tt While a local com t0rs to bis a tCmpt t0 convey these fac ‘ S suPeriors, the time and dis
occond w — “ccucu:
?n When the LT* be Prepared to carry '00% re|i.,Ki.yS,,ems Pai1 No machine is
ne contrary Ut lnterrerence. Quite Place great h °Ur. Potential adversaries
face great . ‘ pmenuai adversaries
have devoted “Ctnnal emphasis on and tbat are carnm rCa[. resources to systems n‘and. conm^ C, °. destroying our com- w<)rks: satellit • communications net-
might hpatme.nt wdl inhibit others who Somp lnc'lned 'n that direction.
enm„r , y Ulal lnis trend should
command a8ld; the higher the level of and abilitj1? hority’ tbe rnore experience tors will hp k° assess the significant fac- Whiie thpr br°Ught t0 bear °n a situation. - e is an unquestionable need for
‘.orAfl - _ . . . .
'Ultiative nrp. a“u immeu
ing the onn S?ntS grave dangers, reduc- bat. First Ptf°rtunUy for success in com- on-scene ’are factors which only the
^PPortunitic?p!."?Cr Can see and assess- are often n t0r decisive action in battle
mandercanle?ln8' While a local com-
talce from ‘ ““>e ana ais-
thc appre • . e attlefield will diminish °PPortunitipc °u,° SUch assessments and which sank n, ^0uld the decisive strike atthe Battle,aPanese aircraft carriers ed if the a M,dway bave been launch- 'n Chief p PPr<)v;d ot the Commander Second!v 1C’ had b^n needed?
UU% reliahi f- ra“- No machine is ‘rated by m^ , Every day, we are frus- Ures- and on? 3111?1 or electronic fail- and inform ,.:,, rnodern communications ‘be same ini'1 sys‘ems are products of w°uld be extr USlr,'CS' Furthermore, we °LUr enemies !,me y naive t0 believe that ‘bese systems u/m a,.,ow us to operate tbe contrary Ub°Ut lnterference. Quite
■ satellite • "lrnunications net- c°untermeasnr lnterceptors, electronic- range artillery6S ^“'Pmcnt, and long- We must uy and missiles, disruption of Prepared t0 fight with total T° do so 1 ‘eebnical capabilities. CaPable of • ,must have commanders action. When n ePeP^ent and decisive c°nditioned mdividual who has been and directions ^g'dly follow the plans ' addenly Conf higher headquarters is
'Ommunication°nted with the b«s of his .otb, wifi he kS fad tactical data net- ptUa‘ion rapidly ^ l° assess the tactical r°babiy not y and take decisive action? decisiveng ' He Wl11 waiver, and in- m°dem comht,n combat, particularly p'nally. whma Uf!a,ly results in defeat. ,aratl°n of thesp ?vUk haPPen when a gen- that they would suddenly develop the ability to think independently, to seek and explore new and innovative concepts, and to make decisive judgments when required.
The computer also stifles initiative in the area of supervision, or, more correctly, over-supervision. Closely related to over-control, over-supervision is more subtle, more widespread, and even more difficult to distinguish, representing an even greater danger to independent thought and action. Most commanders realize the drawbacks of over-control and are aware when they are infringing upon their subordinates’ authority. If the risks are not too great, they will avoid overcontrol as much as is allowable by regulations or their superiors. This is not the case, however, with over-supervision.
Modem information systems allow a frightening volume of data concerning every functional area of individual tactical units to flow upward through the chain of command, often to the service headquarters in Washington. The individual squadron, ship, or battalion commander realizes that his unit’s “report card,” listing grades in operational readiness, tactical proficiency, personnel management, administration, supply status, and maintenance efficiency, will be reviewed at the highest levels of the military structure. Therefore, he will believe that the risks of too little supervision will be far greater than the risks of too much supervision. The pendulum has swung decidedly to the side of micromanagement. This trend’s effect on initiative is potentially devastating. Modem systems allow each commander to become submerged in the minute details of his subordinates’ duties; given the potential pressures involved, what individual would be able to resist exercising the degree of supervision available to him? Junior officers will be carefully guided in the performance of most operations.
Few commanders will be willing to accept the risks of innovation or initiative either by himself or his subordinates knowing that the results of a mistake will be readily apparent up the chain of command. The commander’s goal—hence the unit’s—becomes to satisfy the requirements of the various informational systems. These requirements are stated in the manuals and directives, and innovation or deviation from these requirements is neither expected nor encouraged. Over-supervision is a two-way street, and can result from perceptions of those below just as easily as it can from actions of the higher headquarters. Take a hypothetical example of an over-zealous subordinate who turns an innocent comment by his superior concerning a maintenance status report into an order that the use of equipment in his unit will be restricted so that his organization will not appear on that report next week. What effect would such an order have on that unit’s tactical training? That commander has become a slave of a system which was intended to help him; it is leading him, rather than helping him lead.
The computer is having a similar restrictive effect on the development of tactical skill. The degree of control and supervision made possible by technology stifles battlefield genius as surely as it does initiative. Closely watched and directed, the young officer will have little opportunity to practice tactics, experiment with new ideas, make mistakes, and learn from his experiences. Commanders at'all levels, aware that their performance in training evolutions is being observed and graded, will be wary of straying too far from the “school solution” for fear of receiving a failing mark. Innovation will be applied only after it has gone through the slow bureaucratic practice of doctrinal development and received the appropriate blessings. Yet tactical proficiency goes beyond a knowledge of existing doctrine and school solutions. It requires boldness, innovation, initiative, and judgment at all levels—qualities which are not compatible with tight control and close supervision. One wonders if the abilities of master warriors like Admiral Horatio Nelson, General Robert E. Lee, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, or General George Patton would be fully realized if they were to fight in the modem military structure.
