Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

The Naval Gun: Encore! Encore!

An Almost Ready Reserve

Amphib Warfare: Whose Responsibility?

Sealift

Roll of Drums

All the Way from Waves to Wins The Eagle’s Own Plume Supporting the Six Hundred Stay Loose, Spokesperson!

A Matter of Principle Underwater Guerrillas Reorganization of the Armed Forces Roll of Drums EUUA

FFG-7s: Square Pegs Iowa vs. Yamato: The Ultimate Duel Military Retirement Pay: A Time of Crisis What’s in Store for Arapaho?

The Bear Facts

Arms Control: Upping the Ante

How Silent the Silent Service

Remember Pearl Harbor

War, Morality, and the Military Professional

Their Sovremennyy

“The Naval Gun: Encore!

Encore!”

(See M. L. Mosbrooker, J. A. Murray,

pp. 105-109, July 1983 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Colonel Frederic J. McGrath, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding Officer, Maintenance Augmenting Unit Service Support Group Three One, 1st Marine Brigade—The article addresses a very important question. But there are several points that were not made.

First, the guided projectile often re­ferred to but never named is the Copper­head. Figure 2 indicates a probability of hit of .89 to a .75 out to a range of 30 kil­ometers. The Copperhead has failed to demonstrate a probability of hit of .89 at any range. Also, it does not achieve a range of 30 kilometers or even 20 kilo­meters. The eight-inch laser homing ord­nance, under joint development, is re­quired to achieve a range of 30 kilometers with a probability of hit of .8 and a prob­ability of kill of .6. But foot dragging in this program has stalled adequate progress.

Second, Naval Surface Weapons Cen­ter, Dahlgren, has proposed a design for a lightweight universal gun mount. The Navy does not have to depend solely on the FMC Corporation for its naval guns. The lethality of the eight-inch projectile versus the 155-mm. projectile may make it a better choice for naval gunfire. A 155 mm. is not very effective against hard targets. The eight inch is.

I have no argument with the authors when they say that fire support for the amphibious assault is missing. The ma­rines have always supported an increase of naval gunfire. And it is too much to hope for that the Navy will use its mis­siles for shore bombardment. So, arm the amphibs! But make certain they take what will get the job done. The 155 mm. has great potential and so does the eight inch. Perhaps a comparison of all 155­mm. versus all eight-inch guns might reveal the better weapon.

The authors concede that greater leth­ality can reduce the number of rounds needed. The eight inch has always pos­sessed greater lethality and greater accu­racy than the 155 mm. in land operations. Therefore, it follows that fewer rounds of eight inch are required to do the same or a

better job than the 155 mm.                 _e]i.

It is inaccurate to compare              t

penditures for ammunition develop^ with Navy expenditures for the ^ The Navy has concentrated on ^rru and the Army on projectiles.

Finally, I question whether the ^ vertical loading gun can accept t ^ j_n ventional 155-mm. ammunition tW production. . _gl)n-

The question of increased ^nava, ^r\v'e fire support could be studied to dea ^ are very good at that. It would be ^ for the Army, Navy, and industry ‘ ^_r. and hammer out a cost-effective, ^c

“An Almost Ready Reserve ^

(See H. W. Seng. pp. 37-45, September

Proceedings)                                                                       /

rr C

Commander C. F. Ward, U- _c3se Reserve—Howard Serig stated t ^ ₀f quite well, but a comment near the ^ his article requires some elaborate ^ concept of “acquiring aircraft t ^ _(V3o active wing” brings to mind one ^ possible situations. In one variatj⁰ ’ _fl|)C of the current air wings pr°^{vl L} j_rod plane, say an F-14, to areserve sq^u^ This doesn’t seem very practica- a ju other variation, the “surplus”               40

“varying states of readiness ’ _cur- stored F- 14s) are substituted for rent F-4N/S aircraft at D^a‘^a (pjflJ Miramar. However, there is a ^s^_(ate^s of facts behind those “varying .^rif that extends from aircraft n° „ from current fleet F-14s to 30,0 ^ ₃(i lated spare parts flying formation AWG-9, two TF-30s, and a swing'.^e,

j»g

The F-4S is not really fleet co but it does somehow “chug” tinuing to provide a modicum oj ^ _r3d" for those who fly in and against 1 ■             /

dom trade of decade-old F-l4s _reg^u' almost unmaintainable even by ¹ pjb- lar Navy for somewhat creditah ^_flllld is hardly quid pro quo, although ¹ p)jd suffice to make the modernize¹* ^ o> look great. The unfortunate end such a change would be the neg^a ^ pact on the people who put on form and go to the base to fly ^aI1 tain an insurmountable task.

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uⁿ?^er (CVa ,9ua.bfi^cd on board the _u^Urin8 these ~      'ⁿ September 1968.

Were»~" ^{Se ca}mer qualifications, we

craft be th^ ^{option of usin}g surplus air- the trade ⁶ °^{ne cbosen}’ ^one hopes that ⁿ°t a de ^^r?^{Ves t0 bc a ste}P forward and aircraft in ,u ^r°^{m ttle} bottom so that the same as tk ^{6 reserves on}ly look to be the though ik ^{6 re}§^ular hl^ect aircraft, even ^8h they never seem to fly.

“Plain Pin-,

serve                       u ^A       U- S. Naval Re-

lertt di_Sr. ^0Wartl Serig provides an excel- ^naval air ^SS'⁰ⁿ °^{n tbe status} °f today’s P^r°jection^eSerVe’ ^anC* ^tbe °dds ^are that his Well. [|₀ ^{S WlP} be right on the money as

that 1 Wo'uhn'i’ ^{Serig makes a few} points ^{as c}larifv ^{1X6 t0 ex}P^an£l ^uP^on as well He ^

tecalled^^ ^{tbe nava}l air reservists Crisis _w " , ^g during the Vietnam ing be_cail.^{e re}!;^eased without ever deploy- lems and 1° ° ^a*^rcraft maintenance prob- ³¹⁶ many _nf^{W aircrew} proficiency. There with vp.-rm ^Wh° ^{Were recalled in 1968} take aravp l^p"^8s) out of Dallas who ¹ first h ^excePtt°ⁿ to these assertions.

^Was “mak^{eCame aware of the recal1 as 1} 2°n as _a ^lr!®.*^be rounds” in the Penta-

⁽ypc on _a ^CIyiban contractor marketing

^An active dm xT^{anuary mornin}S in 1968^ that I _w ^y Navy captain informed me

^ⁿ°wing tk TT back on active duty.

^at hiaval Air ^ ^F‘^{8As we were n}yⁱⁿ8 ⁿ°t carrier ■^tatlon (NAS) Dallas were ^other cantn ^SU-^table’ ^{1 was} dubious. An- ^reca|l. I tnin'k" ^{Naval Air} confirmed the hcployabjg u^{lm tbat tbe} F-8As were not ^We Would h ^{6 Saicl lhat} n° one said that ^lbat We cnnki°ⁿ board ships, and ^als° didn’t ^ ^{3 Ways be shore} based. It ^Planes acti,m^ern_u ^{t0 matter} that the air- ^Corps. i _a. ^y. belonged to the Marine [here was ^{0 ln}formed the captain that because as J! ^ortaS^e °f fighter aircraft ^°Ught p_ettl ^{any as} 100 F-8s were at ^tlme during aa ^{new win}g^s at any one V^as that non '^S, Period. The bottom line ^d°'ng with ik® ^{knew what} they would be From j_an ^{6 reca}Hed reservists.

?^s Well _{as w}^Uaiy t° May 1968 , we trained

^e were Th ^C°^{Uld in our trust}y F-8As.

^bere train in^{£n Sent t0} ^AS Miramar !^mity of avail k?^{S enbance}d by the prox-

Wg* ^environ of^e_a^rm⁸t^S ^ f ^eXCel‘ ^re told that ^master J^et base. We

⁶ ^SS Tim T ^Wou^ be deploying in b?ary 1969 wf^r°^{ga (CVA}-ⁱ⁴) in Feb- ^lns delivemn ”^{en Ca}Ptain George Wat- pbttzed p o^{dus 0Ur} first F-8H (a mod-

Pacific pT ^{realized that Air} °°ⁿ had 12 p Tf^Cti ^{was ser}ious. We _H^r'Sinaliy_s , ' PI aircraft which were

^day and nlg_h^dU'^ed.^t0 S° to VF-111. We ^;er (CVa-i

"told^{656 C}

that we would be released to

inactive duty in October or early Novem­ber 1968.

