Leadership Forum: Leadership in the Computer Age

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soon intensify. The leadership

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of the 1980s will be to integrate^ new capabilities within the frame'*' to traditional leadership so that the acc ^ information becomes an asset rat a liability.                                       . -_t:_ative

The first stumbling block to >ⁿ ^ created by advanced technology ₀f- degree of control afforded by ^s ^_g{l the-art communications and int°^r ₈, systems. In the most recent crisis^ ^ tions involving the employment ⁰ tary forces, the recapture of the _stag^e guez in 1975 and the abortive .^t rescue attempt in 1980, the Fr ^ controlled- events halfway            th^e

globe from the Oval Office- ¹ _c0lll- continuing refinement of satelh _s munications, global positioning ^sy

and integrated tactical display

Time Magazine's selection of a com­puter as “Man of the Year” would have come as no great shock to George Or­well, author of 1984 (New American Library, 1971). As we approach the year 1984, the system Orwell described in his futuristic parable is coming ever closer to our grasp—no great surprise to those of us in today’s military. Automation has permeated every area of the military.

Almost daily, we hear of some new automated, digital-downlink, microcom­ponent system which has been proposed or introduced to increase our forces’ ca­pability. Soon a commander will possess the ability to communicate with units and agencies in any part of the world, access large parts of the tactical data base of his service, and assess his personnel and material situations instantly through a | display on his “command terminal.” Unfortunately, our infatuation with the ¹ dynamic innovations the computer offers us has kept us from fully recognizing that there are also undesirable side effects which, if left unchecked, could gravely damage our military structure. No one has an accurate idea of the effect technol­ogy is going to have on warfare. Few people appear to have stopped to consider the effect computerization is having on leadership.

Two perceptions concerning the ability of our officer corps appear consistently in our professional forums: the lack of initi­ative which creates a “careerist” mind­set, stifling the traditional exercise of leadership; and a glaring lack of tactical proficiency demonstrated by all ranks in all services. Both of these deficiencies are at least partly the result of the auto­mation present in almost every facet of military life. The computer and its asso­ciated components have placed unprece­dented information at the commander’s disposal, and since we must ^cont'^jll improve our capabilities, this ^tr®_aj|_enge

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tional leader or theater-level ^con1I^_ctjo!i-‘^; is able to influence and direct the ^_re- of his subordinate units in a ^manne _s< th^e tofore impossible. If this contm*^ foe ^a

local commander will no nnme an^oI^^er commander at all; he will becom -_cation cog in the information/comrnun^^ system, passing data to some .₀„s headquarters and relaying the ^d and instructions of the superior co ^ ^j- to the operating forces. The eff^eC -ffe tiative is clear: there will not be ^arjj_t(j_e o< subordinate commander will have no control over his organization-^ tive will be neither encouraged n ^ mitted. The officers who succee _l(l- those who provide the most Tw h#! formation, defer the decisions _olit headquarters, and faithfully ^ca those decisions. Those who ^att^_nt0 th^e insert their personal prerogative ^ system will be selected out as ,_e

eivA¹’                 “unrpliolil*' ” The eX^a

140

Somp u ^{eQ ln that} direction. ^be enc₀.iJi^ht,.^Sa^ ^{that this trend} should

t strom, a~ “ ^'questionable need for ^are ultima,°* ^control hy those who

^ln extremp"-'- :^w>P”^,,s|oic—particularly ^ayagup? ■ ^CnS,'^{S sltua}tions such as the ^based on nl"!Lf"^tT^{a mili}‘^ary structure

on ^                    “itiuoiy Mruciure

ive n ^{allZed contro1} and limited

^mander can tt ^{While a local} com ^t0rs to bis ^{a tCmpt t0} convey these fac ‘             ^{S su}Periors, the time and dis

occond w — “ccucu:

?ⁿ When the LT* ^be P^repared to carry '00% re|i.,Ki.^yS,,^ems P^ai¹ No machine is

^ne contrary ^{Ut lnter}rerence. Quite Place great h °^Ur. Potential adversaries

face g_reat .           ‘ pmenuai adversaries

^have devoted “^Ctnnal emphasis on and ^tbat are _carnm ^rCa[. resources to systems ⁿ‘^and. conm^ ^C, °. destroying our com- ^w<)rks: satellit • ^communications net-

might hp^atme.^{nt wdl} inhibit others who Somp ^lnc'^lned 'ⁿ that direction.

enm„r , ^{y Ulal lnis trend} should

command ^a8l^{d; the higher the level of} and abilitj¹? ^hority’ ^{tbe rnore} experience tors will hp k° ^{assess the} significant fac- Whiie thpr ^br°^{Ught t0 bear} °n a situation. - ^e is an unquestionable need for

‘.orAfl - _               .   . .    .

'Ultiative nrp.                       ^a“^u immeu

ⁱⁿg the onn ^S?^{ntS grave} dangers, reduc- ^bat. First ^P_tf°^{rtunUy for} success in com- on-scene ’^{are factors} which only the

^PPortunitic?p!."?^{Cr Can see and assess}- ^are often n ^t0r decisive action in battle

^mandercan^le?^ln8' ^{While a local} com-

^talce f_rom ‘                  ““>e ana ais-

thc app_re • . ^e attlefield will diminish °PPortunitipc °u,° ^SUch assessments and which sank n, ^^0uld the decisive strike ^atthe Battle,^aP^{anese aircraf}t carriers ^ed if the a ^{M,dway bave} been launch- 'ⁿ Chief p PP^r<)v;d ot the Commander ^Second!v ^1C’ ^{had b}^n needed?