We have progressed to the point where we are introducing computerized systems to evaluate tactical proficiency. The concept of developing performance standards for tactical execution is not unsound; however, such systems have hidden dangers which could severely degrade the war-fighting skills they were designed to enhance. Providing a standardized “checklist” of elements of a successful combat operation can provide a starting
point for unit training and can ensure that all elements of an organization receive a sound foundation in the fundamentals of war. But mastering the checklist is no guarantee that one has acquired tactical proficiency. Checklists cannot guide the application of fundamentals to the actual circumstances of a combat situation. A commander must recognize this limitation and reach beyond the checklists when training his unit. War games cannot quantify all the factors present in a combat environment. Since war games are developed to evaluate a certain way of fighting, participants must recognize that outcomes will be weighted toward that tactical format. A standardized evaluation system can lead to the creation of an inflexible set of tactics; standardization fails to account for the range of possibilities and the need for diversity in tactical thinking. The greatest hazard lies in tying the standardized tactical performance system to tactical “grades.” This would make the system an end unto itself, inviting over-control and over-supervision into the area where we should resist such intervention the most. We will train to satisfy the checklist and get a good grade on the test, not to win the next war. Consequently, war-fighting skills will only
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be as good as our tests and checklists.
A third area in which technology has impacted upon tactical proficiency is in the amount of time available for developing such proficiency. Combat skill is not developed overnight; it requires study, planning, practice, and evaluation. Unfortunately, modem information systems, although theoretically designed to save time, are placing greater demands on commanders and junior officers, leaving less and less time for the necessary study and practice of fighting ability. Most officers receive inadequate training in the technical systems upon which their units depend for personnel, maintenance, and supply management. Therefore, they must acquire working knowledge of these systems on their own, which is both frustrating and time-consuming. The systems often create a myriad of informational and reporting requirements; meeting these requirements in the proper format creates a burden which often outweighs the system’s potential benefits.
Finally, combat leadership is recognized as a key element of tactical skill. Over-supervision, tactical standardization, and time limitations on the development and practice of war-fighting capability inhibit the exercise of combat leadership and therefore tactical proficiency. Leadership is the result of a fragile relationship between a commander and his unit which is based upon confidence, concern, trust, and respect. An environment which does not allow a leader the opportunity to demonstrate and develop his skills with his unit prohibits the development of such a relationship. Without it, there is no basis upon which to inspire the men to victory.
The pace of the modern world demands that we adopt the latest technology now and deal with the hidden costs and undesirable side effects later. However, by recognizing these costs and effects now, we can begin to develop safeguards against their most debilitating consequences. One step which would prevent many of the negative influences of modernization would be to recognize computers and information systems for what they are: management tools, not driving forces in and of themselves. Systems must enhance, not inhibit, the tactical commander’s abilities and provide him with useful information, not additional, unnecessary requirements. While the computer places a great deal of information at our disposal, it does not significantly increase our resources to deal with the problems exposed by that information. More than ever, we must have a well-developed set of priorities, resisting the temptation to shift them around in
; viSJl
ible
reaction to problems made more by modem technology. ,, u,» to
A second positive move
re-
expensive equipment and scar ^ sources and any misstep might aP!^ever- a story on the six o’clock news. ^ theless, unless we guard again„cfiljrs
defer-the-decision-uPst3
play-it-safe, deler-the-cieciM'-”1 -> ^
syndrome, we cannot hope to dev r^ leaders we will need to succee
next war. We must recognize trainln^j what it is: an opportunity to PraC . re-
get the bugs out. Creating smoo
r , •_______ oiktic see"
hearsed exercises with unrealistic
gets
ios to impress outside observers 0 j*" test passing grade on some contriv ^ ^ creates a false sense of security^ uH" higher level of command and j, healthy cynicism in the lower ra^jnjn does little to enhance the ability to (0 combat. Allowing the opportnn^j make a mistake and learn from it great deal to develop initiative an
cal skill in our officer corps.
Finally, an increased emphasis^ ^
classic principles of leadership
the
bad£
most beneficial in combating |0p-
fects of computerization. The ^ ce
ment of mutual trust and confiden tween the links in the chain of ct’n>tvveei' is essential. Communication -
fid'
levels must consist of more than ^”111
ing an input into an information
and receiving a report in return.
Com1
nn3"'
uetWe‘ .
ders must seek the balance control and over-control, supervis ^ must resist.
over-supervision; they
temptation to become intimately inv
,ves
1C 111|tIcll 1VJ11 IU UtLUUIt llllliu***’ pj'
in every area to which the conrpute ^ir them access. They must develop ^ ^
subordinates by telling them what
the
but not how to do it. They must all0j|
subordinates to carry out missions they might make a mistake or fad’ ing that there is value to be derive ^ the experience. Each individua
iibmv
id1
accept his part of this response ^ not concentrating on those things in the
look good on paper—or puter—but add little to the the
seff*'
w
in
tiveness. Basic leadership has st0° r0b-
the P1
test of time and can help solve tl
lems which modernization has ^jll Initiative and tactical proficienCr ^
become lost arts unless we recog1
dangers in computerization
,nize‘
and ga
against its hidden costs: over-c
■_con*r(
•of
of t*c;
over-supervision, standardization ^,^0
tics, and multiplication of burea1 requirements.
w
e
el
3'
t)
n,
142
Proceedings / Noven1^