This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
The Fleet Connection
Skippers of fleet units often respond to the installation of new equipment with the question, “Where did this come from?” Odds are that it didn't come from the Navy's one remaining research laboratory. After ten years of bureaucratic consolidation, uniformed management, and increased involvement of private contractors, the link between Navy R&D and the fleet is on the verge of being disconnected.
By Richard Boyle
Contractor A has an idea. The concept is brought to the desk of a Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSeaSysCom) manager. The idea looks attractive, but no mission element need statement (MENS) is on file. One is written and reviewed in the Department of Defense (DoD). Specifications are written to invite an alternate systems concept exploration. Ultimately, two contractors are selected to build competitive prototype hardware. Contractor A and Contractor B prosecute the idea. During the demonstration and validation phase, Contractor B wins. Full-scale engineering development proceeds.
During test evaluation of a preproduction model, serious design problems develop. Even though Contractor B failed to meet specifications, engineering changes are funded, and the system barely passes final tests under ideal conditions.
Production begins. As installations are made on board fleet units in overhaul, commanding officers ask: “Where did this come from?" When the first production model goes to sea, more design problems occur. More money for modifications is trundled out, and the new hardware stumbles into being in the fleet. Operators still ask: “Where did this come from?" The process has taken eight to ten years.
Ludicrous? Perhaps, but it could happen in today’s tangled material world. Let us compare the above scenario with how things should happen.
Ideally, the researcher communicates with the operator. Hardware needs are discussed. Prototype equipment is built by hand. Researcher and operator go to sea together and test prototype equipment. Researcher and operator go to sea together and test prototype equipment again and again. Design improvements are made and tested. Detailed specifications are jointly decided upon. The contract is drawn up by Navy civilians. A competent contractor is carefully chosen. Production begins. Researcher and operator go to sea together and debug the initial run of production equipment. Researcher follows up all problems and communicates with operator frequently. The process has taken only three to five years.
During the first half of this century, particularly during periods of global conflict, this dialogue worked well and won wars. Since the 1950s, creeping changes have produced a crisis which cannot be ignored. At the heart of the crisis are the Navy Research and Development (R&D) centers, homes of professional civilian researchers. Some say the Navy’s R&D centers are dying; others consider them dead. Whatever the prognosis, we are in serious trouble.
Management of R&D centers was a problem ten years ago.' Today, their very existence is open to challenge. Fragmentation of funding authority and poor control of R&D projects caused a frightening situation in 1972. Today, a turbulent management crisis is compounded by the recent creation of yet another level of bureaucracy in the Material Command: the Office of Naval Technology (ONT). Double-hatting the Chief of Naval Research as Chief of Naval Development has produced a new review authority for R&D projects. Also, within OpNav, the Office of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (OP-98) continues to exist, despite the burgeoning Material Command’s domination of R&D.
On 20 April 1979, during the 105th Annual Meeting of the U. S. Naval Institute, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward said, “Russia is now investing at least 75% more in research and development in technology, than the United States Navy.” This is a devastating statistic. We simply cannot afford the confusion manifest in excessive layers of "modern managers” in Navy R&D organizations.
R&D centers deserve special attention because they have served as the technical backstop required to keep R&D efforts on an even keel. Unfortunately, the technical base of R&D centers has been slipping during the past ten years.
“Centers” used to be called laboratories. Only one “laboratory” remains—i.e., the Navy Research Laboratory. It is unique in that its commander reports to the Chief of Naval Research. In the late 1960s, a consolidation process began which resulted in the following centers having their COs reporting to the Chief of Naval Material:
►Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, Pennsylvania
►Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City. Florida
►David W. Taylor Ship Research and Development Center, Bethesda, Maryland (with satellite lab in Annapolis, Maryland)
►Naval Ocean Systems Center. San Diego, California (with satellite lab in Kaneohe, Hawaii)
►Naval Surface Weapons Center, Silver Spring, Maryland (with satellite lab in Dahlgren, Virginia)
►Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, Rhode Island (with satellite lab in New London, Connecticut)
►Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California. Bear in mind that the most important characteristic of an R&D field activity is its ability to conduct an effective dialogue with the fleet. Three important criteria for such a dialogue are:
►The researcher must be a civil servant, detached from any competitive industrial profit motive.
►The lines of communication with the fleet customer must be two-way and always open.
►The researcher and operator must go to sea together frequently and for long periods of evaluation in a variety of environments.
Ten years ago, the link between researcher and operator was strained. And the gap between researcher and operator has widened in recent years. Why is this crucial aspect of R&D falling apart? First, consolidation of former laboratories has
Produced “centerization" at the expense of common sense. Physical separation of “center” components by as many as 3,000 miles is a contradiction m terms. Prestigious laboratories of the past have ost identity because of name changes and mergers. 'j.ne group, for example, has had six different names s>nce 1967. Sadly, as recently as 1980, two merged 0|mer laboratories were embroiled in rivalry. New names for centers have blown away longstanding , ePutations for earlier functional excellence held by smaller, tightly organized laboratory groups. Mod- Crn management has taken a terrible toll.
