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Our marines, lower photograph, preceding page, vastly outnumber theirs, but we haven't got anything to match their “Aist”- class landing craft, which can carry five light tanks or four light tanks and 150 naval infantrymen at 65 knots. They have more operational surface effect ships than the entire combined NATO navies.
Both the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) and the U. S. Marine Corps are earmarked for use in a European conflict. In the case of the U. S. Marines, two-thirds of their active combat forces could be brought into the conflict during the initial stages—almost 100,000 men. On the other hand, the SNI appears to be a relatively small force that generates differing opinions as to its use and possible impact in a future conflict.
Estimates of the size of the SNI’s “Black Berets” range from a low of 12,000 men to a high of 50,000.' Although personnel figures have remained stable at roughly 12,000 men over the past ten years, this trend is not necessarily predictive of near-term growth potential during times of crisis. It should be remembered that the U. S. Marines expanded from 17,000 men in 1937 to more than 550,000 by the end of World War II. In like manner, the Soviet Marines expanded from an almost nonexistent force to more than 25 brigades of 3,000 men each during the same war. Most sources agree that the SNI is organized into five operational regiments: one apiece in the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets, plus two in the Pacific Fleet.
The SNI is structured in such a manner that each of the regiments (often referred to in current literature as brigades) can fight as an integrated unit; the basic combat units of an SNI regiment are three naval infantry battalions and one tank battalion (see Figure 1).
By today’s standards, the SNI is lightly armed and equipped—much the same as its counterpart in the United States. This is true, in both cases, because of the amphibious nature of their mission and the concomitant requirement to remain strategically and tactically mobile. Any increase in major equipment size or density results in a tradeoff of this mobility. The primary firepower for the SNI is provided by the “T-54/55” medium tank, the “PT-76” amphibious light tank, and the “Sagger” antitank guided missile launcher system.
Deactivated shortly after World War II, the SNI was reactivated in 1964 and has grown in either size or capability almost continuously since that time.
During the SNI’s hiatus, the political utility of amphibious forces could not have gone unnoticed by Soviet planners. From 1 January 1946 until 31 December 1963, the United States used its armed forces as political tools in situations short of war no fewer than 134 times. Thus, it is clear that the Soviets recognize the need for naval forces, including amphibious units, with the ability to project power worldwide.
SNI forces assigned to each fleet are under the operational control of the appropriate fleet commander. Each Soviet amphibious force has its own commander, with sub-commanders for landing forces afloat and the landing party itself—made up of naval infantry and ground forces.
Soviet doctrine divides amphibious landings into four categories:
► Strategic: To support theater forces in opening up a new front of military operations, which involves a multidivisional force (a capability which they presently do not have).
► Operational: To assist ground or naval forces in a coastal region to surround and destroy enemy ground or naval units in that area (an SNI regiment would be the first echelon in such an operation).
► Tactical: To strike at the rear area or flank of an enemy force along a coastline using battalion-sized forces or larger.
► Reconnaissance and Sabotage: To conduct reconnaissance, damage rear area facilities, and create diversions using platoon-, company-, or battalionsized forces.2
In amphibious operations, the Soviet Navy provides the shipping, gunfire support, aviation support, minefield clearance, missile ships, antisubmarine warfare ships, and logistics support. Some aviation support also may be provided by Soviet frontal aviation.
For purposes of this discussion, as well as to depict the relative importance that the Soviets assign to various regional areas by their force deployments, Figure 2 summarizes Soviet naval deployments in 1980.
At present, the primary naval amphibious support for the SNI is provided by growing numbers of amphibious ships in the Soviet Navy and other ship types which possess obvious applications for amphibious operations. Between 1965 and 1976, the Soviet amphibious ship tonnage more than doubled, growing from 60,000 to 140,000 tons.3 This trend shows no sign of abating.
The newest and most capable amphibious ship is the Ivan Rogov. She was introduced in 1978 and is capable of both long-range and long-endurance operations. The Ivan Rogov is twice as large as any previous Soviet amphibious ship, displacing 14,000 l°ns. She has two helicopter landing spots, a flood- dble well deck with bow and stern doors/ramps capable of handling surface effect ships (SESs), and can carry a naval infantry battalion along with 30 armored personnel carriers and ten tanks.4 This is ’he first ship of the new class of amphibious transport docks (LPDs).
