This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
The dominant and technologically superior seaborne weapon system of World War I was the battleship, of World War II. the carrier. Today, the dominant seaborne weapon system is the submarine. You know it. I know it. Only the U. S. Navy doesn't seem to know it—or want to admit it.
Between World Wars, “battleship admirals" delayed the coming of the carriers as, today, “carrier admirals” spend almost no time lauding the supremacy of the submarine. Nor are submariners themselves aware of this supremacy, and therefore they do not try to convince those who count that tactical and fiscal advantages would accrue from a change in emphasis from carrier battle groups to a powerful force of numerous submarines.
The U. S. Navy will eventually make this transition. However, progress is delayed by the fact that the essential ingredient, a cadre of tactical submariners capable of understanding and demonstrating the concept, has yet to blossom from our nuclear submarine force.
Less than 10% of the Navy's people are submariners, and. even though they operate and maintain more than 45% of the Navy's combat-capable warships, they are not a major factor in naval tactical policymaking. Why? Mostly because they lack tactical perspective and a thorough knowledge of naval warfare.
Nuclear submarine officers are the product of a one-man screening and selection process that has eliminated many candidates who demonstrated individuality and original thought. Once selected, new officers are processed through a system of "all-eyes-aft" nuclear power training with limited exposure to submarine tactics and almost no exposure to Navy-wide missions and tactics. Many promising young nuclear submarine officers do not like the limits placed on their creativity by the nuclear power community and leave the Navy as soon as eligible. Partly because of this exodus, those officers who remain spend most of their time in nuclear engineering assignments. When they achieve command and postcommand positions, they are superb nuclear engineers but are poorly schooled in general submarine capabilities and potential. The end result is a submarine officer community more interested in the nuclear machine itself than in the machine’s mission.
This community-wide malaise has grown out of the policy that all submarines must be nuclear powered. Nuclear submarines are very costly to build and to man. And nuclear submariners refuse to objectively investigate the merits of cheaper submarine platforms. Also, since submarines have less clout than carriers in the competition for funds, the total number of attack submarines will not exceed 100. With such a small force of tactical submarines, no more than one-third of which can be made available for sustained combat at the same time, their operating areas are predictable, and they thereby forfeit their primary tactical advantage—surprise.
Thus, while the U. S. Navy continues to prepare to refight World War II. World War III—a battle for access to economic resources—is in progress. This war. primarily between the Soviet Union and the United States, is being waged under the continual threat of all-out nuclear war. Currently, the Soviet Union, for the most part, does not rely on foreign economic resources. The United States, however, depends on imports, primarily by sea, for a significant percentage of its petroleum requirements, as well as nearly all the strategic minerals important to high-technology production.
A Soviet assault on U. S. sources of strategic imports can be divided into two major components: (1) political and military intervention or pressure in or on supplier nations, and (2) military interruption of the Free World's sea lines of communications. Interrupting sea lines of communications is much easier than keeping them open. The vulnerability of our sea-lanes provides the Soviet Navy with significant tactical leverage against the Western world. Inthissituation.theU. S. Navy, concentrated in World War Il-type carrier battle groups, is ill-prepared to counter a widespread Soviet Navy.
U. S. Navy carrier task forces cannot provide sea-lane protection for two reasons: (1) limited numbers of carriers and escorts can only provide protection for a minor fraction of our commitments in the worldwide sea-lane system, and (2) modern tactical sensors and weapons render carrier task forces vulnerable to defeat in a matter of hours by tactical naval units representing a significantly lesser investment of assets.
To prove the carrier task force's tactical vulnerability, one should observe the results of major fleet exercises where the opposition, which is normally assigned the older and less capable ships that are additionally limited by restrictive scenarios, normally neutralizes the combat capability of the carrier.
The Navy’s lemming-like dedication to the suicidal and out-of-date concept of carrier warfare has spilled over to the submarine force with the construction of a single class of nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), the Los Angeles (SSN-688). This class, designed as an escort for the direct support of carriers but ill-designed for other vital submarine missions, is being built at an extraordinarily high cost per submarine. As a result, too few submarines are being built, and the advantages of the attack submarine’s technology are not being exploited.
The submarine force prefers to use the Los Angeles class, in spite of the
poor design, in traditional independent missions rather than the designed mission of direct carrier support. The direct support role ties the submarine to the carrier, thereby forgoing one of her tactical advantages—independence. The direct support mission is the trade-off accepted by the submarine force in order to gain the carrier admirals' backing, which was necessary to obtain funding sufficient to build an exotic class of nuclear submarines. Ironically, the carrier admirals, in supporting the Los Angeles-class SSN, not only acknowledge the tactical vulnerability of the carrier, but. more importantly, they successfully delayed the eventual shift of major naval tactical missions to submarines by forcing the construction of an overly expensive, underarmed, and less than optimum class of submarine.
Civilians, however, dictate the types and numbers of ships and submarines to be procured. But in carrying out this responsibility, they listen to the technical advice of the naval hierarchy, which is conservative and heavily invested in yesterday’s naval concepts. Therefore, the Navy tends not to propose innovative solutions to meet the challenges of a changing tactical world.
Worldwide sea control can be defined as being prepared to prevent the Soviet Navy from carrying out any of its design missions. To meet this mission, we should not be dedicating the bulk of our shipbuilding funds to carriers and carrier escorts, either surface or submerged. Instead, we should be investing in combat-efficient and cost-effective sea control units that can operate independently and be widely dispersed.
Our current force levels provide the
Soviet Union with the opportunity to apply tactical pressure almost anywhere a U. S. carrier task force is not present. With less than six of the 13 U. S. carriers deployed at any given time, this Soviet opportunity exists nearly anywhere in the world. Unfortunately, even if we were able to double or triple the number of carrier task forces, this situation would not be significantly improved.
During the past two decades, offensive seaborne tactical sensor and weapon capabilities have increased, while the defensive systems of surface warships and aircraft carriers have not kept up the pace. This is particularly true with submarine offensive systems, which have improved dramatically; surface and air antisubmarine systems have barely improved. As a result, we now find a higher percentage of our severely limited surface shipboard and airborne weapon systems dedicated to defensive, rather than offensive, roles. In other words, we are building a surface navy to try to keep our surface navy afloat, not to prevent the Soviet Navy from carrying out its missions.
In Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (January 1981), Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward stated:
"The Soviets have considerable forces available to locate and attack surface formations such as carrier and amphibious task forces. Although they have expended considerable resources in recent years on anti-submarine warfare [ASW], including an intensive ASW research and development program, it is apparent that the Soviets have not resolved the problem of locating sub-
Those who don’t think the Soviet Navy believes in tactical submarines more than we do simply can’t count. They have 290 such submarines, 180 of them nonnuclear: “Foxtrot” (foreground) and “Tango” SSs are pictured. We have 90 tactical subs— five of them nonnuclear.
marines on the high seas with a high
degree of probability.”
With the notable exception of detecting high-speed nuclear submarines. neither has the United States. The key to the evolution of naval warfare from carriers to submarines lies in the enemy’s inability to successfully find and attack the submarine, as opposed to its relative ease in locating. attacking, and defeating the carrier and other surface warships.
This is precisely why the U. S. Navy shifted its strategic strike capability from attack carriers to ballistic missile submarines. And it is cause for the Navy to pass its tactical mission—i.e., to defeat the Soviet Navy—to a significantly expanded attack submarine force. Assets currently being applied to the building of new carriers and carrier escorts, including the Los Angeles-class SSNs, should be shifted to build a more combat-efficient and cost-effective tactical submarine force, both nuclear and nonnuclear, to convince the Soviets that exercising their naval power against the Free World would be unproductive. The logic behind this change in tactical strategy is simple.
In today’s complex tactical environment, ships must be able to conceal their presence to be effective. The technology of surface, air, and satellite
sensors, and antisurface ship weapon systems has rendered major wartime surface ship operations obsolete. For survival purposes, surface warships are integrated into complex task groups of expensive ships and aircraft employing about 12.000 men per task group. Such a gathering of separate naval units forces them to coordinate their assets and dedicate a high percentage of sensor and weapon systems to task force defense. Gathering such numbers of people and assets would not be necessary if the enemy could not locate the ships involved.
Ships that can not be found, such as a submerged submarine, can be designed to be dedicated to offensive operations. If a submarine is detected, offensive weapon systems also provide the best defense, making expenditures on strictly defensive systems, as are required for surface and air units, unproductive.
The hi-low mix concept has been attempted with surface combatants, but the result is that the entire task force is limited to lower speeds or dispositions that provide protection for the weakest members of the force. The hi-low mix, however, is extremely practical for submarines. An attack submarine, regardless of whether she is a $600 to $800 million Los Angeles class or a $100 to $200 million nonnuclear submarine, has a high potential to remain undetected. Therefore, a low-mix submarine can be employed on station and still not be vulnerable.
The value of a low-mix submarine as opposed to an expensive Los Angeles class can be demonstrated by asking the following question: Would we be better off with a force of ten Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines with an assumed load of 26 long-range weapons each for a total of 260 weapons in a given theater, or a force of four nuclear submarines and 24 nonnuclear submarines (assuming a fairly realistic cost ratio of four nonnuclear to one nuclear) with 26 long-range weapons each for a total of 728 weapons? When you consider that an enemy does not know the location of any of the submarines but must now deal with 28 adversaries, armed with nearly three times the number of weapons as in the high mix, the value of a low mix becomes apparent. Furthermore, evolving nonnuclear submarine designs include weapon loads of up to 45 Mk-48 torpedo-/Harpoon-/Toma- hawk-sized weapons with a reloadable launcher capacity double that of the Los Angeles class. A large number of submarines remaining in operating areas and armed with long-range weapons is more effective than a small number of high-speed submarines traveling between locations and making themselves vulnerable to detection and attack by moving at high speeds.
Lack of numbers in our submarine order of battle has forced nuclear submarines to transit long distances at high speeds: but this would not occur if we had a higher number of submarines. A submarine in position and sustaining submerged combat operations on station is important, not how fast she got to her station. Since submarines fight at relatively slow speeds and are most vulnerable to detection during high-speed maneuvers, high-speed submarine operations should be avoided whenever possible.
