FMF for the RDF

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P^e-World War II Marine drill instructors scribed training boots: “Take everything away ^r°^,n Mem and give them the Corps!” A modern variant for the Fleet Marine Force might be: Take away almost all their aviation and give ^Xe,n the RDF.” No defending Norway’s fiords, no NATO commitment whatsoever.

Just the RDF!

T^{1 e} idea of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is Den"^{101 new}' ^ had '^{ts or}'Siⁿ iⁿ the 1960s, when the ^sDo H^tment defense recognized a need to re- °fth ^l° ^cont'ⁿg^encies which might arise in areas _a|_r ^e. ^World other than Europe or Korea, where we r_e ^a. ^ f°^rces 'ⁿ position. To help meet this tra ^lrcrnent' designs were proposed for a strategic _C *P°n aircraft and a strategic sealift ship; the _cha G^xy aircraft was developed and pur- ^ed, but the fast deployment logistics (FDL) ship

p_erj ^e Vietnam War forced the RDF concept into a p_re . dormancy. It emerged again in 1977 when °^rand ^6nt ^^arter '^ssued Presidential Review Mem- si_de )d, which discussed military strategy out- Un,il ATO. Nonetheless, no actions were taken ra_n f|!^{er t}*^le seizure of the U. S. embassy in Teh- °f _Af° °wed six weeks later by the Soviet invasion Can ® . ⁿ'^stan- These events prompted President _Uar ⁱⁿ his State of the Union message of 23 Jan- b_ec                to make a policy statement which has

known as the Carter Doctrine: tro|           by any outside force to gain con­an ■              Persian Gulf region will be regarded as

of _A^{Sault on} the ^v'^tal interests of the United States by - ^rTler*^ca' and such an assault will be repelled ^ar>y means necessary, including military force.” ^a result, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task

^{lnRS 1} June 1<*82

Force (RDJTF) was formed on 1 March 1980. with a 261-man headquarters under the operational com­mand of the U. S. Readiness Command. As con­ceived, the RDJTF has no forces assigned to it. It is a staff whose mission is to develop plans to meet various crises. The intention is to present the Na­tional Command Authority with a number of options when confronted with a contingency in an area where U. S. forces are not prepositioned. The RDJTF will then assume operational command of resources taken from the four services. These resources will have been designated as potential RDF assets. The assets used and the response will be scenario-dependent.

The RDF concept is being developed in two phases. The near-term RDF consists of 13 ships presently at anchor in the lagoon of Diego Garcia. These ships are loaded with sufficient supplies to support an 11,200-man marine amphibious brigade (MAB) for about 30 days.¹ The long-term program, which is scheduled for introduction in three phases—to com­mence in 1983 and to be completed in 1987—will consist of three maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) forces, each capable of supporting a 16.000-man MAB for 30 days. The plan is to move an MPS force or forces to a potential trouble spot and join its equip­ment with the men who will be airlifted from the United States.

The near-term RDF assumes that we will be in­vited into one or more Persian Gulf nations in suf­ficient time to deter the actions of the Soviet Union or a Soviet proxy. That this is done in a benign environment is important, because the near-term MPS ships can be unloaded only alongside a pier. The long-term MPS force will be able to off-load at an­chor in an undeveloped harbor.

It is unlikely, however, that we would be invited into any Arab state prior to the onset of hostilities. The presence of a U. S. combat force in an Islamic country would be viewed as a threat to that nation's independence. A government which would allow us to establish a base for support of the RDF would be admitting weakness and making itself vulnerable to criticism from revolutionary factions. If invited into a country, we could find ourselves in the position, as we were in Vietnam, of propping up a government which lacks the support of its citizens.

Another political reality which undercuts the RDF's potential strength is the “War Powers Resolution” of 7 November 1973. This law restricts the ability of the President to introduce U. S. armed forces into areas where hostilities exist or “ . . . there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged in hostilities” without a declaration of war. The intent is to ensure that the President will consult with Congress prior to committing U. S. troops to combat. The required consultation could drag out 'Interview with LCdr. M. J. Carpenter. Jr.. USN. Executive Officer. Mil­itary Sealift Command Office Indian Ocean. 22 November 1981.

long enough to make the probability of finding ^a benign environment unlikely. In the event we ar^e invited in. the President must still consult with Con­gress. As invitations or calls for help—in the ab­sence of a treaty ratified by the Senate—would prob­ably come only from a government that needs immediate outside support to remain in power ana because the intent of the "War Powers Resolution is to avoid another Vietnam, congressional assent to commit troops would be unlikely.

