The Return of Tactical Thought

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_Cai . ^ey ^{to a} real return of innovative tacti­le ^lln^ⁿ£ ^^es in exploring new waters in f(i_r^^re(.^lS °f antisurface warfare, strike war- The’ ^{C ectron}i^{c w}arfare, and surveillance. 'ⁿetlt ‘t*^[1][2]^ ^otfler areas of tactical develop- tre_nd ^V °^U^ ^navai offieer business. The i_aiu^to P^ass tactical development to civil- sho ^,n.^a.^nne(i operation evaluation groups ¹¹⁽¹ he ended.

u'? leaders are calling for a return to the “individ- ^a adroitness” in tactics that strategist Bernard naval n° *^{C Sa}*^ ^s^°uld be the ‘‘full time occupation of °^Ver the 5^ersonne1'' The ‘‘narrow margin” of superiority (CNO) Ad°^V-^et ^^{avy that} then-Chief of Naval Operations ^tired), said"¹^^{31 Thomas B}- Hayward, U. S. Navy (Re- ^en°ugh jp ^cPcnded on our aircraft carriers may not be forces a ,^Wc. ^not plan optimum tactics for U. S. Navy

^has ordered^' JameS D‘ ^Watkins- ^u- ^s- ^Navy, CNO, •hent rece' 1 if* **^{le tra}'ⁿ'ⁿ8 in tactics and tactical develop- ^efore ^rpj^^VC "‘Sher priority in the U. S. Navy than it had

^respOnsibil^f ^SUC^^{eSS our Nav}Y *^{n carr}y*ng out its global °n, to ugg^{1 le}^ *ⁿ defense of the United States depends I'ave thou h °^0t^^a" analogy, a coach and players who Pied with!-* °^Ut *8^ame plan” and are not preoccu- • Uurin,, th^{P PadS and Chin s}traps. jⁿg and dev²!*³³⁸* ^^eca<^^{es> the} emphasis on tactical train- ⁿ the 198o ^C °/^>rnent ^^as decayed. What has caused this? ^Cal thouehf^S’\A/u^re ^^as ^^{een a} return to emphasis on tacti- • here should that emphasis be placed?

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constrained scenarios to ueieimmc uiw*                        _eS

Such a procedure is a natural outgrowth of ^adVt_vaj_uable analytic techniques and computers and can be a _anj tool. Unfortunately, defense acquisition of weap _nalysis

Table 1 Definitions of Tactical Thought

United States Soviet Union      Definition

A system of knowledge about the character and laws of armed conflict The preparation of a state for the conduct of war

Methodology for plan­ning and waging war, including the setting of political and military objectives

Methodology for planning and conducting specific military operations The practice of combat by units and formations, including the coordina­tion of such units The internal doctrine of individual units regard­ing employment of sensors and weapons

growth of the Soviet Navy has restored priority to the t

tics of sea control.                                     kmili-

Contained within the U. S. definition of strategy tary-political theory, or what the Soviets cal   . _£tt

science.”⁴ Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian S. _t agree, for example, that a theory of naval war are^ ^ conclude that a successful navy is, by the ^natu!j^e_tj_CS. ocean environment, offensive in its strategy an The U. S. Navy has maintained an offensive^ strategy has drifted into defensively oriented tactics/                                                                           y

Tactics are the piecemeal implementation ^{01 s r}_cre. Military and naval writers in the Soviet Union hav ^ ated some useful definitions, which are compare definitions based on U. S. practice in Table L “tactics” in the United States encompasses a broa , _e, tram of meaning. For clarification, the terms in par ses in Table 1 will be used herein.

