At Home On Every Ocean

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In one of his most angry works—“What do they know of England who only England know?”—Kipling told the world what the Union Jack was and where it could be found: at sea. The English flag no longer flutters, as it did in the 19th century, over all the oceans. But ours must if our survival is to be assur­ed in this century and beyond.

which has contributed to the prevention of a nuclear race in the region. Yet, the military predominance

United States.

Since the closing salvos of World War II, the United States has maintained a strategic dispersion of land and naval forces around the globe. The wisdom of our forward deployed naval strategy, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea, is being reexamined by many strate­gists in light of Soviet military predominance in Europe, strategic nuclear parity, and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a naval power. Although these concerns bear directly on the practicality of our naval strategy, there is another aspect of the issue that we overlook at our peril. The debate over how to shape and deploy our naval forces must also address the implications that our forward de­ployed strategy has on the policies of Western-oriented states concerning the procurement of nuclear arsenals. Our naval strategy cannot be based solely on the exigencies of war fighting, but must also be suited to the requirements of a foreign policy that seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in an increasingly unstable world.

U. S. naval presence in the Mediterranean since World War II has been employed to reassure our NATO allies and Middle Eastern states on numerous occasions. The pres­ence of the Sixth Fleet has been a stabilizing influence,

am¹⁵

of th^e

Sixth Fleet has not always been a source of assurance our allies. The British and French decision to develop clear arsenals can be traced to the divergence of i^nte . _s between the United States and its principal NATO a during the Suez Crisis in 1956.¹           . j_0l)

Britain and France viewed the Egyptian nationals ^ of the Suez Canal in July of 1956 as a serious threat vital line of communication with their colonial P°^s . sions. They threatened military intervention after neg tions stalled. The United States was not prepared t° ^ port militarily the threatened intervention because to ^ would have been injurious to U. S. interests in Afr*^ca -j. the Middle East. The policy of the Eisenhower Adn¹¹^ tration encouraged Egyptian intransigence and ^c ^ quently doomed British and French intervention at Said to failure.      . _otji

The political repercussions of the Suez Crisis l^e ^ the British and the French to reexamine their defense P ^ cies, which relied heavily on a presumed converge¹¹ interests with the United States. When U. S. coop^era

was not forthcoming, the limitations of British an military capabilities rendered their diplomatic untenable. Reaction to the crisis in Britain brougW j the government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden a 3] suited in the British decision to procure a nuclear a ^ as necessary for pursuit of an independent foreign P _aS a The French also chose to develop nuclear weap^on^fth⁶ means of underwriting a foreign policy independent

62

Proceedings / NoveH¹^

If the noli °^{r exam}Pl^e> Israel and South Africa^{2 tw}° ^categorie ^ ^°^a'^{S op a sta}te fall under one of the first ^tegic nuclear ^Sf ^^{en tbe wea}P°ns of choice would be stra- ^strategi_{c nuc}i ^orces- Both Britain and France developed ^forces to achi^ !^r'^{ads com}posed of land, sea, and air S'^c nuclear _sf^^{e tae}!^r P°b^cy goals. The number of strate- ^dtTlefortwo ^{aeS not like}ly increase at the present Periority ₀f J"^easons- First, the overwhelming nuclear su- ^Strategi_c nn,.i,^{e tW}° ^suP^erPowers has made the spread of

?ⁿd, the rpc^. ^ear.f^{orces to} other states a moot issue. Sec- d consistent behavior of the United ^0rces has rpH.,—j^ⁿ‘^on iⁿ the use of their strategic

