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They know how to put a man in orbit and they know how to build a navy with ships and people that look at least as squared away as ours. They also know how to play the propaganda game to convince the world that military muscle and space achievements alone confer superpower status. Not so; a superpower ought to be able to feed its people, open its borders, and tolerate dissidence.
Around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu said, “Know the enemy and the battle is half won.”1 The United States has failed to "know” its number one enemy.
The contrast between the United States and the Soviet Union is crucial to understanding their fundamental differences and how each government views its role as a world leader. The United States is a status quo nation, dedicated to preserving peace through world stability. This stability is essential to the trade and commerce upon which our nation depends. The Soviets, in their pursuit of communist doctrine, are dedicated to pursue policies which employ instability as a means to further social change in governments of the world. The Soviets cannot stop their adventurism outside their border without surrendering their leadership in establishing communism throughout the world. They can never abandon adventurism voluntarily.
The Soviets have two principal means of placing communist governments in power. One is by a de facto annexation of the nation, where the government is installed by the Soviets and follows their lead. This is seen in the Warsaw Pact nations. The other is by pursuing wars of national liberation wherein leftists of the working or peasant class overthrow the legitimate government and install a communist
regime, usually friendly to Moscow. Cuba is a g°° example of this type of revolution.
We can best know our enemy and reduce ins!a bility throughout the world by recognizing SoV strengths and weaknesses and directing our fore'? policy accordingly.
Soviet Strengths: The Soviets have adhered to ** doctrine leading to the eventual triumph of MarX's Leninist ideology over the forces of capitalist o
. °cracies. Khrushchev’s “We will bury you” still n8s in our ears.
0j. 0rr>estic security and preserving the legitimacy § the regime are of first concern in maintaining a®viet strength. A police state is established where j c°ntribute to servicing the Soviet nation. Travel c controlled; jobs are controlled; emigration is ^ntrolled; reading material is controlled; the means c Production (food, clothing, transportation) are ntrolled; place of residence is controlled; and
church membership and attendance are discouraged. In the 60 years since the revolution, the Soviet peoples have not risen up against their leadership. They admire strong leadership and take pride in their country’s achievements at home and abroad.
There is a deep sense of nationalism in each Soviet citizen. Whatever its faults for harboring so repressive a regime. Mother Russia can do no serious wrong. George Feifer has observed in his article, “Russian Disorders,”
and
ters vitally to the state, it is specially done
"Even Russians brimming with discontent still tend, with their villagelike patriotism, to rally around the Motherland when it appears to be in trouble. Although ordinary people have more misgivings about the invasion of Afghanistan than the invasion of Czechoslovakia, a Russia-first fundamentalism holds sway. Most Russians are content to believe that their tanks went to the aid of an Afghan people menaced by imperialist interference, as they rescued the Czechoslovak people from a similar danger in 1968.”2 A great strength of the Soviets is their ability to ride. Roman-style, two horses at the same time, even when the horses are diverging. How else can
the general acceptance of Soviet behavior in supporting wars of national liberation while condemning U. S. support of established legitimate governments be explained? The Soviets defend any socialist government from changing to another form of government, even if that new form originates within the socialist nation itself. Reforms are viewed suspiciously. Witness the strong support and high praise for recent moves in Poland to reverse the labor unions movement for government and party reforms.
And what of cohabitation, peaceful coexistence- detente? The Soviets equate detente with the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence, which is designed to obtain unilateral advantages for the Soviets, that is, bind the West while leaving Soviet options unfettered. As a result, Moscow has secured recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe, gained recognition of parity with the United States, and secured some economic benefits from the West a1 bargain rates. The Soviets insist that peaceful coexistence (detente) does not apply to their own activities in the Third World, but it does contest any U. S. program to export counterrevolution. Henry Shapiro, manager of the United Press International office in Moscow from 1939 to 1973, explained this double standard the following way: “The first priority of the Soviet leadership today is detente, whatever they mean by it.”3
A strong military establishment is the base of Soviet strength; the U. S. base rests on a strong technological and industrial complex. By pursuing mu" itary superiority against the United States, Soviej rulers are seeking maximum military power, as wd1 as superiority in the economic-technological ba$e on which all military capabilities must rest.