VF-703 squadron experience was at a much higher level than any typical opera­tional fighter squadron. We had no “nug­gets” and half were combat qualified. There were two highly qualified ex-Air Force types who had never seen the “back of a boat” before. One of these was a seasoned Braniff captain with lots of F-86 time, while the other was fresh out of F-lOOs and “bird-dogs” in Viet­nam. We had 15 qualified F-8 drivers ready to go. In fact, this same group later became VF-202, which has continued to distinguish itself as Serig points out.

The call-up was ill advised because not only was there a shortage of both fighter and attack aircraft but active duty person­nel were being released from active serv­ice. This policy created a morale problem with some of our pilots. Since we had 20 pilots, those who objected most strenu­ously were given non-flying assignments either in the squadron or on staffs else­where.

My only regret was that we took all the training time that VF-111 should have received since it was that squadron that deployed in the Ticonderoga in February 1969.

“Amphibious Warfare: Whose Responsbility?”

(See M. J. Stoffel, pp. 127-129, September

1983 Proceedings)

Colonel James B. Soper, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)—I applaud Captain Stoffel’s excellent portrayal of the plight of amphibious warfare and his solution. There is one error, however. Realistic operational concepts for the LCACs were examined and presented in detail as far back as 1977. I was the project manager and senior analyst on five major studies between 1977 and 1980 that employed the capabilities of the LCAC in conjunc­tion with current landing craft and the postulated LCM-9. These studies in­volved a scenario and capabilities pro­jected to 1986 at Marine amphibious force and lesser levels, including assault echelon, follow-on echelon, and air ele­ments moved ashore. The LCAC’s great operational advantages and its severe lift versus space limitations were well de­fined. The cited studies have been used in many subsequent examinations by naval activities.

My remarks only add to Captain Stoffel’s point, i.e., there is no central point where amphibious warfare matters can be examined and promoted. The cur­rent fragmentation destroys the best of efforts.

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“Sealift”

(See J. L. Holloway, pp. 28-37, June 1983;

M. O. Miller, p. 103, September 1983; M.

Adams, p. 122, October 1983 Proceedings)

“Roll of Drums”

(See T. J. Belke, pp. 58-64, April 1983

Proceedings)

Captain R. V. Buck, U. S. Navy—Mar­vin Miller’s response to Admiral Hol­loway’s article noted an out-of-context statistic from World War II regarding al­lied merchant losses to German U-boats in 1942 in the Atlantic. Similar statistics are cited to support attrition estimates for wars between the United States and the Soviet Union each “going it alone.”

While a large submarine force does have the potential to sink many defense­less ships, the extrapolation from World War II is neither accurate nor warranted, despite being the only “real world,” large-scale conflict from which we can draw numbers.

First, the period chosen covered the months of peak losses to U-boats: 140 ships were sunk during June 1942, and an average of 87 merchants—not 100— were sunk per month through September 1942. This nine-month period was de­

scribed in “Roll of Drums.” Loss rates reflected entry into the war, a shift of U-boat operations to the East Coast and Caribbean, and a deliberate U. S. policy that gave priority to northern route con­voy protection. To call this period repre­sentative of World War II losses ignores other periods, such as October 1942 through June 1943, when monthly losses were reduced to 57 despite the greatest average number of U-boats at sea during the war. Second, over the course of World War II, merchant attrition aver­aged 3% of sailings, but varied widely from that figure depending on strategy, tactics, area, and opportunity.

What is needed in this time of prepara­tion with constrained resources is to hedge against uncertainty with forces and an industrial base that have sufficient flexibility to meet the enemy in the place he tries to do us harm, outlast him there, and recover to the extent required. An offensively capable, 600-ship Navy, a fleet of 700 U. S.-controlled merchant ships, and 100 shipyards able to build or repair oceangoing ships would seem to be about right from a national defense per­spective for the near future.

“All the Way from Waves to Wins: A View from the Unrestricted Line”

94-97, Augu^st

(See L. A. McComas, pp. Proceedings)

1983

U-

Lieutenant William R. Parkes, - Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Me ^ addresses some current and imports , _ sues concerning the role of women

Navy.                                                _oara-

I agree strongly with her tirs v graph, and it is the very truth of tha P ._n(

in the

that undermines the self'^s6r^„,,

grapn tnat undermines uic bombast of her final paragraph. In ^ the quotation from an officer in the ^ New Zealand Navy, Lieutenan Comas notes its frank, honest q^ua!                                   "

“party

line-

being distinct from our This is an apt phrase.

No more fervent issues exist ° _atjve political spectrum than action” and “equal opportunity- Lp ions on these topics vary from one p cal party to another and from °ⁿⁱ".

onrithpr Mr» mattpr hn\V Sfl ^

the

to another. No matter how an might feel about rights for^ ⁿ‘j _stj]l be

minorit*⁵’

women, or homosexuals, it shuu.- - ^p_S recognized that women are on Navy^

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nofnrL^f°^r P°^{htlCal reasons}- While I am that _an, ^t0 fi^uote statistics, I believe U. S \r°^{ne who wish}ed to argue that the of womp ^Would 8^find to a halt for lack to do _SQⁿ °^{n sbips would} be hard pressed

tions    ^J^avy with a few notable excep-

sues n,^{US avo}'ded partisan political is- equ_ai _nnt,^Wever’ affirmative action and ^as rJZ***** P⁰siti°ns are every bit m£ p'^{Ve,nthe U}- S. Navy as Corn- Navy. _s,_a, ^y doctrine is in the Soviet ^action anri^{emCntS su}PP^ortiⁿg affirmative Valuations °^pP^ortunity ^aPPear in wide. ^{and f}hness reports Navy-

^Performanrp^Sef^{0f thlS}’ ^the Professional ^evaluate          ° ^wornen is difficult to

The *

fortunate^Tvf ^^er Majesty’s navies are Passive _n„i,^ey, ^{316 not} victims of the ^br°ueht n . ^{Cal and m}edia blitz that has hieutem, where we are today, and w_e]i _r^{n b/}*^cC°mas makes a strong

^her facts a ^aH°^{ned ar}8^ument- However, ^match u_D p “elusions do not quite ask is; A_rP ^erbaP^{s a} better question to fit of ik„ women on ships for the bene- Women? ^{avy or} ^^or the benefit of

^C_r⁰ⁿ»nander Fib ,

Com,nandine ntr' ^BaCa’ ^U' ^S' ^Navy’ Usance vf ff^icer, Fleet Air Recon- ^riving at m^^Uadr°^{n Tflree}—Prior to ar- ^S£nse of _an^Preu^{ent duty station}-¹ had a "tales i_{n a} PP^rehension concerning fe-

^r°ⁿ- I had J^{Vy fleet} ttperational squad- ^ye°Persons ^emales on shore duty as 'f'ively rpf^^S,°^nnelpersons’ ^and col- i^yeonien _ ^ed to as “wopersons.” Were rea’liv ^rS°^nnelmen> ^and women ^°^men’s libbers ~°^{ndoned b}y activist Wondered           to be objective,

Problems of ^W would handle all those Physical limit,„^Separate head facilities, P^regnancies <.^10ns °f the “weaker sex,” tttttque “nrnhi ^m0nthIies’" ^{and a}H other ⁰ cause. ^erns women were going

^exPerts senior^ ^sources and supposed ^eVer had femai ° ^1X16 ^^none °f whom had JJtauy of whn_m^{eS m tbe}‘^r commands and feasibility ^{Woald refus}e to allow the i⁰⁰^ pity ’ ^te they given the option)

w °^W ‘hat rr ^{Were quick to let me}

Would be revk A⁰"⁰" Sound (AVM-1) °Fo^e headlines ' * ^{needed onl}y to wait

!f°^ke with 'wfff ^part’ female sources I ,. atter. ^e more objective on this ‘hhers we_{re s} ^{W out}spoken women’s n^{he Scal}e, bv d^mUCh °ⁿ ‘he other side of _th ^{y and} lab_e^yiinfⁿi|^{ndln8 equal} °PPortu- ^at they _Were ^{8 a}'^males as chauvinists,

^N°w th!t?u° ^help 31 all-

ave been with my com-

^ / Novpmt_____

mand for more than a year, I have a dif­ferent outlook on the matter. There are more than 100 women in my command, and most of them are fine technicians, radiomen, aircraft commanders, mission commanders, and pilot and navigator in­structors. The first female flight engineer is due to arrive soon. True, there are a few who cause problems, just as there is a small minority of males who cause prob­lems. But, women are hacking it! I pre­dict that the first female squadron com­manding officer will come from this group.