No longer • ^ ^c'^lan§^e(^ greatly since the Suez Crisis,

declining rrT ^nuc!^{ear arms} perceived as a quick fix for with joinin ,^l^,°^rnat'^c Influence. The liabilities associated ^,h^were30v!"!^Clear club are more apparent today than °f^a nuclear ,^^{ears a}S°- ^ nation considering the adoption ^t'^c'Pated ^{S rUtc}Sy ^must weigh the risks against the an- The decisi^⁸ ^ -^Secur'^ty ^or diplomatic leverage, generally h-<^IOri| ^{3 state t0} P^rocure nuclear weapons is ^ To comner⁶ - ^Up°ⁿ °^{ne tbe} f°H^owlng policy goals: ^arHple, Brit i’^{2 38} “ ^Wor*d power diplomatically—for ex­* To develo'^{11, rance> an}d possibly India fr°m anothe^ ^{U detcrrence} to counter a perceived threat Soviet Uni^^{r nuc}*^ear power—for example, China, the ► To provil _a^and.^POSSibly ^India °f ^conventio ■ |^means last-ditch defense when the strain bear-—p₀ j,¹!³ w^;ir becomes too great for the nation to If ..          examnlp Icrt>pl nnH Qnuth Afrmo^

iwo_cate^pollcy g°^ai* of

^te8ic nnoi°"!^S;^thenthe

^dtes anH fV X ^lu const;

UOV U1 UlUll OUUlUglU

Oonnuciear st *^{be Pear} unprovoked attack against ^taeir antici_n..,^a,?^S' ^Pact'^ca' nuclear weapons, because of ^c°ⁿventio_nai ? ,^{USe 0n tbe} battlefield and adaptability to °^ns f°r nudp ⁶ '^VerX ^means, are the most probable weap- folicy goai_s i PJ°bferation. States seeking to achieve ° ^tactical n„ i ^{Uded under the} third category would turn The p_ri ^ear weapons.

^c'^earweap₀^C'^pa*_-^beneBt derived from use of tactical nu­ns a last resort in conventional war is that of

force multiplication. A small number of nuclear weapons, deliverable by conventional means, could increase a state’s counterattack potential. For states with populations smaller than their potential adversaries’, such as South Africa and Israel, tactical nuclear weapons offer the possi­bility of redressing a vulnerable weakness. In addition, tactical nuclear weapons are cheaper to maintain than an equivalent counterattack potential in conventional forces.

The risks incurred by adopting nuclear weapons are not as obvious as the advantages. The principal risk of acquir­ing any nuclear capability is that of provoking preemptive attack by another nuclear power. A state armed with tacti­cal nuclear weapons might threaten, either through design or circumstance, the vital interests of another nuclear power, particularly one already at war. The Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear project in June 1981 is an example of the risk of preemptive attack associated With nuclear capa­bilities or even the possibility of their development.

Another risk in acquiring a tactical nuclear arsenal is the upsetting influence its introduction would have on the re­gional balance of power. The increased tensions resulting from the disruption of this balance would lead to further spread of nuclear weapons among neighboring states.

Because of these risks, it is not surprising that all mid­dle powers except India have elected to maintain conven­tional defense forces. The ratification of the United Na­tion’s Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by 119 states as of January 1983 is further indica­tion that these risks are clearly recognized.³ The NPT

'Va.,

^edlr>gs / November 1983

63

would not be apparent without its visible mai

nifesta*

Proceedings

would not have received as wide support as it has without the security guarantee offered by the United States; the United States promised to come to the assistance of any nonnuclear treaty member attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons.⁴ The forward deployed naval strategy of the United States provides visible manifestation of our in­tent to honor these commitments. Recognition by the treaty members that the United States has both the means and the political will to provide those assurances is a cru­cial factor in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The stabilizing influence of U. S. naval power is dem­onstrated in the Middle East. Both Israel and Egypt are recognized as possessing the technological and material prerequisites for nuclear arms production.⁵ The continued presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean over the past three decades has reduced fear of direct Soviet inter­vention, thus eliminating a primary reason for a declared nuclear strategy by Israel. Were the United States to with­draw the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean in support of a more cost-effective and flexible naval strategy, Israel would have little choice but to announce a strategy of lim­ited nuclear deterrence built upon tactical nuclear weapons in order to discourage direct Soviet intervention in the event of another Middle East war.⁶ An adoption of nuclear 64

i li feral*⁰¹¹

strategy by Israel would then create a general prom _t of nuclear weapons among the Arab states.⁷ The arg _a that U. S. naval power could be reestablished du crisis offers Israel little assurance. Israel has been ^ ^ cally reluctant to accept assurances and guarantees basis for its security.⁸ It has preferred more tangin' <j port in the form of military aid and the presence o j_g| forces. The only convincing hedge on the growing ³ _e( strength in the Mediterranean is U. S. power. Tha'

