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The pride of Hitler’s fleet at the outbreak of World war 11 was the pocket battleship, Admiral Graf inch f^ee' we'ghed 12,100 tons, carrying six 11- siz guns and eight 8-inch guns, which was close to the and armament of ships which the Versailles Treaty ■rutted Germany to retain for training.
Ion > 6 Germans Planned to operate pocket battleships for me8 peri(Kls at sea using auxiliary vessels for replenish- asn and Prison ship duties. They were to sink or capture any merchant ships as possible without undue risk, —it 6 ^'n'^^e-e *ept Wilhelmshaven on 20 August 1939 \y0 ,Was l^e *ast day she would spend in a home port, ot her departure soon reached the British Admiralty.
Altmark, painted bright yellow and flying a Norwegian flag to avoid detention by British cruisers in the area. The ships rendezvoused, and Captain Heinrich Dau of the Alt- mark teased Langsdorff that his lookouts spotted the pocket battleship s smoke before her masts came over the horizon. Making a lot of smoke in wartime is an invitation to disaster, and it was especially embarrasing since the Graf Spee had diesel engines, which should have produced less smoke than steam turbines.
Captain Dau reported to his ship’s company:
“The task which the Fuehrer has selected for us is to act as the indispensible, floating supply base for a German battleship which is going to make the high seas
Graf Speel
Orders ■
lantj , Were issued to patrol the area between the Shet- \vas ■ Norway> but the Graf Spee was not found; she Brjtjs*[rcady 'n ^e Atlantic, poised to wreak havoc on to p(). and Frer|ch commercial shipping. Her orders were lw 0 an urea northwest of the Cape Verde Islands, keep Dw'reless silent, and wait.
dorffUnn? tllc v°yuge to Cape Verde, Captain Hans Langs- 'Tiujorv his navigating officer plotted the positions of the lanes. lpP'ng lanes. The captain chose to cross the sea- ber |(at a'ght to remain undetected. At 0805 on 1 Septem- l°°ko 9~~as ^'tier’s panzers drove across Poland—a sigiltUt Hn hoard the Graf Spee bellowed, “Two masts in °n the starboard bow.”1 It was the German tanker
°Cl't'U"iss / |une |9S1
dangerous, uncertain, nay, deadly for the enemy. We must not relax our preparedness. A few hefty blows at the British Empire just may bring them to their senses. We are part of the instrument which can strike this blow. Victory in Poland will be followed by the hammer blows of the Graf Spee—Sieg Heil!”2 When a noncoded message from the British Admiralty stating, “11 a.m. Commence hostilities at once against Germany, was intercepted, Langsdorff steered to an area just west of Ascension Island and St. Helena. He thought the area would be free of ships and the sea would be calm enough to enable fueling of the battleship by the Altmark. His assumption was wrong.
They comprised, in the words of Winston Churchill* available aircraft carriers, supported by battleships, t cruisers and cruisers.”4 Eventually, 23 ships were org nized into nine battle groups to search for the Gem’ ship. These requirements placed a severe strain on o British naval resources.
At funeral services in Montevideo for fallen members of the Graf Spee’s crew, opposite page, some Uruguayans displayed fascist leanings with Nazi salutes. Soon after, the pocket battleship’s despondent captain, Hans Langsdorff, took his life.
“Action Stations” blared through the Graf Spee after two masts were sighted on the horizon. Langsdorff ordered full speed toward the northeast away from the unknown vessel. If detected, British warships would be hunting him from Gibraltar to Bermuda to the South American coast, and to South Africa. The intruder turned out to be the British cruiser Cumberland, and the German ship escaped detection when the Cumberland altered her course by 30°.
On 26 September, Captain Langsdorff was ordered to “commence active participation in the trade war.” He decided to take the ship to an area off Brazil and sweep south to find British shipping. The next day, Langsdorff gave his men the news. To confuse the British, the Graf
Spee was to use the name Admiral Scheer, her siste pocket battleship.
