Leadership Forum: Leadership: Ours Versus Theirs

tern makes upon the leader is that he accomplishes successfully his duties.

. Leadership, in an American sense, ^ls Usually regarded as an art, instead ^{of a} science. Because it is an art, mil- 'tary leadership is something which requires special skills to exercise, and ¹¹ >s a discipline in which some are Wore successful than others.

Dynamic, forceful leadership is en­couraged at every level of command !ⁿ the U. S. military from the most junior enlisted man to the most senior officer. The necessity for leadership t° be a personal manifestation of each supervisor’s military management technique is fundamental to U. S. mil- Uary philosophy and is essential to the Proper functioning of the U. S. mili­tary system.

Soviet military leadership: The U. S. system of individual leadership, en­couraging spontaneity, initiative, and ^dependent action, is completely for- ^e|gn to the Soviet military mind. There ^,s no more alien system of thought for a military organization which, like the socialist society it represents, abso­lutely rejects the importance of the in­dividual. The “kollektiv,” or com­munal group, forms the center of all social and political intercourse in So- ^V|et society. Unlike the American sys- f^em, in which individuality is cher- ■shed, the Soviets view collectivism as exerting the greatest influence upon human behavior. The concept of the kollektiv profoundly influences all as­pects of Soviet society, including the military.

The Soviet military, like all orga- mzations, requires leadership in order ^to function properly. For the Soviets, fhe term leadership, and especially the mstitutional mechanism for its aopli- oation, differs in all respects from our own. The term is usually reserved for the role of the Communist Party in its guise as a secular religion, and rarely f° describe an individual effort. Marx- ^,st-Leninist theory, which maintains that all things can be explained by ra- honal scientific observation, cannot ^accept a leadership system based on subjective, largely mysterious princi­ples, as is the case with the U. S. phi­losophy of leadership. The subjectiv- •ty of U. S. leadership is the source °f some amusement to the Soviet mil­itary writer. The concepts of honor, integrity, idealism, and morality which form the moral ballast of the U. S. officer, are held in contempt by many

Soviet authors. Using the standard Marxist class-oriented interpretation of Western society, the Soviets write that in order to motivate his subor­dinates the American officer must re­sort to graft, bribery, namecalling, constraint, and scapegoating. Fur­ther, American officers “are mainly recruited from bourgeois elements, in order to ensure the class influence over privates and NCOs.”¹ The Communist Party completely dominates the Soviet armed forces. The importance of the military was dem­onstrated to the Communists by both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions: the 1905 revolution was lost and the other won by the faction which controlled the military. This led the Communist Party to exert its influence over all aspects of every military organization. The communist leader Vladimir Lenin stated that although professional mil­itary professionals “will be in charge, we will place our own people along­side them. And we know from expe­rience that this will lead to successful results.’”

The principles of Soviet military leadership are firmly based in Marxist- Leninist theory, which regards the de­velopment of leaders as a “class sci­ence” and bases the leadership train­ing process on empirical, objective doctrine. The Soviets view leadership development as an objective instead of a subjective process, implying that leadership training can be reduced to a universally applicable set of proce­dures. Soviet leaders are developed by a “military pedagogic” process based on scientific theories; it at­tempts to fit all military leaders into a predetermined mold, ensuring uni­form ideologic and political reliability. Unlike the U. S. system, in which de­veloping a leadership style is a su­premely individual matter, the Soviets favor a collective, predictable form of leadership development. Soviet offi­cers are trained to be phlegmatic and self-disciplined, and officially there is no concept of the natural or charis­matic leader. Soviet leaders are made, not born.

Soviet military pedagogy is for­mally defined as:

“The science of the objective laws of Communist education and train­ing of fighting men . . . in the skilled conduct of modern combat . . . [it] forms the basis for the training of servicemen . . . and analyzes the activities of the commander as the

leader of his subordinates.”¹ Soviet leadership is based on three pedagogic principles: training, ideo­logical education, and formal educa­tion. Training and formal education are matched in the U. S. armed forces by an excellent network of basic-through- advanced education which attempts, as in the Soviet system, to instill the combat skill and psychological tough­ness necessary for armed conflict. These two principles form the basis for a cohesive fighting force in the U. S. military system, but they are not gen­erally considered an active and inte­gral part of the leadership process as they are in the Soviet military.

Ideological education has no coun­terpart in the U. S. system, and is one of the unique tools and strengths of the Soviet system. All echelons of the Soviet military are ceaselessly bom­barded by communist propaganda to ensure cohesiveness and single­mindedness and to provide the Soviet fighting man with a strong sense of purpose. Heavy emphasis is placed on communist theory and ideology in an attempt to inculcate communist mo­rality and an understanding of com­munist goals and convictions. It is ironic that the Soviets, who are openly contemptuous of religious convic­tions, idealism, and any other mani­festations of “bourgeois morality,” depend upon a system which basically attempts to instill the same motiva­tions in its own fighting men.

The Soviets place tremendous im­portance upon the proper indoctrina­tion of their own armed forces. The Soviet military leader can tap the great emotional wellspring created by this educational process to motivate his subordinates; he has at his command fighting men who are absolutely con­vinced of the superiority of their po­litical system. The goal of this pow­erful system of ideological education is to turn each fighting man into an ideological fanatic—a modern-day Cromwellian Roundhead—who is willing to die for the Soviet State.