Every submarine has a main propulsion and associated auxiliary noise signature. This signature will normally be detected only by sophisticated listening devices at short range. However, when the submarine operates at speeds where propeller, flow, and increased auxiliary machinery noises exceed the submarine’s slow speed auxiliary and main propulsion noise signature, the submarine is easier to detect and thus more vulnerable to attack. Therefore, future submarines will find it advantageous to operate at speeds below this threshold for a significantly greater percentage of their missions. Hence, current Los Angeles-c\ass SSNs become less competitive, and cheaper low-mix nuclear and nonnuclear submarines become more competitive. In addition, submarines armed with Mk-48 torpedoes. Harpoon missiles, and Tomahawk missiles seldom require high speed to close a target and it may even be dangerous to do so. The development of the advanced capability Mk-48 torpedo and the submarine long-range antisubmarine standoff weapon system will provide additional advantages. In the future, submarines will operate at slower speeds with the one exception of a burst speed capability to evade possible incoming weapons from enemy attack.
Submarines can accomplish sea denial anywhere the ocean is deep enough for them to operate. For smaller long-range (transoceanic) nuclear and nonnuclear submarines, this can be depths of 75 feet or more. For Los Angeles-class SSNs. the shallow limit is significantly deeper, and the SSN cannot use its high-speed capability in shallow water. Therefore, the Los Angeles class is not very efficient in vast areas of ocean where submarine operations will normally be required. Ignoring these vast areas of ocean provides a potential haven for enemy operations that could successfully deter much of our critical trade.
The modem nonnuclear submarine is extremely quiet and is therefore harder to find than the nuclear submarine. Emerging nonnuclear submarine designs, including updated diesel-electric submarines (SSDX) with quieter sound-dampened engines and higher capacity batteries, as well as evolving under-ice-capable fuel cell designs (SSFX) that will remain quiet throughout an entire patrol cycle, can be produced relatively inexpensively. The nonnuclear submarine, after more than 25 years of neglect, provides the Navy with a lucrative area for improvement in tactical combat capability.
Construction and employment of nonnuclear submarines among a broad cross section of nations, including many relatively minor military powers, is on the rise. With her capability to threaten the operations of carrier task forces, surface combatants, and even nuclear-powered attack submarines, the nonnuclear submarine provides minor nations with inexpensive leverage against large standing navies. This David and Goliath relationship demonstrates that the carrier concept is bankrupt—a fact that has yet to be recognized by the Navy's established hierarchy.
Carriers can still “show the flag.” A standing force of 12 carriers is sufficient to provide political pressure during limited war confrontations such as the air battle with Libya in August 1981. Since it is not feasible to protect carriers in unlimited tactical combat, why should we waste billions of dollars pretending to do so in peacetime? Assets currently being wasted on the impossible task of carrier defense can be more productively diverted to submarine construction. Such a move will yield a standing submarine force capable of bringing continual tactical pressure to Soviet naval units worldwide. Let the Soviet Navy continue its misdirected development of major surface combatants. If the U. S. Navy will invest in a submarine force of sufficient numbers, a mighty Soviet surface navy can be rendered impotent.
Shipboard manning is one of the most important considerations when planning a tactical navy. In a hypothetical trade-off between a carrier task force at sea and a submarine force, we find that the 12,000 men needed to man the carrier task group could be employed on40SSNs(100meneach), lOOSSDXs (40 men each), and 100 SSFXs (40 men each).
What would be better for sea-lane protection: one carrier task force with 12,000 men supporting 60 or less combat aircraft, perhaps capable of controlling one area with a radius of approximately 300 nautical miles and with the enemy aware of its position; or 240 widely dispersed submarines with an equivalent 12,000 men but armed with up to 10,800 major weapons including 200-nautical-mile-capable Tomahawk missiles, with the enemy not knowing from which direction an attack can come? Add to this the limited antisubmarine capability of a carrier task force and the dramatic ASW capability of 240 quiet submarines, and the case for the shift to submarines as the
Navy’s dominant seagoing weapon system is made.
When the transition to a submerged tactical navy is adopted and implemented by the United States, World War III will for the first time be adequately addressed by a standing, tactically capable U. S. Navy within reasonable budgetary and manpower constraints.
Law enforcement is second only to offshore search and rescue as a priority for the Coast Guard, largely because of the dramatic increase in drug smuggling. While the Coast Guard is committed to enforcing U. S. laws afloat, the service still lacks some of the tools necessary to carry out that mission successfully. One shortcoming is the Coast Guard cutters' appearance. Even from many miles away, maritime lawbreakers and their accomplices are easily able to identify and avoid the patrolling cutters. The
Coast Guard clearly needs vessels which can act as the “unmarked cars” of the fleet.
A relatively easy solution to the Coast Guard’s problem lies in commissioning forfeited smuggling vessels. There would be virtually no initial acquisition cost because these boats can be obtained free of charge from the General Services Administration (GSA). Moreover, even though these additional craft would not be equipped for anything other than law enforcement work, they would still be
Unmarked Cars of the Fleet___________________________________________
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Christopher A. Abel. U. S. Coast Guard
available for other emergencies, a godsend considering the Coast Guard’s shortage of cutters and the high cost of new vessels.
Fishing vessels more than 65 feet long would be the best candidates for the program because of their size, cruising range, and versatility: there is certainly no dearth of these craft. In fact, at least 20 are seized in the Seventh Coast Guard District alone each year. The vessels selected could be outfitted for Coast Guard use as law enforcement patrol boats (WPLs) at a relatively low cost. The same communications and navigation package used on board a 95-foot patrol boat—substituting a lower-powered radar more compatible with a typical fishing vessel’s generator—could be rack mounted on each boat for approximately $40,000; a standard patrol boat’s weapons, ammunition, pyrotechnics, and armory set-up could be provided for about $7,000 per vessel. Add another $10,000 for miscellaneous conversion and outfitting costs—the installation of a blue light, siren, and inflatable small boat for use in boarding operations—would bring the initial cost to only $57,000 for each WPL commissioned. Consequently, for well under a million dollars, the
Commander Van Saun is a qualified surface warfare and submarine officer. He is currently the executive officer of the Submarine Training Facility. San Diego. California.
Coast Guard could acquire all of the hardware necessary to establish a ten- cutter WPL program on the East Coast and a five-cutter operation on the West Coast.
Crews for the new WPLs could be structured similarly to those currently assigned to the service's smaller class of patrol boats. Thus, the vessels would be commanded by a lieutenant (junior grade), with an enlisted complement of eight. Prior operational law enforcement experience should be a prerequisite. Only men rated E-4 and above should be considered for the program because of the specialized operations involved. Administration of the program and its personnel could be handled at the Coast Guard's Atlantic and Pacific Area level to ensure maximum operational flexibility.
Each vessel would routinely rotate through the service's districts, frequently changing the color scheme, name, and home port displayed to prevent the cutter from being recognized as a law enforcement patrol unit. For the same reason, each WPL would be decommissioned and returned to the GSA pool after a service life of about six months. The former cutter's equipment and crew could then be transferred to another forfeited vessel.
A WPL’s career might follow the ensuing itinerary:
17 April: The WPL-90375 is informally commissioned at Coast Guard Base Miami Beach. The vessel—a 67-foot wooden-hulled shrimper—had been forfeited after being caught smuggling 15 tons of marijuana into the United States. Although her maximum speed is only 12 knots, the boat's hull is sound and her machinery appears to be in fairly good condition. Best of all. her long-range fuel tanks give her a range of nearly 1,800 nautical miles at an economical speed of 9 knots. The boat has been outfitted for Coast Guard use and given a new blue-and-white coat of paint. The name Cindy II and the home port of Wanchese, North Carolina. have been added to her transom. The new cutter sets a northward course along the East Coast.
21 April: Arriving at the Coast Guard base at Cape May, New Jersey, the 90375 is refueled, provisioned, painted white, and renamed the Dixie Pride from Bayou La Patre, Alabama. The cutter sets a course for the waters south of Long Island. Of the ten WPLs assigned to the Atlantic area, six are under way this week: three off the Florida coast, one off Maine, and two off the New York-New Jersey shore.
27 April: The 90375 is secured from surveillance operations and is patrolling en route to Coast Guard Station New London. Connecticut, to refuel. The only sighting of any significance made during the past week was a northbound sailboat which was on the list of suspected vessels. After the 90375 reported the sailboat's position, the vessel was boarded by the USCGC Cape Fairweather (WPB-95314). but no contraband was found.
29 April: After the logistics call at New London, the 90375 is en route to a closed groundfish area off the Massachusetts coast. Her appearance is modified by the addition of red trim on the pilothouse and hull, and she is now the Kay and Nancy, home ported in Cape May, New Jersey.
1 May: On her first morning in the closed fishery area, the 90375's crew members board three obvious violators and issue formal notices of violation to each. After dark, the cutter proceeds farther offshore to conduct a more general surveillance patrol.
5 May: The 90375 rescues the crew from the fishing vessel Kerry K after she had begun taking on water approximately 75 miles east of Nantucket. Two days later, the survivors are transferred to the USCGC Alert (WMEC-630) and the 90375 resumes her offshore patrol.
28 May: After a two-week maintenance period at the Coast Guard support center in Boston, the 90375 is now painted yellow and black, with the name Cavalier and the home port of Newport News, Virginia. She is en route to the Western Bahama Bank and a major drug interdiction operation which has been planned for months.
30 May: A generator failure forces the 90375 to divert into the Coast Guard support center at Portsmouth, Virginia, for repairs. The WPL-90347 is pulled from operations in the Gulf of Mexico to fill in for the 90375. By the time the 90375 is back in working order, the 90347 has managed to locate one of the smuggler’s boats, which is later seized in South Carolina.
16 June: Off the Bahama Bank, a renamed and repainted 90375 comes across a mothership offloading. As a result of the information the 90375 provides, two other cutters seize both the mothership and two contact boats.
along with their cargo of more than 38 tons of marijuana.