A third problem with the RDF is the proposed linkup of men and material. The troops are to be moved from the United States by C-5A, C-141 Star- lifter. C-130 Hercules, or the proposed CX (C-1" aircraft. The use of strategic or tactical airlift as­sumes that adequate fuel will be available either a interim stops or from tanker aircraft, which als° have to get fuel and support from a forward base- It also assumes that the airfield and logistic facilit'^eS at the terminus will be adequate to process troop⁵ and cargo, and that overflight and tanker basing righ^ts will be granted by allied and normally friendly coun­tries. Just how tenuous basing, refueling, and over­flight rights can be was clearly demonstrated by °^ur resupply of Israel during the 1973 Arab-lsraeli when our only forward support base was in tn Azores. How our allies perceive our actions in ^re lation to their interests will make or break strategy airlift. Adequate airfield facilities are available in ^ vicinity of Persian Gulf ports, if we are invited ¹ use them. If we are forced to off-load in an und^e veloped harbor, getting equipment to the troops nt^J- become unfeasible.

Next is the question of off-loading the ships the¹¹¹ selves. At pierside. the operation is relatively e^aSJ If, however, we must first capture a port facil'D the problems are immediate. We have marines ava> able in the Indian Ocean only on an interim bas*⁵_ and then at the expense of meeting Mediterranea or Western Pacific commitments. The ability of’ first MPS force to off-load without port facility represents only a marginal advantage in the case ^ hostile shore environments. For the most part. be^a<-^ areas suitable for lighterage coincide with Per⁵¹ g Gulf oil ports. In addition, under the present M concept, putting equipment ashore elsewhere ^a sumes no sea/swell problems. However, the Per⁵! u Gulf is characterized by quickly building seas ^w are often out of proportion to the wind force- many places, the holding ground for ships at anc is poor.

As presently organized, the RDF is a force * no troops that belong to it exclusively. Its units designated as potential assets, but are being ^c peted for by other area commanders because t are also earmarked to reinforce Europe or Ko^r This competition for assets can only exacerba ^c command and control problem which will be ^cc plicated by the great distances involved. The eq

I

n ^nt is in Diego Garcia and the troops are in the _Co ^e<J States. Moving the troops presupposes that _an ,^^essj^onal debate will be avoided and overflight anding rights will be obtained.

_Sj_0n ^e RDF is not ready to deter the military aggres- ^con 1°^ P^otent'^al adversaries and is not capable of r_en ^Uctln8 successful military operations if deter- aiaf² We mast reallocate what we have to Fjp RDF a credible deterrent. _su ^st’ the RDF needs specific assigned units to RDF^Ch^{SfUlly com}Pl^ete '^ts mission. It is true that the j_nci j]^as many units under its operational control. Di_V' 'ⁿ® ^e*^ements of the 82nd and IOlst Airborne ^vi_sj^ISl0ns’ 6th Cavalry Brigade, 24th Infantry Di- the°^{n ant}* ^severa* wings of the 9th Air Force. But ^rtland^{SS1Snmenl s}P^ec‘^^{c un}'^{ts W}'H simplify com- t°      control. It makes no sense to assign units

rei_nf R^R if they may end up being used for the ^wou|H^{rCement ofNAT}°: to assume that the Soviets se_rv ^not threaten aggression in Europe if our re- hard^ ^ ^ere committed to the Persian Gulf is fool- a ' With no backup force available to help counter ar_e ■ ^^avv Pact movement into West Germany, we , . mg a nuclear confrontation, ideal ^nne ^^orP^s history and tradition make it an atari ⁿ_>^Uc*^eus f°^r the RDF. The requirement for the R_Uro^{nes to re}mforce Norway or the central front in ^and ₀^{PC s}i^10uid be eliminated. Marine Corps training the s ^^erat'.^onal planning should revolve solely around not ,Q^Cnar‘^os contemplated by the RDJTF. (This is RDf ^^{at t}*^{ie Ap}my should have no role in the ’ tit it is to say that the Marine Corps should have no other role except in the RDF.) As presently constituted. Marine Corps structure is that of light infantry. It needs to become a mobile, mechanized ground force. As an RDF in any scenario, the Marine Corps is not mobile or heavy enough to fight even the smallest Middle Eastern nation's ground forces.

