Mediterranean: Qaddafi's Choke Point?

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Ever since Colonel Mu’ammar al- Qaddafi acceded to power in Septem­ber 1969, Libya has engaged in an oil- financed naval buildup of monumental proportions. In 1969, the Libyan Navy had no submarines, missile-carrying vessels, mine warfare ships, or land­ing craft. Today, it boasts five modern submarines with one more on order, one missile frigate with two on order, six missile corvettes with two on or­der, 25 missile boats, four mineswee­pers, and eight tank landing ves­sels with five on order. Although neighboring Egypt’s aging navy pos­sesses a larger fleet, the Libyan Navy is unmatched in the Arab world, as well as Israel, and in Africa, in terms of offensive capabilities, firepower, and modern equipment.

In November 1975, the Libyan Gov­ernment announced the purchase of “Foxtrot”-class submarines from the Soviet Union. Produced at a reacti­vated building line in Leningrad, five of these patrol submarines, with a 20,000-mile range while surfaced, ar­rived in Libya during 1976-82; a sixth is still building. In 1976, Libya at­tempted to order from Spain four French-designed Daphne-class me­dium-range (4,300 miles snorkeling) submarines built under license in Car­tagena. The order was soon cancelled because of a failure to reach an agree­ment over training facilities, but ac­cording to persistent reports, the Li­byan Government still desires to acquire Western submarines.

But Qaddafi has not been content with conventional submarines. As re­cently reported, Libya has acquired an unspecified number of Italian-made “SX-404”-cIass miniature subma­rines, two of which it transferred to the Palestinian Liberation Organiza­tion (PLO) in 1979. These vessels are ideal for clandestine work, reconnais­sance, and numerous shallow-water tasks. In addition, four Mala-class miniature submarines recently have reportedly been delivered from Yugoslavia.

Libya has developed a formidable force of missile frigates and corvettes as well. A Vosper Thornycroft Mk-7 missile frigate, ordered from England in 1968, arrived in Libya in 1973. With a range of 5,700 miles, this powerful vessel—currently under refit in Genoa—carries four long-range Ital­ian-made Otomat Mk-II surface-to- surface missiles (SSMs) and quad launchers for Italian-made Albatros/ Aspide surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Libya has also ordered two “Koni”- class SAM frigates from the Soviet Union.

In 1974, Libya ordered from Italy four Wadi-class missile corvettes with a range of 4,150 miles, four single Oto­mat Mk-I SSM launchers, and the ca­pability of laying 16 mines. These ves­sels were commissioned in 1979-81. The first of three “Nanuchka”-class missile corvettes ordered from the Soviet Union, each carrying four SS-N-2 (single cell) SSMs and one SA-N-4 SAM, arrived in Libya in Oc­tober 1981; the rest are due in 1983. An older, non-missile Vosper corvette with one four-inch gun and two 40­mm. guns, launched in England in 1965, arrived in Libya in 1966.

Perhaps the most spectacular growth in the Libyan Navy has been in the category of missile-equipped fast at­tack craft (FAC-M). The first three— similar to the Vosper-built Soloven- class—were ordered in England in 1966 and commissioned in 1969. Each car­ries eight French-made wire-guided SS

12 SSMs. In 1975, the Libyan Gov­ernment announced the purchase “Osa-IT’-class FAC-Ms from the 8o viet Union. Twelve vessels of ¹ class, with four SS-N-2B ‘ Sty* SSMs, arrived in Libya during 19 80. In 1977, Libya ordered from France ten Combattante-II-class FAC-M*> each carrying four Otomat (single ce SSMs. Following Libya’s invasion ⁰ Chad in 1980, French President dis­card d’Estaing blocked delivery ⁰ these craft. In July 1981, Preside⁰ Frangois Mitterand lifted the ban, ^0,1 the transfer of these boats to UitA may have already been complete⁰ five had arrived by the end of 198 •

Qaddafi has also acquired a linn¹ e^ minelaying capability for the LmY Navy. In addition to the submarine^ and the missile corvettes which a ^s possess this capability, Libya has cently purchased four ex-Sovi “Natya”-class ocean minesweeper-^ capable of laying ten mines ^eaC‘¹„_n) 3,100-ton roll-on/roll-off (RO-R , transport ship, El Timsah, acqu^|re from Italy in 1979, can also be u^st’ for minelaying.         .

Another offensive naval capaui r Qaddafi has developed is landing troop and tanks. In 1977-78, France com­pleted for the Libyan Navy two '⁷ Outclass, 2,800-ton tank landing smP (LST s) capable of carrying 240 tr°oF ’ 11 tanks, and one helicopter. In 19 79, Libya received from Poland to “Polnocny”-class medium landm. ships (LSMs), capable of carrying ^sl

Submarines give the Libyan Navy the means to interdict shipping; Qaddafi just may be the man to give the order to do it. The “Foxtrot” here is one of five currently in service in the Libyan Navy.