19 June: The 90375 observes still another suspect vessel riding low in the water on a northbound course. With no other cutter operating in the area, the 90375 makes a downwind approach on the boat and is hit by the unmistakable odor of marijuana. Breaking out the cutter's Coast Guard ensign, the uniformed crew of the 90375 attempt to signal the suspected smuggler to heave to by use of their blue light, siren, radio, and loud hailer. However, it is not until warning shots are fired from the WPL’s forecastle mounted M-60 machine gun that the craft finally stops. Twelve tons of marijuana are on board. The vessel is seized, her crew arrested, and the 90375 begins escorting her catch to Florida. On the following day, the 90375 transfers custody of the seized vessel and her 14-man crew to the USCGC Chase (WHEC-718) and resumes her patrol. 26 June: En route to Miami Beach for a three-week maintenance period, the 90375 observes a boatload of Haitian immigrants steering a course for the Florida coast. The illegal aliens are subsequently met and escorted to the Coast Guard's Fort Lauderdale station by the USCGC Cape Current (WPB-95307).
18 July: The cutter's crew members return to the overhauled 90375 after a well-deserved vacation with their families in the New York area.
21 July: Decked out as the blue and white Tango out of Charleston, South Carolina, the 90375 is patrolling off the Virginia seacoast. Although the cutter is able to overhear and record a radio conversation indicating a possible drug offload, no suspicious vessels are sighted.
28 July: The 90375's boarding party issues a notice of violation to a surf clammer found illegally fishing before dawn.
3 August: Following a logistics stop in Norfolk, the 90375 is repainted, renamed the Sierra, and en route to the Texas coast. On the way, she reports a tanker illegally pumping her bilges inside of the 50-mile offshore limit. The 90375 also reports a southbound suspected smuggling vessel.
13 August: The 90375 begins a three- day search for the wreckage of a small plane believed to have ditched in the Gulf. No survivors or debris are sighted.
21 August: The 90375's generator fails again. After taking the cutter to New Orleans, the vessel’s crew is ordered to decommission the boat.
22 August: The WPL-90375 is decommissioned. and her Coast Guard electronics, weapons, and other gear are shipped to the Coast Guard base in San Juan, Puerto Rico. After two weeks of leave, the crew flies to San Juan to supervise the installation of the 90375's equipment on board a 72- foot steel-hulled scallop boat that was
forfeited during the previous month. 19 September: The WPL-90436 is informally commissioned at Coast Guard Base San Juan.
Obviously, this WPL program presents procedural, legal, and administrative problems which must be dealt with before the proposal can be put into practice. Nevertheless, the negative effects of these short-range organizational hurdles would seem to be more than offset by the substantial long-term benefits of the program. The Coast Guard—and therefore the American public—is offered the opportunity to reap a sizeable law enforcement dividend from a remarkably small investment. The time has come to act.
UNIT AS: Exercising a Mutual Strength_________________________________
by Lieutenant Jim Holt, U. S. Navy, and Thomas E. Pallas
aspect of UN1TAS reflects an increasing attention to the significance and security of hemispheric sea lines of communication (SLOCs). There is a growing recognition, for example, that South Atlantic SLOCs, which carry the bulk of imported oil not only to the Americas but to Western Europe
volves a broad range of activities, including antisurface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, surface and air gunnery, amphibious landings, electronic warfare, communications, and free-play exercises which test the integrated capabilities of each navy. For many of the participating navies, UNITAS is the high point of their training year and provides them their most valuable opportunity to develop their combat skills.
Though UNITAS is tactically oriented, it has a broader strategic importance as well. The exercise allows the navies of the Western Hemisphere to test their capacity to conduct joint operations should the need arise. This
UNITAS. which began in 1959, is a joint exercise involving the U. S. Navy and the principal navies of Latin America. Conducted annually, the cruise normally takes place between June and December, during which time the U. S. contingent conducts a series of bilateral exercises with the participating navies. Each UNITAS phase, which generally lasts from one to four weeks, consists of exercise activities and port visits in the host country by the U. S. force.
The central purpose of UNITAS is to promote a continuing improvement in the operational readiness and capabilities of hemispheric navies. To this end, the exercise routinely in
Lieutenant Abel, a 1979 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, first served on board the USCGC Reiituuc (W-615) ami is now commanding officer of the USCGC Point Warde (WPB-82368). He is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings.
as well, are key hemispheric concerns, and that the Americas have a joint interest in assuring the security of those sea-lanes. UNITAS serves to strengthen this joint capability.
UNITAS is not confined to military operations alone; it also promotes goodwill. Each phase of UNITAS includes public activities between the U. S. Navy and people of the participating countries. Ship tours, sporting events, civic action projects by U. S. sailors, the exchange of souvenirs— these all contribute to better relations.
The U. S. contingent for UNITAS
XXII included the USS Slump (DD- 978). USS Dahlgren (DDG-43), USS Capodanno (FF-1093), USS Thomas Jefferson (SSN-618), USS Scamp (SSN-588). and USS Plymouth Rock (LSD-29) with a Marine detachment embarked. Additional support was provided by two maritime patrol aircraft squadrons (VP-45 and VP-56).
The U. S. task force made a clockwise circumnavigation of South America and participated in exercises with the naval forces of Venezuela. Colombia, Brazil. Uruguay. Argentina. Chile. Peru, and Ecuador. U. S.
ships visited 16 cities in Latin America. from Cartagena. Colombia, and Maracaibo, Venezuela, on the northern end to Punta Arenas. Chile, on the southern tip of the continent.
Perhaps the most gratifying operational highlight was the participation of the Chilean Navy after a hiatus of two years. Also significant were the joint operations conducted by Brazilian. U. S., and Venezuelan naval units. This marked an important extension of UNITAS exercises from the bilateral to the multilateral arena.
As a whole last year's operations
£-1
were characterized by increased complexity and sophistication, particularly reflected by the substantial time devoted to free-play exercises. Added emphasis was also placed on amphibious operations during UNITAS XXII. For example, Argentine and U. S. Marines conducted a large-scale beach landing exercise complete with tactical air and naval gunfire support. Of note as well was the inclusion of U. S. Coast Guard vessels in the exercises. The U. S. Coast Guard Cutter Steadfast (WMEC-623) participated in the Argentine and Brazilian phases; dur
ing the Uruguayan phase, a Coast Guard utility boat navigated the length of the River Uruguay, calling at Uruguayan Coast Guard stations along the way. Helicopter cross-decking—first introduced in UNITAS XXI—between participating ships became an integral part of the exercise scenarios.
Successful in operational terms, UNITAS XXII was no less successful in diplomatic terms. The U. S. contingent played host to hundreds of Latin American military officers and political dignitaries; in Venezuela, for example, U. S. personnel participated in
Venezuelan Navy Day celebrations and hosted President Herrera Campins. These activities made a substantial contribution to our navy-to-navy and government-to-government relations in Latin America and demonstrated that UNITAS continues to be a highly productive cooperative effort.
Lieutenant Holt is an intelligence analyst at the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center in Suitland. Maryland; Mr. Pallas is the senior analyst for Latin America in the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Zero Tolerance for Drug Abuse
By Captain R. A. Bowling. U. S. Navy (Retired)
For more than a decade, the Navy followed a drug abuse control policy of essentially decriminalizing such abuse (by not strongly enforcing existing proscriptions), and depending heavily upon an education program to solve the problem. The result was drug abuse in such proportions that national security, in terms of degraded combat readiness, was at stake. Extensive publicity of this intolerable situation. as revealed by in-house surveys and congressional investigations, aroused the Congress and the public to demand that the Navy take a tougher stand on drug abuse.
On 9 July 1981. the Chief of Naval Operations took advantage of this support, and also that of the judiciary, to institute an Enhanced Navy Drug
Abuse Control Program (NAVOP 097-81). This program is designed to prevent and control drug abuse through "positive and visible leadership and action throughout the chain of command.” Stressing that the Navy’s renewed emphasis on pride and professionalism is incompatible with drug abuse. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward admonished commanding officers and supervisors at all levels that they cannot "condone the illegal use of drugs, regardless of the degree of acceptance in the civilian sector.” He directed commanding officers to “convey a consistently tough intolerance to drug abuse;" he directed all other officers and petty officers to “recognize the threat, set the example, enforce the rules and work to change conditions, both on board and ashore, to eliminate illegal drug abuse.”
Among several actions taken to implement this program, the Chief of Naval Operations temporarily authorized commanding officers to discharge first-termers who are habitual discipline problems. Since a large majority of these people also are drug abusers, and drug abuse is rooted primarily among young first-termers, cleaning out these troublemakers will go a long way toward eradicating the drug abuse problem throughout the service.
But that was only the beginning. In December 1981, Admiral Hayward launched a three-pronged offensive against drug abuse with the announced goal of "zero tolerance:" i.e.. any unauthorized use of drugs, including marijuana, would be considered a serious breach of discipline. Violators would receive stiff penalties, including punitive discharge by courts- martial or administrative discharge under conditions other than honorable. In a special videotaped message on drug abuse. Admiral Hayward made it clear that he intended to establish and implement "a hard-nosed, get- tough policy” on drug abuse. The admiral stressed that the Navy is different from society in general. This difference is recognized by the public, which expects service personnel to maintain higher standards of conduct than the general population. Therefore. the Navy not only has an opportunity to take the lead in the crusade against drug abuse, it has the responsibility to do so, and now.
To meet this responsibility, the Chief of Naval Operations has broadcast two messages to naval personnel. For those who were drug abusers, he offered to “help:” if they refused the offer, he promised to “hammer.” For those who were not abusers, he urged them to get personally and professionally involved with “zero tolerance" conviction and determination expressed by the resolve: “Not on my watch. Not in my division. Not in my Navy.” This videotaped expression of drug abuse policy was formalized by two written directives. On 23 December 1981. the CNO issued NAVOP 172-81. “Navy Policy Concerning Illegal Drugs,” and on 29 December 1981, NAVOP 178-81. “Navy Policy Concerning Drug Abuse Urinalysis Program.” Navy policy, as contained in these two directives, is:
“The illegal possession, use and distribution of drugs and drug paraphernalia are not tolerated in the United States Navy at any time: ashore, afloat, on or off duty, on or off base. ... It is Navy policy to make full use of urinalysis testing to assist in controlling drug abuse." These policies became effective on 1 February 1982.