The problems I had imagined prior to reporting for duty were just figments. The problems I do have are generated externally by the “experts” who want staff studies and explanations on why I am or am not treating females a certain way. For the most part, these “experts” look at my squadron as strange or differ­ent because there are so many females; hence, there must be problems! Bullpuc- key!

It’s time for many folks in our Navy to start opening their minds to the facts of life. The facts are that women are compe­tent and doing the job. If there are any disadvantages, they exist only in the minds of those who try to expound on a subject based upon opinion rather than experience or fact.

Not only were my fears groundless, I have found the presence of women to be advantageous. The outstanding, hard­working female officers and petty offi­cers tend to generate a higher sense of purpose and dedication in some shops because they so far exceed the expecta­tions of some male counterparts. The females’ pride and hard-charging spirit motivate and challenge their male count­erparts who might otherwise do the bare minimum.

I am not saying all women fall into the above category, but I am saying that the myths are clearly wrong. I eagerly antici­pate the day when the awareness level in the Navy is such that a letter of this nature will generate no interest and not be worth publishing.

“The Eagle’s Own Plume”

(See P. Grant, R. Riche, pp. 29-34, July 1983 Proceedings)

Colonel Albert A. Mullin, U. S. Army Reserve—We owe Lieutenants Grant and Riche our gratitude for pointing out seri­ous vulnerabilities of embedded com­puters in support of certain specific types of naval operations. These examples also apply to land warfare and air warfare.

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Proposed embedded weapon systems; automated command, control, and com-

ESr^s(C3) systems; and automated

^planr>insform°^rt,^{SyStemS requirc that Ce}ives h;„K ^{1Clr test ani}-‘ evaluation ra­tion in th • ^P,ⁿ_r°^{rity for earl}'est considera­te hi 1 '^{fe Cyde}- ^{We cannot} afford ^a(ld-_0n '!,^{kmd of} Panning be a mere eycle t_nmⁿ' T°^rked into the development Certain ^eWhu^re'^Usually “*> late ^aut«m_ated !^^bedded weapon systems, tegistical _t sterns, and automated ^test and ^P⁰¹¹ systems must receive ational use ^UJ!^tlon throughout their oper- “dead co l ” °^{e mUst be sus}Pi^ci°^us of during ^and unstructured programs reduce thp ^{and securit}y testing to ^tage f_rom ^el‘hood of automated sabo- ^of 'he soft ^Unauthorized manipulation °^nce thev ^Ware °* ^emhcdded systems U'onkey ,,^aiC. ^dePl°yed. Yesterday’s shafts can ,^encbcs thrown into drive

'^nt0 sensitive ^tT^0rrow’^s bugs inserted The ^VC software.

Ware and°^^depl°^{yment testin}g of soft­wood of „„,^{CUnty Wl11} reduce the likeli- ^Unauthori_i,„.|°^maled P^ilferage from the ^suPport svstp^USC °f automated logistical ^0rders i llct>.-i] ^{CUt m}ateriel release te'duee the in ^’_L ^Urtber’ ^such testing can ^ling “loS V,^ke_T^{llhood of} critical items get- teported unJlu ™ ^happen- ^{ln 1966}- ¹

^{er to} the p^P '^SPcated attempts to pil- {s°rea. if ^{1§hth u}- S. Army G4 in ^aster and , k,^{mpUler can} process supplies te°re efn_cj,..,^L. i'^Pcr’ ^{il ca}n steal faster and

^Careful testin ^y’ ^t0°' ^More controls and ^lestlng are needed.

^(See M B                           hundred

^Proce*din_Ss) ^dWardS’ ^pp- ⁴⁸-⁵¹. August 1 ^J°hn \Y_ic,

Pfesses a i.Kt r °_J^mmander Edward: ^'sis ar.se _c‘ f!^{ed fear:} Should a g ^a,n and oner “ ^d,^{the United States 1 and} ‘heir re_sn*^e • ^{5 Carrier battle} g'

^ent8^roup_STuTGs?^derwayrePle

The United States, as Commander Edwards points out, doesn’t have an ade­quate fleet train to support 15 carrier groups operating around the globe simul­taneously. Although the United States has enough oilers (AOs) to form 15 URGs, Commander Edwards worst-case scenario requires 25 URGs. All is not lost, however. In a global crisis, the U. S. Navy would probably operate other battle groups as well as the 15 carrier bat­tle groups, most likely amphibious and surface warfare groups. However, these other battle groups would also require extensive replenishment forces. Addi­tional fleet train units would be needed to resupply friendly bases and to maintain a steady flow of supplies to the operating battle and replenishment groups.

During the Falklands Conflict, the British swallowed their pride and requisi­tioned many civilian merchant vessels of all types. Can the U. S. Navy swallow its pride?

Because of the current global oil glut, many American-owned, flag-of-conven- ience-registered, ultra-large crude car­riers (ULCCs) and very-large crude car­riers (VLCCs) are laid up overseas. These huge tankers, which can easily cruise at 15 knots, could maintain a steady flow of fuel oil in a crisis.

The VLCCs could replenish the sup­port bases and the URGs at sea. In the Indian Ocean, a ULCC could become a stationary and mobile fuel farm in addi­tion to the existing tank farm on Diego Garcia. VLCCs could transit back and forth to the URGs operating in the Per­sian Gulf or elsewhere. Other VLCCs would transit back to friendly bases (Subic Bay, Pearl Harbor) and fop off the Diego Garcia ULCC. This ULCC would be needed at Diego Garcia so as not to interfere with the other fuel needs of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Central Command.

The most desirable ULCCs and

VLCCs would be the diesel-powered types. The steam-powered tankers would require a larger Navy detachment.

The most important question is whether our sister NATO navies would or could lend us support. When the British were pushed to the limit during the Falk­lands Conflict, we gave them minimal support. History shows that the British will back any ally if asked.

“Stay Loose, Spokesperson!”

(.See T. Field, pp. 152-153, October 1983

Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) Wardee Bruce, U. S. Navy—All too often, when a prob­lem comes to the attention of senior per­sonnel there is a tendency to catalog it as one that has been seen before and solved before, and therefore can be handled as before. Yet, it’s rare when a new problem is exactly the same as an old one, and it’s a rare problem that has exactly the same solution.

When I was a young airman, my su­pervisor used to tell me, “There’s a right way, a wrong way, a Navy way, and my way—you do this job my way.” I’m really glad he’s not around anymore—or is he ? When a young apprentice tells his supervisor, “I’ve got a better way to do this job,” is he met with enthusiasm and encouragement? Or if it’s a bad idea, is the time taken to explain why? Or is my old supervisor still around today?

Far too often we hear a problem or a suggestion only to the extent that it fits an established framework of experience. We must leam to listen for that new wrinkle that makes this problem or idea a little bit different from those of the past.

(Continued on page 91.)

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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 33.)

Critique u:_ac _ri “^,c '-ommen The nre ■ ⁸^¹ °^{n t}*^{le marlc}- ^sciie missi^ISC °! ^l*^{le art}'^cR was that the 'minimalist’'^{11 p ann}'ⁿg was guided by a ^ell-trained ^apP^roach and that “A ^{tery u}nit, inJfin f^S1Ve’ ^{and spiri}ted mili- ^lmPortan_ce , ^{with a sense of} mission Positive _anH^{n led} ^y ^an aggressive, '^c°uld h_avel ^caP^able commander, can ^C'^{es a}nd unf₀ ^OVercorne enormous obsta-

^Prindp^,e”

^J- ^W- Harrell ' ^PP; ²⁹~³⁶' February 1983;

^Mets’ pp. 94lqs^P'<;²⁴'²⁵’ ^Aus^ust 1983; D R.