Although not strictly amphibious in nature, the A7ev-class aircraft carriers offer the capability of suPporting amphibious operations with their vertical ’akeoff and landing (VTOL) Yak-36 “Forgers.” Their 50 to 600-foot angled decks permit them to handle S1gnificant numbers of VTOL fighters and helicopters. Indications are that the Soviets may be planing to build more Kievs and a class of nuclear- Powered conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carriers. In addition, the Soviet Union is rapidly expanding its surface effect ship program, already having more operational SESs than the entire combined NATO navies.
The rapidly expanding Soviet merchant fleet—a fleet controlled by the Soviet military—is capable of landing logistics support and ground forces subsequent to the establishment of a beachhead or secure port by the SNI. The merchant fleet has for many years supported the Soviet Navy in normal operations, as well as exercises such as Okean-15 and Okean-80.
The Soviet Navy also continues to suffer shortcomings that affect the ability of the SNI to conduct operations. There are, of course, the geographic constraints imposed on the fleet basing sites in the NATO arena, such as the Danish and Turkish straits as well as the North Cape. In addition, the Soviets
Figure 2 Soviet Navy Deployments (January 1980)
____Type | Pacific | Indian Ocean | Mediterranean | Black Sea | Baltic | Northern |
Carrier | 1 |
|
| 1 |
| 1 |
Cruiser | 11 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 11 |
Destroyer | 25 |
| 40 | 26 | 10 | 12 |
Frigate | 48 | L | 32 | 47 | ||
SSBN | 30 |
|
|
| 6 | 50 |
SS/SSN | 80 | 1 | 10 | 15 | 29 | 135 |
Bombers | 110 |
|
| 90 |
| 110 |
lpd | 1 |
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__lst | 9 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
Source: John M. Collins. U. S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications. 19801. p. 250.
lack adequate fighter cover far from friendly shores, relying instead on land-based bombers for area defense and on-board surface-to-air missiles for short- range and point defense.
Fundamentally, there are two schools of thought on the future of the SNI: It will remain a special- purpose force capable of conducting limited missions within the Soviet theater; or, it will develop to the point of being used in overseas interventions or to conduct large-scale amphibious operations.
Evidence in support of the latter are predictions of continued increases in LPDs and carriers. There are also indications that the trends in growth of the amphibious fleet will continue, with more than a purely defensive capability being sought. A recent DoD publication, Soviet Military Power, states: “The Soviets have in hand, or are developing, the elements necessary to provide a formidable projection into distant waters. These include the improvement in assault lift capability, the expansion of a large administrative lift ability, ... the retention of a substantial naval gunfire support strength,
. . . development of sea-based tactical air power,
and an improving underway replenishment capability. The Soviet Navy’s ability to project tactical power ashore at some distance from the Soviet littoral may be part of Admiral Gorshkov’s grand plan of achieving a ‘balanced fleet.’ ”
The vast majority of additional sources consulted agree with this assessment.
In summary, the SNI has a wide range of possible tasks: from show of force and raids and choke point control to operational and strategic amphibious assaults. Force size, limitations of the navy, and the dependence on land-based aviation obviate successful independent execution of tasks at the high end of this spectrum. But the capability continues to grow as new amphibious ships, aircraft, and naval gunfire capabilities enter service. The SNI will continue to expand as these constraints are removed— but how rapidly will that expansion take place and what additional tasks might be assigned?
Current strength of the U. S. Marine Corps is about 190,000 personnel. During peacetime, the operating forces are organized into the Fleet Marine
Forces, Pacific and Atlantic. In all, the active duty Marine Corps is composed of three divisions, three aircraft wings, and three service support groups. However, for operations and exercises, these forces are organized into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) of various sizes.
Each MAGTF is a task-organized combined arms force consisting of command and control elements, ground forces, air forces, combat support forces, and combat service support forces. There are three types of MAGTFs: the Marine Amphibious Unit
(MAU), the Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), and the Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). In each case, the basic organization consists of command, ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support elements.
MAGTFs, regardless of size, can operate as a naval entity, part of a joint or combined task force, or as a uniservice force. The ground combat element can range in size from a battalion (in an MAU) to °ne or more infantry divisions (in an MAF). The aviation combat element will be organized to support the ground combat element. It may include offensive air support, air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, electronic warfare, and command and control elements. The combat service support element will be similarly task-organized to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services to all elements of the MAGTF.