Admiral Hayward placed emphasis on leadership responsibility in this noquarter war on drug abuse. Specifically, he called for participation by all in the chain of command. And he reminded officers and chief petty officers of their responsibility and attitude as leaders:
“The principle of leadership by example was never more applicable than as related to the drug abuse policy. Zero tolerance is the only policy that will apply to officers, warrant officers and chief petty officers.”
Any of the foregoing individuals involved in drug abuse will be processed for separation, which could be under conditions other than honorable.
>
Pushers and traffickers will get short shrift. They will be subject to possible pre-trial confinement. If not separated by a court-martial punitive discharge, these people will be administratively discharged for misconduct, probably under conditions other than honorable. There is some leeway in the Na-
vy's approach to other service members. But the probability of discharge for the drug user remains, as is outlined here.
First-time offenders, not drug dependent. can remain on active duty at the commanding officer's discretion, but will be disciplined and enrolled in a 36-hour drug education program. Drug-dependent first-time offenders will enter a residential rehabilitation program. Anyone discovered to be using drugs while participating in this program will receive an administrative discharge for misconduct, which could be under conditions other than honorable.
Second-time offenders can receive an administrative discharge, which could be under conditions other than honorable. If the commanding officer, however, determines that an individual “exhibits exceptional potential for further useful service," the second offender can remain on duty. The commanding officer must notify the Chief of Naval Military Personnel Command (CNMPC) of such actions.
Third-time offenders shall be referred to trial by court-martial or administratively discharged for misconduct which could be under conditions other than honorable. The CNMPC, however, may grant a waiver to the third-time offender for continued service, but “only under the most unusual circumstances.”
Current offenders—personnel with three or more drug-related offenses in their record, as of 1 February—may be administratively discharged at the discretion of the commanding officer, or placed in the category of secondtime offenders and retained.
For drug abusers, it is “shape up or ship out.” Officers, chief petty officers, and traffickers will have no second chance; for others, there is the possibility of three chances before discharge, but administrative discharge
could result from a first offense.
But can the undermanned Navy afford to discharge large numbers of personnel? The answer is an unequivocal yes. Under the previous policy, officers and senior petty officers had to spend a disproportionate amount of their time coddling drug abuse misfits, the great majority of whom were first- termers. Freed of that chore, these highly skilled managerial and technical personnel now will be able to apply themselves more fully to combat readiness matters. The result will be an increase in combat readiness despite personnel losses.
However, the assumption that drug abuse will continue near the levels reached under the previous policy is questionable. Young people in the Navy (and in civilian life) are searching for an alternative to drugs. The Navy can provide that alternative (pride and professionalism) through dedicated leadership, peer group pressure, and stern discipline when necessary—all based on a zero tolerance of drug abuse in any form by anyone. And with an increase in pride and professionalism will come a drastic diminution of the drug abuse problem. Therefore, the expected large numbers of discharges will not materialize.
In fact, this hard-nosed, get-tough, no quarter campaign against drug abuse in the Navy already is succeeding where previous efforts, based on a bleeding-heart approach, failed miserably. For example, in the spring and early summer of 1981, the Chairman, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Representative Joseph P. Addabbo (D., N.Y.) singled out the Navy as the service having the worst drug abuse problem. However, by October, only three months after Admiral Hayward’s Enhanced Navy Drug Abuse Control Program went into effect, Congressman Addabbo was recommending that the other services follow the Navy’s lead in attempting to solve the drug abuse problem in the armed forces.
Such a dramatic reversal should not surprise those who have been exposed to even the basics of leadership. Given strong, traditional military leadership, the great majority of officers and petty officers have always turned to with a will to solve just about any problem. That principle is proving equally valid in solving the drug abuse problem, despite claims that the latter is a new social phenomenon on a large scale that defies control by traditional military principles of leadership and discipline.
But we still have a long way to go. The final victory will not be won or lasting unless all officers fully support in thought, word, and deed a consistently tough intolerance of drug abuse, both at sea and ashore, and fully support the chain of command in effecting that policy. If there are officers who have “no strong biases against” illegal drugs, then they should re-examine their attitudes toward drug abuse in the military. If they do not believe that they can give their full moral support to the current get-tough drug abuse control program, then they should consider resigning their commissions.
Under the strong leadership of Admiral Hayward and the continued enthusiastic support of Congress, the public, the judiciary, the vast majority of officers and petty officers in the Navy, using traditional concepts of military leadership and discipline, will succeed in eradicating drug abuse— the single greatest threat to good order and discipline, internal security, and combat readiness in the service.
Captain Bowling is a 1946 graduate of the Naval Academy, and holds a Ph.D in history. During his 33 years of active duty, he held eight commands, including a major command afloat in a flag officer billet.
Sharpening the Claws of
By Art Hanley
On 21 December 1970, a fighter that was more advanced, more powerful, and capable of greater growth than any fighter that had flown before took to the air for the first time. To this day, no aircraft in the fighter category embodies as many advanced aerodynamic principles or electronic capabil-
the Tomcat
ities as the Grumman F-14 Tomcat. It is the Navy’s best fighter, and—until the arrival of the VFMX fighter sometime in the 1990s—all large-deck carriers will have 24 of these fighters. Yet, the F-14A of today is the same basic aircraft that flew in 1970, with only minor improvements. Finally, it ap-
pears the Tomcat will get the upgrade it needs to remain the premier fighter in the Western world.
With the imminent introduction of two or three new fighters into the Soviet inventory and the planned launching of the Soviet Union's first nuclear-powered large-deck carrier, the performance of the F-14 takes on new significance. In addition, few would doubt that the Soviets know the Tomcat quite well: in fact, they have probably flown the basic F-14A. With the revolution in Iran and thorough penetration of its military by Soviet sympathizers, it would be ludicrous to assume otherwise. Although the Iranian F-I4s lacked nuclear capability, advanced electronic countermeasures (ECM). and (thanks to the brave action of Grumman personnel when they left the country) key elements of the fire control, the aircraft is thoroughly compromised. This state of affairs adds weight to the case for improving the Tomcat as soon as possible.
Electronics: In the Libyan incident over the Gulf of Sidra last year, the E-2 Hawkeyes and radars never saw the incoming Su-22 “Fitters"—the first warning of their run came from the F-I4s' own radar. In the Iran-Iraq War, primary air defense and early warning radar coverage came from what F-I4s the Iranians could get into the air. But the Tomcat's AWG-9 radar fire control system represents late-1960s technology, and it is getting long in the tooth.
Scheduled improvements for the F-14A include expanded computer memory modules that are smaller, lighter, and require less cooling than the current AWG-9 computer. The Northrop Television Camera System (TCS) will be installed, allowing for much earlier visual acquisition of distant targets. The radar's beam will be sharpened: this will allow identification of aircraft type from the radar return.
Fleet reconnaissance will improve with the introduction of the tactical airborne reconnaissance pod system (TARPS); 49 F-I4s will be equipped to carry it. The pod contains a CAI KS-87B camera (for forward, oblique, or vertical shots), a Fairchild KA-99 panoramic camera, and the Honeywell AAD-5 infrared scanner. Full armament is retained when TARPS is mounted under the rear fuselage.
In fiscal year 1984. the F-I4C Model is scheduled for production. It will incorporate all improvements to the F-14A. plus: the radar will use a medium pulse rate frequency to provide better resolution and reduce jamming, a further expansion of computer memory. programmable signal processing, and a new target identification system integrating TCS and computer software. The TF-30 will be upgraded to improve durability, more of the avionics will be digitized, certain wiring harnesses will be replaced with Halar wire (more resistant to fluids and cracking), and a tenfold increase in corrosion protection is expected from the use of cadmium connectors.
The AYK-14 central computer from the EA-6B Prowler and F-18 Hornet will be installed with an initial 64.000- word memory, but will be increased to 128.000-word capacity. The F-I8's stores management system most likely will be included. The Boeing 767 and McDonnell Douglas AV-8B programs will contribute the Honeywell laser- gyro inertial navigation system (INS). Programmable multi-function displays will be fitted in both cockpits, courtesy of an earlier version from the SH-60B Seahawk. The F-15C Eagle contributes the ALR-67 threat warning and recognition system, and the Westinghouse-ITT internal airborne self-protection jammer will receive information from it. The Hughes-ITT joint tactical information distribution system, which is a secure ECM-re- sistant datalink, will be fitted. So that all these new avionics may talk to each other, the F-14C will have a Milspec 1553B digital multiplex database, which allows new systems to be added in a modular fashion.
Weaponry: If one aircraft has had a hard luck story with weapons, it has to be the F-14. When the aircraft was first conceived, a whole family of weapons was also planned for it that would take full advantage of the Tomcat’s incredible capability.
Although the M-61 cannon is very reliable, it is old and not really up to the threats of today. It was hoped that the Air Force's GAU-7A 25-mm. cannon would be installed, but that program died. The Rockwell Condor missile was intended to be the long-range air-to-surface weapon of the F-14. but it was cancelled just when it was on the verge of production. The Agile dogfight missile, whose capabilities could only be described as awesome, was stopped by an interservice fight with the Air Force. The AIM-54B improved—yet cheaper—version of Phoenix was stillborn.
r-
I
Recently, a contract was awarded for the highest-priority missile project in the air-to-air areana: the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AM- RAAM). It will replace the Sparrow and other NATO air-to-air missiles. Compared with the Sparrow, it is smaller, lighter, faster, more maneuverable. and permits the launching aircraft to engage multiple targets through
//, as claimed, the F-14 Tomcat is the Western world's most capable fighter, it can remain so if given more power, better arms, and improved electronics.
l ^ 7v? |
|
L \9i |
|
The F-101DFE engine, left, can provide the power that Tomcats were intended to have; above, aging electron ics of the AWG-9 fire control system have been scheduled for an update.
GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION
time-sharing. It will have an active seeker, so the launching aircraft can turn away after firing. Its electronics will be more reliable and easier to maintain than the Sparrow, and the miss distance should be less than that of most current infrared missiles. The F-14 will carry at least six and. because of its advanced fire control, will use the AMRAAM more effectively than any other aircraft scheduled to receive it. The missile will feature lock- on-after-launch capability, which will revolutionize air combat.