"The Russians are determined not to be backward, not to be second best, but to be seen as the equals of their chief rival on the world areng I0’ day—the Americans. By today’s standards the greatness of a state is measured by its might as3 nuclear power and its prowess in space. Hence- the Russians will make the sacrifices necessary1(3 attain equality with America, or at least to projee the image of equality, especially in those fields- "In the West, military technology is closely re fated to the general level of technology in the en tire economy. Not so in Russia. If something m;lt'
the chances are that it will be done quite well- Another Soviet strength lies in leadership- J" Soviet Union is a nation of many races and relig'°uS backgrounds. Problems of nationalities within So viet borders have to date been successfully over come because of the consistent leadership of regime, however repressive its methods. .
The Soviet Union has also greatly improved international standing since World War II. R can exert leadership over many countries and appears
capable of extending its influence on a global scale, "rior to World War II, the military strength of GermanY and Japan threatened the Soviet Union at each end of its borders. Since World War II, Germany ar>d Japan have shrunk as important military pow- and the Soviet Union has blossomed. Much of . credit for this reversal can be attributed to a Politburo, members of which have been in power r°nt 20 to 40 years, that has a consistent record in Pursuing its political purpose.
been a noticeable weakening of Soviet stoicism, a weakening of accepting without question government pronouncements on domestic and world affairs, a weakening in the belief that socialism can provide a better life for the working class.
Alcoholism is a problem in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has had the world's steepest rise in alcohol consumption, which now accounts for about
Soviet Weaknesses: Strengths also contain in- crent weaknesses. These weaknesses, if we can ex- P°it them, are the seeds that can grow to destroy 0v*et strength. During the past ten years, there has
a third of all consumer spending in food stores. Bottles are smuggled to work and inebriated workers are common. Labor productivity is the lowest among the industrialized nations of the world. The infant mortality rate has been affected adversely, and life expectancy is declining. An accepted growing killer is alcoholism, together with alcohol-related accidents and diseases. Public health specialists fear a national degeneration through alcoholism.
Civic morale is degenerating also. Although Soviet leadership does not recognize the existence of inflation, it does exist. Prices have soared—by 50% for restaurant meals, carpets, and sheepskin coats in 1980; 100% for gasoline and 300% for coffee in 1978. These rising prices frighten white- and blue- collar workers, most of w hom are earning only slightly more than they did ten years ago. There is an open disenchantment with Soviet leadership not seen before. The feeling that life was better under Stalin and is getting worse under the Brezhnev regime is privately vocalized to friend and stranger alike. "Their chief grievance is nothing more elevated, or less significant, than the system's failure to provide them with what they regard, with Russians' traditionally low expectations, as a tolerable standard of living.”5
Low labor productivity brought on by alcoholism and poor leadership by the partocracy is accentuated by the continual shift of priorities from domestic production to military requirements. The effect on the domestic economy is devastating and adds nothing to the standard of living. Excelling Western weaponry with a relatively primitive economy places an enormous strain on the nation's resources. Ninety percent of the research institutes in Moscow are closed to public scrutiny because they are doing defense work. In addition, the Soviet bureaucracy has grown to a bloated ten million, and superimposed on this is the secret police and the Young Communist League.
In 1971. the majority of the Soviets viewed failures in the economy as growing pains. The hopes were that Western technology would stimulate economic growth and Western consumer goods would raise living standards. The Soviets are now convinced that fewer Western goods are being imported because the country cannot earn the foreign exchange to buy them. Observers on the scene believe Western imports are needed more than ever because
Among the faces the Soviet Union shows the West are the fine-looking Seleznyovs, a small working family who seem to be prospering under a government that tightly controls their travel, jobs, emigration, reading material, and place of residence.
the Soviet economy is drifting into chaos. These developments are seriously damaging morale.
