Thank God for the Sitting Ducks!

When Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived in Pearl Harbor to take command of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, he found defeatism rampant. Although this may have been understandable under the circumstances, Nimitz would not condone it. He wanted to send his few carriers out as soon as possible to raid the Japanese positions in the Marshall Islands. Nimitz, of course, had no carrier experience, and his staff, including the more senior air officers, strongly cautioned that surprise would not be possible and that Nimitz might be jeopardizing our last remaining line of defense in the Pacific.

On 7 January, one month after the day of infamy, Admiral “Bull” Halsey returned to Pearl Harbor on board the Enterprise (CV-6). The next day, he barged into the CinCPac conference and cleared the air by sounding off loudly, and no doubt profanely, against the defeatism he likewise found. As the senior and most experienced carrier admiral in the Navy, he endeared himself to Nimitz by backing him and his raiding plan to the hilt. The plan was successful, and Nimitz’s affection for Halsey, while recognizing his shortcomings, is said to have stemmed in large part from that incident. Truly, it is in such momentous times that great men—and great nations—come to the fore.

Today is such a momentous time for this great nation—once again a time for us to demonstrate the quality of our leadership, as we ponder the troubling events in Poland, the continued Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the inconclusive results of the first round of theater nuclear negotiations in Geneva, the coming round of strategic arms reduction talks, Cuban-backed insurgency that is building daily in Central America, disparate allied views on each of these critical matters, and the mounting debate over the President's budget, a budget which seeks billions more for defense while making significant reductions to the federal budget in other areas of domestic interest. And therein lies the rub.

The "Great Defense Debate" is upon us, make no mistake about it. But what a fickle society we are—a nation which little more than one year ago called for a change in our national leadership, giving that leadership a mandate to rebuild our defense posture and to reassert our position of leadership in the Free World, now hears many cry out in confused anguish as the Commander in Chief steps forward to execute that mandate. It seems that just as rapidly as we had become alarmed over the massive Soviet buildup of strategic arms, the Soviet violation of the territorial sovereignty of one of its neighbors to the south, and the considerable instability in the Middle East and elsewhere, many now conclude that security issues are no longer a primary consideration. They challenge the proposed expenditures for the defense buildup, taking refuge under the traditionally comfortable but specious logic that throwing money at defense will buy precious little security; that waste, fraud, and inefficiency are commonplace management tools of the Pentagon bureaucracy; and that all the brass hats really want is the biggest, most costly, gold-plated weapons they can conjure up.

High on the list of targets for emotional debate will surely be the two nuclear-powered dinosaurs being sought by the Navy. Six-point-eight billion dollars for two Nimitz-class carriers is an incredible sum of money by anyone’s standards! “How can you Navy leaders be so insensitive as to propose spending that much money on just two ships at a time when this country faces so many other critical needs?” The answer is simple: Our narrow margin of maritime superiority over the Soviet Navy has vanished. Our position of preeminence among the world's navies must be restored. We must be a Navy "second to none,” a relative position which this country allowed to be eroded away during a decade of weak resolve, while the Soviet Union pursued its commitment toward building a first-class oceangoing naval force.

Happily, we now find ourselves with an Administration determined to reverse the trends of the last ten years through a major investment in our Navy to ensure that we compete effectively with the Soviets—to make certain that we can say once again, with confidence, that we possess clear naval superiority over the Soviets, particularly when our allied contribution is counted.

A major aspect of this naval buildup is the absolute requirement to increase the level of our offensive strength at sea—which the President’s budget signals by its determination to support our concept of maximizing the employment of cruise missiles on submarines, surface ships, and aircraft, and by commencing now—not later— to build two additional nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

So, let us examine the aircraft carrier issue by focusing on three points: air power at sea, vulnerability, and cost.

When we set all the flim-flam and hyperbole aside, and face up to the real issue, it all comes down to an understanding of the requirement for air power. When you think carrier, you must think air power or, as some would say, air superiority—the sine qua non for battle area control. The last major battle won on land or sea without control of the air occurred in World War I—before the advent of air power. Every tactical commander in the field today knows that without control of the airspace over the battle zone, the risks on the surface are fundamentally unacceptable.

► Air power led to the destruction of the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.
► Air power provided the victory at Midway.
► Air power permitted a successful landing at Normandy and the subsequent use of our land forces to the destruction of Nazi Germany.
► Air power produced the Marianas turkey shoot.
► Air power gave the Seventh Fleet total dominance in the Tonkin Gulf in Vietnam.
► And air power today places at great risk the high level of Soviet investment in their surface fleet.

Now, let me be the first to acknowledge that air power can come from either land or sea—and perhaps some day from space. But, in the professional opinion of this naval officer and my principal advisors, the time when air superiority can be achieved and maintained in vital ocean areas from either land or space is decades away.

► The aircraft carrier gives us air superiority at sea—whenever and wherever we deem it vital to our interests.
► The aircraft carrier is the primary difference between our offensive capability and that of the Soviet Union.
► The aircraft carrier resolves the real issue: the issue of air power at sea.

We cannot permit ourselves to relinquish air superiority to the Soviets through lack of resolve or understanding of its tactical importance. The President’s budget precludes such an option from becoming a reality, as the aircraft carrier will continue to be a dominant factor in naval warfare long into the future.

Now, let me address two issues that repeatedly dominate the carrier debate—vulnerability and cost.

When we think vulnerability, we really must consider detectability and survivability. Can there be any doubt that the 90,000-ton carrier Nimitz (CVN-68) can be detected at sea? Of course not. The question is, relative to what? To one which is half this size? Or a quarter this size? Should detectability drive the decision on carrier size? Many say it should.

