This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
the I to unify the services,
SecreetglS^ators’ intent (hat the E
it was Defense be
® Organization for National Security: A Study
B Gen- Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.), ashington, DC: United States Strategic nstitute, 1983. 141 pp. Illus. $8.00 ($6.40).
Reviewed by Captain Paul B. Ryan, U. S. Navy (Retired)
This book’s message is that our na- r10nal security is at stake unless the cur- Jjnt' ineffective military chain-of-com- and system is changed. The means are and, says General Krulak, who asks St°fffeSS t0 restore to Joint Chiefs of a ' (JCS) authority over unified and Pecified commands and their former sta- deS as direct military advisers to the Presi- st The root cause of the problem, a es Krulak, is excessive civilian med- sj)ln® well-intentioned or not—by
l-term, political appointees and n8~term, civil servants.
Krulak writes from a background of 38 ars of military service, including sev-
Wn ut0Urs 'n Washington, where he °rked closely with the JCS.
ls book is a biting indictment of what ynj£es as a defective command system. Spoer t*le current law, the military is re- Port*S1^e ^°r execut'ng operations in sup- tk T). S. policy and broad strategy den^ and the three military
no7}ments. But, paradoxically, the JCS Part' aC^S t*le authority t0 decide how ach1CUlar operations will be carried out to Ze 'evc ^ese goals. Yet, the average citi- f0r hfnc*s t0 hold the military accountable an i Ufn<^ers which may be attributable to (he n.e , ct've chain-of-command. Recall hasc 3 erna,e °f Korea, the Bay of Pigs (Acpd caPture of the USS Pueblo affaj ''2)’ ‘he USS Liberty (AGTR-5)
edy ahQrtcd Iran raid, and the trag- aL v*etnam with its toll of 58,000 ncan dead.
systeat Went wrong with a command ty* which had achieved victory in C0ris ",ar tl? As Krulak tells it, when
Act ress Passed the National Securiti 1 ln 1947 to iinifi/ J respo ar^’ a*ded by his staff, would 0r8an'S'• for control of the defense decadg231'00' however, over the next vertet|C’ this congressional act was sub- y subsequent amendments which gave the Defense Secretary status as a deputy commander in chief with power to develop long-range strategic plans and to direct combat operations. To carry out these responsibilities, by 1982, the Defense Secretary had acquired a staff and various agencies comprising 88,000 people, an arresting example of Parkinson’s Law.
The congressional action of 1958, which disconnected the JCS from command of the operational forces and from decision-making in strategic plans, produced bizarre procedures during the Vietnam War. Krulak’s first-hand account of how air-target lists were second-guessed by then-Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s civilian aides and then approved by the White House will cause wonderment, but goes a long way to explain why we failed to win that war. It also throws light on how the Defense Secretary is empowered to plan national strategy with his Defense Resources Board, whose membership consists of 15 civilians and only one military man.
Krulak contends that the nation’s warmaking ability has eroded because the corporate judgment of senior military men has been replaced by that of a civilian Defense Secretary—average tenure, 2.4 years—and his galaxy of systems analysts, conflict specialists, and managerial experts. Equally unfortunate, the JCS’s advice to the President has been filtered through defense secretaries who may or may not transmit its exact sense to the commander in chief. Finally, when the joint chiefs lost the authority to command the unified and specific commands, their status sank.
To set matters right, Krulak asserts that Congress should modify the Act of 1947 and its amendments; he even identifies the sections in need of change and the desired revisions. Yet, it may be well into the future before such action is taken. The American public reacts slowly to issues affecting its security. Our lack of preparedness for World War II is a fair example. Similarly, in the 1980s, people may fail to appreciate the ironic fact that in its zeal to avoid excessive military control of the forces, Congress has produced defense secretaries unfitted for their responsibilities, who now enjoy unfettered, civilian command.