*—  . ]_reacj.

the Sixth Fleet. According to many reports, Israel has developed nuclear weapons.⁹ The veracity °.. yof reports is immaterial politically. It is the official p⁰¹ ^ _flll. Israel regarding the development and employment ^ clear weapons that is of consequence diplomatics! r ^ pressures for proliferation will not be unleashed ^ Middle East as long as neither Israel nor the Ara ¹ announce a policy of nuclear deterrence.

U. S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean plays a Y ^ lei role to that of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterran^e^₍ii preventing the spread of nuclear arms to Afn^ca‘ ^ to Africa, a principal supplier of fissionable uranium the West, is capable of developing a formidable n _;i arsenal.¹⁰ However, the nuclearization of South A nation without allies, might invite a preemptive j_St attack by the Soviet Union in support of its interved ^ policy in Africa. A declared nuclear strategy by _uC)eO* Africa would also encourage the procurement ot ^ weapons by the front-line African states. South does not stand to gain under conditions of regional proliferation, since its conventional strength ^lS

bi'f

/ Nove"’'*

South r_f^lhat,^0f ’^tS P^otent>^al African adversaries, fleets it« ^{nCa S retent}'^on °f ^a conventional defense re- outweiuh ^^)erceP^t‘^on that the risks of the nuclear option naval withn^ ^P°^ssible security gains. However, U. S. the isolat' ^ra^^a' ^^rom Indian Ocean would complete thus exn'⁰'¹¹ ° . ^outb Africa militarily, if not politically, Union unv'lf '^{l to} '^ncrcasing pressure from the Soviet ^region' r ^{1C C}°^U'^{d exerc}ise military predominance in the Africa’s ”ⁿ.^secl^uentIy, the nuclear option would be South Policy H°ⁿ ^ ^{bope Por} P^ursuing ^an independent foreign

A si'mi?^S^^{lte tbe r}*^s^^{s suc}*^{1 a} choice would bring. ^ence in [t,^arJy^r^^Urnen^ ^can fr^e made for U. S. naval pres- ^clear w_e-^{C ortbwest} Pacific. Japan’s abhorrence of nu- ^Ceived de^⁰⁰⁸•^{Cann0t bc} denied. Nevertheless, a per- maintain h,^{106 m wd}* ^{or ab}>hty °f the United States to pan’s sea 1' ° ^nava* ^Porces necessary for protection of Ja- its ^rearma'^{neS ob}f^omrnunt^cation (SLOCs) would result in Would not^{ament    tbe event} °f rearmament, Japan

It would h⁸M^{re the less}°ns of its defeat in World War II. imported f^U* ^{a nuc}I^ear fleet to ensure its freedom from ^WeaPons t°^SS' ^^Ue*’.^anc*,*t would be armed with nuclear ^armed anri° ^Cnsure effectiveness against a similarly fied th_e NPT^a^ ^°^V'^et ^^eet- Although Japan has rati- of ^a state t ’ Article X of the treaty recognizes the right ^SuPreme ^fr°^{m the treat}>' ^if it perceives its

^naval sunn ^{ereStS t0 be} *ⁿ jeopardy. A decline in U. S.