Development of the Sidewinder replacement. the advanced short-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM). will be led by the Europeans, probably by a collaboration between the British and Germans. But although the Europeans have many exciting concepts, they do not appear to be in any particular hurry to bring ASRAAM into full production: we may end up with an "AIM- 9Z."
The Phoenix production line is now the AIM-54C. Improvements include better trajectory control through all stages of flight, greater accuracy and range, improved proximity fuze, ra- dome error compensation (improving effectiveness against very high altitude targets), improved effectiveness against very small and low targets, greater use of digital electronics for more flexibility and reliability, built- in self-test, solid state receiver transmitter, superior target illumination capability. linear frequency modulation to improve seeing through clutter, increased resistance to ECM, and sim- pier manufacturing capability. If required. AIM-54As can be converted to Cs; The Navy has yet to establish such a requirement.
Power Plant: The F-14 was never designed to use the TF-30 engine exclusively: it just happened to be all that was available. The TF-30 is a good engine, but was never designed for a fighter. It is smoky, requires judicious movement of the throttles, has to be closely monitored, has durability problems, is uncomfortable at high angles of attack, stalls in fighter maneuvers, and has increased in weight instead of thrust. That the F-14 can perform well with only 74% of the power it was designed for is impressive: a new engine could produce even greater performance from the F-14.
The B-l’s basic F-IOI engine has been modified into the F-I01DFE. It takes the F-101 core (with more than 30,000 hours of time on it), plus the scaled-up F-404 front end and nozzle. Although developed under Air Force Systems Command contract, the design application was the F-14. The engine was sized not by maximum afterburner thrust, but by the dry thrust necessary for F-14 operation from carriers at gross weight (16,400 pounds).
The F-101DFE was designed to be a very reliable fighter engine, and a penalty in weight was accepted to achieve this. The engine has demonstrated unrestricted throttle movement and angle of attack operation, and a high degree of yaw. It is smokeless, resistant to compressor stall, and very reliable.
Flight tests with the #7 F-14 showed other improvements as well: a 34% increase in time on station. 62% increase in combat radius, 22% more energy available for maneuvering at the same radius/duration, single-engine intermediate power climbs at maximum takeoff gross weight, crossstarting at idle (the TF-30 has to be at 80% or more), no requirement for engine trim or afterburner use during carrier takeoffs (night launches of afterburning F-14s light up the sky for 40 miles), self-recovery from stall, and unrestricted ability to slam and chop throttle. The F-14 (with F-10IDFE) supersonic without afterburner, and production aircraft will include an APU or hydrazine starter.
The cost of a qualified F-101 DFE engine would be well under $3 million. TF-30-P-4l4As cost about $2.1 million. The reason the prices are so close is that the B-l and other programs have already paid for most of the research and development costs. At the present time, the Air Force is requesting funds to qualify the engine; the Navy could have qualified engines by 1985. Should the Navy make the decision to acquire F-14s with this engine, it can also expect an 18% reduction in fleet fuel requirements. The F-14s so configured would be known as F-14Ds. They would include the previously described F-14C improvements, possible unspecified “dogfight enhancements,” and maybe a 30-inch fuselage stretch for additional fuel storage. If the Navy decides to build the F-14 as it should be built, deliveries could start in 1985-86. The engines raise the price 5%, but more than make up for it in fuel savings, reliability, and much lower maintenance costs—the increased performance is "free." Mere adjustment of the F-14 production rate will have such a dramatic effect on costs, that the engine cost will be negligible. F-lOIDFEs also can be retrofitted to F-14s in overhaul, and installation costs are about the same as
putting in another TF-30 engine.
Grumman'slast fighter, the F-11 Tiger, also was tested with a fighter engine (the J-79) developed for an Air Force bomber (the B-58 Hustler), and also showed great improvements in performance and range. Yet the Super Tiger never made it to the fleet: let us hope we learn from history. The F-14 is the only frontline fighter we have until the mid-1990s, and the F-10IDFE is the only engine available in a reasonable time frame that can give the Tomcat its full strength.
Mr. Hanley is a freelance writer w ho specializes in aerospace material. He was graduated from California State University at Hayward in 1971 with a B.S. in business, spent six years in U. S. naval intelligence, and holds a commercial pilot's license with instrument rating.
Attack! The Tomcat’s Birthright
attack system. However, the airframe is an old design that is performance limited when compared with the threat. The A-6 is also limited in total numbers, hampered by low production rate, and because of its inability to defend itself, requires a strike escort—i.e.. two airplanes are required just to have one put bombs on a target. Most impor
by Lieutenant Brian Fitzpatrick. U. S. Navy
The strike fighter concept is vital to all of naval tactical air if we are to keep pace with the requirements for future combat. The increased airwing striking power and increased flexibility in operating the carrier will help offset the relatively small number of assets available to the task force commander when compared with most potential
opposing land forces.
Many consider the A-6 Intruder the only possibility for medium attack, and. in fact, the A-6 is one of the finest, most capable, all-weather attack airplanes ever built. It has served well, and updates such as the target recognition attack multisensor (TRAM) have kept the airplane a formidable tantly, however, no airplane is currently being considered for an A-6 replacement. When that consideration finally does occur, we will be far behind the power curve, because of the incredible lead time required to get an airplane into production.
The F-14 may not have the allweather attack capability of the A-6 and full-scale development may eliminate it as a replacement possibility, but we should make every attempt to have F- 14s augment our attack forces. It is wasteful not to exploit all the potential of such a fine airplane as the Tomcat. The wasted potential of the F-14 will become even more apparent as airframe changes (hopefully to include the F-101 engine) are introduced to the fleet.
An F-14 with the tremendous thrust provided by the F-101 engine will have more potential than any other aircraft in the world today. The increased range and performance will significantly improve the combat capability of the Tomcat. (The number of F-I4s lost because of engine-related problems should be incentive enough to replace the aircraft's present power plant.) The requirement for a new engine is known by every pilot who has flown the F-14. and it should be given first priority. A stall-free powerful engine will give the aircrew confidence and actual performance in all flight regimes, from the cat shot to the upper left corner of the flight envelope. The maintenance crew and flight deck handler will also appreciate the new engine's pretrimmed modular design. The many hours of high-power turns and the seemingly impossible job of engine trimming will become a task of the past. Down time will be reduced, and the problem of spotting the deck for an engine turn will be virtually ended.
As a result, overall combat capability for the aircrew will increase, as will craft availability. The F-IO! engine will provide the means to fully develop the air-to-ground weapon system and even explore the nuclear capability of the F-14.
The television camera set (TCS). currently scheduled for procurement
in fiscal year 1983, should be considered our first step toward air-to-ground weapon system integration in the Tomcat. TCS gives the F-14 crew a ten-power aid to search for both airborne or surface targets at standoff distances. All that is now required is the development of an operationally proven TCS as an air-to-ground weapon sensor. The ideal location of the TCS would allow for long-range passive identification, targeting, and launch of smart weapons. Development should begin toward the integration of forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar or a laser designator/tracker as possible interchangeable pods with the TCS to ensure increased all-weather attack capabilities. Any of these sensors could be incorporated without loss of a critical weapons station. In addition, the AWG-9 radar/fire control system is currently being updated by a programmable signal processor (PSP). The PSP makes two basic changes. The first is the incorporation of double density computers which could easily allow for Maverick. Walleye, high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM), Tomahawk, and Harpoon weapons computations. The second is the use of a multiplex bus similar to that in the F/A-18. This single modification will allow for innumerable options and capabilities. Sensors and parameters for weapon release can be easily integrated. An F-14 carrying smart weapons, using its two-way data link for targeting and TCS or FLIR for long-range identification, would be
Even loaded with bombs, the Tomcat has ample wing stations for air defense missiles, left. The introduction of the television camera set, below, provides for long-range identification of surface or airborne targets.
an awesome threat to any enemy, day or night. All this could be done while retaining a superior air-to-air capability for self-defense and fleet defense.
No one understands the limitations of naval tactical air better than naval aviators. The pilots agree that we need aircraft that have the range to carry a significant payload and deliver that ordnance with a certain degree of survivability, day or night in any weather. The strike fighter concept must be in the future of the F-14 if the Navy is to keep pace with combat requirements. The potentially versatile capabilities of the F/A-18 and the sophisticated Strike Eagle are good indicators that the F-14 can be used for all missions. The Strike Eagle will bring the Air Force TacAir into the all-weather fighter/attack business. We should follow that lead in our plans forfollow-on F-14s. The Tomcat should retain its primary role of fleet air defense, and, at the same time, establish a secondary mission to augment attack forces. To keep pace with our requirements, we should increase production of the F-14 as its smart weapon air-to-ground capabilities are developed and proven.
If there is a problem with the F-14, it certainly is not with the airplane or air-to-air weapon systems. The problem is that the Tomcat is more capable than most realize. In fact, the F-14 may be the solution for future tactical carrier aviation. The current changes, both proposed and approved, will make the F-14 air-to-ground weapon development relatively easy and inexpensive and will require very limited lead time. The TCS, PSP, and F-101DFE engine, to name only some changes, will make attack integration a real possibility provided we move now. The F-14 can be, and should be, the strike- fighter of the future. Like its namesake. the Tomcat was born to attack.
Lieutenant Fitzpatrick graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1974. and is currently an operational test director at VX-4 for the F/A-18: he is Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) qualified in the F-4. F-14. and F/A-18.
The Elusive OSR___________
By Captain David L. Woods. U. S. Naval Reserve
For at least three decades.—“For Official Use Only” records vital to the career of every naval officer have existed, unknown to almost all and understood by few: the Officer Summary Record (OSR). Unless you have served on a selection board or in certain sections within the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC), you are probably unaware of this apparently innocuous OSR. Initially, the OSR— designed primarily to assist selection board members in their deliberations—was prepared by hand. Now a machine prepares the most current portions of this document.