The focus of the remainder of this article will be °n the MAB-sized force that can be embarked in '6-21 amphibious ships, and is capable of forward deployment for extended periods.
Briefly, the reasons for such a focus are: cific mission. As a result, marines are able to perform a wide variety of tasks ranging from over-the- horizon presence in amphibious shipping to MAF- sized amphibious assaults. In addition, they make up the only U. S. force capable of seizing a lodgment and building from a "zero base” to a fully selfsustaining force ashore. The great expanse of littoral areas throughout the world only adds to this flexibility by allowing a MAGTF to be positioned during a time of rising tension, thereby increasing both deterrence and readiness. In effect, MAGTFs offer the advantages of being able to:
► Proceed to a crisis area without revealing the exact destination
► Provide a force presence in international waters
► Remain independent of ports and airfields
► Project selected degrees of power ashore
► Quickly build in size from a zero base
► Support themselves while ashore
► Avoid reliance on staging or overflight rights
► Be rapidly withdrawn by amphibious shipping During the conduct of amphibious operations, the
Marine landing force, the MAGTF, is under the op-
^ The MAB is the closest comparable unit to the SNl regiments assigned to the Soviet fleets.
^ Recent exercise trends indicate that current NATO Plans call for initial employment of MABs to NATO. ^ Current Marine Corps prepositioning initiatives are for MAB-sized forces.
^ Amphibious lift constraints make the simultaneous lift of a larger MAGTF speculative.
The tasks performed by Marine forces stem, in great measure, from the inherent flexibility offered By task-organizing MAGTFs to accomplish a spe- erational control of the fleet commander. The landing force commander (CLF) could be the Marine commander of a MAU, MAB, or MAF. The commander of the amphibious task force (CATF) is always a naval officer.
In U. S. doctrine, the amphibious assault is the primary type of amphibious operation. Secondary amphibious operations, none of which involve the “establishment” of a landing force ashore, are amphibious withdrawals, raids, and demonstrations. Ideally, following the successful execution of an am-
Type | Atlantic | Pacific |
Command/Control Ship (LCC) | 1 | 1 |
Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA) | 2 | 3 |
Landing Platform, Helicopter (LPH) | 4 | 3 |
Amphibious Transport, Dock (LPD) | 6 | 7 |
Landing Ship, Dock (LSD) | 6 | 7 |
Landing Ship, Tank (LST) | 10 | 10 |
Amphibious Cargo Ship (LKA) | 2 | 3 |
Source: Collins, U. S.-Soviet Military Balance, p. 285.
phibious assault. Army ground forces would replace the Marine forces ashore and conduct necessary ground operations.
The Navy’s primary contribution to amphibious operations is, of course, amphibious shipping and related support. Unfortunately—although still strong compared with the Soviets—U. S. strength in amphibious shipping has sagged considerably in the last 15 years. Figure 3 reflects current U. S. inventory of amphibious ships.
Normally, 15% of these vessels (a conservative estimate) are in overhaul. That leaves a sufficient number for short-notice MAU and MAB operations, but operational constraints make it feasible to execute only two full MAB-sized amphibious assaults simultaneously in the Pacific and Atlantic.
It should be noted, however, that the near-term prepositioned ship (NTPS) program and subsequent maritime prepositioned ship (MPS) programs will by 1987 provide the capability to position and land three brigades’ worth of gear in a benign environment. This should ease some of the strain on amphibious lift assets.
A question which seems to have been argued endlessly is that of the validity of the amphibious assault in modern warfare. There has been a tendency in some circles to imagine an MAB or MAF landing on a beach opposed by a fully mechanized enemy. Often ignored are the factors inherent in the execution of a successful amphibious assault:
► Land at the place of your choosing, exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses
► Use diversionary forces
► Have carrier-based aviation support
► Use amphibious demonstrations to cause the enemy to redirect forces
► Use surprise through over-the-horizon movements of the task force
In addition to the NTPS and MPS programs mentioned, the landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) will be introduced shortly. This will further increase the flexibility of the amphibious assault by allowing greater force standoff ranges, exposing 70% of the world’s beaches to the amphibious assault (rather than the present 17%), and by providing much greater speed during over-water movement.
A comparison of the Soviet Naval Infantry and the U. S. Marine Corps should begin with a brief assessment of the capabilities of each. Figure 4 compares some of the salient factors that have been discussed. These comparisons are, in some cases, admittedly subjective. Because of the obvious disparity in total manpower between the SNI and Marine Corps, Figure 4 focuses on the assessment of the overall capability or trend of each force within a given area, rather than on straight-line comparisons of numbers—except of course in the cases of manpower and shipping.
