The Dwindling Muster

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

Manning the Fleet was a problem when the photo at left served as the cover for the July 1979 Proceedings, and it’s no better today. During the next 15 years, the number of 18 to 24 year olds is expected to decline 25%. Therefore, as the Navy becomes more technically complex, the pool of skilled personnel is decreasing. This decline in quantity and quality of personnel will have a serious impact on the quantity and quality of our Navy.

. Power pool which the military services have tra-

T^^e decline in quantity and quality of the man-

DflU/Or                   •> /«U * U /-» militncir r           ; i rsc Kni/O t T'l _

'honally depended upon, the increasing quantity skill level of the personnel the Navy needs, and ^e strong private sector competition and societal /^ends are key facets of the long-term manpower ^s.^Ue* which must be addressed now, if the Navy is p^0ln§ to meet its future challenges. Short-term man- pw_er problems are not at issue here; current mar- ■tal adjustments to enlistment quotas and compen- >on levels are likely to be productive.

a Historically, military services have relied on young ^u|t males to provide the foundation for their or­_a ^^lzati°^ns. in time of ample supplies of these men d average or declining civilian job opportunities, e accession and retention of young men in the ^llary are not major problems. In recent years, k^ever, the manpower issue has risen to a much ^oader, strategic level of concern for the Navy. Ideographic projections show that the number of _K^t0 24 year olds will decline 25% during the next

³ years.

o| ^^0rrie have argued that the decline of 18 to 24 year f₀ ^s ^11 not have an adverse impact on the armed o-es because of the small percentage—about 3% _ar ^this age group—required for military service. This however, is misleading. An individual is ■j>, fhe 18- to 24-year-old window for seven years.

^Is translates into the military needing about a 20% _ei ^Cess>on rate for each year group over the span of Ability. Based on the Navy Recruiting Com- and's estimate that 34% will not be physically or ^entally qualified for military service. Department

of Defense (DoD) accession requirements in the 1990s equate to one out of every three qualified-for-mili- tary-service males. Today, the military services need one of every five qualified males.

In addition to the decreasing size of the manpower pool, there are several trends in the composition of the pool which must be recognized.

The higher birthrate of the nonwhite population is increasing the minority percentage of the man­power pool. Today’s infant population shows that minorities will comprise nearly 30% of that pool by the year 2000. Minorities make up 20% of the man­power pool today.

Although blacks will remain the dominant minor­ity group in the manpower pool, Hispanics will total 40% of the minority 18- to 24-year-old population by the year 2000. This projection does not account for the population of Puerto Rico, nor does it reflect the impact of revised immigration laws or amnesty for illegal aliens.

Currently, about 75% of all young adults graduate from high school. This figure has been relatively stable for a number of years. Obviously, a contin­uation of the current completion rate in a diminished manpower pool will mean fewer high school grad­uates in the future—a trend likely to have a serious negative impact on recruiting quality people. It should also be noted that minorities historically have had a much lower percentage rate of completing high school than whites.

A second important trend is the decline in the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores and national achievement test results for elementary and sec­ondary school students. The average mathematics

Average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Scores Of High School Seniors

Verbal                        Math

and science achievement scores of all high school students have declined. In particular, the greatest decline in SAT scores has been among students who indicated no intention of going to college—the very group which is the prime target of our present en­listment efforts. In 1977, a national advisory panel on the SAT score decline concluded that this trend was mostly the result of a “diminution in young people’s motivation for learning." The course pro­files of the three million male and female high school graduates in 1980 supports this conclusion. Of those reviewed, only 9% had one year of physics, less than 10% took more than one math course, and only 3%—105,000 students—had one year of calculus. (In the Soviet Union, five million students annually graduate from secondary school with two years of calculus.)

There are numerous reasons advanced for this decline, ranging from the emphasis on the “disad­vantaged” student in education since the mid-1960s to the impact of television. Preliminary results of some innovative studies of this issue conducted at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center indicate that environmental factors may be largely to blame. Regardless of the reason, if this trend is not reversed, we can expect a continued decline in the quality level of the youth population.

The military services have witnessed a 16% de­crease in the number of upper mental category en­listees since 1977—the last year of GI Bill eligibility. The fact that the average entrance test scores of new enlistees have not declined during this period is because of an offsetting reduction in the number of Category IV (low mental qualification) enlistees. The important statistic, however, is that we are now getting fewer high-quality recruits for sophisticated training.