The British steamer Clement was on the last leg of journey from New York to Salvador, Brazil, with 20" cases of kerosene when she was sighted by the GrafSp1’e' The Clement's, bridge watch reported to the captain i there was a “man-o-war about four points on the P bow, coming in fast.”3 The British captain first thoug^ the approaching ship was the British cruiser Ajax, wm he knew was in the area. Langsdorff launched a cataP^g reconnaissance plane. When the plane opened fire, British captain ordered confidential material thrown 0 the side and had a distress signal sent. •
After capturing and sinking the Clement, the battles _ proceeded south and soon encountered a neutral Gf steamer, the Papalemos. The captain and the first of*1 of the Clement were put on board the Papalemos, and t Greek ship was allowed to continue. ^
When the British Admiralty received word from Clement's officers that the Admiral Scheer was m South Atlantic, it ordered the formation of hunting PaTl^\
19*3
batt,e
t D,Uring the first week in October, the Graf Spee cap- ^re!~ Unt* t^len sank two British steamers, the Ashlea and 6 Newton Beech. The crews of these ships were taken on ornn ^att'es^'P- Captain Langsdorff faced a dilemma 0 October, when he stopped the steamer Huntsman. L e already overcrowded Graf Spee could not hold any ^°re Prisoners. He placed a prize crew on board the “ntsman with the prisoners until they could be trans- jd to the Altmark.
angsdorff was now sure that his presence in the South antic must be known. He devised a plan to trick his ^fsuers. He would make the British think the two ships ser.6 SUnk by U-boats. He ordered a false distress signal > giving a different position and using the prefix SSS, lesnotai8 a submarine attack, using the Huntsman's wire- ana t*len turnect southwest to refuel from the Altmark transfer prisoners.
Sj , "en several weeks had passed without a ship being the’ tet’. bnngsdorff wondered if the British had changed rec^ Sa’.PP*n8 routes. He dispatched a plane to expand his Th<)l|'na'ssance area. The steamer Trevanion was sighted, tain att*esb‘P closed her at high speed. The British cap- ^lred the distress signal, which was picked up imme- tlj f y by the Graf Spee's monitors. Langsdorff ordered fire anc* uPPer deck to be shelled with machine gun Sa ’ ^'though the wireless operator had gotten the mes- f 0ul;' the Graf Spee heard no acknowledgments; the ffnion was evacuated and sunk. aPtain Langsdorff decided to proceed around the Cape of Good Hope and into the Indian Ocean. According to his diary, he would carry on the guerre de course south of Madagascar to draw off British forces. By 8 November, the battleship reached her new operational area and started a zigzag course northward, which carried her back and forth across the shipping routes.
Langsdorff’s mission was successful in diverting the British hunting parties. He then altered course westward back to the Atlantic and toward another rendezvous with the ship his crew had come to call the Graf Spee's “mother ship,” the Altmark. While the battleship was being refueled, her crew was busy painting and setting up dummy funnels to make her look like a British ship!
On 2 December, smoke was sighted, and the battleship gave chase. A warning shot was fired and the word “stop” signaled by searchlight. The steamer slowed, but the monitor in the Graf Spee told the bridge she was using the wireless. “No wireless” was flashed to the ship and the transmission jammed. Soon, a prize crew boarded the Doric Star, a 10,086-ton steamer bound for England with meat and dairy products. The Doric Star's captain had damaged her engines, so she had to be sunk.
But Langsdorff was not sure the wireless transmission had been successfully jammed, so he steered southwest at high speed. His suspicions were confirmed. The Graf Spee's operators intercepted a signal from England addressing all British warships in the South Atlantic. It said, “1417 RRR 19.15 S, 5.5 E. Doric Star gunned. Battleship.”
As about 750,000 people watched from the shore^
December. Many believed, as the New York Ti>nes that she “was poised for a dash to the sea.”5 But wht c . crew stood at attention with the upraised arms of the salute, the great ship rocked with a tremendous expl° and sank in Montevideo harbor. t0
Langsdorff had arranged for the crew to be taken Buenos Aires, where he thought they would not e terned. But despite his and German diplomatic efforts. Argentine Government arrested his crew. The men maining at Montevideo were also interned. This seerne break Langsdorff’s spirit; when reporters approach^^ j| later, he said, “There’s no story tonight, but there probably be a big one for you in the morning.’ Langsdorff asked not to be disturbed that night wrote letters to his wife, parents, and the German a ^ sador to Argentina. The next morning, the captain 0 Graf Spee was found dead by his aide, with a bullet ho e the center of his forehead.