COMBAT

expressed any interest in minelay- Preferring to leave the bulk of its

do

^ne precious little to deter or coun­

^anks (one was lost in 1978). More re­cently, four smaller Turkish-made -107 -class LCTs have been deliv- ^red; 16 are on order. The El Timsah ^{as a}l^so enhanced Libya’s amphibi- °^Us capability.

Ihis massive naval buildup brings

0     mind an obvious question: Why does l.'Oya, a desert country of three mil-

⁰¹¹ inhabitants, need such an enor- J^ous navy? As past policies and ac- J°^ns clearly indicate, the reasons °^{r (}his naval buildup are rooted al- °st entirely in Qaddafi’s personal ambitions. '

1                 ^{d coast}*'^ne spanning almost j 00 miles, a population and infra-

_Co^rUCtUre located mainly along the ^ast, and a long history of naval in- asions, the Libyans have good rea- „°^{ns to} develop naval defenses. How- ^Ver’ if Qaddafi had truly been ^oncerned with Libya’s naval defen­ds, he would have developed his navy °ag entirely different lines. In view y his frequently expressed fear of a , \S- naval invasion and the possi- _{j^l 'ty of a Soviet naval attack if he ^ecided to eliminate the Soviet pres- ^ⁿce in Libya, Qaddafi would have ^een expected to concentrate on the ae capability that could really deter j_n^e awesome U. S. and Soviet fleets the Mediterranean: massive protec- ^^Ve mining of Libyan waters. This Quid require the acquisition of j-^'^nelayers, which are useless for of- nsive purposes as they can only op- ^^rate overtly. But they can lay ,l adreds of mines at a time and are erefore ideal for protective pur­^ses. This kind of vessel is exten- dy used by countries genuinely _a acerned about naval incursions by ^.superpower, such as the Scandina- _n|^an countries and Turkey. Libya has

er$.

melaying capacity to its submarines. , ^ey are suited for offensive purposes / carry relatively few mines, which akes them ineffective for defense. As for concern about naval opera- '°ns against Libya by other than su- ^erPower navies, the Libyans have

teract any of the realistic possibilities in this respect. The only truly plau­sible threat such as this is the covert landing of undercover agents and their equipment by domestic opponents of the regime, or by hostile powers using small craft or submarines. For overt, large-scale military actions against Libya, Egypt would naturally prefer to act across its 600-mile land border as it did in 1977, while Israel can be counted upon to use its formidable air power.

The natural defenses against both small craft and submarines are, apart from mines, large numbers of patrol boats equipped for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). And yet, Libya pos­sesses no more than nine patrol boats and has another 14 on order—none with ASW systems. By comparison, Israel—with similar concerns, but a far shorter coastline—has 25 patrol boats, half a dozen of which with ASW systems on board. The use of Libya’s missile-carrying vessels against small craft would be a ridiculously wasteful overkill, while only nine of its surface ships (one missile frigate, four missile corvettes, and four minesweepers), as well as two on order (missile frigates), have ASW capabilities. Libya has bothered to purchase only six French Super Frelon helicopters to act as ASW aircraft.

If Libya’s navy is so clearly unfit for defense, what other purpose could Qaddafi have for building the navy up at such great expense? One answer is, quite simply, prestige. Submarines, missile-carrying vessels, and amphib­ious craft are more glamorous than minelayers and patrol boats. And when immediate neighbors—in this case Egypt and Algeria—already possess such vessels, the temptation to keep up with the Joneses is almost irresist­ible to a Third World leader of Qad­dafi’s disposition.

If this were the only motive for the buildup, Libya’s navy could be dis­missed as an expensive but essentially harmless showpiece of Qaddafi’s van­ity. Unfortunately, the record indi­cates that in building his navy, Qad­dafi has had much more threatening

Amphibious warfare ships exist to project military force. Qaddafi likely bought the Ibn Harissa, left, and eight other amphibs, with another five more on the way, for this mission.

objectives in mind.

The relatively least offensive yet best known of these objectives is Qaddafi’s insistence, since 1973, on pushing Libya’s territorial waters far beyond the internationally accepted 12 miles to include the entire 3,000-square mile Gulf of Sidra, as well as the 12-mile area extending north of the gulf. Thus far, the United States has been the only country bold enough to challenge the Libyan claim, using military trans­ports and carrier-based jet fighters. Therefore, it has been left to Libya’s air force rather than its navy to engage in actual warfare to enforce Qaddafi’s claim to the gulf. In September 1980, two Libyan jets fired missiles at a U. S. Air Force C-130 Hercules transport flying almost 200 miles off the Libyan coast; both missed. Shortly after­ward, Libyan Mirage and MiG jet fighters surrounded another C-130 but were chased off by U. S. Navy F-14 Tomcats. And in August 1981, Libyan jets repeatedly interfered with a Sixth Fleet exercise partially conducted in the Gulf of Sidra; on 19 August, two U. S. F-14s shot down two intruding Libyan Air Force Su-22 “Fitters.” Following this incident, Qaddafi re­affirmed his determination to uphold Libya’s claim to the Gulf, vowing to turn it into a “new Red Sea with [Lib­yan] blood” if “violated” again and to fight for it with "planes, navies, missiles, and everything.” The Lib­yan Navy will doubtless continue to patrol the Gulf of Sidra and open fire on any naval target encountered.