’ eptember 1983 Proceedings)

^CC7e^e!o°^derkk Lenahan’ ^U- ^S- Mr

Zati°n of l^rat!°^{ns Direct}orate, Organi- letter „ J°^{lnt Chie}f^s °f Staff— This ^a^^ter a dptnu^ref^are^ ^several months ago has been * ⁶ .^ana^^s'^s °f the article and '“Onimande^T'u^{8 clearance} from the 79-1), , • °^{f the} Rescue Force (JTF-

,/au8ht anH^Utnⁿ^^{nt General} fames B. ^Gr°undFom^C^^{0nel Charles} Beckwith, fetired f_rom ⁶, ^ornrnan(fer, both recently ^Careers _Sn.,„ ^actlve duty after completing ^and service ⁿpi⁸ ^ years of dedication August 19»t ^learance was received in ^Critique wa« ’ Wu^{th the comm}ent that the

r -“^vc a_nH            ^J “^u

'^c°uld h_avel ^caPable commander, can ^c*^es and unf ^0Vercome enormous obsta- P'ishing ,^{n reseen} difficulties in accom- The a th ^missi0n ”

ties we_re la^v- '^nt!^mates that these quali- ^lad firsthand 'J^{18 In t}*^{1e rescue} force. If he !^nv°lved _anH ^Pow,edge of the personnel 'nitiative _an i ,^e intensity, imagination, ’ dedication of the combat forces and the Joint Task Force (JTF) planning staff, he could not in good con­science bring himself to impugn any members of the force.

In spite of all the post mortems, criti­cisms, and Monday morning quarter­backing, four things stand out boldly; one, the mission was aborted purely be­cause of helicopter maintenance prob­lems; two, no one in the past three years, including Major Earl, has offered an al­ternative plan; three, the mission was not minimal, particularly in the eyes of the planners and the combat forces, which were often one in the same within the leadership cadre. This was not an opera­tion where rear area staff specialists drew up a plan, laid out its details, and then dictated these to a host of menons who blindly accepted them and went forth. And, finally, Major Earl seems to have totally misunderstood the JTF’s mission. The Department of Defense (DoD) mis­sion was to rescue the Americans being held in Tehran, not kill Iranians or re­cover dead Americans.

This was a complicated and demanding objective which required a maximum ef­fort from every person involved. No one can say with objectivity or validity how much effort went into maintaining the helicopters, which were the only part of the mission-success equation that was neither part of the JTF nor an integral unit in its own right.

The constraints Major Earl lists would be interpreted by most military planners as objectives not constraints. Also, he does not offer an alternative plan or de­fine the extent of military action he envi­sions under a maximal plan. He also overlooks a basic principle of our govern­ment which embodies civilian control and peaceful resolution prior to commitment of military force. In the case of the Ira­nian hostages, the State Department was the lead agency in resolving the crisis, with DoD directed to prepare a plan and train a force to be committed if no other alternative was feasible. The CIA had the mission of supporting both the political and military efforts.

Major Earl notes the proximate cause for the abort decision was the failure to mass the requisite number of operational helicopters at the desert refueling site. This was true. The 200% margin of re­dundancy that the JTF built into the plan was not enough. The number of actual helicopter failures exceeded the safety margin and all previous training exer­cises. But the machines were not the same.

Major Earl indicates that as training and rehearsals revealed that the small number of forces initially planned were in some cases inadequate, additional per­sonnel and equipment were added, but commensurate increases in the number of helicopters were not always made. The

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1983

after the end of World War II Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy mander, Amphibious Group One the commander of the advance f°^r

Coi²'

wa*

for

aS' the

fense of the home islands. It was ass ^ that the tremendous losses on Sa* at Iwo Jima and Okinawa ^woU_ult O² dwarfed by the losses in the assa Japan.                                                           _droP

I am puzzled that the decisions

aton ed>:

the Hiroshima and Nagasaki

facts are that the initial helicopter detach­ment numbered five and this was soon increased to six and eventually to eight with the eighth being a bonus spare. A jump from five to eight appears to be a commensurate increase since the number of hostages dropped from an excess of 70 in the early stages to 53 by February.

Contrary to Major Earl’s view, opera­tions security was good and necessary. It

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did not inhibit review of the plan, which was subjected to intense review by the service chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Secretary of Defense, and officials of the National Security Council, and CIA. Submitting the rescue plan to the normal plans re­view process would probably not have changed any of the operational concepts.

Major Earl states there should have been a single mission commander desig­nated for the entire operation. I agree, and there was—Commander JTF. Every­one on the JTF staff and each of the com­bat units knew who he was, and I am sure each knew who his particular unit com­mander was.

The designation of another general of­ficer, as deputy commander, was not a problem and was merely the formaliza­tion of a working arrangement that had existed for several months just as the ap­parent late designation of the Desert One on-scene commander was a formalization of an existing structure not the creation of a new command arrangement. This offi­cer had been part of the original opera­tional command cadre and remained in that role throughout the planning process.

However, even if ComJTF had been at Desert One or the ground force com­mander had been designated “mission commander,” and the status of the heli-

copters was known at all times, there ^ nothing they could do to offset the \o^s the essential number required for a^S1 - lift extraction.       . x

If any one of a reduced number ot copters was grounded during the e tion or extraction phase, the loss 0 on both sides, American ^and I^ra j would have created a far more critic²¹ internationally explosive situation the Desert One abort, and the re would have failed.

“Underwater Guerrillas’

(See C. A. Barton, pp. 46-47, August Proceedings)

Captain R. A. Hundevadt, V■           ^

(Retired)—Captain Barton’s article ^ plies that the plans for the Japane^s®. s derwater lance-mine kamikaze in c*^e ^

of the home islands were not known

Not so both the Iwo Jima and the OkinaW

saults and was to have had that job          jj_e

assault on the Japanese home islan ■ was responsible for the detailed p'^a r and execution of minesweeping. P^reLja tory gunfire, air strikes, and other ta ^ preparation for the D-day landings⁰ ^ Expeditionary Force. I was the flag . ol) gator and assistant operations on¹ ^ Blandy’s staff, which held all a^¹^ intelligence relating to the operatic ^ The Japanese plan to have an un ^ ter suicide corps sink landing ^cra ^5. known by the staff as early as Apr** j„ We had a crude sketch of the l^an^ ^ breathing apparatus but did not ha degree of detail reported by Captain ^ ton. I was detached from the staff * ₀f June, so cannot report the sped ^ how the underwater kamikaze was ^ eliminated. However, his existence ^ taken as typical of the fanaticism ¹ ^ ....      ’           ’ ^Ti~"^c _sjd' bombs are increasingly questione ^ ₍ that each August anniversary ther^e^_se, growing attitude of guilt and re _fl. The atomic bombs were far more ^aP^|y priate and sensible than the imnieas ( more bloody carnage of the ^a'^tern _eded The fact that a second bomb was n ^ to force the surrender was furtn ^ dence of the fanaticism involved. . _dy had already been amply demonstr the Kamikaze Corps at Okinawa-

justification _nf •                aupuuniimi

1 'ⁿevitahii i ^ex,st'ⁿg service divisi ^tbe servi_ce.. ^{eaves ot}her cracks betv ^nized Naw ' ^protection by the reo *°gistics k ° ^lbe hind forces’ seabi Byron’s sch°^ne °* ^lbose that Commai

, ^The ot_her^er_p^{leaVeS open}’

bLudgetary _an, ^ernatlve is to change ^tbat the_{v r n} ^procurement processe (joint) oroi° • ^{6Ct tke} Priorities of ⁿght. VVhnⁿⁱf^{,ions that} will actu ^tbe service ° ^Unct'⁰nally equivalen ^Perhap_{s a} , ^rc<)_i^rf’^ar>ization proposed, ^tradition-bm ^S ,^{ltter p}'h for our proud ^pr°blents th- " ^serv'^ces to swallow. ^reaL and sor ■ ^ornmander Byron sees ^6ral Walter ^{Ce on a} joint staff, as C ⁿ'fy them _f^SU88^ested. would only n !J° chanc_e °r ^h‘^m' ^Unfortunately, I there i_{s h} ^{or se}rvice reorganizat ^^rengthe_ni_n„^W?'^er.’ ^{a remote} chance Riders in k,^the ’Hfiuence of the o

