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'A'er!'lri|JnilleS' At the time these systems ocrn eve'°Pc<J' it was a fair wager that
“hardatl°nal data would provide
■rain’ ^ mPorrnation for conversion to etlt !n® course materials than subject-ori- R„, ln‘orrnation. It did up to a point.
asK inventory may assume dimen-
ment
‘ntrud
Process earlier than they should, kn^'‘lriP on objective data gathering. rem . anate|y> this intrusion drives the rablvmder ^D process into inexo- Ly asstfmptive directions, my 6t n*.e *nsert a parallel here. During **** years, my battalion built a sp0rte , ndSe across a creek. The bridge creiea 50-foot I-beam span and con- ithpr a”Utnients at each approach: very tia| Cfjsive’ and it looked most substan- soi, , owever, during construction, the manyase tested poorly. We had to drive into" ,h'CrS °* long wooden pilings deep ab0v k Suds°d to hold the concrete bom6- m ^sort °f a caP on stilts) on the brV|deS °* l^e ereek. When finished, ri(Jge sat solid in its embankments, a
But
ieo!f are beyond the modest proof's ot its designers or users. enth ana8ernent has been known to lose ffto aSlasm i°r projects that consume Pend Ij'enta* quantities of input and ex- stae bulk of their resources in early a,m!St development. It is therefore wi,l 1 nevftable that available resources Vcioncrar>ked into those phases of deAfter o'11 dlat show the earliest results. 0ne ^a . ’ what is a big task inventory but inv lcd is bigger than some other task
With 'f0Ih? exact*y can be done vem1 taat a nice, neat compact task in- tIOn try w°n’t do? Besides, the tempta- thc i ° examine (and perhaps manipulate) is acotr>ing data during the input phase look -C r overwhelming; so much of it aSsuS a 'ke, anyway. Thus, judgment and - Ption sometimes enter the developcomforting appearance of firmness and strength, especially after the earth had been graded and piled up against the concrete approaches. However, we who built it could not forget our own impressions formed before the bulldozer filled in the earth around the abutments—a steel span connected to two massive white concrete cubes, whose long wooden legs reached down through the mud for a foothold. However, the bridge held. Like many other functional structures, it was made mostly of respectable and conventional fabrication, with methods and materials that generally work satisfactorily within the confines of their application.
ISD today reminds me of that bridge. It has been put together with respectable materials and mechanisms, and assembled logically. In application, it works better than any of the single systems of which it is compounded; it certainly works better than the traditional academic guessing games that preceded its arrival. But some elements of ISD’s foundation are missing. What has been substituted up to the present is a prop; those long skinny legs are still there, and the concrete is floating.
The missing element is a comprehensive front-end job/task/skill analysis methodology capable of reflecting the Navy’s world of work. To correct this fault, we must be clear on the definitions of work behaviors, jobs, duties, tasks, skills, job-knowledge, complexity, commonality, componency, and criticality. We must be prepared for extensive and comprehensive job/task inventories, replete with task descriptors and tie-ins to underlying skills and job-knowledge identifiers. The Chief of Naval Operations has recognized the need for a single, comprehensive, occupational data base to support manpower management, personnel administration, and training, and has mandated its eventual initiation. Nothing less can truly be considered as an adequate formulation for the expert and economical exercise of ISD.
What we have at present is a low-volume occupational data input, marked by assumptions and data-trimming at the front end. It is opinion-ridden and out of harmony with more carefully developed latter elements of ISD. That we do not have a solid data base now is no great tragedy—fortunately, most of the mechanisms for its development already exist.
The only major obstacle to surmount is finding a reliable method of identifying and cataloging mental and psychomotor skills, and attendant job knowledge items, that underlie tasks and task elements in the inventories. That such cataloging presages gross data collection, processing, analysis, update, and management must be expected and forthrightly provided for. There is no reason to quail before the magnitude of the task. Years of half-measures, with little chance of significant success, will in the end be as costly as a first-class frontal assault on the objective. ISD, driven by comprehensive occupational data storage and retrieval at the front end, eventually will realize the fondest dreams of its many developers. The time for the common occupational data base has come.
Mr. Ansbro. a U. S. Navy salvage and construction diver during World War II, earned his bachelor’s degree in education from the University of Virginia. During his 35 years of government service, he has helped to develop ISD methodology for both the U. S. Army and Navy. Currently, he is involved with research and development for training analysis systems on the staff of the Chief of Naval Education and Training Command.
^nd
erstanding the Sea
“y Gilven
Slonim
'eally611 Jinimy Carter—the first ocean- his [y.- educated president—proclaimed U. 5 11 e East doctrine, emphasizing latere ceterrT1ination to defend its vital lost nStS- m Pers>an Gulf, the press lack 0°ftime ’n Ending its Achilles’ heel: Withjj' Sea**E capability. And the recent the (jraVya* op competitive incentives in reduc ^ ^erchant Marine promises to shamC,°Ur sealift availability, despite the shjpsec'ine in the number of U. S.-flag Was .. n eacb foregoing instance, where anice Policy direction? How did oce- si°I)s.)Uaderstanding temper these deci- 1 And where were the policy incen-
Ceed,nRS / October 1983
fives to sustain the U. S. posture as a secure, determined, prosperous, and respected Free World power? Such gross oceanic errors have hardly been confined to one administration, or even to one party. They are part and parcel of the oceanic “knowledge-gap” that has arisen from the lack of public oceanic education.