Undoubtedly, certain critics will find fault with Krulak’s conclusions, dismissing them as typical of the parochialism expected of a military man. Perhaps anticipating such broadsides, the author points out that differences of opinion among the joint chiefs are not harmful but bring together the judgments of the most competent minds in all types of warfare. Diversity of opinion, when it occurs, means that the President will have before him the options available— as President Franklin Roosevelt did in World War II.
Nevertheless, there are those in government service or in academia who may complain that Krulak has displayed no understanding of far-reaching political, economic, and social elements, which must be factored in whenever military strategy or budgets are under consideration. However, some of these criticisms may come from tenured bureaucrats who, for years, have had a vested interest in resisting efforts by the military to regain operational control of research, logistics, personnel, and command—under the President—of the field forces.
Because the author confines himself to the chain-of-command, the career military professional may note that he has ignored charges that the officer corps itself may be part of the problem. These charges stem from allegations that since the Vietnam War, the military professionals have become civilianized, aping their civilian masters by becoming managers rather than experts in combat operations. It may be true that managership —as opposed to leadership—has been fostered in the services by civilian superiors who do not have to sacrifice their lives in combat. Perhaps managership has diluted the military command system, but this subject is diversionary to Krulak’s theme that the nation must wake up and take steps to correct command system at the top.
One hopes that Congress hears the message.
A 1936 graduate of the Naval Academy, Captain Ryan has held three commands at sea and holds two masters degrees. He is currently a research fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, California.
U. S. Defense Planning: A Critique
John M. Collins. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. 313 pp. Tables. Append.
$30.00 ($27.00) (hardcover), $11.95 ($10.75) (paper).
Reviewed by Norman Polmar
During the past few years there has been increasing concern with regard to the quality of U. S. defense planning. The immediate past chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Air Force General David C. Jones, who stepped down in 1982, has strongly criticized the JCS organization, while many members of Congress have begun to formally criticize U. S. defense planning, several through the Military Reform Caucus.
John Collins, a senior analyst with the Congressional Research Service, has responded to the concern raised by five members of Congress that current defense initiatives may not be “coordinated toward agreed upon objectives.” His 12-month effort sought to show how policy inputs from various agencies and offices lead to U. S. military strategy. This goal has been attempted many times before. But Collins puts the issues in a contemporary perspective, and the message is not comforting.
In a chapter entitled “Defense Planning Standards,” Collins lists his essentials for successful defense planning, noting “Failure to satisfy any of the following preconditions makes effective
General David Jones, past chairman of the JCS, pictured with the President and Secretary of Defense, has become a strong critic of the JCS organization since retiring.
products an iffy proposition at best, and perhaps an impossible one.” The first two preconditions are:
► Professional competence is a must for overseers and staff. No defense planning system is any better than the people who shape and operate it.
► Defense planning demands team play. Political expediency and military parochialism do the state a disservice when national security (and even survival) is at stake. Professional integrity and moral courage thus are critical characteristics.
Collins lists six other preconditions: goal-oriented guidance, a spectrum of options, a spectrum of plans, realistic resource allocation, timely output, and impartial inspection by professionals. Reading this list, one begins to understand some of the recent U. S. military “problems.” The abortive Tehran rescue immediately comes to mind (See R.L. Earl, “A Matter of Principle,” Proceedings, February 1983, pp. 29-36), but there have been other major problems in operations, hardware procurement, and other areas that give one cause to carefully reread this and other portions of Collins’s work.
The book then addresses the “idealistic” depiction of U. S. defense planning, followed by a discussion of each major agency and office involved in the process. Particularly significant are the author’s historical analyses of the men— and the few women—who have held the key posts in defense planning since World War II. For the military officers and civilian service secretaries, he lists their types of experience as well as tenure in that position. Collins notes that the median amount of experience in high- level defense planning for uniformed service chiefs is little more than three years (the Navy’s Chiefs of Naval Operations [CNOs] averaged less than three years). Of the 14 CNOs he examines, 36% had joint planning experience, 65% had some joint/combined service assignments, and 35% had no such jobs. Indeed, while many CNOs earlier in their careers served as aides to senior Navy and defense personnel, only one, Elmo R. Zumwalt, had touch with conceptual planning in the Department of Defense while a captain.
