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Last year’s prophecy that “1981 will not be one of new direction for Latin America, but it may be for the United States” has come to pass in both form and substance. On 8 July 1981, the White House announced a new presidential policy directive concerning sales of conventional arms. Arms sales would be considered on a case-by-case basis, and a major consideration would be “the net contribution” of these weapons to the defense of the Free World. President Reagan wrote, “The United States cannot defend the Free World’s interest alone. The United States must, in today’s world, not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs.”
This past summer, the Reagan Administration agreed to sell three S-2G Tracker antisubmarine aircraft to Uruguay, and currently Uruguayan personnel are receiving flight and maintenance training in the United States. Numerous Latin American nations which fly older model Trackers were pleased with this development. The sale of this type aircraft to Latin America had not taken place during the Carter years. Also, the United States and Brazil have begun once again to exchange high-ranking army officers. This had been a common practice in past decades. For a long time. Brazil had been the staunchest ally of the United States in South America. However, Brazilian-
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada is flanked by Daniel Ortega, a member of the Nicaraguan Sandinista Junta, and Fidel Castro at a rally in Havana that was attended by a million Cubans.
U. S. relations were badly strained during the Carter presidency. In addition, high-ranking officials of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia have visited the United States this past year; such visits did not occur during the Carter presidency. In sum, there is a renewed American interest in Latin America.
But the outcome of the current guerrilla struggles taking place throughout the Caribbean will be the primary factor to influence navies throughout Latin America. Ironically, the volatile Caribbean, which is crowded with a dozen island nations, and bordered by ten countries, can boast of but four respectable navies —those of Colombia, Cuba, Venezuela, and, of course, the United States.
Naval power will not, however, play a part in determining the outcome of these guerrilla struggles. The only two navies which have the real potential to intervene in the area—those of
Cuba and the United States—would not dare to do so. If Cuba tried to support its interests by using its navy, it would provoke the U. S. Navy into action. Cuba has striven to maintain a position of “plausible denial” in order to avoid just such a direct confrontation. In addition, the Cuban Navy cannot do anything to support national interests that are not better accomplished through less risky means, such as the use of third-nation flag carriers. Therefore, it would be foolhardy for the Cubans to employ their fleet.
The U. S. fleet cannot be used if Cuba does not choose to use its navy to support guerrilla warfare. A naval blockade may not be a thing of the past, but it is surely not a viable option in the Caribbean. Intervention is the most despicable word in Latin American politics. A blockade—or that event by any other name, such as quarantine—would result in an unbearable uproar among nations which
the United States does not want to uPset. Foremost among these would be oil-rich Mexico.
The U. S. Navy and those of friendly Latin American nations will be adversely affected if the Communist-supported guerrillas succeed in scattered, seemingly insignificant Places such as Grenada. In 1979, a revolutionary movement ousted the regime of Sir Eric Gairy. Since then, and possibly before, Cuban military Personnel have trained the island’s army and guaranteed the government’s success. In November 1979, Grenada announced that Cuba would help build an international airport by Providing $10 million in construction equipment and supplies, in addition '° skilled labor. This airport will command the deep-water channel just to lhe west of the island through which Passes more than 50% of the oil imported into the United States. Nicaragua also is becoming more deeply entangled with the Communist bloc. One may argue that an airfield on a hny Caribbean island could be easily dealt with in time of crisis, as could °ne submarine base in Cuba, as could hostile bases in Nicaragua, as could any other Communist successes in the region. Perhaps the Caribbean would n°' constitute a second front, but naval forces would have to be diverted from other tasks to deal with these Problems.
. The outcome of the confrontations m the Caribbean will determine where 'he Latin American military dollar is sPent. If nations as far south as Cape Horn see Cuba successfully support- lr,g—and also exporting—revolution, military dollars will be spent on anti- Suerrilla and anti-subversion hardware and training and not on S-2 Trackers and antisubmarine warfare 'ASW) frigates. There is irony here, during the 1960s and 1970s. the United States dictated that UNITAS e*ercises concentrate on ASW oper- at'ons; many Latin American naval officers believed this was folly. First, 'heir ships {then) were hardly capable °f coping with a modern submarine, and second, they believed that out- s,de-nurtured revolution was a far greater threat than Soviet submarines home-ported in the Kola inlet. They Wanted to train with the U. S. Navy m riverine and amphibious warfare, hut could not get the chance. Today, 'here are modern submarines at Cien- fuegos. Even so, guerrilla success in the Caribbean would force the Latin Americans to spend the defense dollar on anti-subversion before ASW.