^UU% reliahi f- ^ra“- ^No machine is ‘rated by m^ , ^{Every da}y, we are frus- ^Ures- and on? ³¹¹¹?^{1 or} electronic fail- ^and inform ,.:,, rnodern communications ‘^be same ini'^{1 sys}‘^ems are products of ^w°uld be extr ^USlr,'^CS' ^Furthermore, we °_L^Ur ene_mies !,^{me y naive t0} believe that ‘^bese systems u/m ^a,.^{,ow us} to operate ^tbe contrary ^Ub°^{Ut lnter}ference. Quite

■ satellite • "^lrnunications net- ^c°untermeasnr ^lnterceptors, electronic- ^range artillery^6S ^“'Pmcnt, and long- We _must u^{y and} missiles, disruption of ^{Prepared t0 fight with} total ^T° ^do so 1 ‘eebnical capabilities. ^CaPabl_e of • ,m^ust have commanders ^action. When ^{n e}P^eP^^ent ^and decisive ^c°ⁿditioned mdividual who has been ^and directions ^^g'^dly follow the plans ' addenly _Conf higher headquarters is

'^Ommunication°^{nted with the b}«s of his .otb, wifi he k^S f^ad tactical data net- p^tUa‘ion rapidly ^ ^l° ^{assess the} tactical ^r°babiy not ^{y and ta}ke decisive action? decisiveng ' ^He Wl11 waiver, and in- m°dem comh_t,^{n co}mbat, particularly p'^nally. whm^{a U}f!^a,ly results in defeat. ,_a^ratl°n of thesp ?_v^{Uk ha}PPen when a gen- that they would suddenly develop the ability to think independently, to seek and explore new and innovative con­cepts, and to make decisive judgments when required.

The computer also stifles initiative in the area of supervision, or, more cor­rectly, over-supervision. Closely related to over-control, over-supervision is more subtle, more widespread, and even more difficult to distinguish, representing an even greater danger to independent thought and action. Most commanders realize the drawbacks of over-control and are aware when they are infringing upon their subordinates’ authority. If the risks are not too great, they will avoid over­control as much as is allowable by regu­lations or their superiors. This is not the case, however, with over-supervision.

Modem information systems allow a frightening volume of data concerning every functional area of individual tacti­cal units to flow upward through the chain of command, often to the service headquarters in Washington. The individ­ual squadron, ship, or battalion com­mander realizes that his unit’s “report card,” listing grades in operational readi­ness, tactical proficiency, personnel management, administration, supply sta­tus, and maintenance efficiency, will be reviewed at the highest levels of the mili­tary structure. Therefore, he will believe that the risks of too little supervision will be far greater than the risks of too much supervision. The pendulum has swung decidedly to the side of micromanage­ment. This trend’s effect on initiative is potentially devastating. Modem systems allow each commander to become sub­merged in the minute details of his subor­dinates’ duties; given the potential pres­sures involved, what individual would be able to resist exercising the degree of supervision available to him? Junior offi­cers will be carefully guided in the per­formance of most operations.

Few commanders will be willing to accept the risks of innovation or initiative either by himself or his subordinates knowing that the results of a mistake will be readily apparent up the chain of com­mand. The commander’s goal—hence the unit’s—becomes to satisfy the re­quirements of the various informational systems. These requirements are stated in the manuals and directives, and innova­tion or deviation from these requirements is neither expected nor encouraged. Over-supervision is a two-way street, and can result from perceptions of those below just as easily as it can from actions of the higher headquarters. Take a hypo­thetical example of an over-zealous sub­ordinate who turns an innocent comment by his superior concerning a maintenance status report into an order that the use of equipment in his unit will be restricted so that his organization will not appear on that report next week. What effect would such an order have on that unit’s tactical training? That commander has become a slave of a system which was intended to help him; it is leading him, rather than helping him lead.

The computer is having a similar re­strictive effect on the development of tac­tical skill. The degree of control and su­pervision made possible by technology stifles battlefield genius as surely as it does initiative. Closely watched and di­rected, the young officer will have little opportunity to practice tactics, experi­ment with new ideas, make mistakes, and learn from his experiences. Commanders at'all levels, aware that their performance in training evolutions is being observed and graded, will be wary of straying too far from the “school solution” for fear of receiving a failing mark. Innovation will be applied only after it has gone through the slow bureaucratic practice of doctri­nal development and received the appro­priate blessings. Yet tactical proficiency goes beyond a knowledge of existing doctrine and school solutions. It requires boldness, innovation, initiative, and judgment at all levels—qualities which are not compatible with tight control and close supervision. One wonders if the abilities of master warriors like Admiral Horatio Nelson, General Robert E. Lee, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, or General George Patton would be fully realized if they were to fight in the modem military structure.

We have progressed to the point where we are introducing computerized systems to evaluate tactical proficiency. The con­cept of developing performance standards for tactical execution is not unsound; however, such systems have hidden dan­gers which could severely degrade the war-fighting skills they were designed to enhance. Providing a standardized “checklist” of elements of a successful combat operation can provide a starting