In this section, Collins also calls attention to the problems imposed on the Joint Staff “for reasons that relate directly to the long-defunct Prussian General Staff and its German successors.” After a brief discussion of the German concept and the U. S. staff system, he concludes: “U. S. Armed Services, in short, could establish General Staff and supporting school systems that incorporate all the strengths and none of the weaknesses displayed by the Prussian template.” The lack of a “general staff” is probably the largest single obstruction to a more effective U. S. defense establishment.
Collins provides similar insight into the other agencies and offices that affect U. S. defense planning. Particularly interesting are the chapters concerning Congress, strategic intelligence, ana “strategic” education. And, many of his analyses indicate that the Navy is >n “worse shape” than the other services in such areas as the size of the staffs at strategic study centers, the faculty/pupil ratio at war colleges, and the use of military rather than civilian instructors at those schools.
Collins concludes with a comparison of U. S. planning and standards, lists optional courses of action, and makes suggestions of remedial measures. The l‘iSt includes a table of responsibilities f°r JCS remedial measures. A number o appendices describe the backgrounds o major U. S. defense planners since Won War II as well as other useful data.
One is left with the feeling that the United States is fortunate that it has done as well as it has with the existing defense planning establishment and incumbents* and that some of those incumbents have been outstanding, despite their lack ° relevant experience. But the U. S. systern of defense planning is inundated w> weaknesses, and those who would con sider improving the system would do we to read this book.
Mr. Polmar, a regular Proceedings contributor. IS^ analyst and author in the defense and naval fields- is the editor of the Naval Institute’s reference w° The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet and G«< the Soviet Navy.
The Men Who Breached the Dams
Alan W. Cooper. London: William Kimber’ 1982. 217 pp. IIlus. £9.50 (Approx.
$ 15.00)/($ 13.50).
John Sweetman. New York: Jane’s .. Publishing Co., 1982. 218 pp. IIlus. $!“• ($17.95).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel W. ^a' Parks, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
During the night of 16 May 1943, jT dally equipped Lancaster heavy bom of 617 Squadron, Royal Air Force. c ducted a low-level night attack nSjJJ the Mohne, Eder, and Sorpe dams in many’s industrial Ruhr Valley. The s cessful breach of the Mohne and dams was a spectacular feat of ar
^hich prompted a wealth of romantic fic- and non-fiction accounts. Authors
tak'11 ^Weetman an<J Alan W. Cooper, [- 'n8 advantage of the recently declassi- and reC0rc^s dealing with the planning execution of the mission, have prop separate narratives of the events, the ?ns^erat'on °f an attack on some of trial RmS suPPtytng power to the indus- 1937 K^r *ey f'rst was raised in late as °y the Air Targets Subcommittee, ratepa'ternat'vc t0 t*le attack °f 45 sepa- suo Valley power and coking plants °f by the Air Staff. After months
dim''SCUSSi0n’ Priority of the concept Stru aished owing to the massive con- that tt!°n *be dams and the realization ties f6'r breach was beyond the capabili- Pl °. hombs or bombers of that time. tajn ’n§ and experimentation to ascer- duri e lyPe of bomb required continued \yajP® 1940-41, most notably by Barnes str„'S’ an engineer with Vickers-Arm-
t(w eetman and Cooper each serve his- ceptjWeb by correcting the popular per- and lbat Barnes Wallis conceived of ediy ou8ht for this mission singlehand- odds.anKd in the face of overwhelming 'v°rk ri concePt arose elsewhere, was lis p|^ on hy many, though Barnes Wal- yed a significant role. By the spring of 1941, it had been determined that a bomb weighing ten tons would be required to breach each dam, through experiments by persons other than Wallis; the requirement helped him concentrate on the type of device required.