Chief*,/ ^{and the} P°^wer of ^"Ornmander r           *^{n an} ideal wo

r confi; . • ^{ny n}°P^e or ^ct in the way we wi

1“~>" of >ho Armed

A. ^J- wtlte^Br^yr0n^^PP' ^68_75’ ^^anuary 1983;

PP. 17-18 A ^P;|²,n ^{March 1983; p}- ^R Schratz, ^Ma* >«3'Price^{R Gadberry}' P- ¹²'

fom!^!nu^ntc^C°^mmander Ralph E. Chat- the Defen*' „ av-’’ Military Assistant to resist rehiin' Clence Board—It is hard to ^rnent that¹ ‘ ^<~'^cnera' Walter’s state- ¹¹³⁵ been m”^{0 esson of} [modem] warfare gence of aj °^{re profound} than the emer- Power nri/ ^{power as} the prime source of

^isss?: • •”^{(tei1 that} *> ^the

^CePtion to _h ^mr^ity)- ^{0r not t0 take ex}" (tell th_at to th^S °^rmu'^a *^{<)r one} air force needs cloen . ^{6 so}*^d'^{er on} the ground who

^hisaPPraisa|^dnf^^1PPOrt)' ^{But 1 cannot let c}*^{e as} “sonh ^^ornmander Byron’s arti-

^graPh or ,^Ph°^m0ric” 8° ^without ^a para-

,^wr^wr^fcomment-

^Vi^ce> yet no- ^{USt lnevita}bly be joint ser- joint. Xhe ^acetlrne budget battles are not P^r°blem oth ^{3re tW}° ^solutions to this ^war. The f ^Cr ■*^{lan wa}'t'ⁿg for the next ^vices so J™ '^{S to re}°rganize the ser- Pects _as „ ^th.® ^war has as few joint as- byron quite°^SS1^^e’ ^wbdcd Commander ^eXampi_e .. ^reas°nably proposes. If, for 'ⁿ tactical ■ ° ^0r"^an'^zation that uses fuel !‘°ⁿ that mi,«^raft !^{s the same} organiza- bring th_e P^rovide tactical pipeline to ^{is s}°me cha^ -^{t0 th}°^{Se aircra}ft> then there ^be bou_eh_f n^C , ^{tbat en}°ugh pipeline will ^able solution K^rtUnately’ ^such a reason- ^d°gmatic (i°ⁿ ₁j^ir'ⁿ8^{s out} impassioned, stification ¹ •* ^say “^s°phomoric?”)

r°^mmandor a ^Staff- ^{,n an ideal of} directne, ^{yron s} P^lan has the P^ear the trn ^{S and} simplicity, i • ^Uy'ⁿg hm , ^natUre °f the defense

^ln8for’conn ° ^{aVCany hope of} 1 ally fight it, we should work on, and if possible even with, existing organiza­tions. This latter approach admittedly would continue to obscure the real mean­ing of our defense budgets and the func­tions of our services for the public, Con­gress, and ourselves, but it has the virtue of having a small, but finite, chance of success.

“ ‘Roll of Drums’ ”

(See T. J. Belke, pp. 58-64, April 1983

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander T. C. Miskill, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I am at a loss to understand such statements as “Vice Admiral Adolphus E. Andrews, Com­mander Eastern Sea Frontier lacked a sin­gle surface vessel that could outrun one of Donitz’s U-boats on the surface at the start of the war.”

From January of 1940 through the fall of 1942, I served on World War I-class destroyers, namely, the USS Foote (DD-169), USS Noa (DD-343), and the USS Roper (DD-147), chasing subma­rines up and down the U. S. East Coast and the Gulf of Mexico. These World War I destroyers, which were recommis­sioned in Philadelphia and in San Diego, were fine ships, and they were fast. We operated out of Casco Bay in Portland, Maine; Newport, Rhode Island; Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; and Key West, Florida. I can vividly remem­ber many occasions when operating under the Commander Eastern Sea Fron­tier or the Caribbean Sea Frontier search­ing for German submarines operating in these waters.

I don’t understand how an article of this nature could be written without any mention of these fine ships, which bore the brunt of the German U-boat attacks on the East Coast until our newer ships were brought into commission. There were probably 75 to 100 of these World War I destroyers operating in the Atlantic Fleet, since 50 of them were turned over to the British Navy in Halifax, Nova Sco­tia, in September 1940. Equipped with four boilers, any one of these ships could probably have outrun any diesel subma­rine on the surface on two boilers. I also recall the attacks on the USS Greer (DD- 145) en route to Iceland and the sinkings of the USS Reuben James (DD-245) and the Jacob Jones (DD-130), all four stack­ers, and all engaged in antisubmarine work in the period this article mentions.

I am sure that the thousands of officers and men who served in these ships during this period will feel slighted, as I did, at no mention of our World War I four stackers and the job they performed.

A saga of sea power.... and the Attack Carrier

•       “Hook Down, Wheels Down” (parts I & II) Langley, Saratoga, Lexington, Enterprise. Wasp, Hornet, Ranger and their fighting air­craft like Wildcat. Dauntless. Avenger and Hellcat. Here is the Mariannas Turkey-Shoot and the "Thach Weave" of the battling Wildcats. Hell-bent-for-leather Naval Aces at their finest.

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^Proceedings)^!imOK’ ^P' ^SeP^tcmbcr 1983

^{rUnk L}' Adamson—AMEN!

EFG-7s: Square Pegs?”

ISee B R i • .                 ®

Sher, p_p ,Z!?o^er:^pP' ^3&-⁴³, June 1983; T. S.

Wmy (Re,^ejL^^a^[^ord Becken. V. S. ^Submarine J' ^Dl.^rector °f Technology,

Company_ r‘^^na^ Division, Raytheon

a very ohip^_t ^0mmander binder presents the Naw’c 'T⁶’. ^balanced description of Prirtte _De.,_r„^S.° Utl0n to finding an appro­ve wartime '^me exercise equivalent to signed as ! ^m'^{SS10n of the Fp}G-7s. De- env'ronmentc^COn₁^{VOy escort in} low-threat ^aP.toS^S; ‘^{he FFGs are more} often ^rier battle p ^{yed ln} P^eacetime in a car- antiair anH^8r°^{Up su}PP^{ort r}°le where their ti°ns are antisubmarine warfare limita- ^trasted with °c^{S sbortc}°mings when con­torts _or P^ruance- and A";;cur-class LommanH* ,^guided-missile cruisers.

Zl ^{Under made some} -g-

tyill hoDefnii ^aPP^ear t° have merit, and t'°n by f].,„.^{y rec}eive serious considera- ^sP°nsors Tn .??^mmanders and platform ^{rs In}add,tion to his suggestions, I c'gure l r ■ ■

'-nsis Points, 1945-82

propose that the original wartime mission for which the FFG-7s were designed is still valid and that the trade-offs which were made leading to the FFG-7s’ weapon suite were correct. To support that argument, I refer to Figure 1 which was employed by Mr. Gerald Cann, Prin­cipal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, during a recent presentation on antisubmarine warfare in the year 2000. The purpose of the figure was to illustrate that there have been a continuing series of naval incidents since World War II, and we can expect further occurrences.

Fortunately, past events have not in­volved overt hostile submarines since, almost without exception, any engage­ments would have occurred in the acous­tically difficult, shallow-water environ­ment. Compounding the antisubmarine warfare problem is the growing commit­ment of many potentially hostile coun­tries to diesel-electric submarines which can be very difficult targets when intelli­gently employed. Were we required to deploy our naval forces and accompany­ing logistic support to any of the areas indicated, the intelligent opposing sub­marine commander would wait in the area where he knew our forces were required to come and choose a shal­low-water environment that would be to his tactical advantage.