And as the size and nature of the manpower pool are changing, the Navy’s people requirements are changing. Unfortunately, the gap between the sup­ply and demand lines is widening.

Growth toward a 600-ship Navy will require, by fiscal year 1988,70.000 more enlisted personnel than are presently serving. There is much evidence that the level of skills required to maintain military equipment continues to increase—e.g., the logarith­mic growth in the number of pages in technical man­uals for new equipment—therefore increasing peW officer-level requirements for manning new cruiser and destroyer classes. Using a Navy-developen scheme to classify enlisted ratings as highly tech­nical (e.g., electronics technician), technical (e.g- gunner's mate), and semi-technical (e.g., store­keeper), the number of authorizations for highly technical ratings has increased by 3,000 billets frot¹¹ fiscal year 1974 to the present. Conversely, the num­ber of technical and semi-technical billets has de­creased by 23,000 during the same time period­Looking to a 600-ship Navy, which will require ³ 17% growth in the number of shipboard billets, the same trend occurs—a 30% growth in the demand for highly technical ratings, with only a 15% growth in the technical and semi-technical ratings. Clearly- the Navy is sailing against the tide! Aggravating this future manpower situation are the changing externa demands and the environment in which the Na^v) must compete for quality people.

Current Reagan administration and Data R^e' sources, Inc. (DRI) projections forecast a steady b¹¹¹ low—2% to 4%—long-term real growth in the gr°^sS national product, accompanied by a lower rate c*' pansion in the size of the work force—about \^,( compared with the 2.3% growth experienced in tb^e late 1970s. As a result, the unemployment rate ^|S projected to decline somewhat, with a resultant m crease in the competition for labor relative to today- Because the projected low growth rate for labor’⁵ caused largely by the reduction in the size of the 1°' to 24-year-old labor pool, a tight labor market fo young adults—lower unemployment rates and a d> ficult military recruiting environment—appears be developing. A tight market could also result ’ economic arguments being employed against move⁵ to reinstate the draft.   <■

There are already many reports of shortages ⁰ skilled workers, and the Bureau of Labor Statist'⁰ (BLS) projects that the demand for skilled blue-c°^ lar workers will grow at twice the rate of denial for unskilled blue-collar workers. Examples of ‘^u ture problems abound.

36

Proceeding* / J«^ne

BLS projections indicate the demand for cob¹ puter service technicians will double by 1990: dur’ⁿ- this same period, the Navy expects to greatly crease the number of ships equipped with tactic

data systems. In addition. BLS projects that the need for industrial machinery repairmen will in­^Crease by two-thirds; at the same time, new naval ^ships require increasing amounts of air conditioning ^ar>d labor-saving machinery maintained by in-house machinery repairmen (shipboard “A gangs”).

At the opposite end of the skill spectrum, BLS Projections indicate the highest rate of job growth ^will be in the service industries such as food and Personnel services. This segment of the economy mditionally attracts unskilled labor, including large numbers of females and lower mental group cate- S^ry males. It is important to note that these are ,. groups often cited as potential targets for en- ^lstment to offset the decline in the size of the man­power pool.

. An interesting dilemma arises from the projected mcreases in DoD fiscal activity. While the Navy ^Seeks to recruit and retain valuable technicians in ^an expanding and more technical military force, the ^ITl0nies spent in the civil sector to expand the force ^and provide more sophisticated equipment actually generate a higher demand for those same technical

ms in the outside labor market.

Another potential competitor for manpower is '§ner education. Institutions of higher education

However, both the four-year and two-year insti­tutions are now faced with excess capacity and de­clining enrollments. How they manage this decline will directly affect the military. Some colleges and universities have chosen to aim for less academi­cally endowed students until the numbers of poten­tial quality students return to current levels. A re­cent survey conducted for the College Board Testing Service showed that 34% of these institutions now accept everyone who applies, regardless of aca­demic qualification. Many colleges make direct mailings to high school seniors to recruit candidates. We may soon see some of the same “Madison Av­enue” approaches to recruiting that the military ser­vices now employ.

^uPper

mental category individuals. However, this

^Proach promises to be dramatically different as

the

^s,ze of the 18- to 24-year-old population de-

f^reases. The number of university seats increased

°m six million in 1965 to 12 million in 1980 to ^acco

Perc

mmodate the "baby boom.” A more dramatic fiv ^^en.^ta8^e increase—one million seats in 1965 to tur ^rn‘**'^on 'ⁿ 1980—was made in two-year insti- *°ⁿs during the same period.