Work continued on weapon design as aircraft capabilities improved. At this point, the bureaucratic rub began. The Air Staff dismissed further consideration of a dam-breaching mission for operational reasons. This decision received the strong concurrence of Air Marshal Arthur Harris, commander of Bomber Command, who fought daily battles against diversion of his forces for “panacea” missions or targets suggested by a number of people usually well-meaning but not always fully qualified or competent to weigh completely the merit or feasibility of their respective recommendations. Harris opposed Wallis’s projecting “a five ton lump of iron across a lake,” primarily because it would require diversion of one-quarter of one month’s Lancaster production for a single mission. Wallis had official support, and early in 1943, tentative approval was given to the mission, which followed two months later.
Each author describes development of the bomb, training of the crews, and carrying out the mission. Cooper concen-
The barrier is breached; the raid on Mohne Dam is successful. The autographs of the men who did it—Wing Commander Guy Gibson and his crew—are visible in the upper right corner.
trates on the crews of 617 Squadron, to the neglect of other details. Sweetman provides the more balanced account, blending staff planning and training, as well as personnel matters into a highly readable narrative. Each author traces the flight of each aircraft and its ultimate role in the mission, which was not without cost: of 19 aircraft, eight were lost. Although only two of the six dams intended for attack were breached and damage to Ruhr Valley production was not as extensive as had been anticipated, Sweetman and Cooper each conclude the investment paid dividends.
Operation Chastise clearly is the better of the two books. Although of equal size (in printed pages), Sweetman is more detailed (smaller print, narrower margins) and, because of Cooper’s overemphasis on personnel details (40 pages are devoted to summarizing the service careers of the crews), the more balanced. It is a comprehensive account produced in a professional manner, reflecting care by author and publisher. It is highly recommended reading.
Colonel Parks, a frequent contributor to Proceedings, is Chief of International Law for the U. S. Army.
The Church and the Sword: An Examination of the Religious Influence in America on Pacifism and Disarmament, Second Edition
Capt. G. Russell Evans, USCG (Ret.) and C. Gregg Singer. Fletcher, NC: New Puritan Library, 1983, also available through G. Evans, 5010 Gosnold Ave., Norfolk, VA 23508. 128 pp. Notes. $6.95 ($6.25).
Reviewed by Colonel Meyer I. Krischer, Army of the United States (Retired)
The blind have a prayer, “Help us to see.” This book charges those espousing pacifism and disarmament for the United States with being blind to the communist goal of destroying liberty and democracy. This book could be the answer to their prayer.
Captain Evans and Dr. Singer, a historian, charge the National and World Councils of Churches with undermining our country’s safety by advocating disarmament in the face of the blatant com-
lnss / July 1983
THE U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE SHIP & AIRCRAFT PHOTOGRAPH COLLECTION
Choose from over 35,000 photographs! The Naval Institute’s photo archives include photographs of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels commissioned since 1883, as well as a wide selection of aircraft photos. All photographs are 8x10 black and white with your choice of matte or glossy finish. $6.00 each.
SHIP (HULL # AND YEAR ABOARD) AIRCRAFT (TYPE AND YEAR)
MATTE I OR GLOSSY I
Name _____________________________ ___________________
Address ____________________________ ___________________
City/State/Zip ________________________ ___________________
Number of photographs _______________ x $6.00 =____________
Maryland residents please add 5% tax _________________________
Shipping & handling 1,00
Total enclosed ____________________________________________
Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. Order form and payment should be mailed to: Ship and Aircraft Photo Collection, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
munist weapons buildup. They issue a potent indictment:
“Over the years many objectives of the National Council have closely pa1' alleled those of the Communist Party, for example, unilateral disarmament, ban on nuclear testing, abolish investigative committees on communism, promote the social revolution, encourage foreign aid to the communist countries, and discredit the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among other objectives. Many of these goals have been reached.”