From Figure 4, it appears that the Marine Corps has a decided advantage. But several factors are governed by the internal organization of the forces. The SNI has no integral air or combat logistic support elements, thereby degrading its organic sustainability and aviation support factors. Lack of organic sustainability, however, could be offset by the Soviets’ large merchant fleet. In addition, the Soviets are closing the gap in weapons development and quantity, VTOL aircraft, and amphibious lift. The Soviet Navy continues efforts to improve the strategic reach of its forces through forward basing, carrier development, and an improvement in its ability to conduct underway replenishment operations.
In any military operation, whether strategic or conventional, the deciding factor is not necessarily the total force of the opposing sides, but the combat power that can be brought to bear at the critical time and place. Soviet fleet composition is such that enough amphibious assets are deployed with each fleet to lift simultaneously all five SNI regiments. But they are constrained from conducting larger than regi- mental/brigade-sized operations by the geographic separation of the fleets. In the same context, current U. S. amphibious lift capabilities are limited to the immediate employment of one MAB-sized assault force in each fleet area.
Considering the capability of the SNI to deploy
only regiments/brigades and similar factors that limit S. initial amphibious assaults to MAB size, it is worthwhile to compare more closely these two organizations. As one would suspect, however, a strict numerical comparison does not tell the whole story— a valid comparison is situation dependent.
. Much has been written concerning the relative '/NPortance of NATO’s Central Front vis-a-vis the Northern and Southern flanks in terms of a sucCessful defense of Western Europe. To a large degree, the trend reflects the same thinking that some H- S. planners use in their treatment of the “swing strategy”—movement of Pacific amphibious assets to the Atlantic area. Each of the three regions plays ^ significant and interrelated role in the defense of NATO; the importance of any one region is depen- uent on many factors. The most important of these are Warsaw Pact actions, warning times, status of reinforcement shipping, and the speed of the NATO decision-making process. The Northern Flank scenario will be used to explore possible uses and lim- ■tations of the SNI and U. S. Marines since current Plans, exercises, and force dispositions indicate both
forces are planned for employment in this region.
The SNI regiment stationed on the Kola Peninsula would most likely be used in operations against Norway in conjunction with the motorized rifle division stationed near the Norwegian border and an airborne division from the Kola Peninsula. The primary objectives might be to secure the airfields at Bod0, Bardufoss, and Banak, thereby establishing secure passage for the Soviet fleet around the North Cape and to use as footholds for further operations into southern Norway.
In the Danish Straits, the SNI regiment of the Baltic Fleet would most likely be employed to seize Bornholm Island, control the Danish Straits themselves, and possibly occupy part of the northern German coast in conjunction with a Polish amphibious division, a role the Soviets have rehearsed.5 The employment of the SNI in these operations would serve to reduce the limitations it suffers in terms of sustainability and strategic mobility. At the same time, this scenario would optimize the support that land-based aviation, ground, and airborne forces could provide. In addition, the fjords of Norway and
Figure 4 SNI and Marine Corps Comparisons
| USMC Superior | Parity | SNI Superior | ||
| Solid Lead | Soviets Closing Gap | Solid Lead | u. s. Closing Gap | |
internal Factors: Manpower Organization Weapons/Equipment Aircraft support Helicopter support Training Doctrine Exercise intensity Ship-to-shore movement Sustainability Portion of forces deployable by amphibious lift Experience __ Crossing obstacles/Beaching | X |
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External Factors: Amphibious lift Land-based aviation Surface effect ships Carrier-based air Naval gunfire Merchant fleet ^Strategic reach | X |
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the areas around the Danish Straits are ideal for the employment of SNI amphibious assets and surface effect ships, and would allow for rapid reinforcement by the Soviet merchant fleet.
Although U. S. Marine forces have been identified for employment in NATO for many years, their role has been ill-defined and often poorly planned. Assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe’s (SACEur) strategic reserve, these forces were to come from FMFLant on the East Coast, as well as from FMFPac on the West Coast. In effect, it was a Marine Corps swing strategy with all the inherent problems of its Navy counterpart.
