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One of the components of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's proposed 600-ship Navy is a force of 100 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). While, on the surface, this appears a modest increase above the previous goal of 90 SSNs, the increase may be one of the most difficult parts of the Lehman program to achieve.
Several factors contribute to make this a difficult proposition:
► The U. S. Navy is only now reaching the previous goal of 90 submarines, which was established more than a decade ago, but not attained because of a slowdown in proposed SSN construction rates.
► A large number of older submarines will be retired in the 1980s and early 1990s—probably 19 SSNs and five diesel attack submarines.
► There is a lack of available analytical justification for submarine force levels compared with most other naval ship types.
► Several Navy leaders state that the actual number of SSNs necessary to undertake all U. S. Navy submarine missions is significantly higher than 100, with the numbers 130 and 141 having been given in congressional testimony. This range of numbers has introduced uncertainty on the part of several key decision-makers.
► Admiral H. G. Rickover. the most influential proponent of nuclear submarines, is no longer in the Navy.
This is not to imply that a force of 100—or more—nuclear attack submarines cannot be attained. Rather.
although a 10% increase over the current submarine force levels may seem modest in terms of the cost of the proposed increase in carrier battle groups and amphibious lift, the issue may be much more complicated.
The Navy currently has 88 attack submarines in commission: 64 modern SSNs (SSN-594 class and later), II early SSNs, eight ex-Polaris SSBNs, and five diesel submarines (SSs).*
Another 41 attack submarines of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class are under construction or have been authorized through fiscal year 1983. These submarines are scheduled to join the fleet by 1990-91. However, by that time, the early SSNs, ex-Polaris SSBNs, and the last of the diesel attack submarines will have been decommissioned or have only a couple of years of service life remaining. This will result in a submarine force of only some 80 attack submarines in the early 1990s—20 submarines short of the new force goal.
During the 1990s, the 13 attack submarines of the Permit (SSN-594) class, as well as the earliest submarines of the Sturgeon (SSN-637) class, will have surpassed more than 30 years in commission, probably their maximum ser-
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Proceedings / June 1982