The authors note the steady decline of U. S. military superiority over the past 1 > years with the greatest drop during the Carter years, e.g., delaying the B-* bomber, the MX missile, the Trident submarine, and the Pershing II missile, slashing the nuclear warhead program, cutting the shipbuilding plans; and reducing the size of the armed forces.
Particular attention is given to Soviet superiorities in both conventional and nuclear weapons, and to their advantages in civil defense and their antiballist,c missile system, based on the estimates o former Air Force Intelligence Chiet, Major General George Keegan. It is a chilling comparison.
An interesting section describes the “New Right Christians” as attempting10 restore decency, honesty, and morality >n government, and to counteract the seeming goals of the church and councils an their member denominations: appeal’ compromise, and surrender in nationa defense matters. Astonishingly, l^e United Methodist General Conference m 1980 voted down two petitions tha would have prohibited giving churc money to Marxist causes.
Other church groups have been qulI£ active in downgrading defense and at tacking the Christian Right at the sam1time. But, the authors note, these reh gious liberals may be performing a grea service in alerting the public to the radma issues they have long promoted, thereby focusing attention on their own doubt standards and hypocrisy.
This book is a highly documented 173 references—powerful eye-opener- the snowballing movement of the libera churches to destroy our defenses continues, the words from Daniel 5:25^" “MENE, MENE, TEKEL, UPHAK' SIN” (translatable as “Our days ofgreat’ ness are numbered”) might come to pasS'
Colonel Krischer was graduated, with a medical ® gree, from the University of Glasgow, in Glasg0 ' Scotland. He served 25 years in the active reserv > including five years in World War II.
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
Assault From the Sea: Essays on the 'slory of Amphibious Warfare
^ Bartlett, ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval lnHat„e press, 1983. 453 pp. Ulus. Maps. Bib.
^signed to fulfill the need for an anthology SUrveys the development of amphibious C(j316 from ancient times to the present, this find ^re^CnSiVC an<^ scholarly collection will a ready audience in Marine Corps ROTC also mS ant^ among marines in general. It is aff ■3 Useku* work for historians of military canT confrnec*t0 Gallipoli and Guadal- i_ a ; fre book includes essays on the Persian ]j asi0n °f Greece in 490 B.C., the Mongo- ous attemPt t0 >nva<fe Japan in 1274, amphibi- cou °perations io Vietnam, and the latest ac- p.,,, °f the amphibious aspects of the Falk'ands fighting.
5] U. S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History
Norman Friedman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 488 pp. Illus. Tables. Append. Notes. Ind. $44.95 ($35.96).
Norman Friedman’s most recent offering, a design history of U. S. destroyers, was a Notable Naval Book of 1982. Here, he follows that success with a companion volume on U. S. carriers. His general approach is chronologi-
of value to those interested in the future of gas propulsion, or the protection of the lines of supply that bring it to market.
AN IIAl’STRATED DESIGN IftSTORV
SHIP CLANS BY -A.». BAKER HI
to the Soviet Navy, Second
Jane’s Merchant Ships, 1982
R. A. Streater and D. Greenman, eds. London: Jane’s Publishing Company, 1982. 1,046 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $140.00 ($126.00).
The worldwide economic recession has led to significant reductions in the merchant fleets of most nations; fewer and larger ships now seem to be the rule. Great Britain in particular has seen its merchant fleet decline precipitously, and U. S. flag ships now carry only 1.1% of the country’s exports and only 1.4% of imports. These trends and others are highlighted in this year’s edition from Jane’s. As in past years, a special section is devoted to new construction, and the largest section—more than 900 pages—provides references to the world’s active merchantmen.