While the range of propagation charac­teristics varies greatly from one shal­low-water region to another, shallow water is an equalizer in performance characteristics between sonar systems which might normally exhibit large per­formance differences in deep water. It would not be surprising if the FFG-7’s AN/SQS-56 sonar with its medium fre­quency and reverberation clutter suppres­sion features may be able to hold its own in active search with the higher powered, lower frequency AN/SQS-26 and AN/SQS-53.

Towed line passive search systems would probably experience some operat­ing limitations as a result of water depth and passive systems as there would most likely be more interference from high shipping densities in shallow water. In addition, if the diesel-electric submarine is the principal shallow water threat, then the towed array systems will have little with which to work.

Rather than attempt to force fit the FFG-7s to the carrier battle group mission for which they were not designed, a seri­ous effort should be made to exercise the class during peacetime in its wartime role as an escort for amphibious ready groups, service/replenishment groups, and con­voys, and to conduct such exercises in the shallow-water environments.

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THE BLUE ANGELS EXPERIENCE

illllliSIIOLD

from that it

battleship*

The 16-inch guns in the fast

vvoiil^

would have had to resort to evasive ■ ^ ing, if she was still under ^contr0 _(r0l is authors’ source on Japanese fire con

not cited as to what degradation ^ might impose on the Yamato's           it

hit; my incomplete recollection m _oUr might have been insignificant. A^s -_0ll, continuing to hit her despite her ev ^ we had doctrines for the situation. ^a _jt Mk-8 assisted their application by instant detection of target maneuv .

On the U. S. side, the tactical^ ^ mander should be assumed not to g¹ Yamato a steady-course target. „_erj-

armor—cause fires, explosions, an ^ ondary missile damage in the ligbt batteries and the extensive sup^e ,

etho¹

d<”

oi>

“                IV

well rely

analysis. One might just as

FIGHTING LADY

“Iowa vs. Yamato: The Ultimate Gunnery Duel”

(See T. Hone, N. Friedman, pp. 122-123, July

1983; L. E. Hoskins, pp. 102-103, September

1983 Proceedings)

Vice Admiral Lloyd M. Musdn, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The authors’ note in­cludes my name among those “generous with their assistance,” but I’m having trouble finding signs of my assistance.

I don’t intend to go into some minor irrelevancies and debatable conclusions in the article, at least some of which had been pointed out in the extended discus­sion I had with Dr. Hone.

But one point has significance to the way the authors develop their conclusion; the treatment of U. S. Navy radar-con­trolled surface gunnery of that era. They postulate that it was significantly limited by the resolution capability of the Mk-8 fire control radar. That analysis is flawed.

The authors mention the Mk-8’s angu­lar beam width, then go through the exer­cise familiar in the early radar days— distinguishing between two “adjacent” targets both lying within the radar beam. They conclude that the Iowa's Mk-8 could not distinguish separate aiming points in an engagement with two such targets, in their case, the Yamato and Nagato.

They don’t mention that for two targets within the beam width to be indistin­guishable, both must also be at the same range from the radar, to within the limits of the radar’s range resolution capability.

Radar range resolution is a function of pulse length, which for the Mk-8 was quite short for its day. My recollection is that it may have been one-tenth microsec­ond, which would give range resolution on the order of 30 yards. Something just about like that was what we were looking at every day in the fleet, and we knew how to use it.

In other words, for the Yamato and Nagato to be indistinguishable as sepa­rate targets to a U S. Mk-8 radar, they would have had to remain not only within its angular beam width, but also within about 30 yards of identical ranges from the Mk-8. This would be extremely diffi­cult for battleships of dissimilar classes in high-speed combat maneuvers. If would be impossible if there were more than one Mk-8-equipped U. S. ship to contend with, as in the situation proposed, espe­cially when the U. S. tactical commander has the speed advantage, knows the po­tential problem, and doesn’t want it to happen.

The authors apply the same flawed analysis to the question of correcting the fall of salvoes by radar spotting. Because

of its short pulse length, the Mk-8 g^a^₍ superb map picture of the fall ⁰ ' | around the target. It was a superior for spotting. One black night it help^e put about 80 salvoes onto a                          ₂

ship, all by radar until we had her bu -

^brightly'                                                          . „ _lised in-

So the authors seem to have us complete radar premises to develop conclusion that it was not certain an could hit the Yamato at 40,000 y Having spent World War II at sea m nery, and having been Vice Admira ^ lis A. Lee’s staff gunnery, radar combat information center offi^cer 1944 on, I can assure the authors I ^ was as certain as anything can be ¹

L- 1VJ-111^11 gUllO 111 111V/

were beautifully accurate. Admira ^ demanded that the gun batteries be ^ meticulously aligned and calibrate. conducted frequent firings to con and he was there personally to ⁰ ^ the results. Those of us who _yards the first salvo come down at 40,00 y in a nine-gun, 300-yard straddle p^a have few doubts.

It’s unlikely the engagement                 c

have remotely resembled the set authors visualize, the results ot (a. could be measured numerically a j„

bles of projectile penetrations an armor thicknesses.               _y iaio

After our first few salvoes, the a .

:vasiv

if she was still under control-

typical evasive maneuver would no ^ ously disturb our fire control, an t the speed advantage it would no

problem.                             frod¹

Of course, further variables enle.-_cti^ the effects of projectile hits ^w though they might not penetrate ^

‘trol ^

tures, destroy or blind ship coni -_(e fire control stations, rupture and fuel bunkers, and degrade naain P _(ef. sion. These can lead to helpless _tof The authors seem to take no accd these and other incidents of comba • flf

not possible to do so by their rm

hit first^h ^?'ⁿ^ ^{t0 l}hc side which could ^0ften' ^{0n tha}‘ ^baS1S’ the outenm ° ^were there would expect

PriedmanT °,^{bejUStaS Drs}' ^H°ne and rived _a. ,°^{nc ude}’ ^even though we ar- route. "^{e conclusion} by a different

Tim'^tar^ ^Retirement Pay: A

June of Crisis” *

(See X M u..i

>■ Clowes F ^e’_D^PP' ¹⁰⁸“^1U- ^AP^{riI 198}3; M. ^M- Hale n Qn'<r^{rady- p}' ^{75> Jul}y ¹⁹⁸³l ^T _L. ’ ^{P u}' September 1983 Proceedings)

riZlZ ^C°^m™^ander Paul B. Hend-

^Ha'e’s article                 ^Reserve~^{Captain

Plete m_(k, ^S ‘Hhirmative, but incom- ^havecZ"^- in corporations ⁱⁿ ‘he servf^C °^{r graduate} degrees, while ^are colleof. ^{6 g}₁^Cnera,,y ^only the officers ^t0 tnention    ^{Captain Hale fails}

^cer receives th_r ^ ^a!^{erage mililar}y °^m'

^ale education™^ °^{r foUr years of} 8^radu-

^Vate sector ^ ^tram’^{ng free}i^{in the} pn-

^funded bv ’,i,^mt>St graduate education is Ployment at tb ^Cmp,oyee- Civilian em- ^hundyeds,               °!f^1Cerlevel’\ requires

'^Vorth of sub- ^thousands of dollars ^Uniform exn^S’^tl6S’ ^s*^ur*^s> ^and shoes; the minimal : ^{pense Por tke m}>htary man is Most ,^ComP^arison. ^tract; j_n jl¹' ^ltary People are under con- Pie have em^^{1Vate sect}or, very few peo- ^Can be fi_rp,i^{P oyrnent} contracts, and they ^at any p^{r have} ‘heir salaries reduced TWA cut «i ^ecen‘*y> Coming Glass and ‘^1Ve'y, because^f ^{5% and 10% res}P^ec'

^l0n’ even-on ^P°°^{r earnin}S^s- In addi- ^days vacati_n ^{6 ln ttle sen,}ice receives 30 tPtist Work f ^year’ ^{while most} civilians ^Qre receivi_n^e ^^{een ten} and 20 years be- ^Private indn t °^{Ur Weeks} vacation. Also,

career

^antlUal raises b* ^erS’ ^selection boards, or ^Ch°ose _h ; ^Civilian must pick and Man ^{Wn Way}-

P °Ple in the military suggest

that the unique dangers of the service make the compensation and retirement system necessary. These dangers are not unique; workers in steel mills, chemical plants, and paper mills are subject to life-threatening circumstances daily. They also live with the possibility of being laid off during recessions.

