Comment and Discussion

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We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

Naval Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf PEB: Is It Working?

The Offensive-Passive Ship Leadership Forum

India: The Neglected Service Faces the Future

The April 1982 Proceedings

Strategic Choice and Maritime Capabilities

PHMs: Unique Ships, U nique Problems

Thinking Offensively

Armed Confrontation Builds in South Africa

Contents:

The Victim's View of ASW

Tomahawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix

Dress Rehearsal for Doomsday

No Place for Women

Stallion or CH-46 Sea Knight aircraft for such duties.

Those of us who are directly iⁿ‘ volved in ASW should open more path^s for exchange of information. The P'-^- S-3. and SH-3 communities should take ASW surface warfare attack team members up with them. And. in turn- tactical coordinators should ride sum marines. All of us should know mot^e about each other: only then can we b^e an effective team.

“The Victim’s View of ASW”

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 39-43. April 1982

Proceedings)

Chief Operations Specialist (Surface Warfare) Jonathan Fischman, U. S. Navy—The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) surface ship, unlike a subma­rine, must on many occasions get un­der way lacking not only numbers, but many critical naval enlisted classifi­cations (NECs). These NEC short­falls are normally within the mainte­nance area.

Today's ASW platforms are equipped with the most up-to-date equipment. But if we cannot provide enough operators for their extended use. or if we don't have a technical representative to troubleshoot and re­pair them, then all the tactics in the world won't help. I am not putting down training: as an operations spe­cialist (OS). I am very aware that training is a constant need and re­quirement. And as the leading OS on board any ASW ship. I would gladly trade 20% of my available training al­lowance for the training and qualifi­cation of the technicians required to support me. On too many occasions, I have seen the ASW attack team nearly fall apart—not from lack of training, but from equipment failure and crew fatigue.

Another problem not addressed is money. As Commander Byron states, "a submariner will commence evasive tactics when the presence of an active buoy or a dipper is detected." Active buoys are very expensive, and in most cases, commanding officers will not expend them during exercises and al­most never during actual searches. Another point is the use of a dipper with the SH-3 Sea King helicopter. This aircraft and the light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) SH-2 Seasprite must be the most design- abused helicopters in our inventory; they should not be used for any other role than ASW, surface/subsurface, or control over-the-horizon targeting. Yet we find them doing search and rescue missions or transporting pas­sengers. mail, and other cargo. It would be more cost-effective to supplement aircraft carriers with either SH-53 Sea

“Tomahawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix”

(See P. G. Johnson, pp. 26-33. April 1982.

Lieutenant Richard P. Hansen, U- Navy—I agree with Lieutenant Jo*¹ son that mission trade-offs can be problem in deploying Tomahawk ⁰ warships. On a fast attack nud^ea submarine, a finite number of ^wea^ ons can be stored in the torpedo r°° and, as ready weapons, in the torp^e0 tubes. A possible weapons l°^a".°_r. could include Mk-48 torpedoes. H ^             ‘

poon and Tomahawk missiles. ^an possibly Mk-37 torpedoes. The g^reat^ the number of cruise missiles ^carr!^£,_s the smaller the loadout of torpeu° that could be used in carrying out sub’s primary mission. ASW.

Vertical launchers outside the p^r° sure hull would get a sufficient num ^ of Tomahawk missiles to sea on s , marines without degrading the A mission. Another solution might be

deployment of Tomahawk on fleet ^

listic missile submarines (SSBN) -_c are being phased out of their ^stratfj_ss deterrence mission by Ohio-⁰ , Trident submarines. Sixteen launchers are already in place in ^ form of missile tubes that previ0^u^_s carried ballistic missiles. These t . could be modified to allow for vidual or even salvos of Tomah⁸ j_S ¹ to be fired from a single tube. ¹ j modified SSBN would be a q^u'^ei _rpi. highly survivable weapon P'^aI ^js- Space would be available in th^e. sile compartment and in the *nn> control center (MCC) for equip ^ ₉ modifications and additions. ^a° :₅                                        '

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J. F. Bouchard, pp. 22-26. May 1982 Proceedings)

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gathering relevant information. his reply to Colonel Evans's artid^e-

appears that Doctor Korb has made up his mind before all the ^ formation is in. His reply contains of the solid facts or defensible ratm ale he seeks from others. Therein ^ I would like to comment on some the issues he raised:       ₀f

Casualties: The acceptability ^

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already installed. Also, the SSBN has the equipment to maintain continuous copy on the radio broadcast, which can provide up-to-date targeting in­formation from sources such as air­craft surveillance, satellite photogra­phy, and surface ships.

The major drawback is the fact that Tomahawk is a system of the future, and the hulls of these SSBNs are 20 years old. Great care must be taken to ensure that this concept is suffi­ciently cost-effective to justify the in­stallation of the cruise missile system, upkeep of the already existing ship's systems, and possible core refueling.