Even more extravagant than its claim to the Gulf of Sidra has been Libya’s claim to jurisdiction over Mediterra­nean waters up to 130 miles from its shores. In this case, the Libyan Navy has played the lead role.

139

^r°ceedin_Ss / March 1983

Based on its accepted claim to ju­risdiction over waters up to the half­way point between its own shores and those of Libya—98 miles—Malta’s government asked Texaco in July 1980 to undertake offshore oil prospecting in its behalf on the Medina Bank, well within its claimed zone—68 nautical miles from Malta’s southern coast. In mid-August, the Saipem-II oil rig.

chartered by Texaco from an Italian state oil corporation, arrived in the area. Within days, a Libyan subma­rine began harassing the rig. Next to appear was a Libyan warship, whose crew ordered the rig’s captain to wind up operations or face further action. Under the timid advice of the Italian Government, the captain complied. The rig abandoned the site, surveilled by both Libyan and Italian naval ves­sels. Although the immediate Libyan- Maltese crisis was seemingly resolved in March 1982, when the two coun­tries agreed to refer their dispute over Mediterranean oil-drilling rights to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, an identical agreement signed in 1976 was never implemented be­cause of Libyan reluctance. Since the international court is highly unlikely to rule in its favor, Libya can be ex­pected to continue to drag its feet, using its navy to deprive Malta of its offshore drilling rights in the face of Maltese and West European quiescence.

However, by far the most threat­ening capability developed by the Libyan Navy has been its power to disrupt the principal shipping lanes across the Mediterranean. Qaddafi ap­parently has in mind nothing less than the potential to sink ships carrying passengers and goods to and from Is­rael, as well as westbound tankers carrying oil from “moderate” Arab countries.

If this sounds farfetched, the fol­lowing incident should be recalled. On 15 April 1973, the Queen Elizabeth II (QE II) left Southampton for the Is­raeli port of Ashdod on a special cruise to celebrate Israel’s Independence Day. On 17 April, Qaddafi ordered the commander of a Soviet-made Egyp­tian submarine stationed in Libya un­der a joint defense agreement to sink the QE II. The submarine sailed out of Tripoli, but rather than intercept the ship, her captain radioed the Egyptian Navy for instructions. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was immediately notified, ordered the submarine to return to Alexandria at once.

At the November 1979 Arab League summit in Tunis, Qaddafi recom­mended that the Arabs threaten nav­igation through the Suez Canal, hit ships carrying goods to Israel, and de­stroy Arab oil “if it is not used for the liberation of Palestine.” In view of Qaddafi's attempt to sink the QE II, it would be a grave error to dismiss such statements as empty threats. The Libyan leader, who regards both Is­rael’s existence and the policies of the

“moderate” Arab states as obstacle⁸ to the realization of Arab unity, ^wh'C is his most passionately desired drea ^ can hardly be counted upon to balk ordering the Libyan Navy to sink ship^ in the Mediterranean to remove tries obstacles. .

Although all of the trans-Med>^te ranean shipping is within easy striking distance from Libya, Qaddafi’s nayy is not likely to engage in any °^vl-._s actions against it; the Sixth Flee ^ presence is sure to act as a power deterrent. If Qaddafi were to order t ^ sinking of a passenger ship. ^a j¹¹ chantman, or a tanker, he is likely repeat the much less risky mode ot stealthy attack he attempted on¹ QE II. The Combattante-IIs would even more suitable for such an ^u dertaking than are Libya’s Soviet-mu ^ submarines. Equipped with long-raug Otomat SSMs, the swift missile boa could fire their missiles at the targ ^ ships from distances of up to 130 mi and return to base undetected. Sm numerous Mediterranean fleets a equipped with Otomat SSMs, any ^cV dence of the attacker’s origin cou only be circumstantial.                       f

Many observers have made ligm the Libyan Navy, citing its dearth qualified personnel and the mo provenance of its vessels. True. _ would expect it to perform with ^ tinction against any competent na force in the Mediterranean such as Sixth Fleet or the Israeli Navy, this is not the point. As incornpe¹^ as the Libyan Navy may be. u^s pabilities most certainly suffice ^ sinking large, slow-moving, unarm civilian vessels plying the Mediter nean within easy range of Libya s m - siles. One would hope, therefore, t the Sixth Fleet would maintain a ^c°^ stant watch over Libya's naval ^vC sels to forestall any such action.

Mr. Danziger is a policy analyst for the mission on International Affairs of the Amcn^L' Jewish Congress in New York.