In some ways, however, the Soviet people are living better now than ten years ago because of an increase in the barter economy and outright theft from the state. In the barter economy, much time is spent chasing too few goods, which is time deducted from the productive end of the planned economy. Shops only have the leftovers, and anything of commercial value is siphoned off into the second economy where it costs more. A leather jacket officially priced at an engineer’s monthly salary is never for sale in any store; to make such a purchase, he must pay twice his monthly salary in the secondary economy. To raise the money necessary to buy the goods a Soviet wants, he must steal whatever he has access to. The more that is sold under the counter—at double or triple the official prices— the less that is attainable without participating in this illegal mercantilism. And what of outright theft? It takes all forms and knows no bounds. The chauffeur offers you taxi service during his lunch hour at his employer’s expense. Or the waiter tells you that your lunch will be 72 rubles or S50, if you want to pay in cash dollars. (72 rubles equals S96.) Dollars fetch a blackmarket rate of 4:1. The Soviet economy's chief characteristic is not socialism, but fraud, manipulation, or some kind of deceit.
As socialism weakens Soviet traditionalist values. spiritual foundations may be eroding also. This had led to a religious revival. Soviets want to believe in something bigger and better than themselves. It is difficult for them to tolerate a life-style which lacks purpose, and now there is a return-to-roots search for new values. They are becoming interested in
prerevolutionary ideas and are discussing politics.
Orthodox mass is being attended by a higher proportion of young people than in the past, who are driven by a quest for a new morality and a new purpose. This revival is coupled with right-wing nationalism and old-fashioned Soviet xenophobia. Outsiders are still regarded as corruptors of Mother Russia. There is the feeling that religion is the only salvation. When people are asked why they attend church or believe in the faith, they express their frustration with the emptiness of their contemporary life, and the feeling that religion gives them something to hold on to, something their secular life does not provide, is growing.
Soviet character has been molded by years of oppression. The individual states of the Soviet Union have remained strong only because of the unity generated and demanded by strong central leadership.
“From the Western point of view, one could oppose the government while remaining completely loyal to the nation: this was impossible in Russia, because the absolutist regime was the bond of the state. For the West, pluralism meant freedom and absolutism was suffocation; for Russia, pluralism meant anarchy and single rule was order.”6
The Soviet character yearns for a strong charismatic leader, much like a Stalin but without his repressive policies.
The present regime appears to the Soviet people as one made up of mediocrities. The Soviets' com-
u.
On a collective farm in Odessa, harvesting machinery gathers the crop, but it seems never to be enough, and Soviet ships must come to Free World elevators to temporarily close the Grain Gap that is but one aspect of the communist system’s failure to feed its people.
ments about their leadership are derisive and sharp and spoken more openly than in past years. Life at the top is pictured as an institutionalized stronghold of cradle-to-grave privileges, and the party-KGB- military oligarchy is seen as a hereditary ruling class that passes position and luxury to its children as if by right. Qne official in publishing states, “ Those second-rate hacks [the country's leaders] have the fewest qualities for anything resembling genuine leadership. Who is Brezhnev, this “leader of 260 million people?” Trotsky said that Stalin was an amazing mediocrity to govern all Russia, but by comparison to Brezhnev, Stalin was a genius.’ ”7 Many would return to authoritarian leadership, to the good Tsar. The conviction that the country needs a strong hand is an admission that the Soviet, with his history of disorder, procrastination, anarchy, and drink, needs one.
Another weakness occurs in the agricultural economy. Private plots of the Soviet peasants produce nearly 50% of all consumer agricultural products from less than 3% of the country’s cultivated area.8 The shortages, always a problem in the past, are now enormous. The loss of energy and work hours wasted as workers search for food is a national disgrace. Soviets have memories of hunger, and nothing is so important to Soviet confidence as adequate food supplies: nothing has so undermined the national morale as the growing failure of communism to provide enough.
Procrrdings June 1982
Conclusions: Soviet superpower status results primarily from Soviet propaganda and U. S. self-delusion. The Soviets have proclaimed their country a superpower based on military strength and space flight achievements, and we have accepted this status based on only these accomplishments. The British and the French have nuclear weapons, but they
are not accorded superpower status. The East Germans have gone into space with the Soviets, but East Germany is not a superpower.