In planning for employment of marines in NATO, some problems have yet to be addressed. For example, considering the large force commitment to the Rapid Deployment Force, what force level can SACEur now count on in a NATO conflict? How will the marines arrive, given the paucity of strategic airlift and sealift? Will the forces that do arrive be trained to fight in the harsh climate they might experience on the Northern Flank?
Some initiatives have been undertaken to reduce the mobility problem. In 1980, the U. S. and Norwegian governments agreed to preposition equipment for a MAB in central Norway; such equipment has begun to arrive this year. However, this initiative appears to have been as much a political maneuver as anything else. It gave the Norwegians a chance to resist intense Soviet pressure against stationing foreign forces on Norwegian soil. At the same time, it allowed Norway to seek NATO infrastructure funding to build the facilities to support the MAB.
On the other hand, central Norway is not where the probable war will be fought. The conflict will most likely take place more than 400 miles to the north. Therefore, even if the MAB is airlifted to its prepositioned gear, the Norwegians are faced with moving this force to the north by road (only one road, integrated with ferries, leads north), air, and inland ferry, while at the same time, they are attempting to mobilize and transport their own forces.
Choke point control in the Danish Straits is another role suitable for Marine forces. Marine Corps organic amphibious and airlift capabilities would provide the mobility necessary to fight in and around the islands of the Danish Straits and thereby indirectly support the battle in the Central Region.
It is clear that the Marine Corps offers a flexible, capable force. However, for marines to be optimally employed in NATO, their tasks must be clearly defined, imagination must be used to determine their specific roles, and problems must be squarely faced and resolved.
We have reviewed the relative strengths and weaknesses of the SNI and U. S. Marine Corps, both in terms of their separate internal structures and NATO employment. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to consider the SNI and the U. S. Marine Corps as “other” forces, primarily because of their relatively small sizes. This is particularly true in regard to the views of many Europeans concerning U. S. Marine forces. But when one discusses the two MAFs earmarked for a role in SACEur's strategic reserve, one is not really dealing with—as many believe—division-sized forces. One is confronted with an infantry division (reinforced) backed by 375-475 organic fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The MAF consists of almost 50,000 men—in effect, it is a small corps.
Unfamiliarity on the part of NATO planners with the versatility and capability of marine forces has limited imaginative planning for their use. In the same context, this unfamiliarity has limited the Western perception of the SNI threat. The SNI is viewed as a small force, capable of only very limited operations. NATO planners tend to discount the fact that the SNI is merely the tip of the arrow, that its doctrine calls for rapid follow-on by Soviet ground forces transported by a capable merchant fleet, and that the SNI routinely conducts operations with the other Warsaw Pact amphibious and airborne units. The Soviet Naval Infantry is merely one facet of a very large threat and should not be taken lightly.
Despite the limitations that the SNI and U. S. Marine Corps might have, they are structured to perform some missions that no other type of force is capable of performing as well (or at all), and that must be accomplished in a NATO conflict. NATO planners should begin to view amphibious forces— ours and theirs—not so much in terms of size, but in terms of their potential capabilities.
'The International Institute of Strategic Studies in its annual publication The Military Balance: 1981-1982 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 13, sizes the SNI at 12,000 men organized into five naval infantry regiments. Harriet Fast and William F. Scott in The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder. Col.: Westview Press, 1979). p. 166, estimate the size as being between 14,000 and 50,000 men. This latter figure could include reservists.
2Lt. Col. Louis N. Buffardi, The Soviet Naval Infantry (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1980), pp. 2-3.
3Cdr. James G. Roche, “The Soviets’ Growing Reach: Implications ol Comparative Capabilities to Project Military Power." (Paper presented before the European-American Workshop. Belmont Conference Center. 25-27 May 1977), p. 7.
JBufTardi, op. cit.. p. 75.
sLCdr. William R. Hynes, “The Role of the Kiev in Soviet Naval Operations,” To Use the Sea, 2nd ed. Edited by LCdr. F. C. Rouse (Annapolis. Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977), p. 327; Charles G. Pritchard, “The Soviet Marines,” Proceedings, March 1972, p. 28; and Graham H. Tuberville, “Warsaw Pact Amphibious Operations in Northern Europe,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1976, p. 24.
Colonel Jaroch was commissioned following his graduation from the University of Santa Clara in 1964. He has held several assignments in the field and served at Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, as the NATO/European Desk Officer in the Department of Plans, Policies, and Operations. He has a master's degree in national security studies from Georgetown University and is presently a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University.