Press'3? Po*mar- Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute $36 95 ’ MO PP- Illus. Append. Bib. Ind.
r> ^ '
•Ppletely updated and revised, this third edi-
h°n is surv,
Julva*so >n a new format. In addition to a Wea,e~v ok the Soviet Navy’s strengths and summ 6SSes ’n tbe 1980s, and a comprehensive novvmai> oP the numbers of each type of craft less ln serv'ce- Polmar also grapples with the • quantifiable issues of readiness, reliabil- ’ and political effectiveness.
ber . enolosed by parentheses are mem- of othCes- Members may order most books slituteer puk,Pshers through the Naval In- 'idotcd" 3 *9^ discount off list price. (Prices and w‘"‘his eolnmn are subject to change a||0vv 1. °e reflected in our billing.) Please lnstitu,0r tielnys when ordering non-Naval cia| l e frtles. When air mail or other spe- ar|d h^n'n® 's requested, actual postage
cal, and he focuses on the emergence of the carrier as a major combatant in the 1930s and the extensive design changes that followed. As in the earlier volume, the accompanying line drawings by A.D. Baker III illustrate the technological changes over 40 years.
53 The Tea Clippers: Their History and Development, 1833-1875
David R. MacGregor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 256 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($19.96).
First published in 1952, this classic illustrated history remains one of the best sources of information about the tea trade and of the ships that made it possible. In this second edition, much new material has been included and more than half the text rewritten. The virtues of the first edition remain: a clear and detailed explanation of the cultural and economic underpinnings of the tea trade, as well as detailed line drawings and illustrations that make the book very attractive as well as useful.
ber o nGling cost will be billed to the mem- Pfess d°* s marked 23 are Naval Institute Instil,,.aks- Books marked H are Naval
r°rniat ° P*ook Selections. For further in- (30|)->?'an about these books (B, ), call bop 0 Bk ext. 30 or 31. For informa- fhe 0f. lae other books, call ext. 67. Use er form provided in this section.
MARITIME AFFAIRS Gastech 82
Brian Singleton, ed. Rickmansworth, England: Gastech, Ltd., 1983. 504 pp. Illus. Tables.
This fat paperback contains the verbatim proceedings of the Gastech conference held in Paris in October 1982. Session topics included the world gas supply, current and future gas consumption, transportation and storage technology, and the current business outlook for those engaged in the buying or selling of natural gas and petroleum. The information is very detailed and specific, and the book should be
MILITARY AFFAIRS Jane’s Aviation Review, 1982-83
Michael J.H. Taylor, ed. London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1982. 160 pp. Illus. $15.95 ($14.35).
As in last year’s inaugural edition, this review contains a chronology (June 1981 to June 1982) of all events relative to aviation. Though not a substitute for Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1982-83, which contains data on all existing aircraft, this shorter yearbook offers information on all planes that flew for the first time within the past 12 months. In addition, there are feature articles on the Harrier, the Space Shuttle, lighter-than-air craft, and even one on Freddie Laker.
Space Shuttle: America’s Wings to the Future, 2nd Edition .
By Marshall H. Kaplan
Here is the how, what, when, and why of NASA’s space shuttle. The system and its parts are described in everyday terms. Every phase of a typical mission is presented, including preparation and training of the crew, loading of the payloads, the sensation of liftoff and acceleration upwards, extravehicular activities in orbit, and the exciting reentry and landing benefits are reviewed, both from the introduction of the National Spaceline and from spaceflight in general.
Called one of the most comprehensive books on the subject available to the public, Space Shuttle has now been updated and revised to reflect recent changes in the program. New photographs taken from actual launches are included.
1983/216 pages/197 black & white and color illustrations/index/appendices/71/2" x 11". List Price: $19.95 Member’s price: $15.96
The most complete account of Pearl Harbor yet written, this f § Em. "masterpiece of war reporting
is, quite simply, without equal. It provides a unique and meticulously documented look at the preparation, execution, and aftermath of one of the most famous surprise attacks in the history of warfare.