With the exception of helicopter squadrons and the A-4/AV-8 close support squadrons, all Marine Corps aviation units should be deactivated. They draw too heavily on resources needed to improve the fighting ability of the infantryman. The air in­tercept, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and all­weather attack/interdiction missions can and should be performed initially by the Navy. It is inconceiv­able that we would make any attempt to insert the RDF without total air superiority, which means that carrier aviation would be employed. If the Marines are ashore so long that the carriers are needed else­where (a doubtful scenario), the Army and Air Force should be ready to assume both ground and aviation duties.

The 82nd Airborne Division should be deactivated and its budget resources allocated to other facets of

There must be a better way of supporting the RDFighting men than airmailing them M-I tanks or risking amphibious warfare ships by taking them in close to the shore to off­load cargo.

LOCKHEED-GEORGIA COMPANY

ail'

able in the Indian Ocean. The administration h^a* decided that a naval presence, specifically a can"¹ battle group, will be maintained continuously in¹ region. Arguments used to justify carrier present also support a continuous MAU presence. This b? tie group-MAU force would give us the capab'¹¹ - to seize and defend a port/airfield complex or bea^c head, while most of the troops fly in and the M force off-loads.

Coupled with the continuous Indian Ocean P^rt._s ence of an MAU must be a concomitant emph^a , on amphibious lift shipbuilding. In order to

marine amphibious unit (MAU) needs to be av­

the RDF. With the exception of the German inva­sion of Holland, no strategic air drop has been suc­cessful. The movement of an airborne brigade/di- vision requires an inordinate amount of airlift just to get to the combat zone. The 82nd has 11,000 support personnel in a 27,000-man division.² The paradrop concept requires sealift to support it to such an extent that an airborne force is incapable of fighting independently. On the tactical level, the helicopter has replaced the parachute as the means of putting troops behind enemy lines. With the hel­icopter, problems of landing troops in the right place and of soldiers’ finding their own units on the ground have been largely eliminated.

The C-17 concept needs to be reviewed. The ne­cessity to improve strategic airlift—especially troop- lift—capability is inarguable. But the problem with the C-17, as proposed, is the requirement for the aircraft to carry the M-l tank. This does not appear to be a reasonable design criterion. For example, during the resupply of Israel in 1973, only 29 tanks and 14 pieces of outsized equipment were moved by air. Seventy-four percent of the resupply was by sea.³

For the RDF to work, we need to move the troops to their equipment. The tanks should be already in position with the MPS force, and resupply accom- •Jeffrey Record. The Rapid Deployment Force (Cambridge. MA.: Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis. 1981). p. 64.

^JSenator Robert Taft. Jr.. White Paper on Defense: A Modern Military Strategy for the United States (Washington. D.C.: 1976). no. 62. p. 81.

plished using the converted SL-7 containership^ Building an airplane capable of moving only °^ae tank is not cost-effective. Design criteria for ^I*'^e C-17 should be troop capacity, range, in-flight r^e fueling capability, and the ability to land on an ^aa improved airfield, i.e., any airfield from which tr'^t C-130 can operate. This will help the linkup whe¹¹ the ships are forced to use an unimproved harbor- The only credible military force is one which ¹ perceived as being capable of fulfilling its intend mission. The RDF—both on the near-term and l°ⁿ- term basis—lacks credibility because it has be^e created on a best-case basis. The near-term f°^rL must off-load at a port/airfield complex; this requ>r^e ment had to be accepted in order to give us an W capability until the MPS force is operational. Ho'^ ever, too much weight is placed on the RDF spring ing into action in a benign environment. A full-¹"¹¹.

54

Proceedings / J^une

Stakes

everything fit together neatly and keeps it

Uie retirements of the eight Thomaston (LSD-28)- j ^as^ ^ships, the new Whidbey Island (LSD-41 )-class ock landing ships must be introduced more quickly ^an planned. The Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibi- °^us assault ships’ well-decks should be converted ⁰ facilitate operating air cushion landing craft (LCAC) uring their next scheduled overhauls. The LCACs in⁶.^{lmportant t0} achieve a forcible entry capability he Persian Gulf because few beaches are suitable _a°^ ^{an ov}er-the-beach landing. The LCAC provides ourfold increase in the number of potential land- sites around the world.⁴ Research and devel- Pment are necessary to introduce a 25-knot me- '^urn-sized landing craft (LCM) capable of being _for ^on an amphibious cargo ship (LKA). Designs (LPh ^reP^^acements °f the amphibious assault ships wh’ h ^ ^anC* ^amPh‘hious transport docks (LPDs), I9hn ^reac^ ^tf*^{e enc}* °f their service lives in the early _(Sp^Us’ should incorporate either surface effect ship te h °^{r sma}** ^water-plane area twin hull (SWATH) ^c nology. These high-speed ship designs would _Un^{Crease our} ability to respond rapidly to a degree Imagined when the RDF was first conceived. (LSr- *h^e P^arachute division, the tank landing ship -pi ¹1 is a concept which has outlived its usefulness, recti^ac*^Vanta8^e °f being able to discharge cargo di­rest ^ °^{ver t}*^ie heach is offset by severe loading rations and limited cargo capacity (500 tons) ₂ Jj®n beaching. The LST’s current value is in her ' 0-ton cargo capacity when off-loading at a pier _c ^Causeway and the 150,000 gallons of fuel she can tai ^ ^°^{r mar}*^ne vehicles. The LSTs should be re- bv¹¹⁶^ ^unt'* ^t*^ie‘^r *'f^l capability can be replaced SWat ti°^nal ^SD-41s ^or an intermediate-sized SES/ ATH ship capable of carrying the LCAC.