The Decay                                                    ____

~                                                                     "•              f nuclei

Political-Military Theory: The existence o ^

weapons and the confrontation with the Soviet un ing the post-World War II era produced a plethora o ian strategists.⁷ The consolidation of the services ^ the Secretary of Defense in 1948 tended to suppr ^_ate, tary and naval thought and give credence to civi ^ia, j pre- gists, particularly in the case of the Navy, whic ^_etary. viously operated under its own cabinet-leve ^sC^ _con- These civilian strategists concentrated on abstra ^ ^ cepts of deterrence based on nuclear terror rather terrence concepts founded on superior warfighting^^ bility. The result was an invalidation of tactical c supporting a warfighting strategy. j^Os,

Defense Acquisition and Logistics: In the ear y _g(j then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara iF^ an organization on the Department of Defense ^ ^jj_tary the succeeding decades resulted in subordinating and naval planning to systems analysis.⁸ Systems a ^ is an analytic procedure that is aimed towar _£ter- employs mathematical models of systems in ^pa-_veness- constrained scenarios to determine their eftec

supporting logistics became driven by systems _egy budget decisions and not by a planned nationa _{e 0}„ and tactical objectives. As a result, a strategic -_nj₀g which to build tactics was diluted; in the services, _tj,_e officers in systems analysis in order to compete jj_ca] defense dollar—a diversion from the pursuit o ^ _waS thought—was emphasized; and systems procurem driving tactics rather than tactical developmen

systems procurement.                            Hermit

Strategy: Planning for naval strategy was un _a[ia|- by the dominance of nuclear deterrence and syste _Qf the ysis strategists. This was confirmed by the decay Navy’s strategic plans organizations: the Genera ^ during World War II, the Strategic Studies Brancn ^ 1950s, and the Long Range Objectives ^Groap- _ctj_VeS 1960s. In the early 1970s, the Long Range J

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sion^UV^{WaS su}^^orc**^natec* ^to Systems Analysis Divi­ded'in thTi^f ^planning ^{for naval} strategy effectively

Was estnhr u j°^S' ^{A new office for ,on}g-^range planning dilished on the personal staff of the CNO in 1980.

naval ^post‘^World War II era was a time of unopposed ^emereef/-^reiu^^C^ *^or S- Navy. The aircraft carrier

it _See^ 'ⁿ Period as the capital ship of the Navy, and U, s ■ ^su‘ricient strategy to simply send carriers where throi,_otIⁿ,f^ref,^{S Were thre}atened. This strategy continued In h "^{e Vietnam War}-

i The u ⁷°^S’ ^S°^{me important} changes took place: ^di(1 in th f ^d°^{llar n}° ^longer P^urchased as much as it once oil short*^{2 aCC of} European and Japanese competition, and causing ⁸o^{S began t0 take a to11 on the U}- ^s- economy, ^°rld w" r *^{0n and} high-cost defense weaponry. Also, the flppt ¹ ,htP^{s w}ere retired, new ships were few, and i The ^echued dramatically in numbers, by i 2(_)n^S' ^fleet’ Populated largely with ships propelled been’ b ^P°^{Unds per s}9^uare inch (psi) steam turbines, had ^■etnam^ew°^{VerWOrl<ed and} undermaintained during the ^ahundant ^ ^pr°h^^ems in propulsion systems were ^ Th *

^mUmV^eSS°^{nS learne}d *ⁿ *h^e Vietnam War provided mini- y _Civ^actlcal input to command of the sea. ing a^V*^{lan strate}gNts and systems analysts were promot­ion of ^{W nava}^ ^strategy that involved only a narrow mis- protecting the sea-lanes to Europe with small,

the sea, and trying to shore up scarce ships whose over­worked propulsion plants were proving unreliable. These efforts resulted in the following:

►  A scarcity of ships, creating scheduling requirements that prevented cohesive unit training and eroded the opera­tional integrity of the basic units for tactical development ^ An era of overemphasis on propulsion problems rather than a proper balance between issues of tactics and engi­neering, accompanied by increasing emphasis on speciali­zation and centralization of authority

► A generation of naval officers whose primary tactical training was not oriented toward command of the sea

►  A defensive clinging to a strategy based primarily on aircraft carriers in response to civilian attack, although changing technology provided new offensive options through the use of cruise missiles and space-based assets

The impact of these results placed tactical thought in cold storage. Indeed, conditions opposed to a sound chain of naval command and the -development of innovative naval thought ensued.