The development of the requisite pedagogic expertise is a long and ar­duous process involving years of study and application to master. In order to develop his pedagogic skills the Soviet officer is charged to study:

“. . . classic Marxist-Leninism, the resolutions of the Communist Party . . . military regulations and in­structions. . . [and] the military pe­dagogic works of outstanding mili-

An American military which is fully aware of its heritage and cognizant of the benefits and fruits of the freedom we all enjoy, can only serve to strengthen itself and the society which it defends.

tary leaders.⁴”

The result will be a leader who, the­oretically at least, is a truly authori­tarian one, with the qualities of com­munist ideological convictions, professional preparedness, moral pu­rity, discipline, restraint, tenacity, and pedagogic thought and skill.

The greatest advantage of the So­viet system of leadership is the co­hesiveness brought about by the in­doctrination process and the absolute political mastery the Communist Party holds over the military. The Soviet armed forces are literally the “shield and sword” of the Communist Party; all leaders are shaped in the same fashion using identical procedures; ensuring uniformity of efforts, results, and, some might argue, mediocrity.

The strengths of U. S. leadership are the spontaneity, initiative, and the independence of thought and action which are rightly emphasized at every level of the command structure. True leadership ability is regarded as some­thing which cannot be taught. The American leader is allowed to exer­cise his own brand of leadership, un­fettered by ideological judgments.

Because of the nature of Soviet leadership, the Soviets will prove to be formidable foes in any environment, but particularly in one which can be planned in advance, following a pre­dictable pattern. These conditions, coupled with a superbly trained, equipped, motivated, and indoctri­nated armed force, will form the op­timum environment for the Soviet style of leadership. In such an environment it would be to our advantage to force a breakdown in the Soviet command and control structure and force the Soviet leader to think and act inde­pendently. He is not trained for an environment requiring initiative and spontaneity; if there is an institutional deficiency in the Soviet system, it ex­ists in this area.

The U. S. armed forces are gradu­ally eliminating those portions of the leadership development process which form the heart and foundation of the distinctive U. S. leadership style. We are moving more and more to a system which takes away individual initiative and substitutes a centralized com­mand and control structure. One ex­ample is the aircraft carrier; The ship's captain interferes with the airwing, and the carrier air group commander over­manages the organization and work­ing of his squadrons; the squadron commanding officers over-manage the division officers. The overall trend is both negative and insidious because it stifles those qualities which the sys­tem should be nurturing, and which it must have to function properly.

Another alarming trend is that our military system increasingly favors the administrator over the leader. Lead­ership is a dynamic process and quite often “the chips fly.” In many cases, a quieter, less threatening, more com­pliant administrator is favored over a dynamic and forceful leader of men. “A promotional system which stresses ‘loyalty to the boss’ more than per­formance” advances a manager who spends “little time looking at the big picture, instead occupying himself with miniscule matters . . . which should have been considered and disposed of . . . much farther down the . . . man­agement line.”⁵ The result of this pro­cess is the “company man.” The company man is an excellent admin­istrator: he will pick out a split infin­itive or a comma splice in a heartbeat and can shuffle papers with the best of them, but he is a frightful leader of men. We are ill prepared as a military organization to institute a system of leadership which mimics the Soviet style and does not allow the leader full range of action and spontaneity. This works well for the Soviets, and they employ it exclusively. The way to en­sure the continuance of dynamic lead­ership in our system is to reemphasize the strongest points of our system; in­dividual decision-making, freedom of action by the leader, and the rein­forcement of the development of the leader and leadership at the lowest echelon of command. This emphasis will require a rethinking of the nature of leadership, beginning at the highest echelons of the chain of command.

The U. S. military would benefit profoundly from a system of indoctri­nation similar to the Soviet process of ideological education. Those subjects which should be emphasized are the ideas and principles which are now regarded by many as maudlin. The force of our ideas, particularly in con­trast with a system which is based upon the ideals of “atheism, totalitarian­ism, and communism,” are particu­larly powerful and effective. We should actively compare the differences be­tween our two systems of government and social systems. This rivalry is not between opposing militaries, but be­tween opposing systems of govern­ment and philosophy; we should em­phasize our numerous strong points and their numerous weak points.

The mechanism for instituting this program already exists. We should in­clude just such a program of aware­ness at all boot camps and basic train­ing courses for every branch of the military. An American military which is fully aware of its heritage and cog­nizant of the benefits and fruits of the freedom we all enjoy can only serve to strengthen itself and the society which it defends.

It is the essence of leadership which proves to be so elusive and trouble­some. The Soviets believe that this essence can be reduced to a system and can be taught using scientific prin­ciples. The Americans, on the other hand, regard the essence of leadership as undefinable. However, the only true test of the military leader is whether or not he can compel men to follow him. And American leadership is best stated by the U. S. Army infantry's motto: “Follow me.” 'S. N. Kozlov. Editor. The Officer's Handbook, translated under the auspices of the U. S. Air Force as Vol. 13 of the Soviet Military Thought series (U. S. Government Printing Office. 1977)

p. 228.

-Roy A. Medvedev, Lei History Judge, trans­lated by Colleen Taylor (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 14.

'Kozlov, op. cit.. p. 67.

^JIbid. p. 105.

'John Z. DeLorean and J. Patrick Wright. On a

Clear Day Yon Can See GeneraI Motors. (Avon Books. 1979). p. 250 and p. 8. respectively.