The OSR's cover sheet presents an officer’s name and sequence number, along with personal details ranging from promotion history and current status to education, medals and awards, special qualifications, and total service. The remainder of the OSR summarizes each fitness report on one line of a special summary sheet. These summary sheets are keyed to the particular fitness report form in use during the period. For example, NavPers 1070/50 (Rev 6-74), the current OSR form, lists in order: grade, station, duty, date of report, number of months covered. reporting senior's last name and grade; five factors, including specific performance, comparison, desirability. promotion, and traits; and concludes with a remarks section (which merely identifies each report as regular, concurrent, etc.). Seven boxes are provided to reflect markings in the first three and the fifth factors, while "promotion” has three boxes labeled E. P, and N (early, promotable. and not recommended).
Consequently, an officer with six As, five Bs, and one N in specific performance boxes 29 through 40 of today’s machine-readable fitness report NavPers 1611/1 (Rev 5-77) would have on his OSR: a 6 in the first column under specific performance and a 5 in the second column. The N would not appear anywhere, but there would be a line below the 6 in the first box—since a majority of this officer’s marks were in that column.
Naturally, no self-respecting selection board member would rely exclusively upon such machine-prepared summaries. But these specific and numerical summaries, when combined with their hand-prepared predecessors, go a long way toward establishing at least an initial competence tendency for each officer being considered for promotion.
Also, while errors in recording are rare (but possible) in these days of machine-processing. errors occurred more frequently when such summaries were prepared by hand. Omissions or mistakes on as many as 10% of a given officer’s entries are not unknown.
The enormous burden of record evaluation faced by each selection board clearly makes some form of OSR a virtual necessity, yet officers approaching a promotion zone would be well advised not only to insure all fitness reports are present in their record. but to request a copy of their OSR from NMPC and compare it item by item with their actual reports. Both these steps should be taken, of course, well in advance of the selection board's convening date.
As with any summary, some valid and significant data in the longer, original report must be omitted from the summary. Among such missing information on both active and inactive duty officers’ OSRs are the following:
► Designator changes or transfers from line to staff corps, or vice versa, and the date thereof (release from, or return to, active duty status is accorded one line on the summary sheet).
► The designator or status of the reporting senior (you cannot tell if a reporting senior is USN. USNR. TAR. Selected Reservist, or from another service.
► Indication of exact rank for flag-level reporting seniors (the system runs from 6 for an ensign through 1 for a captain. Only 0 designates a flag or general officer, a factor further compounded by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act’s [DOPMA] insertion of a one-star flag rank).
Two other common entries can easily confuse an evaluator:
► A one-line, hand-entry noting time and duty and the legend “Memorandum Report” is identical for either a short gap in reports, a missing fitness report, or even a report removed by direction of the Secretary of the Navy. Only by returning to the original memorandum report on the microfiche can the specific reasons for each identical entry be determined and checked.
► In pre-machine days, not all traits, qualities, or comparisons as marked by reporting seniors were listed on the OSR. Rather, an X was placed in the box where the officer had the most marks. Thus, an officer marked: 0/2/ 2/2/0 for a five-box entry might arbitrarily receive an X in either the second, third, or fourth box. Similarly, a comparison mark for one officer could be: 0/0/0/X/0. Yet, only a check of the original fitness report would reveal the actual fact that the summary marks for all officers of this grade at that time was: 0/0/0/7/0. Thus, the rather significant fact that all officers of this grade rated by this senior at this time fell into the same category is obscured by the OSR process. And while such a relatively low mark might not be career enhancing, it is clearly better to be “one among seven in the fourth box.” than to be thought the only officer meriting such low standing.
Inactive duty Naval Reserve officers face certain additional challenges with their OSRs. The more active a reservist has been—the more voluminous, and probably the more confusing. his or her record will be. One hundred fitness reports are not uncommon for a naval reservist with 25 to 30 years’ service. Bear in mind, reservists’ fitness reports are due annually and for each period of active duty lasting seven days or more. Also, should civilian job transfers of either the officer or regular reporting senior take place with frequency, the number of annual reports can escalate.
Among the more critical omissions on inactive duty OSRs are:
► Training category (This can be A, B. D. or other and can be an important factor in close comparisons.)
► Whether duty is pay or nonpay
► How many drills are covered (This ranges from one to 100 or more. For inactive duty, months—if at least half a month—are shown.)
► Length of active duty, if less than one month
► Billet while on active duty for training (All such duty is simply labeled training duty (TraDu) on hand-prepared summaries and active duty for training (AcDuTra) on machine entries. Thus, duty under instruction can be noted only during inactive duty.)
Finally, from at least the mid-1950s until the late 1960s, there was a critical variance between active and inactive duty fitness report forms. Active duty reports provided five boxes to list the all-essential comparison mark, but inactive duty reports listed ten such boxes. Accordingly, those inactive duty OSRs carry only a solid line through the entire comparison box. Comparison by inactive duty seniors is simply omitted. In contrast, comparison from active duty reporting seniors are noted correctly by an X in the proper box. Thus, not only do these OSRs provide a bias toward AcDuTra performance rather than inactive duty drilling, but an officer's splendid comparison marks from inactive duty are of no avail (unless the reviewing selection board member takes the considerable trouble to check inactive duty fitness report comparisons over perhaps two decades with great care).
The U. S. Navy’s officer promotional system is a good one. exceeded by few (if any) others. Yet, for its success to continue, selection boards must be provided with accurate and complete information, particularly when examining competitors of almost equal merit. The OSR can provide such data, but in its present form (and in its hand- prepared era) it appears wanting in at least the instances noted.
Captain Woods is a member of the Board for the Correction of Naval Records and special assistant to the Chief of Naval Material. His latest book. Signal inf* cind Communicating at Sea, is published by the Arno Press.
“Pride in Her Name”_____
By Samuel L. Morison
On 29 September 1938, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson, with the approval of President Roosevelt, announced that “a definitive policy has been formulated to supplement existing law and establish customs for the naming of certain types of ships.” This policy supplemented the Act of 4 May 1898 which established, as law, the criteria for naming ships. Until the naming of the Newport (LST-1179) on 13 October 1966, this was the basis for the naming of ships. But when the name notice for this ship was signed by Robert H. Baldwin, then Under Secretary of the Navy, the snowball started rolling downhill.
On the matter of hull numbering policy. General Order No. 541 was issued on 17 July 1920. A footnote to the order, which was signed by R. E. Coontz, then-acting Secretary of the Navy, states in part that "The number ‘5’ should not be again used for vessels of this class; the next heavier-than- aircraft-tender built or taken over would be ‘6'.” The aforementioned refers to the AV classification, which in 1920 was defined as “heavier-than- aircraft-tender." The point is plainly made that the ”5” should not be used again for the AV classification. It established the policy that no number should be used twice in any ship-type classification. General Order No. 541 was never modified, superseded, or cancelled. Hence, it is still officially in force.
On 15 August 1959, the Bass (SSK- 2) and Bonita (SSK-3) became SS-551 and -552 respectively; on II August 1960. the hull number SS-555 was assigned to the new auxiliary submarine Dolphin as AGSS-555. To quote an
OP-332B report dated 15 June 1959. this was done because . . . "the CNO does not wish to use hull numbers in the hull number group with the nuclear submarines, and in keeping with the age of the submarines . . .” As far as the author knows, this was the first time such a thing had occurred. However, on 1 April 1967, when the Ashe- v/7/e-class PGMs were reclassified PGs, they retained their same hull numbers—despite the fact that the PG hull numbers had been used before.
With this, the assignment of hull numbers started to go the same way as ship naming policy. Both have become so politicized and farcical that one is reminded of Abbott and Costello’s routine of “Who’s on First?” To give all the details of this comic opera would require an entire Proceedings issue. Instead, the growing problem will be defined by citing a few examples in different ship categories:
In the area of aircraft carriers, let us examine the naming of the Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) and the Carl Vinson (CVN-70). The Eisenhower was originally named just that, but in speeches and written text. President Richard M. Nixon kept referring to the ship as the Dwight D. Eisenhower. Finally, the White House called the Secretary of the Navy’s office and ordered the name changed to conform with presidential usage—although there is only one Eisenhower famous enough to have a ship named after him. Until then. Navy policy had been to use only the last name of a person when naming a ship, unless it could cause confusion with another name already on the Naval Vessel Register (NVR). If so, then the first name and/or initial was added to differentiate between the two, as in the case of the Frank Knox (DD-742) and Leslie L. B. Knox (DE-580).
As for the Carl Vinson, she was the first ship in the U. S. Navy to be named for a living person in more than 150 years. Imagine the trend this could set! Any member of Congress could hold up a vital government bill as ransom for a ship to be named after him.
Why name aircraft carriers for people, anyway? Some of the Navy’s greatest achievements are enshrined within ship and battle names, such as Wasp. Essex. Yorktown. Princeton. etc. I hold nothing against Admiral Nimitz, President Eisenhower, or Mr. Vinson, but it would have been more appropriate to name Trident-class submarines after them. Up to the Tridents, the Navy said that all SSBNs would be named after “distinguished Americans and others whose lives have paralleled and contributed to the growth of democracy.” Aren’t Admiral Nimitz and President Eisenhower distinguished enough?
One final note on the subject of carrier names; the Navy has recently done something in this area that can be applauded—naming the new CG-47 class after “famous ships and battles.” Hence, old carrier names such as 77- conderoga and Yorktown are being used again. In this way. historic names won’t be lost.
Turning to cruisers, the confusion deepens. In the past, cruisers were named for cities. Not counting the DLG/DLGNs (now reclassified to CG/ CGNs) we now have three cruiser name sources within 40 hull numbers; we also have AOEs, AORs, ATSs, LSTs,
The Navy's ship naming policy sometimes falls victim to personal whim. The CVN-69 began simply as the Eisenhower; her name changed because President Nixon couldn 7 break his habit of adding “Dwight D.”
LPDs, and other ship types named after cities. To revert to the use of city names for cruisers would be ridiculous because the name source is now so common. I suggest that all future cruiser construction, including the apparently reborn CGN-42 class, use the Ticon- deroga-dass name source. By doing this, the name source would become standardized by the 1990s for most cruisers.