Frequent relocations and “ticket- punching” are not a military phenomena. Climbing the corporate ladder requires the “right” jobs, good contacts, and re­location. Some corporations also have the “up-or-out” system that is prevalent in the military.

Most private pension plans accrue at 1.5% of base salary per year, while mili­tary pensions accumulate at 2.5% per year. Thus, to have comparable pension benefits, a civilian would have to earn 2.5, 1.5, or 1.66 times a military peer’s pay. The maximum percentage of salary at retirement that a civilian can earn is .015 x 43 = 64.5%. (This assumes 43 continuous years of employment with the same company, and retirement at age 65.) Conversely, a military man’s retire­ment will be 50% of his base pay at age 42, or 75% at age 52. This looks espe­cially good since U. S. News and World Report recently reported that the average household income in the United States is $40,000 per year.

Fortune magazine recently did a sur­vey of U. S. corporations and found that many had underfunded pension plans; a military man’s pension is paid by the U. S. Government with tax dollars. The mergers and bankruptcies of major cor­porations (e.g., Bendix, Braniff, and Johns Manville), and the recent restruc­turing of U. S. industry, especially in the steel and automobile sectors, have wreaked havoc with job security and pen­sion benefits.

Captain Hale mentions vesting but does not explore the subject adequately.

A person in civilian industry is normally vested after ten years continuous service. If he leaves at that time, he may receive a lump sum payment or a reduced annuity at age 65. Thus, a working man in his early 30s, leaving a $30,000 per year job, would receive either a lump sum or an annuity of $4,500 per year at age 65 (.015 X 10 years X $30,000)—hardly a lucrative benefit considering most private pensions are not adjusted for inflation. On the average, Americans switch jobs every four years, so very few people ever have vested rights.

Military people have a preoccupation with pension benefits. Life is too short to work at a job one does not like. Job satis­faction should be the most important con­sideration, not the possibility of rich pen­sion plans.

Nautical Brass, etc. is an illustrated bimonthly magazine covering the fields of nautical antiques, col­lectibles, and maritime history. NB is a forum for nautical collectors (reader participation encouraged) and covers collecting, restoring, authentication and identification. Regular features include sources, book reviews, letters, cartoons, classified and display ads. A new subscriber wrote, “I was fascinated and delighted with my introductory issue ... an entertaining and informative publication.”

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(Continued on page 144.)

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Comment and Discussion

“What’s in Store for Arapaho?”

(See G. O’Rourke, pp. 117-119, July 1983

Proceedings)

Captain James E. McNulla III, U. S. Navy, Head, Air Antisubmarine Warfare Sensors (OP-981E), Staff of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, responsi­ble for the research and development of the Arapaho Concept—Captain Gerry O’Rourke explains the background of the Arapaho concept correctly. However, once he starts talking about the Royal Navy’s tactical use of the Arapaho con­cept in the Falklands Conflict, it is diffi­cult to separate the manner in which the British actually operated and the manner in which they could have operated.

The Royal Navy did not use Arapaho in an operational mode, and the potential for extensive air operations from the fa­cility is not apparent. The inability of the facility to be operated in a continuous war-at-sea environment is an important aspect of the concept which its advocates usually overlook.

The U. S. Navy has studied Arapaho’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability in depth. A recently completed study by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) addressing the “utility” of the concept in an ASW scenerio not only addressed Navy ASW helicopters but all military and civilian helicopters. When the con­cept was first envisioned, the plan was to use Naval Reserve forces which, at that time, included a large contingent of SH- 3-type dipping sonar helicopters. This is no longer true. Therefore, the comment that O’Rourke makes concerning an inad­equate helicopter inventory is a valid Navy concern.

In discussing the cost of Arapaho, Captain O’Rourke’s figures are not even the tip of the iceberg. The dollar values he uses for the initial procurement cost of the ship kit (facility) are close, but he underestimates the cost of initial helicop­ter procurement by a factor of two or more, depending on the type of helicop­ters selected. He doesn’t discuss the life cycle cost, which must include training and the additional manpower required in the reserves to man the facility.

Civilian helicopters were investigated, and the results were not promising. Even if the minimum of equipment were in­stalled, the requirement for trained per­sonnel and availability of equipment make them expensive in the long term. In addition, they are not as available as ex­pected because of payload limitations.

The comment that the basic costs for the ship could be covered by earnings in the peacetime commercial market implies that the government would own the ship and operate her commercially. An exam­ple of what a containership costs to oper­ate was discovered when we looked for a ship to be used as the carrier for the test of the facility in the Chesapeake Bay. These costs were so high that the Navy finally decided to tow the Export Leader for the at-sea test after obtaining her from the James River reserve fleet. The cost of renting a ship and crew for a two-week period was estimated to be a million dol­lars. One of the reasons we leased the ship kit to the Royal Navy was to elimi­nate a substantial cost to provide secure

Captain W. K. Earle, U. S. Coast (Retired)—Many Coast ^^uar. gbo¹¹'

myself included, had reservations _s ji

the 270-foot Bear-class cutter designs, was being developed in the l®^te ^ Most complaints were that the s too small, too slow, and not long “p_fi- enough to serve as the Coast Guar

paiivjia, auppui uug, uaiww-—

assisting distressed ships, and

planes, gathering meteorologies

mary offshore cutter of the future; that her computerized COMDAC (command, display, and control) system was too so­phisticated and reliant on black-box tech­nology to be effective on a working Coast Guard cutter; and that her armament suite was inappropriate for her small size and limited speed.

But the people calling the shots in the Bear program were undismayed by such criticism. So they built themselves a bear—but a Grizzly it ain’t. Their bear is that strange looking ship pictured on page 112 of the August 1983 issue. It is the newly commissioned Coast Guard cutter Bear, first of a fleet of 13—possibly 24—new medium-endurance cutters that will dominate the Coast Guard fleet on into the 21st century.

How does the Coast Guard get locked into design deficiencies such as this? Per­haps it’s because our people, long starved for adequate resources, are like kids in a candy store when they get the go-ahead to build new ships. Or maybe they have become too far removed from ships and the sea. Whatever, it appears another design debacle has developed. We’ve had a number of these over the last two dec­ades, some major, some minor. Our 210s are hampered by slow speed and huge forward sail area. The fuel-gulping gas turbines on both 210s and 378s have proven impracticable. The Polar-class

icebreakers still suffer nightmares over variable pitch propellers and excessive shaft flex. Now comes this stubby, over­loaded, short-legged Bear, which one of the design team members already con­cedes is unsuited to carry out basic jobs for which she was designed, offshore fisheries and law enforcement.

We seem to have forgotten the lessons of the Secretary-class cutter, perhaps the most successful of all Coast Guard ships. There was no big dealing with respect to its hull design. Coast Guard officers of vast sea experience went looking for a ship that was strong, durable, seaworthy, and could go in harm’s way. It had to be big enough and fast enough to accommo­date both present and future needs, Coast Guard and Navy alike. They found it in an existing Navy gunboat design, the pre­war Erie and Charleston. They took the hull and machinery of this class, added Coast Guard peculiar requirements such as towing bitts and rescue boats, gave it a float plane, installed basic armament, and—most important—left plenty of room to accommodate changing mis­sions.

The wisdom of this approach has been proven. These ships were in the forefront of the Battle of the Atlantic, serving as escort unit flagships and sinking more than their share of U-boats. Later, as amphibious force flagships, they spear-

headed Pacific invasions. In the y^e^j following World War II, they « through countless 30-day ocean s ^ patrols, supporting transoceanic a^^)

and

p'uiiv.,5, ₆uim,u"₆

oceanographic data. They returnee during the Vietnam conflict an formed yeoman service with the j gunfire support ships. They ^con' ^_c. through the 1970s as reliable and e tive long-range offshore cutters, ^e ing fisheries laws, interdicting ^s^₀f glers, and assisting distressed ^rnarin ^ all nations. The last one, the (WHEC-37), was retired less ^than ” aS ago because of age. At that time, s ^ ^ the only ship in commission that ^a _f gaged Japanese aircraft at Pearl H j The success of these ships was mn upon two basics; outstanding ^seaT Lot. capability and adaptability to c y Over the years, they were rebuil times. They carried esoteric * suites when needed, discarded ^ when not needed. They had endless^ eties of electronic suites and ^se oceanographic winches, ^bal*^o0,J_matioi¹ deep sea sounders, combat intom ^ centers, and even flag plots. Th^eJ ^j. Coast Guard cutters in the fi^neSt_g(j by tion—flexible, responsive, ^mann_ved a true professionals. And they P^r0 true national asset.