El Salvador: Leftist guerrillas
launched a major offensive as 1981 began. The El Salvadoran Army withstood the test better than most had expected, although the government’s counterattacks did bog down after making some progress into key guerrilla sanctuaries. The war has since evolved into an arms race. The United States is airlifting supplies to the government forces. Aid is primarily composed of AH-1 helicopters, trucks, small arms, and includes ammunition and training. The guerrillas are obtaining aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba through Nicaragua. Reports indicate that this aid includes tanks and helicopters flown into Managua.
Cuba: Recent articles have credited Cuba with having the most powerful
navy in Latin America. This is far from accurate. Those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela are clearly superior. However, the Cuban Navy is formidable; it is exceptionally strong in short-endurance missile patrol boats.
Following Castro's rise to power, the navy was purged and rebuilt as an anti-invasion force. During the early days of this first phase, “Komars” were the backbone of the fleet. In the 1970s, they were supplemented by the larger “Osa I" and "II” boats.
A second phase of Cuban naval development is just beginning. On 23 September 1981, the 1,900-ton “Koni”-class frigate Marie! arrived at Havana from the Soviet Union. This ship will be used throughout the Caribbean to provide a military presence. Recent failures of the revolutionary export “crop" may be forcing Castro to supplement his guerrilla ac-
On 23 September, Cuba received its first “Koni”-class frigate from the Soviet Union. The Mariel gives Castro a new power projection capability.
tivities with more traditional means of power projection.
The recent acquisition of submarines by the Cuban Navy has clouded our understanding of the Cuban Navy. Last year’s review suggested that these boats offered a potential to further support guerrilla forces. Although the potential remains, the fact that Cuba is continuing every effort to maintain a “plausible denial" of its revolution-exporting activities suggests that these submarines would not be used in other than a very safe environment. Rumor that Nicaragua has created a restricted zone along its Caribbean coast might offer such a safe landing site. Another role of these submarines is emerging. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has constructed and maintains a submarine base in Cuba. The fact that the Cuban Navy operates submarines makes credible Cuba’s insistence that this base is for its use.
Not all exports of revolution have been profitable this past year. Costa Rica has broken relations with Cuba and renounced its agreement on economic and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union. Cubans had fun- neled arms through Costa Rica to Colombia and were caught with fraudulent Costa Rican passports. Also, Colombia has severed relations with Cuba. This followed after U. S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig documented Cuba’s support for the guerrilla groups in that country.
The future of the Cuban Navy undoubtedly holds more of the same. It will retain a strong island defense force, acquire additional frigate/cor- vette-sized ships for showing the flag, and leave the exporting of revolution to the nation’s less conventional forces.
Mexico: Growing responsibilities are being placed on the Mexican Navy. Mexico has been taking a much more active role in international affairs. It borders an area ripe with revolution. Its importance among nations is increasing because of its oil reserves and assets. For these reasons, the Mexican Navy is being modernized, although slowly. As projected in last year’s review, Mexico has announced an order for six 844-ton economic zone surveillance corvettes from Spain. Mexico is also in the market for large patrol boats to replace the 38 World War Il-built mine warfare craft used as patrol ships. It has held discussions with Sweden and Brazil on building as many as 45 patrol boats or small corvettes—some to be constructed in Mexico.
Venezuela: The Venezuelan military force is among the fastest growing in Latin America. The pending acquisition of as many as 48 F-16 fighters will be a quantum increase in the country’s military prowess.
As has been occurring throughout Latin America, old border disputes are surfacing once again in the northern area of the continent. Venezuela claims more than half of Guyana as its national territory. Obviously, Guyana, possessing two 60-foot North Korean-donated patrol craft, one 103- foot British-built patrol boat, and a small army, cannot cope with this challenge alone. The country does have one strong friend—Brazil. In addition, Colombia-Venezuela tensions have increased concerning disputed coal-rich territory in the Guajura Peninsula.
Argentina: The immediate concern for the Argentine Navy continues to be the territorial dispute with Chile at the southern tip of the continent. Tension in the area peaks with each new incident and then wanes. Early in the year, Argentina arrested a Chilean military team surveying the area. The sovereignty of this disputed territory is currently being arbitrated by the Pope. History suggests that mediation, even by men of such high character, generally results in a decision based upon compromise and seldom has this resolved the problem. Although this dispute is not serious enough to drive Argentina and Chile to war, the issue will continue to provide a source of friction, and if combined with other circumstances, could become very serious.
The Argentine Government has signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to conduct a joint research and development study of the indigenous fishing industry. The Soviet Fishing Ministry is to provide one or more research ships, and six Argentine scientists will make the deployments. Both countries will share the information gained. This arrangement evokes two observations. First, Communism is not contagious. There is probably not a more ardent anti-Communist government in South America than Argentina. Second, the Soviets are able to make such agreements because that nation is offered little competition in this field.