In examining destroyer-frigate-minor combatant names, we find some interesting examples. First is the Con- olly (DD-972). Originally, the name was assigned to FF-1073 of the Knox class. Conolly family members accepted, but later changed their minds and asked that the name be saved for a new destroyer. The name of the FF-1073 was changed to Robert E. Peary.
The Samuel Eliot Morison (FFG- 13) originally was named Samuel E. Morison. According to the naval historian's former secretary, who worked for him for more than 20 years, Morison preferred to use his middle initial—in 14 of 15 volumes that comprise his History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. that is the way he signed the forewords. But deferring to the wishes of family members then-Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor Jr. changed the name to Samuel Eliot Morison. This was approved on 17 August 1979 at an additional cost of $6,600 to the Navy. As in the case of CVN-69. more name was used than necessary.
It is hard to know where to begin with submarines. When we first began building SSBNs. the official policy was that they were to be named after “distinguished Americans and others . . .” What was wrong with continuing this policy with the Tridents? They may be larger than any of the others, but that should not matter when choosing a source for names. However, because they are so large, they are considered in some quarters to be the capital ships of the Navy.
On 26 December 1968. in a memorandum to Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius. Admiral Thomas Moorer. then-Chief of Naval Operations, wrote.
“Your approval of the use of state names for major surface combatant nuclear-propelled ships is requested.” By definition, a submarine is not a major surface combatant. In the memorandum, Admiral Moorer specifically mentioned CGNs. His request was approved on 2 January 1969; this would seem to settle matters on what type of ships would be named for states. As it turned out. nothing was settled.
On II February 1975. Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II. in a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations, said. "As you know, only DLGN-41 and 42 [later cancelled] remain to be named in that program. Would it not be logical to name the Trident submarines after states?" The first question that comes to mind is: Why is it logical? Why not name aircraft carriers after states? Moreover, it would be just as logical to continue naming SSBNs after distinguished Americans. Naming policies certainly must adapt to the times, but must they do so illogically?
Then we have the SSN names. When I was working for the Naval Historical Center. I had a phone conversation with a chief who had been in the submarine service his entire career, which illustrates how things are in the area of submarine names. This conversation occurred just after the GlenardP. Lipscomb (SSN-685) was named. He wanted to know what type of fish the "Lipscombfish" was? I replied it was not a fish, but a former member of Congress who was now deceased. There was a pregnant pause, and then he said, “I guess I will go home and burn my dolphins.”
Within nine hull numbers (SSN-680/ 688). there are three naming sources. The Cavalla (SSN-684) is the last SS/ SSN to be named for a fish or "denizen of the deep.” The SSN-685 is named after a former member of the House of Representatives, and SSNs- 686 and-687 are named for two former members of the Senate. Naturally, to be fair and keep things balanced, the then-Secretary of the Navy approved renaming the Redfisli (SSN-680) for another former member of the House of Representatives.
*
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover was the originator of the request that—beginning with the SSN-688 class—all
Table I 1969 Proposed Name Sources for Types of Ships Ship Type (Classification) Name Source
SSNs be named for cities. He also specifically requested that SSN-688 be named the Los Angeles. Obviously, everybody agreed.
For more than 70 years, submarines of the ‘‘Silent Service” have always been named after fish and other denizens of the deep. Names such as the Tang, Harder, and Wahoo are an important part of the history of the U. S. Navy. In the first years of World War II, the submarines carried the war to the Japanese, and names like “Mush" Morton and Dick O'Kane became famous. The esprit d'corps of the silent service was legendary. Yet how can any sailor say with pride that his ship is the William H. Bates? How suitable is it when compared with names like Trigger. Trout, Croaker, Nautilus, and Argonaut? Of all the name sources changed or discarded, this is the worst of all—for no other ship type was better named.
The most recent example of shipnaming absurdity is the proposed “American Industrialist” class of oilers. Already known derisively as the “robber baron” class, the proposal— supported by the Secretary of the Navy—seeks to name the lead ship of the class after Henry J. Kaiser, because of the approaching centenary of Kaiser’s birth, and his “many contributions to the Navy.” This proposal has met with strong opposition within theNavy. Eversince AO-I was named Kanawha more than 60 years ago. oilers have been named for rivers of the United States—one of the few ship types left that still can be identified by name alone.
Efforts to recreate a standard name policy have been tried, but regrettably have failed. On 24 June 1969, the Riera Panel was established by direction from Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Bernard A. Clarey to produce a consistent policy, so that each type of ship could be identified by name. The resulting document was presented to Admiral Thomas Moorer, then-Chief of Naval Operations, who forwarded it to the Secretary of the Navy (see Table I). However, he refused to approve it because he didn't want to be restricted on what he could name a ship. Perhaps it is time to try again, before matters get any worse.
Let us now turn to the Navy’s hull numbering system, which in the last ten years has come to resemble a Chinese fire drill. As mentioned earlier, the first modern case of dupli-
Battleships (BB)
Aircraft Carriers (CV, CVN) Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Cruisers (CGN)
Guided Missile Cruisers (AEGIS) (CG)
Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN)
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)
Destroyers and Frigates (DD/DDG, FF/FFG)
Amphibious Command Ships (LCC)
Amphibious Assault Ships (General Purpose) & (Helicopter) (LHA/LPH)
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
Dock Landing Ships (LSD)
Tank Landing Ships (LST)
Patrol Combatant Missile (Hydrofoil) (PHM)
Destroyer Tenders (AD)
Ammunition Ships (AE)
Combat Store Ships (AFS)
Fleet Oilers, Fast Combat Stores Ships, Replenishment Oilers (AO/AOE/AOR)
Tugs (ATA/ATF/ATS)
Oceanographic Research and Surveying Ships (AGOR/AGS)
Submarine Tenders (AS)
Submarine Rescue Ships (ASR)
Minesweeper Ships (MSC/MSF/ MSO)
Named Service Craft
Dry Docks (AFDB/AFDL/ARD/ ARDM)
Large Harbor Tug (YTB)
States; required by law
To be considered on an individual basis
States; policy established in 1969
Famous ships and battles (old CV name source)
Major U. S. cities (exceeding 100.000 population)
Trident type: States Poseidon Polaris type: "Distinguished Americans and others whose lives have paralleled and contributed to the growth of Democracy”
Deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy Non-volcanic mountains and mountain ranges
U. S. naval battles, campaigns, or expeditions in which Marines played a prominent role (or battle only)
Cities named for explorers and developers of America Historic Sites
Counties (with the word “County" included)
Constellations
Natural regions, areas, and localities in the United States
Volcanoes or words suggestive of fire and explosives Astronomical bodies U. S. rivers (but not the names of states)
Prominent Indians, Indian tribes, Indian words (but not the names of states)
Naval officers and other prominent scientists distinguished in oceanographic and allied fields Pioneers in submarine development Birds (emphasis on former ASR names) Descriptive words (e.g.. Aggressive, Bold, Alert)
Name Sources
Words appropriate to mission of fleet support (e.g.. Sustain)
Prominent Indians, Indian tribes (emphasis on noted Indian leaders)
eating hull numbers occurred with the Dolphin (AGSS-555). Bass (SS-551), and Bonita (SS-552). Their numbers duplicate part of a group of hulls authorized for construction on 16 June 1940. but cancelled on 26 March 1945.
The first hull number duplication of major significance occurred with the Aslieville-class PGs. keeping the same hull numbers they had as PGMs. The official reason for the Asheville reclassification was that the Navy wanted to keep the PGM designation for those small combatants built in the United States for transfer to foreign navies, while the PG designation was to be used for those minor combatants retained by the U. S. Navy. The same numbers were kept to avoid changing “. . .blueprints, embossed stationery, repaint the hull number, etc." Unfortunately, in doing this the hull numbers of Asheville (PG-101: later PF-1), Natchez (PG-101: later PF-2). and 14 British “Flower”-cIass corvettes of the World War II period—acquired from England under lend-lease—were duplicated. As a result, the historian will have to cope forever with two PG- 38s, 89s. etc. The numbers should have been PG-211 to 226.
In the destroyer, frigate, and minor combatant category, one of the best examples of hull number confusion is the Spruance-class destroyers originally ordered by the former imperial government of Iran. When ordered, the U. S. hull numbers DD-993-998 were assigned. Two of the class were cancelled in June 1976. According to official documents and for some unknown reason, DD-995 and 997 were cancelled instead of 997-998: the keels were then still some two years away from being laid. On 23 April 1978. when the contract for the remaining DDs was awarded to Ingalls Shipbuilding, the Navy compounded the situation by reclassifying DD-996 and -998 as DD-995 and 996 respectively. When the new Iranian government cancelled the last two DDs on 31 March 1979. the U. S. Navy officially took over the destroyer in July 1979 and promptly reclassified them DDG-993/996 on 8 August 1979. While reclassifying these ships as DDGs was appropriate (the Iranians w'ere classifying them as CGs). the DDG-48-51 numbers should have been used (DDG-47 is now CG-47). Incidentally, the "air-capable" destroyer authorized in the fiscal year 1978 program wears the hull number DD-997: this duplicates the hull number of one of the Iranian units.
Another example of hull number duplication is the USS Glover (FF- 1098), formerly AGFF-1. Originally, FF-1098 through 1107 were authorized for construction in fiscal year 1968: the first three hulls (FF 1098-100) were later cancelled. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has stated that if a hull number is officially assigned to a unit authorized in a shipbuilding program, then the same number can't be used for hull designation again—even if the original unit’s construction has been cancelled. Yet this policy was not followed when the Glover was reclassified as FF 1098—a number already assigned to a previous, albeit cancelled, unit.
One of the most laughable hull numbering cases is that of the first Trident- class unit. Originally, the first Trident was to be numbered SSBN-711, but the SSN office in the Naval Sea Systems Command had already taken the number for a Los Angeles-class SSN. So. the Trident was reclassified SSBN-I in February 1974. The official reason was that the Tridents were a new class of vessel. Well, so were the George Washington-class SSBNs. Ethan Allen-class SSBNs. and the
Lafayette/ Benjamin Franklin-class SSBNs. Fortunately, reason prevailed. and on 10 April 1974. SSBN- 1 was reclassified SSBN-726.