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°_n^{P S}, ^ps—^a contradiction of all accumulated wisdom Th ^{Va theor}y ^and strategy.

ⁿava|^{6Se pressures} produced an inwardly focused U. S. that _th^Sr^{gy of} bureaucratic survival, in spite of the fact (J. o ^{e Soviet} Navy was emerging as a credible threat to W_ere ^^ommand of the sea. The efforts of naval leaders ^defen r ^SOr*^3ed 'ⁿ rig^ht'ⁿg systems analysis for new ships, ^lng the Mahanian strategy of flexible command of

Operational Tactics: Operational tactics in the environ­ment described were devoted primarily toward how to properly use carrier task groups and amphibious task groups. Two facts forced thinking toward defensive tac­tics. First, carrier aircraft could conduct offensive strikes at long range, but ship tactics within the carrier group had to be directed to defend the carrier, the only ship with

In a benign environment of unopposed naval supremacy, as in the 1960s off Vietnam, the aircraft carrier emerged as the capital ship of the Navy. Sufficient strategy, then, was to simply send carriers to where U. S. interests were threat­ened. The game has changed since then, and so must the strategy and tactics.

offensive striking power. Second, amphibious warfare ships and operations are even more vulnerable to attack than carrier battle groups, reinforcing the pursuit of defen­sive tactics.

Defensive tactics for the carrier battle group have been polished over the years, leading to today’s composite war­fare commander (CWC) doctrine. The CWC doctrine or­ganizes the battle group into a basically defensive posture. It works acceptably well as a defensive tactic, but tends to bind all ships to the carrier aircraft capabilities rather than permitting the formation of separate, offensively oriented task groups. It is also communications intensive and thus works against the modem tactical need to remain silent to avoid detection. Naval tactics should not be bound to CWC doctrine, but should use it only where it is helpful. Additional, more offensively oriented command-and-con- trol schemes are necessary.

Formation Tactics: In the battle lines of World War II and before, the fleet’s manuevers were necessitated by the importance of bringing heavy gunfire on the enemy while reducing his ability to do so. Thus, the classic formation tactic was to “cross the T” so that all ships could concen­trate a broadside on the opposing battle line. Cruiser scouting formations and destroyer torpedo attacks were

part of this tight, tactical jockeying for position- _surveil- In modem naval warfare, real-time ^sate! _ng._rang^e lance, nuclear and chemical warheads, and ® ^tic- guided weapons have made tight formations                                                                     _a(ej by

able. Ships and submarines must now operate ^seP _nS in large distances, employing their long-range we mutual support. Positive control and coordination ^_ma. surface ships and submarines are essential to nav ^_oU)d tion tactics. The needs of formation tactics ^ _an(j receive the most emphasis are effective com ^ j_r0m control over large areas, concentration of fir^eP° _control dispersed formations, carrying out command a ^ _anCj in a under conditions of electronic and acoustic ^sllenC_tering n«- hostile electromagnetic environment, and coun - clear and chemical effects.            posed

Unit Tactics: During World War II, unit ^tat'_orpedoes- fairly simple questions of how to employ guns, P^jons depth charges, and, later, radar sensors. Comm _h_f_re- were rudimentary ultra-high-frequency an                                                              _sj_gnals-

quency radio circuits with flag and flashing ig     _cj_ass

On a modern Spruance-class destroyer or e ' _c0iH' guided missile cruiser, the choices available ⁰_sterns manding officer of how to employ the com a ^^_cers suite are many and varied. Yet, training for nav'                                                                   ^_gap₀n

tends to focus on the capabilities of indivi u _teIps-

systems and the capabilities of Soviet weapon ^_cers This cookbook approach to tactics produce _uti- who are familiar with weapon characteristics ^ jnt^e' derstand little about how to select proper optm                                                                           ₀f-

grate ship systems for varying tactical situations- ₀t ficers will misinterpret tactics by considering to

tactics to be defined by ship weaponry and y _gy. understand the essential linkage of tactics an _anders Too often during exercises, task group ^c0_s eh¹' become preoccupied with unit training in we

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^on^aml^{11 and fai}* ^{t0 develo}P ^the ship’s abilities in forma- the C(v,i,u^)pe,^rat'^{0nal tact}ics. This is another symptom of °kbook approach to tactics.