As reported last year, the Argentine Navy is well on its way to solving much of its material problems through various building programs. Nothing has occurred during the year to upset the ambitious building program- which includes six submarines aim four 3,360-ton and six 1,470-ton missile-equipped frigates. On 6 December 1980, the keel of the first “TR-1700 ' class submarine, Santa Cruz, was lam in Emden; the first two "Meko-360 - class frigates have been launched by Blohm and Voss at Hamburg; and. m April 1981, the keel was laid at R*° Santiago for the first “Meko-140 frigate. All of these units will become operational between 1983 and 1988, they will give Argentina the mos' powerful fleet in Latin America. On 30 July 1981, the Argentine Navy commissioned the third of a trio ot French “A-69”-class frigates—the Granville.
Argentina’s coast guard is als° growing. Twenty new patrol boats built in West Germany were recently placed in service, and three of a class of five 200-nautical mile econorm0 zone patrol corvettes (of the same type as is being built for Mexico) have been launched in Spain.
Brazil: Brazil has always been a nation of contrasts. In spite of a continuing balance-of-payments problem caused primarily by oil imports, the navy has embarked on a modest flee modernization. A training version 0 the Niteroi-class frigate was laid down at the Rio Arsenal in July 1981. Braz1 has designed a frigate class to replaCj- the Fletcher-class destroyers, whic
Were recently demoted to an ocean Patrol status, and the ten aging Imperial Marinheiro-class corvette types. These new 1,600-ton ships will be built in Brazil, and 60% of their cost will be spent in the country. Twelve units are projected; the first four were ordered in November 1981. and the last is expected to be completed by 1990. Brazil is currently designing a submarine for indigenous production. Construction is not expected to begin for three to five years. Construction of two helicopter and V/STOL fighter carriers in Brazil is being studied as a means of replacing fhe 38-year-old light carrier Minas Gerais.
At first glance, the scope of such a Program might not seem to be signif- ■cant. Before this plan is passed over lightly, however, two past achievements must be kept in mind. First, in two decades, Brazil has become one of the world's leading merchant ship builders. This was accomplished by Producing medium-sized general cargo carriers and not by building 200,000-ton supertankers—which
Would inflate the tonnage figure. Sec- °nd, Brazil has become a major arms exPorter. During 1981. military hardware sales abroad totaled more than billion. Brazilian armored vehicles—the Urutu, Cascavel, and Jar- aca—have performed well in the Iraq- Iran War, and Brazilian-built and -deigned aircraft—some of them military-—are selling well around the World. Brazil has a 300-man military mission in Iraq. As has happened to ’he nation in the past, Brazil's projected naval program could be adversely influenced by many unforeseen factors. Yet. in the past 20 years, Brazil has developed an adequate industrial base to achieve these goals.
Chile: Tensions between Chile and Argentina continue at the bottom of the continent. As noted in the Argentine section, a Chilean survey team was seized in 1981. Also, late last year, the Chilean fishing trawler Mini) was seized by the Argentine destroyer Rosales off the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. Her confiscated cargo was sold for $390,000.
The Chilean Navy has been under tremendous pressure since the overthrow of the Allende Government in 1973. Following that event, an effective international arms embargo had been maintained against Chile until the last several years. During this period, tensions mounted with two neighbors—Argentina and Peru—that had grown significantly in military strength.
In 1981, Chile received the first significant relief from its arms problems: 50 AMX-30 tanks and other ground arms were acquired from France. Indigenous production of the Swiss Mowag amphibious light armored vehicle fine was begun. Two “Type- 209” submarines are being built in Germany and are expected to join the fleet in 1983 and 1984. The first of two French-designed Batral-class landing ships was launched in Chile; both units will be operational by late 1982. Chile has purchased the light cruiser Norfolk and a fleet oiler from Great Britain. Israel delivered the first of two 400-ton Resliev-class guided missile patrol boats in late 1979, the second in 1980, and additional units from the Israeli inventory may yet follow. Finally, Chile reportedly ordered two Descnbierta-class frigates from Spain in May 1981.
What does the future hold? Great Britain has reportedly offered to sell the V/STOL aircraft carrier Hermes to Chile when that ship is prematurely discarded in 1983, but that would also mean purchasing a complement of expensive Sea Harrier aircraft, for the Hermes' ski-jump bow and lack of catapult and arrestor gear precludes the use of conventional fixed-wing shipboard aircraft. The price for joining the carrier club is probably too high for Chile, although the navy strongly desires to rival Argentina in that field. Chile is attempting, through such arrangements as the construction of the French landing ship design, to develop its own naval shipbuilding capability. Production of its own patrol units is an achievable goal and one which will probably be pursued.