The tre ^ ,^W0U^ P*^ace Japan’s interests in jeopardy. °^Ur forward ⁿ] °^{US C}°^StS *^{n men anc}* ^sb'P^{s op} maintaining ^burde_n. Gr,nS^l0y,^{ed naval strate}Sy are a considerable lively m_ai^ane ’ ^a i^ess far-flung Navy would more effec- MATo w_ar ^am ,^0ur. ^LOCs to Europe in the event of a intense com ^ ^tb*^{s ar}S^ument is appealing in a time of ^ever» transc ^^e,^{tltlon Por} defense dollars. Strategy, blow­ing run ^{S econom}ic as well as tactical issues. In the serves to* i; ^F- ^lnlcrests are best served by a strategy that ^frenchment"¹ ^ ^spreaci ^op nuclear weapons. A naval would indeed save money; but it would be a savings purchased at the high price of general destabiliza­tion, followed by a nuclear arms race among the middle powers. The policy of the United States has long been to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons as much as possible. This policy is based upon the hard fact that our survival can best be assured in a world in which our power and influence are predominant. For this policy to succeed, our flag must be at home on every ocean, our fleet an assur­ance that the balance of power will not be easily altered.

‘Arthur Cyr, “The Elements of British Security Policy," Armed Forces and Soci­ety, Spring 1982, p. 391; James Chase, Solvency: The Price of Survival (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 39.

“Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, “Nuclear Threat in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs Studies No. 23 (Washington. D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. July 1975), p. 8.

““Treaties in Force," U. S. Department of State. Publication 9351. 1 January 1983, p. 266.

⁴International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weap­ons, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 48 (Wash­ington, D C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, January 1969). p. 166.

^?Pranger and Tahtinen, p. 11.

⁶P.T. Deutermann, “Requiem for the Sixth Fleet,” Proceedings. September 1982, pp. 46-49.

⁷Uri Bar-Joseph, “The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East,” The Journal of Strategic Studies. June 1982, p. 223.

⁸Seth Tillman, American Interests in the Middle East (Washington. D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1980), p. 21.

Tillman, p. 21; Bar-Joseph, p. 211.

^I0J. E. Spence, "The Nuclear Option," Defense Policy Formation, ed. J. M. Roherty, International Relations Series No. 6 (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), p. 108.

"Osamu Miyoshi, "Toward a New U. S.-Japan Alliance: The Crucial Choices of the Eighties,"Comparative Strategy, 1980, pp. 292-293; Taketsugu Tsurutani, “The Security Debate," Defense Policy Formation, p. 189.

Captain Jordan graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1972. Since his commissioning through Officer Candidate School in 1976, he has served with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, The Basic School, Quan- tico, and Marine Barracks, 8th and I. He completed Advanced Commu­nications Officers School in Quantico and graduated from the Naval War College off-campus program in 1983. Beginning October 1983, he will be Commanding Officer, Marine Communications Detachment, USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19).

Returning from an extended patrol over far north Canada, a Royal Canadian Air Force Maritime ^lr Command Argus crew was startled out of boredom by a U. S. Air Force F-104 that appeared seemingly out of nowhere and rolled past the Argus’s nose. The Starfighter returned to do a series of aerobatic maneuvers in full view of the flight deck crew, the agile fighter appearing to mock the umbering patrol plane. Presently, the Canadian pilot looked left and saw the American tucked atly under his wing. The two pilots exchanged waves, and the Canadian signaled for the fighter P ot to wait. The Canadian used a grease pencil to inscribe a large number on the cockpit window, e American pilot acknowledged with a nod. The Canadian captain scrubbed the window clean with elaborate motions began to write the second number, of which the American took surely to “ n ^Senes that would identify a radio frequency over which the two could converse. The Argus was allowed ’ to wander just a bit so the American would concentrate on stationkeeping and recording , ^c numbers. All the while, the Argus copilot began easing back on the throttles. By the time the >rd number was posted, the airspeed had bled off to just above stall speed for the F-104. By the ■me the captain turned to write the last number, the F-104 had disappeared; the distracted fighter Pi ot had stalled out of sight. No cocky jocky now, the embarrassed hare did not return to show his tail to the tortoise.