_0u course, the cost of the RDF will increase if _ng^{r arn}Phibious capability is tied to it. But this is P|, ^essarY *f we are to maintain a credible force. ⁿ'ng for the best case and a benign environment

rar^aV^Ve,y '^nexP^ens'^ve- However, military forces are be ^a**^ovvec*^{to use} the easy option. Planning must els K^Se^ ⁰ⁿ worst-case scenarios—then anything ^ becomes an advantage.

the p^Cent*y' ^lbe requirement of a hospital ship for •he b^as been raised. Current feelings are that 2 App United States should be converted into a 'ho ^ hospital with 24 operating rooms. Al- ^ ^ugh casualties are a subject seldom talked about is i?ⁿ ^^ea*‘ⁿ§ ^w'tb the RDF, the need for such a ship the ^^Uest‘^onable. However, instead of converting Co in ^ⁿ‘^ted States for hospital duty, a better use tr_Q ^a made of the ship by converting her into a ab r^ ^transPort. This would greatly improve our A ^{to re}iⁿforce Europe or any RDF contingency, b-knot hospital ship is not something the RDF

<_Co)

cisj_0n             Miller. USMC. "Amphibious Warfare: The Decade of De-

’ Proceedings. September 1981. p. 75.

needs. A hospital ship should be provided by con­verting some other existing hull.

With regard to operating in Southwest Asia, our primary concern is to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz to the United States and our allies; all ideas for the introduction of troops is based on this premise. Our troops will stop Soviet expan­sionism by their presence or by combat if neces­sary. Almost everything published on this subject seems to indicate that seizure of the oil fields is the way to turn the spigot on or off. Little has appeared in the press which focused on the problem of keep­ing the Strait open in the face of a long-range in­terdiction attempt.

Moving troops, either by airlift or on the ground, into the oil-producing areas of the Gulf is a problem for the Soviets which almost rivals ours in the com­plexity of the task. However, the Strait of Hormuz is only about 800 miles from the Soviet Union, well within range of Soviet aircraft. To halt the flow of oil, it would not be necessary for the Soviets to seize oil fields—only mine the Strait. This long-range in­terdiction is not only cheap and safe, but has an effect out of proportion to its cost. Although not directly related to the RDF, the ability to stop air mining of the Strait or clear any mines which might be dropped is a factor which must be considered when discussing employment of the RDF. Upgrad­ing our mine countermeasures (MCM) forces is something we have too long ignored, and our vul­nerability in this area is immense. Given the threat, the first of the new MCM ships should be assigned to the Commander, Middle East Force, as soon as she becomes available.

Our short-term reaction to halting interdiction can be the establishment of a positive identification ra­dar advisory zone (P1RAZ) over the Strait similar to the PIRAZ operation used in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War. This would require the full­time presence of a guided missile cruiser close to the Strait. This is a short-term fix which would fur­ther strain our overcommitted naval forces. But, for the long term, regional defensive organizations for the Gulf must be established. As a part of this effort, long-range surface-to-air missiles and inter­ceptor aircraft should be introduced in Oman.

If implemented, the proposals advanced here can turn the Rapid Deployment Force into a fighting force capable of defending U. S. interests—providing a legitimacy and credibility that will successfully deter Soviet expansionism.

Commander Cover is a 1967 graduate of the U. S. Naval Acad­emy. He has served in minesweepers, destroyers, and amphib­ious warfare ships, most recently as executive officer of the USS San Bernardino (LST-1189). He is currently a training officer in the Division of Professional Development at the Naval Academy.