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aid Real’- ^mi ^StrateSy^; The leadership of President Ron- Sceretary¹⁰ ’ ^^cretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and ^trends in °r • ⁶ ^^avy John Lehman has reversed adverse logistics *th ^lt'^Ca* ^md‘^tary theory, defense acquisitions and ^egy. fq₀^e affordability of defense, and national strat- °^ve_r ^ ^on§^er do nuclear deterrence advocates hold sway ^a ^11 sn ^{COrnrnonsense} need for conventional arms across ^Cansyste^{C rUm} P^otent'^a* conflict situations. No longer ^ence nf ^analy^{sts w}‘ⁿ budget debates outside the influ- A U ^^trate8^ic-tactical thought, time in th ^nationa* strategy is more clear now than at any °ⁿ stro_n >^{C PaSt tWo} decades. It is a national strategy based level _of^{8 pa}rity and negotiating strength at the nuclear conflict, maritime superiority with a 600-ship command-of-the-sea strategy employs the new capabilities in power projection to negate shore-based infrastructure that may support enemy sea power. Operational tactics are changing from a defensive to an offensive posture. Forma­tion tactics must become increasingly dispersed without losing the capability to provide mutual support to other ships in the task group and concentrate firepower on the enemy. Unit tactics must increasingly integrate the full capabilities of modem warships.

Continuing Development: After World War II, the So­viet submarine force was considered the primary threat to U. S. command of the sea. Building on World War II experience, antisubmarine carriers and escorting destroy­ers concentrated on close-in ship and aircraft tactics.

By the 1970s, weapon and sensor ranges had extended, and standoff antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tactics were more in practice. The Soviet submarine force has contin­ued to grow in quantity and quality and presents a signifi­cant challenge to U. S. tactical development. The greatest tactical challenges in ASW are in coordinating diverse air, surface, and subsurface forces in open-ocean, offensive

a||j.'⁸ kJ- S. interests, a continued overseas presenct ^Ce system, and a lean, maneuver warfare-orien

'^ed land"?" >_h^{d f}°^rce’

^ry to

^P°litical-^C°M^^{manci llle seas} 'ⁿ support of global interest! ^achi_evj ^m'i^tafy control of escalation of conflict whil

9n<j *-   ^ U, S intprpctc o Ppnlinnp/4       .. n.

"TOasi ’ ^ready ^{t0 res}P^{ond to} crisis situations, wit Th_e J ^{tIle Ra}pid Deployment Joint Task Force. *th*V ^Nayy bas adopted an offensive, commanc ^a strategy in support of national strategy. Thi

weaponry, the rivalry between the Navy’s air, and submarine communities over how to best con

_surfac^e> trol aⁿ'

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enemy positions and when they can be employe sively to deny enemy command and control. 1 _oB1. important areas to be developed in EW are radar an ^

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employing the increasing capabilities of EW to

ASW and in developing passive acoustic and nonacoustic detection tactics.

The Soviet Naval Air Force has grown in strength. The introduction of the naval “Backfire” with long-range anti­ship missiles has made fleet antiair warfare (AAW) quite different from simply defending against dive-bombers and torpedo planes. Two tactical necessities in AAW for the United States are offensive AAW, including attack on enemy bases with cruise missiles, and coordination of multiplatform defense in depth, with emphasis on the outer air battle.