Our own dissemination of information must now deflate Soviet status as a superpower and redress the balance to the world. Our foreign policy should define and reflect the following criteria for superpower status:
► A superpower must be able to feed its people. After 60 years of communism, the Soviet people are at a bare subsistence level. Is this the model for Third World nations to adopt?
► A superpower must have a great technological base which can support both domestic and military production. The Soviets have never accomplished this goal. They have neither the managerial leadership of a middle class nor the will and character within the bureaucracy to stimulate the working class. Third World nations should not ask why the capitalist system must be destroyed, but why the “workers' utopia" has produced so little improvement in the standard of living of its people.
► A superpower has no need of tightly controlled borders. If communist ideology is indeed the wave of the future, it need not fear new ideas. The people should be free to compare communism at home with capitalism abroad.
► A superpower shoulders the burdens of others. It takes the lead in solving world health problems. The Soviets are inward-looking people, less concerned with improving their own circumstances than they are in keeping others from reaching the same level as themselves.
► A superpower has nothing to fear from a free press. Information and ideas freely exchanged benefit all.
In addition to establishing a superpower criteria as the standard among nations, the United States should institute an active program to advance American interests and undercut Soviet interests.
► Emigrants from the Soviet Union (not dissidents because they have little credibility) should be encouraged to describe the life they have experienced in the West to the nations of the Third World. The Soviets will be even more dissatisfied with their lot in comparison.
► Sales of grain and other food should be reduced by the West to further exacerbate Soviet food problems, forcing the Soviets to put more money into agriculture and less into offensive military weapons. U. S. grain can raise the standard of living in lesser developed nations in return for raw materials or base rights for mutual security.
► We must get ahead and stay ahead in space technology. The Soviets must attempt to keep up. forcing them to reduce expenditures in their offensive military budget or else risk a domestic crisis by squeezing the Soviet people still more.
► We must deny technological equipment and knowledge that would ease these Soviet problem areas. We must not sell the means with which the Soviets can bury us.
► We should call attention to Soviet adoption of any capitalist or mercantilist practice which is contradictory to Marxism-Leninism. Pointing out where ideology is not being strictly followed is a means to undermine their ideological leadership in the Third World. In short, we must show that socialism. Soviet-style. is a failure.
► We must provide future leaders of other countries with a basis for comparing the U. S. and Soviet systems. If this means escorting these leaders on tours in communist countries and the United States, then we should do it. Seeing is believing in a world steeped in misinformation.
Americans generally believe the Soviets excel in all things as we do. We are in space. They are in space. We have a strong military. They have a strong military. The comparison continues in our minds. We know so little about their everyday life that we assume they are like us, with grocery stores on every corner filled with staples and luxury foods, numerous full-service gasoline stations, two cars servicing every family, the freedom to travel without restriction. book stores containing any reading material, access to competitive newspapers and television stations carrying national and international news, and a standard of living equal to our own. The Soviets have none of these things. Mirror imaging makes the Soviets equal to us in our own eyes only.
The Soviet Union wants to be the greatest power on earth, but its health is affected by an ulcer of inept government. We must pursue policies which aggravate its condition until it bleeds to death from within.
1Ncut Gringrich. "Blunt Talk About War. The Military and National Survival." Washington Report. November-December 1980. p. 2. George Feifer. "Russian Disorders." Harpers. February 1981. p. 55. ’Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey (cds.l. The Soviet Union: Yesterday. Today. Tomorrow. (Center for Advanced International Studies. University of Miami. 1975). p. 208.
‘Hendrick Smith. The Russians. (New York: Ballantine Books. 1977). p. 312.
‘Feifer. p. 43.
‘Robert G. Wesson. The Russian Dilemma. (Neu Brunsuick. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974). p. 21.
’Feifer. p. 53.
'Feifer. p. 49.
Captain Thaubald, commissioned through the Naval Aviation Cadet program in 1957. received a bachelor’s degree in political science from Washington University in 1966. He was the executive officer then commanding officer of the Navy’s first F-14 aircraft squadron (VF-I), the first man to amass 100 carrier- arrested landings in the F-14. and the operations officer of a nuclear aircraft carrier and a carrier group. He is a graduate of both the Naval and National War College and is presently Commander. Training Air Wing Six. in Pensacola. Florida.