From both a historical and current point of view, there has to be some consistency in name sources. They should be logical, definitive, and project pride and individuality. Above all. once a name source is published, then it should stick. We should not have to tolerate name changes each time a special interest group decides that a name is inappropriate, as recently was demonstrated in the case of the nuclear-powered submarine Corpus Cliristi—pressure from religious groups forced the Navy to rechristen her the City of Corpus Cliristi. No such objection seems to have been raised in 1943 when the patrol frigate Corpus Cliristi was launched. As for hull numbering. it is a simple matter of checking with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and/or the Naval Historical Center before assigning the number.
In today's Navy, pride in one's ship has been lacking for many reasons. Maybe it would help things a bit by enabling the sailor to identify more strongly with the name of his ship. Let us take advantage of unused name sources, as well as modern ones that deserve honor. As Captain 1st Rank M. Grigor'yev wrote in his article entitled "The Proud Name of a Ship." published in the October 1971 Mor- skoy Shornik. the Soviet naval magazine. “. . . love for one’s own ship and pride in her name is one of the most important traditions of the Navy.”
Mr. Morison is employed by the U. S. Navy Depanmem. and edils the U. S. section of Jam 's Fighting Ships.
Energy: The Winnable Ballgame
By Captain D. A. Dyer. U. S. Naval Reserve
In today's world of rhetoric and demagoguery, it is little wonder that Americans are confused about the fundamentals of national defense as affected by domestic policies.
Most people would probably agree that the primary reason for concern about conditions in the Middle East and the vital interests of the United States represented there is singly focused upon the dependence of the United States upon that region for oil. This is because energy is the lifeblood of any industrialized nation, and the sea-lanes needed by the United States to transport this oil circle the Cape of Good Hope and traverse some 11.000 miles. South Africa is another region in which vital interests are bound up, again because of the need to protect
the flow of oil.
If the United States were to become energy self-sufficient, the significance of many areas of vital interest would change quickly and profoundly. With the deregulation of oil prices, new drilling has increased production in the United States by some 600.000 barrels a day, about one-half of the present level of dependence upon imported oil.
Part of this has been the result of conservation brought about by the market forces, higher prices causing users to conserve.
All of the oil produced in the United States today, however, comes from drilling and wells from 2% of the regions in the United States with known oil reserves or geophysical attributes which have a high probability of major oil deposits. Yet. primarily because of environmentalist resistance, pressures to withhold vast areas of known deposits continue. This occurs in spite of the fact that if we were to increase production by the same amount next year we would essentially eliminate dependence on foreign oil imports.
The methodology for producing oil and gas from coal has long been known. During World War II. the Germans produced their oil, to a major extent, from coal.
Given these two factors, the need for aggressive leasing programs to expand drilling activity and the need to produce oil from coal, it is perplexing, indeed, that the impact of these program potentials has been lost in the debates on national defense. The United States could quickly become oil self-sufficient in the short- and midterm. while alternative means of energy production are developed for the longer haul.
All of the energy needs of the United States can be fulfilled by unleashing the free enterprise system (energy companies) to close the gap. To do this requires aggressive leasing and elimination of the cost differential between oil and gas caused by arbitrary limits upon the price of natural gas, resistance to which is blatantly motivated by selfish motives for competitive advantage. Natural gas today, 95% of our requirement for which is produced domestically, costs one-half the price of oil per British thermal unit (BTU). Parity in the cost of BTUs of energy would generate a much greater flow of gas in interstate commerce and greatly ease the overall pressures for energy, and at the same time encourage further exploration to stop the present erosion of a 12-year reserve brought on by the economics that force a tilt to oil production and a perpetuation of oil dependency as a result of our current price control policies.
As we look at priorities for national defense, it is time we recognize the relationship between energy self-sufficiency and defense. It is time we recognize the relationship between areas of vital interest and energy dependence. The entire picture related to buildup of military means would be dramatically affected by such a recognition and a policy based upon that recognition. Our allies in Europe and Asia are more dependent upon imported energy than we are, and this factor (given energy independence for the United States) would motivate those allies to concern themselves more realistically with their ability to defend their vital interests.
The Soviet system, viewed historically, is breaking down. There is a growing gap between eastern European nations and the Soviet Union. There is, likewise, a growing gap between western European nations and the United States. Europe is moving into a greater dependence upon the Soviet Union for gas energy. The historical trend strongly suggests that both the United States and the Soviet Union will find themselves less able to command the destiny of joint actions with their allies in the next ten to 20 years. We need, therefore, to scrupulously avoid a Maginot-Line mentality toward NATO and to recognize that the great equalizer, in fact, is energy selfsufficiency.
In addition, the growing capability of many small and emerging nations to engage in nuclear actions is becoming a scary threat to world peace. The ability of small, fanatic, and irresponsible nations to trigger a nuclear conflict will grow in real terms during the same time the influence of superpowers over their allies wanes. Can we depoliticize the process sufficiently to enable us to move on a priority effort, over the next three to five years, to realize practical energy independence, and at the same time review the criteria of vital interests in light of such a development?
If we can. the size, makeup, and cost of our military forces will reduce pressures brought about by the single glaring fact of energy dependence upon far-flung sources. The need for entangling alliances around the world will be substantially reduced.
This premise does not suggest that the Soviets, based upon their unprecedented military expansion of the past decade, are not of great concern. But, rather, it proposes that the numbers and locations of potential direct confrontation. together with all of the implications of likelihood of confrontation, can be reduced dramatically.
Just as “putting a man on the moon” was the order of the day in the 1960s, energy self-sufficiency is clearly the priority of the next five years. This objective is well within reach, given incentive to industry to continue to expand upon the efforts of the past year or two.
The greatest single barrier to such an effort is demagoguery in the form of the old and trite cries of feigned anguish about the profits of big energy companies. Profits of energy companies generate tax revenues in massive amounts, while their drilling activities make a great contribution to national defense without the budget pressures normally related to defense buildups. The time has come to rise above year- round electioneering to put the interests of the United States above partisan politics. The time has come to unleash the proven capability of industry to gain for us an energy-independent status.
The impact of such a program in reducing the drain of capital to the oil- producing cartel of the Middle East. Africa, and Venezuela should not be overlooked. The mitigation of the major impact of persistent deficits in balance of payments generated primarily from oil dependence and the salutary benefit upon our economy should certainly be recognized as frosting on the cake of energy self-sufficiency.
Business and management training programs teach that the way to solve a complex set of problems is to identify the central problem and solve it first, thus eliminating a large number of peripheral problems. The central problem facing the United States today—that which underlies our primary vital interest decisions, that which dictates the size and shape of military requirements, that which continues to plague our economy with an unacceptable negative balance of payments—is energy dependence upon sources far removed from our shores.
Solve that problem, and the solution is well within reach, and we enter a totally different ballgame.
Captain D. A. Dyer has enjoyed a long and distinguished career in industry, attaining Senior Vice President, subsidiary President, and then Chairman, in the largest international conglomerate in the world. He has served in the Navy and the Naval Reserve since 1943 and is currently serving on active duty as special assistant to the Chief of Naval Education and Training.
Operation Rosario: Recapturing the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands
By Dr. Robert L. Scheina
At 2100 on 1 April, approximately 70 Argentine commandos came ashore on Soledad Island in rubber boats. Possibly, they were transported to the island on board the "Guppy II"-class submarine Santo Fe. The night was moonlit and visibility was good. The commandos remained secluded until 0030. 2 April, when the force divided into two patrols. The objective of the first patrol was to neutralize the Royal Marine Barracks and the second to
capture the Government House. The commandos were ordered to use force only if absolutely necessary. The first patrol trekked the eight kilometers across country to the barracks. When it arrived at the barracks at 0530. it found the facility abandoned. The commandos now presumed that their presence was known to the British. They reformed and started to march to Stanley, the principal town of the islands with a population of about
I.(KM). Groups of Royal Marines, carrying flags of truce, were disarmed and taken prisoner during the march. At 0900. the commandos heard explosions coming from the direction of the Government House.
The second patrol had arrived at the Government House at 0550. The British had been alerted to the Argentines' presence. The patrol's commanding officer twice asked the British governor to surrender. The commandos insisted that delay could cause loss of lives on both sides throughout the islands. Both sides opened fire. It was now 0630 and becoming light. The fighting at the Government House would continue for three hours. The Argentine patrol’s commanding officer was killed, and two other Argentines were seriously wounded during this action.
At 0345. frogmen came ashore to guard the harbor's main entrance. Three hours later, amphibious vehicles were launched from the Argentine LST Cabo San Antonio. The LST then entered York Bay and disembarked the main Argentine force—the commanding officer of the operation (Rear Admiral Carlos Alberto Busser. Commandant of the Marine Corps), 600 marines, and 279 army and air force personnel and their vehicles. The destroyers Santisima Trinidad and Hercules. frigates Drummond and Grand- ville, and icebreaker Almirante Irizar remained outside the harbor. The main force had three immediate objectives. The first was to capture the airport— accomplished without firing a shot. The second was to secure the harbor so that the Argentine warships could enter—also easily accomplished. The third mission was to secure the town.
As the force landed, the firing from the Government House could be heard. Upon entering the town. Argentine vehicles were fired upon from two positions. They returned the fire and silenced it. The force continued toward the Government House. They came upon approximately 40 people with a flag of truce. These had been the combatants at the Government House. A cease-fire was declared at 0830. Fifteen minutes later, the first Argentine Air Force C-130 landed.
On 3 April, the Island of South Georgia was seized. The Argentine frigate Guerrico established radio contact with the island and was told that there were no military personnel on it. The Argentine warship then transmitted human rights guarantees in English. At 1200. a Puma helicopter carried the first group of Argentine marines to the island and returned to the frigate. As the second group of marines was landing, the island's civilian population disappeared, and the helicopter and warship were attacked by British marines. A launch from the corvette carried more Argentine marines ashore. A two-hour fight ensued, ending when the Royal Marines were captured. The Argentine frigate and helicopter were damaged, and three Argentine marines were wounded.
Operat ion Rosario was over.
Dr. Schcina writes the regional review of Latin American navies for the Proceedings' international navies issue.