Exploring New Waters: Opportunity for major innova­tions in tactical development exists in antisurface warfare (ASUW), strike warfare (against land targets), electronic warfare (EW), and surveillance. These areas have lagged because of:

► Overreliance on the capabilities of attack aircraft against heavily defended warships and land targets

► A general misunderstanding of EW (EW, electronic emission control, deception, and jamming tactics are sel­dom exercised because they interfere with sexier opera­tions. EW'should be a primary warfare mission.)

► Overreliance on carrier-based aircraft as the only air­borne surveillance capability

The primary U. S. ASUW weapon of today, the Har­poon missile, became operational in 1977 without ade­quate systems or tactics to support targeting to its full range. Though some progress has been made, this capabil­ity is still in tactical infancy. The foremost needs in ASUW tactics are developing systems and tactics to target Harpoon, developing the same for the even longer range Tomahawk antiship missile, and developing well-prac­ticed procedures for coordinated missile attacks from air, surface, and subsurface platforms.

Strike warfare, long the exclusive realm of tactical air­craft, will soon become a fleet-wide mission with the in­troduction of the long-range Tomahawk land-attack mis­sile. The most important tactical needs of strike warfare are developing real-time targeting procedures for strike mission Tomahawk missiles and coordinating a proper mix of Tomahawks and tactical aircraft in striking differ­ent kinds of targets, having varying degrees of defense.

The ASUW surface-to-surface missile, right, launched from the USS Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) looks as mean and deadly as it is. But its ultimate effectiveness depends on strong tactics to support targeting to its full range.

Will the real USS Stein (FF-1065), opposite page, please identify herself? Is she on the port or starboard side of the USS Dixie (AD-14)? Deception can be an effective tactic to confuse the enemy—and is a game played by both sides.

The use of the Tomahawk land-attack missile, ^COIVj^ tional warhead, and the Tomahawk land-attack ^mlS₀f nuclear warhead, needs to be understood in all regifjj ^ strategic-tactical thought. This understanding ^W1 made difficult by the interface with strategic nu ,S uvci liuw ^ — - ace- employ the new weapon, and the interface wn v ^ based systems (traditionally controlled by the D^eP^a<, ^ of Defense, the intelligence community, and the U.

rorce; required lor eneciive, giuuai, icai n"-                       .

Electronic warfare and deception may be the mo^ portant new tactical areas, particularly in I transition periods when they are the basis of

munications jamming using more platforms

and confuse the enemy, passive targeting ^coor ^_ce among multiple units, and understanding the i^|TIP of electronic and acoustic emission control. _warfat^e Surveillance is more important now in modem ₍₀ than in the days of coal and sail because of the a ^ ^ strike at ranges that equal, and sometimes exce ^ ^ ability to detect. The most important areas of tac ¹

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sets^^ent '^{n surv}eillance are exploiting space-based as- Stnaii t ^^r°^{Vlde re}2l-time tactical information and using (helieont ^met*'^um_s>^zed surface combatants to base aircraft tic_{aI Qr}^{P e}_h^{rs an<}J later, vertical takeoff and landing and ver- ^sP°nsiv ^S"^{0rt ta}^^e°lf and landing aircraft) to provide re- P| ^{e ear}ly warning and targeting.

NaVtI"! ^t*^{le Nav}y’s ^new computer tactical game, have_nmV’ ^mak^es one wonder why these “new waters” Win read'i ^{n ade}9^uately explored. Any NAVTAG player katinp * ^{y cord}'^rm that the most important tactics in de- ^tronj_c °PP°nent are surveillance and detection, elec- of exp_e^ ^ac°ustic emission control, deception, the timing devejQ ^{n ln}^ ^an overwhelming weapon launch based on ^Use 'ⁿ^ ^su"’^c'^cnt targeting information in a cat-and- §^arne, and causing the enemy to flinch first.

quisjtio ^n<^ ^^3S'^S 'ⁿ Political-military theory, defense ac- °f p_r0(J^{a and} logistics, and national strategy for the return lead_ers[i.^ctlve tactical thought exists today. The Navy’s ^PPorte'd u            P^rocess of creating a naval strategy