An increasing number of schools are already of­fering credit for “life experience,” a marketing de­vice clearly aimed at the nontraditional college stu­dent. As another alternative, the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education recom­mended in 1981 initiatingjoint training programs for industry groups and labor unions administered by community colleges and vocational schools to use excess capacity. Some of these programs are under way. The long-term impact of such programs on the Navy is a diminished role as a skill/experience

builder—one of the services’ key attractions.

The impact on military accessions of such com­petition will be direct and negative. Even cuts in federal student loan programs may not mitigate the situation as institutions of higher education acquire public and private funds to offset reductions in di­rect student assistance programs.

Additional factors in the labor market affect re­cruitment for the Navy. Difficult to quantify but of considerable importance are societal trends which run counter to the established patterns of military life. The increasing participation of women in the labor market has resulted in a greater share of home/ household responsibilities for many married males. Preference for a stable family environment is grow­ing as increasing numbers of people refuse to move to different job locations. A third feature increasing in popularity is flexible working conditions (“flex­time,” computer terminals in private homes, etc.). As these emerging societal practices in the work­place develop and are contrasted with sea duty, as it is presently structured in the Navy, it will become increasingly difficult to compete in the recruiting business.

Students of management could quickly generate a list of actions to take to improve the Navy’s short­term competitiveness in the environment outlined here. However, the Navy needs solutions which will have value in a future environment different from our experience—no easy task.

The current approach to manning the all-volun­teer force (AVF) is an econometric one—personnel are viewed as commodities which can be purchased in the labor market for the right price. This pecu­niary approach naturally leads one to conclude that declines in manpower supply can be offset by more money, more recruiters, modifying requirements, °^r lowering standards.

Econometric manpower supply models focus p^rl' marily on compensation, recruiting efforts, and th^£ size of the unemployment pool. The models assume that most aspects of an individual’s behavior can be captured in dollars and that future pay stream d*^s' count rates are used by today’s youth in making enlistment decisions. While these models of hum^aIl decision making are useful tools for the study ^ot compensation and short-term projections, they ^are of questionable value for long-term forecasts. .

The data base for the models is the latter half d the 1970s, a period of manpower supply pool grow¹*^1, which is not representative of what we will face f°^r at least the next 15 years.

The supply curves for personnel are generally a^s' sumed to be linear—e.g., 10% pay raises will alwa)'⁵ yield x percent more people: 10% more recruiter will always yield y percent more people. Thc^se “constant elasticities” are of little value in e^sl1 mating supply in an environment which is substaU tially different from the data base used.                                                                   ,

The ratio of 18 to 24 year olds in the unemploy^e° labor pool is assumed to remain constant, an uⁿ likely occurrence as the population ages and de mands for youths increase. By making such an as sumption, a recent econometric manpower study concluded that if military pay could be indexed civilian pay, if current retention goals are met, ad if the Comprehensive Employment and Training A (CETA) is not resurrected, then the “populat¹⁰ decline should cause only minor recruiting problem for the services.” Such analysis is misleading- .

Some consider reinstitution of the draft a soluh

38

Proceedings / J^une

tainJuM-^er mitiatives to impose reliability and main- tiv,

i_n .,y —                 vvw nave 3iai leu iu eneeri me nieiease

. "I demands. However, we should ensure that

m_aj   . “'-‘imnus. nowever, we snouiu ensure inai

lUajn^'H^'lity goals focus not only on reducing

o meet the anticipated shortcomings predicted here, ocietal trends and economic arguments which would ^ear on a draft have been covered. While a fair draft ^could eliminate numerical shortfalls for the military , ^rvices* it might not solve the Navy’s quality prob- ,.^m- The Navy’s requirements—skewed toward ^'gher intellectual ability—may not be satisfied by ., ^raR input which conforms to a cross section of _st^{e nat}ion’s intellectual profile. A shift toward draft andards which emphasize higher mental capabil- ^es or favor one or more services over another th^U a ^re^*^nc^^e inherent fears about the fairness of _s ^e nraft. In essence, the need to foster national _r ^pP°^rt' or even acquiescence, for a draft could t₀^SU.| '^{n a} contradiction if it were to be employed _str^{a ev}'^ate targeted deficiencies in the manpower _dr^UctUre- On the other hand, a potential quality Pre /f⁶ voluntarily select the Navy, as in the Ihe'tl ^ ^era' ^rat^^{er t}^^ian ^^{ace t}*^ie uncertainties of Ornh^-’ however, th'^s would be highly dependent are i ^S*^{ze    dra}ft—* ^e- only small numbers

p_er ^draRed to make up shortfalls in the AVF, the cei_Ved threat ₀f _{a dra}f_{t to an} individual is rela- ^tlv^'v small.