Second, we have a very real and very serious Personnel crisis. Billet ceilings for GS-I3, -14, and ' ' scientists and engineers have been periodically 'educed, partly to counteract “grade creep.” Hiring cmd promotion freezes have produced stagnation. In Particular, promotions above GS-12 have been rare, and the effect on morale has been devastating. We are losing two groups of technologists in large num- , ers- First, experienced technicians, many who have ^en with us since World War II, are retiring. Replacements are rare. Second, young scientists and er>gineers, many with advanced degrees, are leaving Sovernment service because of stagnation at the GS- level. In 1981, the General Accounting Office rePorted that Navy R&D centers lost 47% of their SC|entists and engineers during a recent two-year Period. The demand for technologists in industry is 'gh and will increase with expansion of the defense adget. Technologists, who should be going to sea and keeping up a dialogue with the fleet, are not e'ng replaced; managers remain at their desks, °wever, producing an ever-escalating demand for documentation.
Fhe fleet connection was jeopardized in 1980 when mto of the R&D center's commanders was fired. Amidst the smoke and confusion, two conflicting vmwpoints came into focus in press accounts of the ■ncident. First, the fired officer was described by a force commander as a man whose service to the fleet was “nothing short of superb.” Enigmatically, another report, confirmed in a personal interview by this writer, said that the officer in question had been told by a senior naval officer not to talk with the fleet. Whatever the circumstances of this tragic incident, other center commanders will certainly feel the strain of the Naval Material leash, be it real or imaginary. The effect of fleet readiness could be longstanding and disastrous.
During the past five years, civilian pay raises have not kept pace with inflation. It has paid one to retire; cost-of-living increases to retired pay have been geared to inflation. During 1981, it was reported that 95% of government senior executives between 55 and 59 planned to retire. Talented senior technologists can retire, particularly in the Washington, D. C. area, and immediately find contract work doing the same thing they did as civil servants. It is insane to pay twice (retirement and contract costs) to accomplish a given task by the same individual.
Third, too much Navy R&D work is being contracted out to private concerns. Senator David Pryor (Dem.-AK), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service and General Services, estimated in 1979 that consulting firms, some of which even organize the government bureaucracy, receive more than $2 billion per year from the federal coffers. In the Navy, for example, less than 10% of the engineering development budget is expended within R&D centers. Even more disturbing, 35% of the Navy R&D budget is spent on “creation of options."2 A lot of this money is wasted by contractors.
What about Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109? One phrase in this document—“Concepts will be primarily solicited from private industry. . —has produced a great deal
of consternation in Navy R&D circles. The circular was intended to provide guidance for projects involving major systems, but when the implementing instructions were written in DoD. the following translations of intent appeared in print:
►“Technology base shall be maintained by the [Navy] and performed by industry, universities, and government in-house organizations with emphasis on industry and universities.
►“Competent industry and educational institutions regardless of size shall be the primary sources for the exploration of competitive system design concepts to satisfy approved mission needs.
►“The management of system programs not designated as major systems will be guided by the provisions of this Directive."
Why did DoD expand the scope of OMB Circular A-109? Universities are not oriented toward operational needs of the fleet. Why are all projects to be guided by the cumbersome procedures required for major system acquisition? This folly parallels guidance in the 1960s, which required all contractors to keep program evaluation and review technique (PERT) charts, regardless of the size of the effort. Without unlimited funds, imitation of Polaris program management techniques failed in the 1960s. Major system acquisition techniques will not work any better for small programs in the 1980s.
The trend toward industrial domination of Navy R&D is self-destructive and, viewed alongside other problems, is causing further erosion of the fleet connection. For a federal civil servant who has been going to sea for more than 20 years, it is very discouraging to be asked by unwitting crew members during a work-up. “What company are you with?" “Tech reps” visit ships in port more and more these days because of the complexity of modern hardware. They seldom go to sea. For that matter, too few Navy civilians deploy with ships, but the important point is that there can be no meaningful dialogue between contractors and the fleet as a result. Continuity of the technical base must remain with civil servants from Navy field activities.
Fourth, fragmented control of R&D efforts has provided a generation of technically illiterate program managers throughout the Material Command. Arthur Bloch, in his delightful book entitled Murphy’s Law. has given us a quote (attributed to Putt) which summarizes the problem: “Technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage and those who manage what they do not understand." Tragically, within Navy R&D, the ranks of those who understand are being depleted, while the main body ot uninformed managers sits rock solid on top of the control process. The malaise at hand has to do with excessive documentation whenever and wherever found. Micromanagement produces slow strangulation. Let us bring the problem into focus by looking at two methods of funding.