^tical th innovative tactical thought. The return of °fnperat'⁰¹^¹ 'ⁿ             ^^avy ^{must occur} in the areas

isre _area^10nal» formation, and unit tactics across all war- '^var. q_q^{S an(}l along the spectrum of conflict from peace to 'he ^ntlnuing developments are important; however, "'ith _ex ,° ^{a rea}l return of innovative tactical thinking lies ^re, str'L°ⁿⁿ^ ^{new wa}t^ers in the areas of antisurface war- 1hes_{e ar}^{e War}fare, electronic warfare, and surveillance. ^'ntarilv⁶^ ^tactlcal development should be addressed ’actual d ^ °P^erational naval officers. The trend to pass k^at'°n ^evel°P^rnent to civilian-manned operational eval- ^com ,°^UP^S should be ended if naval personnel are to

M_aj^ ^actlcalIy ^adr0it

^to the r_et ^SUr^^ery ^on the Navy’s organization is necessary ^engi_nee^c;^arnoftactical thought. A proper balance between lining ^ ^and tactical matters should be restored in ^S^°^uld b_e^{and or}8^ani^zation. In addition, the squadron ^Cal ^endeav^rCSt°^{red aS} ^^as‘^{c unit} f°^r tactical and techni- ^acti°n to ^Vfh^{r                                 wct/dp}y squadron concept is only a re-

^CQlhniand i P^r°k'^ern’ ^{not a} solution.¹¹ The squadron ^er should understand his ships in all tactical and

technical areas and work them up as a team, avoiding the current practice of using pick-up teams to put together task groups.

The movement to return tactical thought to the fleet comes none too soon. The days when the Soviet Navy could be deterred or defeated by overwhelming U. S. naval forces disappeared in the 1970s. For the 1980s and beyond, our thin edge of superiority will continue to de­pend on technical prowess. It will depend equally on the implementation of enlightened tactical thought. U. S. naval officers must remain adroit in the balanced pursuit of technical and tactical thought.

'Edward Mead Earle, ed.. Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. 100.

"B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., The Development of Naval Thought. Essays by Herbert Rosinski (Newport, Rl: Naval War College Press, 1977), p. VIII.

³     See, for example. The Defense Science Board Task Force on “Strategic Planning and The Maritime Balance: An Experiment,” Under Secretary of Defense for Re­search and Engineering, Washington. D.C., Executive Summary, November 1979.

⁴     A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of The Soviet State (Moscow, 1975), translated and published by the U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C.

⁵T. Wood Parker, “Thinking Offensively," Proceedings. April 1982, pp. 26-31. ⁶See the definitions in Grechko, The Armed Forces of The Soviet State.

⁷Civilian strategists such as Bernard Brodie. Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, to mention a few.

"Robert J. Hanks, “Whither U. S. Naval Strategy,” Strategic Review. Summer 1982, pp. 17-18.

The Maritime Balance Study, The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment.” Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C., 15 April 1979. See Appendix A for a history of strategic planning organizations in the U. S. Navy.

'“Theodore C. Taylor, “A Basis For Tactical Thought," Proceedings. June 1982, pp. 27-33.

This concept is implemented in the Atlantic Fleet. In a dry squadron, the squad­ron commander deals exclusively with logistic and support problems. In a wet squadron, he deals primarily with tactical matters. Ships rotate from one type squadron to the other.

Captain Powers holds degrees from the Naval Academy, Naval Postgrad­uate School, George Washington University, and Catholic University. He has served in four destroyers and was CO of the USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5). Tours ashore have included U. S. Naval Forces Viet­nam, Naval Ordnance Systems Command, The National War College, the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-354), military assistant to the Defense Science Board, and special assistant to the Director, RDT&E (OP-098X). Captain Powers now commands Destroyer Squad­ron 17, San Diego, CA. Of his four essays submitted in the 1983 GPEC, one earned first honorable mention, two were purchased as articles, and one was purchased as a professional note.