Colombia: Cuban “exports" have also had setbacks in Colombia. In March, the Colombian Army defeated Cuban-trained and -armed guerrillas, and Colombia suspended relations with Cuba. Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have since joined together in an informal security agreement.
In the spring of 1980, the Colombian Navy signed a letter of intention to buy four “FS-1500” frigates from West Germany’s Howaldtswerke. Construction began in early 1981. and the first was scheduled to be completed on 20 July 1982. The United States is seeking to provide aid in stopping the flow of Colombian narcotics to the United States through the lease of two decommissioned Aslie- ville-class patrol boats, while Colombia’s customs service is undergoing a rejuvenation of its patrol boat force and a new coast guard has been established with the commissioning of its first patrol boat, the Olaya Herrera (a U. S.-built 105-foot Swiftship), taking place on 10 October 1981.
Ecuador: Ecuador’s major border
The Peruvian Navy’s submarine force, the largest in Latin America, is made up °f three classes: (from top to bottom by class/name) Dos de Mayo (lead ship), Guppy-IA (La Pedrera), and “Type-209” (Casma).
A small navy’s capabilities can be improved rapidly by putting missiles on patrol boats as was done when the Ecuadorian Navy recently installed four Israeli-built Gabriel missiles on its Manta-class torpedo boats.
clash with Peru in January 1981 and the death of President Jaime Roldos Aquilera in an air accident four months later have shaken the nation. The war proved to be very expensive; Ecuador totally mobilized its military.
The first two of six Italian-built corvettes were scheduled to join the fleet in the past few months; four more have been launched. It is doubtful, however, the Ecuadorians will make any other major naval acquisitions in 1982.
Peru: At the end of January 1981, the long-standing border dispute between Peru and Ecuador erupted. Peru charged that Ecuadorian forces had occupied three abandoned Peruvian outposts in the Condor Mountains, and Peru then launched a well- conceived and -executed attack. Peruvian air, land, and sea units were ordered to the border area in order to pin down Ecuadorian units. On 28 January, Peru’s Soviet-built Mi-8 “Hip” helicopters devastated Ecuadorian outposts. Then three Peruvian amphibians, supported by surface combatants, landed 100 vehicles—tanks, armored cars, and trucks—north of Talara, near the border. A cease fire was effected after Peru gained its objectives, and is being monitored by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States.
As explained in last year’s review, numerous border areas are being disputed by Latin American nations. The root of the problem is that Spain had no need to establish precise boundaries among its contiguous colonies.
Peru continues to gradually upgrade the strength of its submarine and destroyer forces. On 19 December 1980, the first of four German-built “Type- 209” submarines joined the fleet; all are to be in service by the end of 1982. The Peruvians already have two “Type-209s,” two “Guppy-IAs,” and four Dos de Mayo-class submarines. For the past 30 years, Peru has had the largest submarine fleet in Latin America. Three additional Dutch destroyers (one of them damaged by fire and possibly intended only for cannibalization) have been purchased for $12.7 million. This makes seven former Dutch destroyers in the fleet. The last of six French-built 610-ton guided missile corvettes of the “PR-72-560” class was commissioned in September 1981.
Except for six submarines and one old Fletcher-class destroyer, all major combatants—five submarines, three cruisers, seven destroyers, and two frigates—have been built in Europe. Fifteen years ago, Peru had one of the most “American” fleets in Latin America. This trend away from American hardware is taking place throughout Latin America.
As both the United States and the Soviet Union focus increasing attention on the Caribbean, the ramifications of the actions of each will become correspondingly complex. The
United States had better acknowledge the fact that any unilateral intervention in Latin America will not go unchallenged. The Monroe Doctrine is dormant—if not dead. This doctrine might well have died in 1962 when the Soviet Union was permitted to retain military personnel in Cuba after the Missile Crisis. Now, for any U.S. action in the Caribbean to be successful, it must be supported by Mexico, Venezuela, and other Latin American powers.
Hot spots are difficult to predict. However, given Cuban activity in the Caribbean, plus the numerous border disputes that exist throughout Latin America, there are bound to be some clashes. As Latin American nations grow in the ability to produce their own arms, these border disputes are going to be increasingly difficult to control.
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The United States still perceives Latin America to be a source of raw materials and does not seriously think of the southern fleets as assets in the East-West conflict. Two post-World War II developments should cause a reevaluation of this perception. First, the growing number of hot spots in the Caribbean creates more of a need for friends with naval muscle. Second, if an East-West confrontation should take place, the United States migh1 not have enough time to become “the arsenal of democracy” again. Surely it is not that today. A future war migh* well have to be won with what the West has on hand. Latin American navies could be a valuable asset.