Commander James J. Tritten, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Johnson raises the "muddy” issue of verification for cruise missiles. I do not agree that de­ployment of Tomahawk is necessarily a bad idea because of this problem. Should we stop deployment of a weapon system that has all the inher­ent advantages and capabilities he outlines because of a potential arms control negotiating problem?

The goal of arms control is not ver­ification. It is deterrence and stability. Tomahawk does not contribute to instability, but rather is one means of redressing the overall strategic nu­clear imbalance caused by unre­strained Soviet growth during a period when arms control agreements were being advertised as limiting forces.

Instead of deploring the lack of ver­ification and deployment of Toma­hawk nuclear land attack missiles, we could better appreciate Tomahawk's enhancement of deterrence by the proliferation and thus multiplicity of aim points, and its contribution to flexibility and to offensive firepower. Flexibility, escalation control, a se­cure reserve force, and targeting op­tions were all goals of Presidential Di­rective #59. not simply counterforce as Lieutenant Johnson implies. Tom­ahawk contributes to these goals.

“Dress Rehearsal for Doomsday”

(Sec B. C. Lapiska. pp. 107-110. April 1982 Proceedings)

Lieutenant John P. Feerick, Medical Corps. U. S. Naval Reserve—I am concerned about our lack of prepar­edness for operations in a nuclear, bi­ological. and chemical warfare (NBC) environment. Compared with our po­tential adversaries, we are woefully inadequate in our efforts to provide self-protection, much less carry out an offensive in an NBC environment- Most aviators I know have never seen an NBC suit, let alone tried to func­tion in one.

I think it's time for the Medical Corps to take the initiative in NBC education (though it will have to teach itself. first[1] and become involved in the evaluation of each unit's ability to function in such hostile environments. Our current lacs of medical awareness in this area >^s displayed by inadequate decontami­nation facilities at our highly touted fleet hospitals. 1 find this highly ironic- since rear area, lightly defended med­ical facilities would be ideal targets-' both in terms of loss of morale and loss of ability to return wounded to the front (very important in a fast-pace short-term war scenario where traine replacements are not available).

Let's see more on this topic. Events in Afghanistan have borne out fea^rS which a few years ago would have been considered groundless.

“No Place for Women”

(See D. Evans, pp. 53-56, November 1981 • C. Nlollison. F. R. Hamlett. and T. C. Nichols, pp. 10-17. February 1982: M. A- Brewer, pp. 18-21. March 1982; L. J- K°J' ’ pp. 87-90. April 1982: J. H. Brother. P- ^:°⁸' May 1982 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Colonel Jade E. Sh^L’^a' U. S. Army—In his many articles an^ recent public utterances. Doctor K° has stated that more solid data ^ar^ needed to determine the role worn should play in the military. At the rection of the Office of the Secrets of Defense, the services are bus¹ -

it

alreadV

women casualties is a matter will ultimately be decided by the E public. While there is broad supP^ _flf for women's rights, the Departing Defense should not confuse this^vS ^ toleration of either the exposure , women to the horrors of combat o women casualties in the numbers P. dieted by Colonel Evans. Doctor h-

jjeneralizes about sharing danger and e inevitability of women casualties.

I 1° ^are the “many” to whom he al- ^udes? If we don’t send women over­^{Seas to} combat, there will be no women casualties. If we are defending U. S.

ores, we can greatly reduce the climber of women casualties by not ^clVlng them as combatants. Contrary o what Doctor Korb would have us ^e mve, women casualties in large umbers are inevitable only if we umtain our present policy.

Do ^ep^^acement °f Casualties: Again, _Wt«^or Korb glosses over this issue 'ha generality. On at least three ^casions in the latter phases of World f ^ar General George S. Patton was ** ^t0 ^vy all Third Army support _w ^lts f°r replacements. These men _w.^re hastily retrained and sent for- ^r as infantrymen because the re- _thg^Cernerit pipeline from the zone of _VVh_e'^nter'^{or was} empty—this at a time “o ⁿ’ ^ln Patton’s words, we were (h_r°^ln® through the Germans like crap sar°^U^ ^{3 800se}-” If that was neces-

uioh r ^^{en t}*^{le ent}'^{re coun}try had been uized for several years and we

wh^ ^<f^ec'^s'^vely beating the enemy, _Cou^{a wi|}l we have to do in the first _er ,^{p e} °f weeks of a short-notice gen- tjQ 'f^&r *ⁿ Europe? With the integra- has f° ^w°^men 'nto its ranks, the Army than °^Un<^ that units composed of more ₀p °^ne-third women are unable to _{of Q}^rate effectively in the field. Many third'f ^SUpport units are almost one- _See emale. From this, it is easy to _{Sem f}^{at as} we withdraw men to be five °^nvarc' ^as infantry, the effec- a_s ,J^ess °f support units will diminish y_0n ,^{e pr}°Portion of women goes be-

one-third.