Well, the Soviets and we each have systems today that can detect the 40,000-ton carrier, or 25,000-ton carrier, or, for that matter, a 3,000-ton frigate with equal facility. In essence, technology has made size a relatively unimportant criterion in the art of detection. And likewise, technology provides us with the capability of confusing or deceiving any radar or electronic-sensing device, or even optical system, as to which target at sea is the carrier whatever the size.

Is a ship operating at sea, constantly on the move, any more vulnerable than a fixed land base, which can be targeted with absolute assurance? Of course not. The true “sitting duck" is the fixed land base, not the mobile, sea-based airfield.

Concerning survivability, the Nimitz, with more than 2,000 watertight compartments, is designed and constructed to permit this ship to go in harm's way, to accept battle damage, and to continue to fight. She is not designed carelessly or recklessly, nor with bigness for bigness’ sake in mind. She was designed with survivability in mind.

In 1969, the USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) had nine 500-pound bombs explode on her flight deck, the equivalent of being hit by six Soviet guided missiles. Not only did the Enterprise survive, but within several hours—not days, or weeks, but several hours—was capable of conducting flight operations.

It is important to examine a second lesson from recent history, remembering that in Vietnam more than 400 aircraft were destroyed and 4.000 additional aircraft were damaged on the ground—on land bases—while not one single aircraft on board a carrier was destroyed or damaged by enemy action throughout that conflict. Nor should we forget that every airfield constructed in Vietnam was lost in its entirety. Even more striking, at least one of them has been turned against us, as the Soviet Union today operates with impunity from the field that was built there.

So much for vulnerability.

Then there is the issue of cost. But, cost is a relative thing and must be kept in perspective.

I vividly remember the intense controversy that broke out over the construction of the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Enterprise. In 1958 that ship cost the U. S. taxpayer $451 million—to the hue and cry of a wide body of military critics who exclaimed. "Nothing is worth that much." The Enterprise is more than 21 years old and will operate for at least another 25 years. Thus, the $451 million we then invested amortizes the cost to the taxpayer at $10 million per year over the lifespan of this incredible warship—one heck of a bargain. We would be less than objective if we failed to appreciate that these two new “gold-plated" big decks we seek to build and have with us for half a century will look like a similar bargain 20 years from now. In dollars per ton, today’s Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate costs 18 times as much as the Enterprise.

CVN Program Savings (CVN-72/73 Multiship vs. Traditional; CVN-71 Early Delivery)

TOA ($ Millions)
	FY-82	FY-83	FY-84	FY-85	FY-86	FY-87	Total
Traditional	475	583	3,056	945	2,965	—	8,024
Multi-ship	475	6,795	—	—	—	—	7,270
Savings	—	(6212)	3,056	945	2,965	—	754
Outlays ($ Millions)
	FY-82	FY-83	FY-84	FY-85	FY-86	FY-87	To Complete	Total
Traditional	72	210	422	524	774	1,102	4,920	8,024
Multi-ship	72	235	482	780	929	1,374	3,398	7,270
Difference	—	25	60	256	155	272	(1522)	(754)

CVN-71 Early Delivery:

Contract Delivery Date: February 1988
Special Incentive Target Date: December 1986
Summary of CVN-71 Savings if Target Date is achieved:
Escalation Savings	$53M
Time Related Fixed Cost Savings	$42M
Subtotal	$95M
Special Incentive Payment	$21M
Net Savings to the Government	$74M

Improved Delivery CVN-71, CVN-72, CVN-73

Delivery To The Fleet
Ship	Program Year	Traditional Delivery	Multiship Est Delivery	Delivery Improved By
CVN-71	1980	Feb-88	Dec-86	14 Mos
CVN-72	1984	Oct-91	Dec-89	22 Mos
CVN-73	1986	Oct-93	Dec-91	22 Mos
			Total	58 Mos

Then there are the critics who bemoan the fact that we have spent so much money on aircraft carriers that we are prevented from looking out after our other naval needs—another myth that simply will not stand up to scrutiny. In the past ten years, we have built only two aircraft carriers. In the past 20 years, we have constructed five. This investment has consumed a sum total of 3.5% of our ship construction funds, or less than 1% of our total naval investment over that period— hardly an expenditure which has jeopardized the development of our other Navy programs.

Finally, on almost a daily basis, one hears the charge that our tradition-bound Navy leadership steadfastly refuses to consider the small, cheap carrier. The officers and men who served in ships like the Gambier Bay (CVE-73), Casablanca (CVE-55), and Dan Gallery’s Guadalcanal (CVE-60) must laugh every time they hear this criticism directed our way. In World War II, the Navy possessed more than 90 carriers at the height of the conflict. More than 70 of them were the small, cheap, inexpensive carrier which the reformists of today allege that we know nothing about. In World War II, after the advent of the Essex-class carriers, we lost one of our first-line carriers to enemy action; we lost ten small carriers. We have more combat experience in small carriers than any other kind. Since World War II, we have continued to operate literally dozens of small carriers. Even today, the U. S. Navy continues to operate 12 ships— i.e., the LPHs and LHAs—that meet the small carrier definition of the reformists. And the President’s current budget proposes the development of a new class of small flattop, the LHD, that will provide further flexibility in our total air-capable complex.

Every study we have done that I am aware of, which compares the large deck with the small deck, has shown that the most cost-effective solution to our carrier requirements, whether using vertical lift airplanes or the conventional ones on board the Nimitz, is the biggest, most survivable, carrier we can build. The Nimitz is that ship. And the Nimitz is the Navy's choice.

So much for the debate on why the Reagan Administration seeks two new, beautiful, nuclear-powered, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. The issue is air power. The issue is vulnerability and survivability. The issue is cost-effectiveness. The issue is being able to go in harm's way—and win. The issue is restoring this country’s naval superiority.