After capturing and sinking another steamer, the Graf Spee made for South America. Langsdorff’s plan was to refuel and continue to an area between Rio de Janeiro and the River Plate that bordered Argentina and Uruguay. He would sink what ships he could and then go south so the British would think he was going around Cape Horn to the Pacific. But he would double back and head for Germany. In the meantime, the British cruiser Exeter, one of the warships patrolling off the Falkland Islands, steamed north to the River Plate area, where her commander, Commodore Henry Harwood, guessed the Graf Spee was bound.
Just after dawn on 13 December, the officer of the watch on board the Graf Spee sighted four thin masts. “Action Stations” rang throughout the ship. The 13,000- ton Exeter was the first to be identified. Two light cruisers, the Ajax and the Achilles, were also with the Exeter. The battleship had been chasing a French steamer when the British ships were spotted. On board the Achilles, the bridge lookout reported smoke. The Exeter was notified and turned toward the smoke; less than two minutes later, the top of the warship was seen. The Graf Spec's smoke had given the British warships a few critical extra minutes’ warning, since their gun ranges were much shorter than the battleship’s. Battle ensigns were run up and the first major naval engagement of World War II was about to begin.
The Achilles opened fire at 0622 and the Ajax a minute later. The Graf Spec's log read: “About 0634 the Exeter turned sharply away after heavy hits—only Turret C was still firing—making heavy smoke and for the time being was out of sight. The light cruisers were traveling at full speed off the starboard quarter. They could be brought under fire with B Turret and secondary batteries several times, but only for short periods because of the use of smoke and fog.”
The Exeter absorbed seven hits, with more than 50 officers and men being killed. She received the almost undivided attention of the Graf Spee, with the light cruisers suffering little damage. The Exeter then limped south to the Falkland Islands for repairs. The other two ships turned westward.
When action was broken off by the British at 0740, the Graf Spee suffered 37 dead and 57 wounded. Langsdorff reported the damage to his ship to Berlin and received permission to enter the harbor of Montevideo, Uruguay, for repairs.
The Graf Spee had been hit more than 50 times; there were large holes in the upper deck and an unexploded shell was embedded in the hull. As the wounded battleship sailed to Montevideo, Berlin broadcasts said she was going there to refuel and repair minor damage—they also accused the British of having used mustard gas shells against the German warship.
After arriving in Montevideo, a work crew reported to Langsdorff that at least 14 days would be required to get the ship seaworthy. The German ambassador to Uruguay, Dr. Otto Langramm, sent a note to the Uruguayan foreign minister requesting permission for the 14-day stay. After diplomatic haggling, it was agreed that a Uruguayan Commission would inspect the ship to determine what repairs were needed. The British Admiralty wanted the German ship to stay at least four or five days to give reinforce ments time to arrive. They wanted the Germans to thin they already had several warships waiting outside the na bor, so they demanded the ship not be allowed to stay more than 24 hours. That would make the Germans as sume the British wanted the Graf Spee to sail to certai doom.
The Uruguayan Government decided the Graj 5/« could stay for only 72 hours. Langsdorff was getting & ports—some of them planted by British intelligence 4 several warships were waiting for the Germans to ma run for it. The captain and the German ambassador agre^ there were only two choices: blow up the ship or submit internment. Hitler agreed to scuttle the ship, rather t face internment in a neutral country that could not trusted.
In fact, the lurking British “armada” consisted ol three cruisers—two of them light ones. None was a mac for the powerful pocket battleship. ^
In Uruguay, the Graf Spee had become the center attention. Thousands of people lined the route from ^ port to the cemetery where the German sailors kille action were to be buried. The Uruguayan Government s a battalion of marines to render full military honors, removed their hats and women crossed themselves as caskets passed. Langsdorff created a stir at the tun
when he gave a naval salute instead of a Nazi one.
■ re, mc
Graf Spee sailed majestically towards the open sea °n
• i
1 Dudley Pope, Graf Spee: The Life and Death of a Raider (Philadelph*3 a York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1957), p. 39.
2 Willi Frischauer and Robert Jackson, The Altmark Affair (New York. Company, 1955), p. 54.
3Pope, p. 66.
4Frischauer and Jackson, p. 68.
5New York Times, 17 December 1939.
6Pope, p. 236.
York-
Mr. Cambareri is a freelance writer based in Albany, New work has appeared in numerous publications.