tlj_a/^e^na/icy: While it is probably true WonJ¹¹²⁰ have more non-duty days than pl_es.^ei\’ Doctor Korb compares ap- Heri^{lna oran}8^es- The periods that most sho_r(^{are 0U1} °f action are relatively 24 k ' ^m°st hangovers are cured in na_nt°^{Urs or less}- Not so with a preg-

Honth ^0rnan' *^{s a} *^oss ^^{or severa}' c°_pe ^s: ^while most organizations can

ma_n(j^Wlt^ ^short absences, it is almost t° h|]^at<]D that a replacement be found if the * ^on8‘^term absence, especially S_e ^person occupies a key position. ^tion-^Xl\\ ^p(lrassment and fraterniza- trajpj 'though better leadership and Ua| ^ niight diminish cases of sex- ^Sayth-^raSSrnent’ 't taxes credibility to ^erniz-1• ^^ere'ⁿ *'^es the solution to frat- legj_si^{d lon}- h is as though we could ^{d e} against love. In mixed units

of the Army, romantic liaisons are common and not only among those of equal rank. It is naive to think that we can put young men and women to­gether continuously and not have these liaisons develop. It is futile to estab­lish vaguely worded regulations which do nothing but add to the confusion. When liaisons do develop, especially among seniors and subordinates, the morale and cohesion of the organi­zation are seriously and adversely af­fected. Unanswered is the question of how organizations so afflicted will react in combat, especially in life or death situations. I am not sure of the an­swer, but I suspect it will be difficult to display on a graph or briefing chart.

Since the decision was made to in­crease women’s roles in the armed forces, the burden of proof has been with those who would move slowly in this regard. It is apparent from reading Doctor Korb’s letter that this will con­tinue for the foreseeable future. This is ironic.

History provides little, if any, sup­port for our present policies. The in­stances in which women played a role have been few and insignificant. There are thousands of historical lessons on preparing men for combat and mold­ing them into units capable of fighting, dying if necessary, and winning. There is some evidence to indicate that when women are added to the equation, the very psychological and emotional fac­tors which enable men to fight may be diminished.

We have now been embarked on this course for nine years and so far none of the other major powers have fol­lowed our lead. Is it that they are less inclined to tamper with their national security by using their armed forces as test beds for social experiments?

None of the advocates of an in­creased role for women has been able to show that it would improve our ability to fight and win. To the con­trary, they have been hard pressed to show only minimum diminution of ca­pability. The lives of commanders, es­pecially at the unit level, have been vastly complicated by the introduc­tion of women. They have not been relieved of any of their responsibilities to have the time to tackle the incred­ibly complex problems associated with the battle of the sexes. In their attempt to keep the lid on. they have less of their precious time to devote to other more important matters such as training for war.

21

ⁱⁿS* l June 1982

Faced with a lack of substance. Doctor Korb takes a cheap shot at Colonel Evans regarding the damaged morale of women in the military. As long as they are in the armed forces, their morale and well-being should be of concern to all. It should not, how­ever, be a reason to stop the debate. Of much greater concern is the armed forces’ ability to accomplish their wartime missions. If the presence of women affects that ability, it must be brought to light. Given the subjective nature of the topic, no one has all the answers. The opinions of Colonel Ev­ans and other military professionals with combat experience should be considered in deciding the policy. If we follow the logic inherent in Doctor Korb’s suggestion, nothing critical of anyone would be published because of the potential damage to their mo­rale. While I am sure that there are many who don’t like what Colonel Ev­ans has to say, there is nothing offen­sive or discriminatory in his article. In fact, he probably expresses well the views of a great majority of service members, all of whom are equally concerned about the welfare of our country.

of the British Navy in the early 20th century is one such example.

In the United States, having only come away with ties at best in its last two wars, the argument that the ser­vice institution must be examined prior to risking the loss of the next war re­quires thoughtful reflection and not smug rejection.

Institutional leadership is not a one­time problem to be solved. It does not yield to the quick fix. It is never the result of slogans and cliches unless the words of those verbalized ideals are made consistent through promotion, assignment, education, and training.

Neither is institutional leadership solely the responsibility of flag rank. The decision to lead the institution must be a collective determination by its members to further a common ideal. It is this shared commitment between the most senior and the most junior members that generates the cohesion, loyalty, and trust that allows a military force to persevere and succeed.

Although leadership will always manifest itself in the traditional ex­changes between superior and sub­ordinate, this is not its sole province. Leadership is also the art of creating character in a military institution and instilling the cohesion and fighting ef­fectiveness that produce victories.

The naval service deserves our sin­cere effort to provide it with a collec­tive institutional leadership. The affir­mation of a service ethic and code of conduct is a worthy goal.

(Continued from page 21) