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Technology and technologists, particularly within A the Defense Department, have been criticized ecently for making our military systems too com- ,ex and costly. The value of developing and em- °ying new or improved technology is being seri- t usly questioned, usually with the implication that e COsts incurred are not worth the gains to be n a lzed- Some even advocate reduction of the tech- ca °ky *3aSC SO ^at numt)er °f competing ideas !1 be more readily assimilated, tw he ddemma we face in military technology is °-sided. On one side, there is the position of for- th^ Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who said fro techn°l°gy will save us. The advantages gained them aPPjying new technology properly will offset a, Cor>siderable numerical advantage enjoyed by css technically advanced opponent, son °nuversely-a significant number of informed per- jje|-S aave said that technology will kill us. They t 'eve that applying technology to our defense sys- hi ,s 0n|y leads to marginal improvements for too cont 3 C°St 'n dodars and complexity. They a ena that a sound approach should be based on i,i„Ulrini large numbers of relatively good but simple ^sterns.
cho'nCe World War ff’ the military’s leadership has pr Sea’ for the most part, a high technology ap- a ni ut0 m'htary systems. This path resulted from ^aiber of factors which included: of . ^ tTar II Success: Some very impressive use Plicafhn0l08y Was made *n World War II, and ap- situai0n *n a number of cases reversed unfavorable Used;ons or helped avoid difficult alternatives. The ancj ,.radar to deny submarines the surface at night With V^'Hation of the need for an invasion of Japan homh "e develoPment/empIoyment of the atomic y are two examples.
Untlj technology Lead: The U. S. enjoyed the of.. Pfted and unchallenged technical leadership lene e, ^0rld following World War II. When chal- res j the Soviets’ space effort in the 1950s, it C nded effectively to regain its leadership. lh%i°uitra.'ned Budgets: It has been widely believed syste ^ Us‘n8 a technology lead to acquire individual enernrns 'Markedly superior to those of potential vidin'eS’ Perce'ved leverage would permit prohigh 8 an adequate defense with a smaller, but
In e technol°gy f°rce-
evaluating the high technology approach, it is
exa al,ack submarine USS Albuquerque (SSN-706), titles ' ^ e °T our most advanced military technology, durjn ,l,l° ll'e Thames River at Groton, Connecticut, er launching ceremony in March.
useful to consider the most recent 100 years of history where “modern” technology has played an important role. It is significant that no weapon system or concept remained dominant through more than several decades. In fact, without a major (revolutionary) change in its capabilities, no platform remained paramount for very long.
Tremendous physical barriers and “natural boundaries” have fallen during the past century due to technological advances and others are still being assaulted. Heavier-than-air and submarine platforms gave warfare a third dimension (the vertical) and restrictive limits on performance were set aside as the jet engine was introduced, the sound barrier was broken, and the snorkel and then nuclear power were developed. Each new capability provided a significant advantage to the developer; but, in each case, time and subsequent developments discounted the value of the gain.
A historical review of technology over the past century or so would yield some important lessons;
► A dedicated, continuing and broad-based technology effort is imperative for any major world power.
► Success in top-of-the-line technology can make a substantial difference.
► Systems do not remain dominant forever.
► When comparable technology is similarly employed by both sides, numbers usually become a dominant factor.
► The most significant technology may not necessarily be what is most impressive.
► Leadership must employ the new technology wisely.
Two key observations can be made from these lessons about military technology. First, significant technical advance tends to revolutionize combat; second, a technical advance, even major, does not guarantee long-term advantage. However, some advantages may provide great leverage during their short lives. The role of evolutionary technology is to take the capability of a “breakthrough” and improve upon it. Early generations of new technology systems usually lead to rapid, real improvement in capability. Progress can be profitable for many years, but frequently a point is reached where the system becomes increasingly difficult to improve upon. Eventually, this trend becomes counterproductive, because significant effort is required to achieve even small gains and often leads to complex and high- cost products (see Figure 1).
Examples of such results have spurred on the “anti-research and development" school currently being heard. Yet an indisputable fact is that research and development (R & D) has often paid off with great technical advances, and meaningful payoffs in the future could be the “baby we throw out with the bathwater” if we take the anti-technologists too seriously.
It is important to note that significant technology
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often leads to advances appropriately measured on a logarithmic scale. The relationship between search rates and search areas illustrates how dramatically some time and space values have changed over the years. As search capabilities have increased and the relative available sea room has diminished, the likelihood of finding a similar-type force has increased markedly.
A century ago, months were spent in locating an opponent on the surface. The time has now been compressed in many cases to hours or at most days by the combined effect of radar, aircraft, and propulsion technologies. In the face of new technology, it is worth considering the capabilities that satellite surveillance, missile-firing submarines, and long- range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMPA) bring to naval warfare.
Today, the maneuver area of a surface task force barely exceeds the area that a single LRMPA can search in a normal operating day. Of course, reaching the area to be searched by LRMPA may be constrained by the lack of suitable operating bases in the area of interest, or the transit distance to the general area in which the surface force is operating. In essence, though, the LRMPA can search in a single day virtually the whole maneuver area (area of
uncertainty) that a surface force is capable 0 achieving. The implication is that—with a reason able basing structure and an efficient search—a s! gle LRMPA can track a surface force on a da*' basis. Two aircraft should be able to do it dul readily. a
When we consider space-based sensors, wit*1 nominal search capability of a few million sqt*a miles per day, the surface force is confronted by a even more difficult problem. The satellite can pr0 ably locate the surface force one or more times P day. When the combined capabilities of the satell* and an antiship cruise missile (200-nautical a1^ range) nuclear submarine (SSGN) are consider^ • the force being surveilled cannot free itself fr° threat of an engagement short of destruction of submarine (or satellite). Failing this, it must eva or destroy the resulting missile attack. This situat* represents a new top-of-the-line threat. A more
with
tech-
orable P'cture for the surface force would probably ,Xlst in limited war, Third World, and home water °Ur side of the ocean with SSGN maneuvers rented) operations.
to evertheless, the message is clear, the latitude fr roam fer and wide on the ocean surface, relatively from enemy observation or likelihood of en- Sement, is far more restricted than ever before. sip10^ 9uest'ons for today’s leaders are: How Cg i. cant are these changes? Can cover and de- Va^|Ion or distribution buy back some of the ad- an *°st’ or are more submerged platforms the 0f We^ The most fundamental issue is the nature the -> C corr|f,atant roles .for surface platforms in su u St centurY- Tradeoffs among characteristics r n as platform speed and weapon speed might eal changed but still substantial roles for various
^stems Th • .
e P°>nts raised thus far argue strongly in favor evevoltUi°nary technology. More imperative, how- ve]' *S Pursu't of major efforts to find and defind *3 nCW waYs °f Pe|Torming our missions—or qui 'n^ new m'ssi°ns- Directing these efforts re- aric]rehs aPpreciation of what technology should do Pav ff'^ can emPloyecl- We should avoid low °tt improvements; too often, they lead to opti- ln8 an obsolete approach.
te^ere do we encounter difficulty in dealing no,no'°8y? It is all too easy to visualize using our ^ t0 'mProve existing systems and to reinforce vitjeCLV'rer|t way of doing business. The need to pro- qiientl C ^roPer capability at the right time is fre- Sou , y frustrated. Marginal improvements are alter 1 ^0r ^ar to° *on8 ar*d often at the expense of ^natives that offer major steps forward.
the (-,rnf>'‘cat'n8 the case for new developments is Which"1 are °^ten harbinger of systems
f°Ptah|may SWeeP away that with which we are comare e. ® ant* familiar. Generational improvements ThdSffr l° ^ea* w't*1 'n our systems a°d psyches. $etlSo hrst generations of a weapon, platform, or erati P °^en represent major advances; later gen- the kns ten^ to refine characteristics. Frequently, faster UtC ^orce approach prevails; bigger, better, °bje H^re powerful, and all-weather become the neCe ■1VeS- The resulting sophistication does not The eSar'ly represent fruitful technical advance, and rl,ln’ k°u8ht at high cost, is seldom employed cond ,a^ even complicate system use under normal Wh0Ql0ns; This is a situation often cited by those The iestlon tf|e value of technology over numbers, ternj. esson to be drawn is that refinements to sys- investreaC^ a PO'nt of diminishing return for added nevv ment; The crossover point is approached, a pr0Vj lrection is indicated, and technology often interjm^ °eW ^‘recti°n or opportunity. In the • once the decision is made, we should use current systems as constructed, seeking to optimize their utility through such measures as improvements in employment and maintenance or assignment to a less demanding role.
New or different systems and approaches are not always the correct answer. Sometimes it is wisest to keep or improve what one has. But as no one admits to working on “bad” technology, this can be a thorny problem. What determines technology’s value is the use to which it can be put. The total payoff must exceed the total costs involved. Good technology can simplify operations, logistics, or support, and reduce costs while supplying new or improved capabilities. Intelligent management across the full range of development efforts is needed to ensure a wise use of resources. It must be realized, too, that development risks are necessary—the full value of new technology has seldom been adequately calculated in advance.
While the technology community must share the blame, there is plenty to go around. To a large extent, we have become programmers, driven by budget considerations, manipulating near-term force levels without enough detailed thought given to the long-term consequences in a changing environment. The accountant’s approach (financially
based analysis) applied to defense matters too often opts for short-term profit to keep our stock high while mortgaging the future. In particular, the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) process, with its continual review and justification procedures, slows and sometimes blocks the implementation of new ideas.
Most new systems seem to be scrubbed and refined so that they become all things to all people. Many of the reviewers may hold only vague knowledge of the technical and operational issues involved and are swayed by the most glib advocates. Frequently, there is a desire to take only a “safe” approach. Improvements are expressed as being faster, higher, bigger, stronger, etc., because these qualities are readily accepted as yielding “better” performance.
The role of system analysis is also significant. Performance comparisons of improved systems are readily examined, while the advantages of greater numbers or an alternate approach are not easily measured and thus largely ignored. Analysis from a known, familiar base is easy to sell and often leads to the most acceptable solution. Analysts work in a world defined by linear, two-dimensional relationships. This may be the greatest fault of the process. Sophistication becomes an end in itself, which is a goal that stands in marked contrast to the Soviet axiom: Better is the enemy of good enough. In essence, we frequently seek the wrong answers from technology. The real danger is that in our haste to improve the Navy, we will overlook the changes that offer the best opportunities of all.
We frequently turn to the results of past warfare to guide us in assessing the relative value and proper use of systems. Historical results are obvious, but the lessons are frequently misunderstood. One can reasonably ask what current developments could influence future warfare as much as radar, the aircraft, the carrier task force, the blitzkrieg, and the submarine have in the past. Current candidates for the advancement of naval warfare capabilities are:
►Semi-autonomous weapons
►Antiship missiles, such as Harpoon and Tomahawk
►Tomahawk land attack missile
► “Smart” mines
►Quiet and fast submarines
► Electronic warfare
► Improved underseas weapons
►Wide area ocean surveillance
►Agile radars—Aegis represents the first deployed generation.
The side which continues to identify the areas of leverage, then develops and employs them most effectively will probably enjoy a major advantage in several areas. The challenge for the military leadership is to acquire the right combination and use the systems effectively in a changing environment.
What is the modern equivalent of the blitzkrieg °r a broken enemy code? The level of warfare, nuclei or non-nuclear, will play heavily in determining which instruments are most useful and how they are best employed. Prudence would lead us to be pre' pared to meet both possibilities.
Waiting their turn are unproved but potentially important developments in: autonomous weaponS' directed energy systems: worldwide, real-time surveillance; and space weapon systems. ,
Making the right decisions will require a broa understanding of the technology and its relationship to warfare capabilities. Some of the proposed de' velopments may raise moral issues similar to thns<- that surround or surrounded chemical, biologic*' submarine, and nuclear warfare systems. But failure to cope with the issues and dangers involved rna- be the greatest peril of all. Moral rightness ProV‘^ little protection when facing a serious threat in 1,1 field. Do we desire to control space or will we con tinue to hope no one tries to gain control there? ^ we prepared to cope with limited tactical nuclear' chemical, or biological warfare if thrust upon us- The fundamental question is: Will the weap°n^ systems, tactics, and strategy necessary to provl for an adequate common defense tomorrow c° tinue to be developed? Technology is not the ‘ c prit" in system effectiveness, cost, and complex*1.^ The primary culprits are misunderstanding, A11.
management, and lack of insight. These are
manl;
fested as a lack of discipline when decisions commitments are made regarding technology-
an°
\Ve
must plan as well as program. The responsibihO
,foUr
from
widespread and extends to virtually all facets 01 society; however, the greatest problems arise 1- ^ a decision process which involves too many "L vested interests and too little knowledge of the bus issues. c.
Somehow, the complex decision process tot quiring weapon systems needs the same scrud applied to it that critics rightfully demand for eV ^ uating the weapon systems themselves. The te nical base needs strong continuing support; the P cess for selecting and determining how to use results needs substantial improvement. The 0- answer may not be obvious, but blaming techno* - is the wrong answer.
- ,of“
Editor s Note: This article is a condensation Jgj larger work by Captain Seeslwltz. Single c°P'e^ the 37-page manuscript may be obtained by ]i'rl ‘ to the Proceedings and enclosing $2.50.
M
lT
Caplain Seesholtz earned a Ph.D. in oceanography from * jjsS in 1968. He commanded the USS Dolphin (AGSS-555) an ^e(
Ajax (AR-6). and has been the technology planner of l£e uar>' of Naval Operations' Long Range Planning Group since r '
1980.
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Proceedings
June • j