The author, Gordon Prange, an eminent American historian, spent 37 years researching the book. As former chief of the G-2 Historical Section in Tokyo under General MacArthur after V-J Day, he had extraordinary access to Japanese records and was able to interview virtually every surviving officer who took part in the operation. He also interviewed every important U. S. source to make a thorough examination of the American point of view. He says the real reason for the American debacle was a massive disbelief in the Japanese threat that kept us from heeding advance warnings and caused leaders to ignore evidence submitted by our own intelligence services.
One of the top ten best-sellers in the country since its publication last December, At Dawn We Slept is now available in paperback.
1981 873 pages illustrated extensive apppendices in- dexed'soit-bound
List price: $9.95 Member's price: S7.96
At Dawn We Slept:
The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
By Gordon W. Prange
AT DAWN WE SLEPT
THE UNTOLD STORYOF
A firm believer i
Anyone interested in America’s defense will short, punchy volume absorbing reading-
List price: $8.00 Member’s price: $6 ‘*°
The Andropov File:
The Life and Ideas of Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR
By Martin Ebon
First there were Lenin and Stalin, then Khrushchev and Brezhnev and now, Yuri Andropov stands as the Soviet Union's leader at the center of world events. But Andropov differs from his predecessors, colleagues, and rivals: he literally towers over the rest of the Kremlin leaders, a tall, scholarly-looking man, cool and enigmatic.
Martin Ebon, author or editor of more than 60 books and a longtime student of Soviet affairs, places Andropov’s career against the background of modern Soviet history. In this analysis Andropov emerges as a man of statesmanlike qualities, who has shown himself to be "meticulously ruthless,” relentless while being well-mannered, polite but pitiless. His years as KGB chief have given Andropov details and insights not available to anyone else in the Soviet hierarchy. He regards the United States as the Soviet Union’s prime “imperialist” enemy, and he has shown the tactical skills that could enable him to drive a deep wedge between Washington and its allies abroad, and to divide public opinion even within the United States itself.
In these pages, the author paints a fascinating psychological portrait of a man who combines urbanity with ruthlessness, sentimentality with cool calculation, and diplomatic understatement with oratorical flourish.
1983/284 pages/illustrated/appendices/index List price: $16.95 Member’s price: $13.56
New and Currenl Special Book Selections
For USNI Members Only
Organization for National Security A Study
By Victor Krulak, Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret.)
An electrifying «<■’ of the deadly bureaucracy on* G abitity t° defend f
nations do not maintain their greatness by i<Jh . fects in those systems essential to their surw ’$■ eral Krulak, in this provocative study made for ^ States Strategic Institute, takes aim at the tnJ'P of bureaucratic fat that have grown up in the u of Defense. Acknowledging that we are on ? jens* , ward redressing weaknesses in our military o ^ makes clear that these efforts will be of litHe-a ^ we correct the existing defects in our natio organization. „
Bureaucracy, bloat, and instability in the V Jt command structure, he says, defeat effects decisionmaking, and execution of operations, conditions must be brought under control.
General Krulak concludes his study with a ^ tions that are as clear and simple as they ar
Also of Interest: ^
The Winds of War and its sequel Waf 3 Remembrance
By Herman Wouk ,2g
Clothbound and Slipcased two-book set. Z pages. ,9g.0O
List price: $35.00 Member’s price. *
The Third World War: The Untold Story
By General Sir John Hackett
■ . <14.36
List price: $17.95 Member’s price. ®
The Wildcat in World War II
By Barrett Tillman
1983/320 pages/113 illustrations
, . el 4.3°
List price: $17.95 Member’s price. »
Skyraider: The Douglas A-1 “Flying Dump Truck”
By Rosario Rausa ,
1982/239 pages/151 illustrations/appendice ■
List price: $17.95 Member’s price: $14
(Please use order form /n i
the Books of Interest sectionI ,
aff„-Prot*Uct a program in national security r» t. ..