Today, largely through Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s driving foresight, the administration of President Ronald Reagan is committed to building the 600-ship Navy required to regain our maritime supremacy. But fleet readiness depends upon a vibrant, competitive merchant marine for control of the seas. And right now, the United States is largely dependent upon foreign bottoms. Citizens and leadership alike, insensitive to the implications of this condition, are seemingly unable to muster the resolve to formulate a strong maritime policy. Every effort to draft a far-reaching policy over the past quarter century has bogged down. Only a dynamic program to create a constituency for public oceanic education can move the U. S. policy process off dead center. The current policy dilemma recalls Seneca’s observations
155
mait5
,olic)
seeks
long-view potential while moving 10"
These two youngsters will probably learn more about the ocean from one visit to a Navy ship than from 12 years of formal schooling.
written half a century before Christ: “Our plans miscarry, because we have no aim. When a man does not know what harbor he is making for, no wind is the right wind.” His lesson is still unheeded; the nation must train its sights oceanward to gain the pattern of seafaring thought that purposeful policy requires.
One’s thoughts return to 1934, when policy emerged to meet a critical maritime challenge. This was the year when the Vinson-Trammel Act laid the keel- blocks for the “two-ocean Navy.” Two years later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s spectacular policy leadership sparked the most impressive shipbuilding effort ever witnessed in U. S. history. During World War II, the people and leadership of America knew the grand design to defeat the Axis powers. As participants, they willingly accepted the sacrifices necessary for a nation at war.
In the ensuing years, the United States became the world’s greatest maritime power, and the lesson was evident: policy incentives were forged in advance of the crisis. But impending crises alone should not stimulate policy. Through policy, a major power formulates national objectives and then blueprints its future. Unfortunately, from its pinnacle of maritime preeminence, the United States—in the
156
absence of such policy—has plummeted to rock-bottom as a maritime power.
Today, the U. S. naval and commercial fleets encounter mounting global confrontation as the Soviets drive relentlessly to control the seas. Yet our citizens remain oblivious to this disparity between maritime policies of the superpowers. Our current policy remains indifferent to the needs of America. The University of Virginia—in concert with the Oceanic Educational Foundation—has launched an oceanic education program designed to give our citizens the “sea legs” they need for the 21st century. The ultimate objective is to give students at all levels of schooling as firm an understanding of the world’s oceans as they now have of its land masses.
The United States requires long-range policies to replace its “seat of the jeans” reaction to crises. We must develop wholly new forms of long-range planning that will involve not merely a handful of technocratic experts, but millions of sea- oriented citizens as well. It would be comforting to place the entire policy burden on one person’s shoulders; unfortunately, the wisdom of Solomon, the strength of Atlas, or the vision of Pericles are rarely found in one human—no matter how gifted.
Therefore, oceanic policy acumen must gain widespread knowledge through meeting the public educational imperative. The glaring vacuum within the U. S. education system requires rectification so as to provide citizens with understanding
as to their stake in the world ocean. ^ where in the $100 billion ec*uca!j^ua( process is oceanic education found. " is required is a cadre of teachers c°n'^ tent and motivated to teach sea-orien^ subjects. There must be multidisciplina^ curricula to bring the world ocean to 1 in classrooms throughout the land; wo ocean texts are the third need on this c cal list. National oceanic policy depen upon an enlightened citizenry compet enough to participate in the policy PrL ess. Although many within our gove . ment cling to the illusion that nati°a maritime policy exists, the regret1® fact is that, in the absence of an enhg rudderless and without oceanic P1 direction. Yet at no other point in U- history has the compelling need for co nuity of policy been driven home m dramatically by world events.
What, then, is this policy that has mained elusive throughout all tri^ years? Simply stated, policy may be fined as the democratic process whefe^ a nation establishes long-term g°a*s’,.s|1 gether with incentives to accomp 'j\ them. Through policy, a nation se^j
its national objectives. Forging and 1 plementing policy entails an orchestra of effort by the executive and congf sional branches, and the public sec For without public support, P° • falters. In the United States, this iron angle must foster the dynamics of oce enterprise. We must work toward bin ing these major pillars of national 1° " range, comprehensive policy. ■.
First, the resumption of U. S. ocea^or leadership calls for public education- the seas still remain distant to the tin ing of most people. The finest U- minds, honed through centuries of sea ing, must mold enlightened policy- ^ f well the nation rises to the challenge^ the sea will depend ultimately upon ^ enlightenment, determination, and d> tion of its policy drivers; thus, man11 ^ supremacy depends on how well our p ^ pie understand the sea and every aspec its influence upon the human condiu The United States must invest its energy and ingenuity, as well as additional sources, to implement a program for 0 . anic education to sharpen its citize understanding of the world’s ocea jf Their new knowledge will enrich 1 ^ sense of the destiny of this nation which manifestly remains oceanic.
Mr. Slonim is president of The Oceanic Educati0 Foundation.
Proceedings / October