q_u ^ long-term fundamental issue cannot be ade- _0r ^e|y addressed in terms of econometric models _nev^^esorting to a draft which could foster a whole to h ^S|^Ct P^r°bl^erns- Instead, a strategy is needed _of,,^^e against the potential manpower problems _f ^e luture. Such a strategy should be simple and Tu^S °ⁿ.^a f^ew key variables. d_re ^{e cr}itical external variable which should be ad- ity in the Navy’s strategy is the decline in qual- Prohl ^t'*^{e nat}*^ons youth. Although this is a national ^role •^ern’ ^t*^le Navy should accept a participatory nati *^{n ,ts correc}tion. We must continually raise the J_en °^nal consciousness on this problem and dial­og^{2 aca}demic world and society to solve it. At Wit^e time, the Navy should be clearly identified fairs ^qUality young adults. Sponsorship of science t\j_0rt,^aatl support of special schools, such as the a_n(j j Carolina School of Science and Mathematics, s_Cj_en ^evei°pment of badge programs for math and ar_v achievement levels in primary and second- ^Phys' °°!^S—similar to the President’s Council of cm.i i^Ca* Witness—are examples of programs the Navy ^aid Pursue.

c_Ur ^e Davy’s military manpower/hardware pro- that ^{Cnt (HARDMA}N) program—which ensures cj_es- Manpower is used or considered throughout the ^and r^_L^and development stages for new hardware— tive^ability §°als on new weapon systems are posi- ■ .^Sl8ns that we have started to check the increase

ski,'iⁿ;^enance man-hours but also on reducing the ^evel necessary for that maintenance. In addi­tion, we should consider revamping current naval programming practices at the OpNav level which charge manpower costs to hardware sponsors using average manpower costs. If the sponsors paid for the specific skills required for their platforms, there would be positive incentives to reduce demand for skill levels and to eliminate high-skill and personnel­intensive platforms.

The need for youth and vigor in the military is obvious. However, the reduced size of the youth base argues that we must consider a “graying” force. Lateral-entry programs offer promise here. In ad­dition, we have an opportunity to take advantage of excess vocational and technical school capacity by initiating joint vocational school and trade union school programs to train our technical people. Em- bry-Riddle Aeronautical University’s certified Fed­eral Aviation Administration engine technician pro­gram is an example of such a program. A vigorous lateral-entry program will require establishment of an industrial-monitoring system to identify short­ages and excesses of skilled labor for targeting of recruiting resources and identification of excess vo­cational school capacity. Another option is to allow dual track specialties similar to the Army, which per­mit individuals to advance through pay grades E-7 to E-9 as technicians rather than as supervisors.

The Navy needs to prepare for the change in mix in the manpower base and the impact of current societal trends. In addition, alternative sea/shore ro­tation schemes and increased opportunity for qual­ity education—e.g., sabbatical leave—are areas in which creative thinking is needed to ensure the Navy remains competitive as the society moves to a more individual lifestyle-oriented environment.

It is important to overcome the tendency to treat the Navy as just another job. Although we have emphasized pride and professionalism and the theme that the Navy is more than a job, our continuous reliance on job-type compensation to recruit and retain people diminishes our credibility. We cannot expect to have a quality, fully manned force in the lean years ahead by just applying money to the prob­lem. There is considerable uncertainty that we would ever have the necessary dollars appropriated. A bal­anced approach—adequate compensation to satisfy needs and emphasis on what makes naval service unique—is required.

Commander Pilling is a 1965 graduate of the U. S. Naval Acad­emy. He holds a doctorate in mathematics from the University of Cambridge in England. His sea tours have included the USS Wilkinson (DL-5), USS McCloy (DE-1037), USS Vo_Kc (DE-1047), USS Coontz (DDG-40), and the staff of Commander Destroyer Squadron 32. He served a tour on the Program Analysis and Evaluation staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College. He is currently the resources planner in the CNO Long Range Planning Group (OP-OOX).