Block Funding: Money is given to an R&D group in a block to support the investigation of a specific functional area of interest. The man in charge of the group is given authority to carry out the investigation to the best of his ability and is held accountable for the wisdom of his approach to the problem. A laboratory specializing in submarine sonar, for example, would receive one block of money each year. At the end of the year, an assessment would be made of how well the money was spent. This method was used with great success during World War II and into the 1950s. An effective dialogue was maintained with the fleet, and specific problems could be tackled by having authoritative type desks within technical bureaus apply contingency funds.
Basically, the process has been complicated by additional layers of management. A block-funded World War II laboratory commander was separated from the President of the United States by only two layers of management: the chief of a technical bureau and the Secretary of the Navy. Today, there are four layers: Chief of Naval Material, Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of Defense. Disappearance of technical bureaus, particularly type desks, made it more difficult to control funding. But creation and expansion of OoD have been monumental disasters.
DoD documentation requirements have produced a stranglehold on thousands of participants in Navy R&D. DoD demands are largely to blame for Navy fragmentation. It may be too late to undo a lot of the damage, but we haven't even tried to be effluent. We have played along and even imitated pedantic antics which strangle. For example, instruc- t'ons for filling in a single page Navy R&D report are nearly one-quarter inch thick.
Fragmented Funding: “Centerization" has supposedly consolidated control of R&D efforts by the assignment of product line responsibility to commanders of large R&D centers. In fact, the commander of a center controls very little.
Remember micromanagement? Let us see how it ^orks. The buzz phrase is “project manager (PM).” orriali groups (R&D task teams) within centers are controlled by gaggles of remote PMs; a “string" connects each PM with a team leader. It is not unusual for a center to have one remote PM for every Jen employees (technical and administrative com- oined). Furthermore, a center’s overhead funds are cached (de facto taxation) from the strings by which hNd teams dangle. Team leaders at the GS-13 and 'JS-14 levels are forced to fight for funds and justify Programs. This often requires expensive trips to hold ’nc hand of a crotchety PM.
Whereas block funding would allow an orderly Same, fragmented funding resembles a rugby match. As management procedures become more cumber- s°me (e.g., creation of the Office of Naval Technology), fewer dollars reach dwindling numbers of Jjdented technologists within the R&D centers and |ewer center people go to sea anyway—also partly oocause of the general preoccupation with fatuous •Management distractions. As a result, the fleet connection suffers.
What has the system wrought ? Sadly, some of the hardware on ships commissioned as recently as 1975 was designed in the 1950s. Use of computer tech- lology on board Navy ships is lagging behind almost everybody. Mr. J. Fred Bucy, President of Texas mstruments, Inc., made the following observation concerning semiconductors and microprocessors in .77: . . the latest technology is in the commer-
c>al field. It won’t be in the Department of Defense held for at least 5 years and more like 8-10 years.’’3
The scenario for collapse will probably play out as follows: Continued discrimination against mid- evc| technologists will drive them from government service; experienced technicians will disappear from the scene. Contracting out Navy R&D to private concerns will become so prevalent and in-house technical base so low, that contract management will drop by default into the laps of "modern managers." Fragmentation of control of R&D projects will produce a frenzied rugby match as funds go up for grabs almost exclusively by contractors. The managers will be at the mercy of contractors, who will have gained de facto control of Navy R&D. The fleet connection will be dead.
We must prevent this disaster from unfolding any further. Let us speak out whenever and wherever possible in support of the following common sense changes:
► Restore prestige to Navy laboratories. Dissolve centers and reestablish smaller functionally oriented laboratories.
► Restore the researcher-operator dialogue. Insist that leading civilians at newly reestablished laboratories spend at least 30 consecutive days each year at sea.
► End discrimination against mid-level scientists and engineers at R&D activities. Fight for promotion and hiring authorizations. Make special efforts to replace retiring technicians with retired Navy chief petty officers.
► Reverse the trend toward contracting outside the Navy. Encourage prototype development in-house. Insist that OMB Circular A-109 and implementing directives be reviewed and revised.
►Reduce the number of R&D directorates in the Navy. Dissolve OP-98 and ONT. Set up a new organization to control R&D, modeled along vertical functional lines. Restore authority to the equivalent of the old bureau type desks. Provide block funding for the reestablished laboratories.
►Innovate in the field of documentation. Eliminate reports and studies that do not directly contribute to fleet readiness. Eliminate administrative billets and plow the dollars saved into technology.
We face a tremendous challenge at a time when R&D is crumbling. We must act now. If we fail to restore the badly frayed fleet connection cable, the collapse of crucial Navy programs will be the best- documented disaster in history, a legacy of paper madness.
'Richard Boyle."Thoroughly Modern Management." Proccedin.gs, October 1972.
:Kenneth A. Boyd. "A Discussion of the Responsibilities and Functions of the Navy Research and Development Centers." Naval Engineers Journal, December 1978.
’Government Executive. July 1977.
A regular NROTC graduate of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1952. Mr. Boyle has been involved with the Navy's submarine Arctic warfare program for more than 20 years as a civilian research general engineer with the Arctic Submarine Laboratory. Naval Ocean Systems Center. San Diego. California.