Quick Reference GUIDE

To MILITARY SWITCHES

^^{ay no}‘ mean much ....................  _

nen are convinced there are betu

Gaardsm,

strength inrn mC ^Bear P^roS^ram. Oi bility ... ^e P^ast has rested upon flex going Drnf„^{miSS10n ca}Pability, and sea pr°vided SS!^ona*i^sm- We have alway ^c°st. The i ^ax,rnum service at minimur ttear j_s P° small, too slow, toothles

strength nn • ^{the vesse}l to project thi ^8th °n into the 21st century.

limited

Ante’’^Contro,: ^Ping the

{See P q | ,

^Proc'edin_gs)ⁿ’ ^pP- ^2&-34, August 1983

S. Navi

IS 0nly half ^arms control.” This assert "Pinion _u?^C°^rrecl- The effects of put ^lrietric_a| -p,^{n tbe} superpowers are as

^emized ^he f^{oasl Guard} needs is a mod- ^toO'-cla« ^PdatCd’ ^m°^{re ca}P^able ^re- backed i, "u * ^{a Peet of} small, hump- ■Televant?^{nds overl}oaded with Guarding-’^S°^teK^ICS' ^{The need for} “^Coast Its offvh,, ^{ln tbe} °^^d tradition continues.

b'ghly seaworthy⁶? “* ^{beSt filled by} can onerato • ™?^y’ ^long'^range cutters that ods of ti_mp ^lndeP^endent*y for long peri- ^,0 charndn °^{Ver argc areas}> responding ^andSce l^{natl0nal needs}- ^both in war grated netv ^m.^{ay be} mce to have an inte- equi_ppcd , ,?^rk °^{f smal1} COMDAC- lance aircraf|^erS’u^SUpP°^{rted b}y surveil- b'gh-speed «■’ ^{Sbore data} bases, and shores. Bm P^ouncers” guarding our such _{a cn}J,^an °^{r wdl our} country afford basis') 1 .u- ,^{y scre}en on a continuing Gne??^k_rl^n0t'^not Vet. at least. " than the enf c^{SS cutter toda}y costs more the ]930c ^lr^,^Secretary-class fleet did in not m?„^0nsidering inflation, this But many Coast new constructioi

^Peserve.___ j ^^Urt Orchard, U.

°bservati_on '.?^Ute?^ant Johnson’s closir ^l° ^0vercom_P ? ^{men bave} risen befoi ^race” is a th "^e tnomentum of an am ^asPiratio_ns ^I_f°'^vback to the language ar boring _the\? _u^Wo leading U. S. figurt l^NC)- _S(^Washington Naval Conferem ,^HuShes'and?^etary °^{f State Cha}rles Evar ?daho. Liem ^{enator Wi|}liam E. Borah t "nbued and ^Cnant Johnson seems to be a Pcrative _a„ ^enamored with a moral in "*^s niostiv ^U8bes and Borah were, an Ueute? ^moral drivel.

Parison of?' ,^J°^hns°n’s favorable con Or arms c ⁶ with the requiremet ’’awed in :,°?^tro1 negotiations today i Publi” ? ^{east four} areas.

, ^w°rldwide Plr?°^{n: He} asserts th, ,^eaders of th ^{PUb lc} opinion pressures th •^0rir>ula fo_r ^{6 su}P^erpowers to search for s oni,, i .. arms control ” This Qccprtm

opinion

trical Th" i"^{,c su}Perpowers are as ^SUive to n„hr^{ited States is} highly s ^nati°nal i., '^C opinion, but, as an in ^a^°ng by th°^{r baS not} always been sw ^e Pfblic currents. Witness

enduring military and political support for South Vietnam for nearly ten years. And during the times when the United States did move with public opinion (such as WNC or the initial expansion of military operations in Vietnam) its ac­tions were frequently mishandled and ill-defined. On the other hand, the Soviet Union does not have a record of being sensitive to public opinion. Its decision­making apparatus appears insulated and protected from criticism. The public out­cry over Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan has done nothing to alter its methods of pursuing objectives.

Misinterpretation of WNC: The Wash­ington Treaty was an abysmal failure as an attempt to obtain enduring security for the United States. To U. S. officials, the conference may have been nothing but an effective panache to dress in fashion the U. S. corralling of Japanese ambition. The problem is that the U. S. officials paid more attention to the morality of what they were saying and doing than to the mechanism they were creating to halt Japanese military expansion.

Contributing to Lieutenant Johnson's misinterpretation of the WNC is his as­sertion that an enduring political settle­ment was reached. Since the differences among France, Italy, Great Britain, and the United Sates were not volatile, we must assume that the core of concern among the Western powers was the Far Eastern problem, not reduction of naval arms. The political status quo resulting from Washington and the Four Power Treaty significantly contributed to the Pacific War. Japan was formally locked into the WNC ratio of inferiority and si­multaneously was forced to accept the demise of its greatest measure of security and prestige, the Anglo-Japan Treaty. In addition, the forced withdrawal from Shantung Province under the Nine Power Agreement of 1922, the failure of the United States to sponsor “racial equal­ity” clauses to the League of Nations Covenant (proposed by Japan), and the Immigration Act of 1924, prohibiting “Asiatics,” helped form the basis for the militaristic appeal to “imperial restora­tion” and eventual reliance upon military expansion to provide security and eco­nomic well-being. Hence, the very politi­cal difference the WNC set out to resolve was no more than an imposition of Anglo-American will upon Japan.

Lieutenant Johnson also ignores the fact that the WNC was among victors, allies, and friends, not adversaries of re­cent experience. Agreements among friends are usually easier than with adver­saries. The notion that somehow a multi­lateral arms control conference dealing

with political issues can achieve anything substantial is flawed. Agreements are not normally entered by all parties when they don't each gain something. Let alone lose nothing.

Hence, when Lieutenant Johnson re­fers to the WNC as successful arms con­trol, he is ignoring the glaring inconsist­encies and failings.

Misinterpretations of the Soviet Union: Lieutenant Johnson is looking at the So­viets through a Western viewer. He has assumed that they can find mutuality of motivation in saving dollars by reducing expensive strategic arms buys, even though security of the state is the para­mount purpose of the Soviet Govern­ment. The Soviets define security in terms which are incompatible with Lieu­tenant Johnson’s ideas of parity, requir­ing the ability to preempt any surprise at­tack. Lieutenant Johnson assumes his historical references have meaning to the Soviets. The Soviet Union was excluded from both the Versailles and Washington Conferences. At about the same time, the Soviets concluded an agreement with demilitarized Germany to secretly test German weapons. Lieutenant Johnson does not account for the preeminence of the strategic rocket forces among Soviet military services. It is inappropriate to compare the Soviet Union to any of the powers which participated in the WNC and then draw a baseline for arms control negotiations.

Arms Control Imperative: It is hard to imagine a U. S. politician or policy­maker today who would be opposed to arms control //it fulfilled U. S. security objectives. The problem comes when arms control processes become the objec­tive, not security. Lieutenant Johnson infers this arms control imperative in his examination of the Washington Confer­ence. The history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks gives a better basis for comparison. SALT was incremental, not comprehensive. It was bilateral and provided a better opportu­nity to gradually increase the constraints upon strategic forces. The introduction of multilateral issues at SALT, the forward based systems issue, complicated SALT so much that agreement was not possible. His proposal for comprehensive political settlement in multilateral talks is just the WNC treaty all over again.

The purpose of arms control negotia­tions should be to establish the rules of the game, temporarily, for strategic com­petition. Arms control must be ap­proached as a means to deal with con­flicting security requirements, not as the end-all political and military solution the WNC professed it to be.