fi"? at the Harvard Center for International The Day They St°le the Queen MarV
Yours to Reason Why: Decision in Battle
Seymour. New York: St. Martin's Press, ($16 15)38 PP' MapS' Append' Bib' Ind' $17'95 TK •
e idea behind this book is fascinating: to d °w the reader of military history to partici- p. e ln *he decision-making process, by pro- 1 lng him with alternatives at critical mo- j,ent.s ‘n ten important historical battles from t,asbn8s ,0 Anzio. The idea works best when ce badle is unfamiliar to the reader. In such eases\Pondering the choices at hand can be an "gaging intellectual game. For more familiar camPaigns, the book is less useful and be- ^ontes little more than a survey history. Also, c°urse, there is no way to determine what e outcome might have been had one of the o ei7lat'ves been selected by the commander ch ' 6 SCene' This book should provide arm- air strategists several dozen opportunities to nu^h^ ®uess tbe generals of history. A large
PteseT C*6ar mapS 'Bustrate the 1Nternational affairs
f0e^rategic Imperative: New Policies American Security
Bajlj1^ ^ Huntington, ed. Cambridge, MA:
$27 Company, 1982. 360 pp. Ind.
The 24?5)' the !°nS’ tb's book suggests that changes in outdSr^gic balance during the 1970s have U ated the worn-out policies that guided
'960 TefenSe P*ann'n8 in tbe 1950s and huz?S P^e n‘ne contributors contend that the t0(] Words op tbe (9f>0s have little relevance United ttleY ^S116 *n particular that the buj]d- Mates needs to put greater emphasis on lng up conventional arms.
Tracks of the Bear: Soviet Imprints in the Seventies
Edgar O’Ballance. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982. 240 pp. Maps. Bib. Ind. $15.95 ($14.35).
The Soviets had a triumphant decade in the 1970s, according to this survey. O’Ballance is a prolific writer, the author of some 20 books on post-World War II military history and international affairs. In this mildly alarmist account, he suggests that Soviet successes in Angola, Afghanistan, and elsewhere should provide lessons for Western readers in the 1980s.
Wayne L. Green. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1983. 284 pp. $12.95 ($11.65).
In the preface to this novel of World War II, the author reports that it is based on fact. The hero, Dr. Tomi Nakamura, served as an lmpe- rial Japanese Army physician on Attu Island in the Aleutians. In 1943, Nakamura shielded a downed American pilot from his Japanese superiors who surely would have interrogated and then shot him. The war in the Aleutian Islands forms the backdrop for this novel of the relationship between the Japanese doctor and the American pilot.
Terence Hughes. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1983. 348 pp. $13.95 ($12.55).
This novel of World War II begins with combat at sea, in the Battle of the Atlantic, and then follows German prisoner of war Ulrich Muller as he becomes involved in a plot to seize control of the vessel carrying him to a U. S. prisoner-of-war camp. What makes the whole idea especially intriguing is that the ves-
sel he plans to seize is the Queen Mary and among her passengers is Winston Churchill on his way to the Quebec Conference. It is a dramatic and well-written tale of sea combat, espionage, and intrigue.
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
U.S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Maryland 21402
Insignia Items (Specify color/size if necessary)
Name _ ________
City, State. FPO
Shipping fees (refer to shipping chart). Maryland residents, please add 5% sales tax.
Enclosed is mv check or money order for the total.
2 Charge it to my D Bill me
Account Number Signature
Add postage and handling to each order for Naval Institute books, book selections, and insignia items according to the following sche dule: $2.25 for orders up to S15.00: $3.00 for orders from $15.01 to $30.00: $3.75 for any order in excess of $30.00.
Add 81.75 per book for special orders from U.S. publishers other than the Naval Institute I*ress.
Add $2.50 for postage and handling to each special order for books from foreign publishers.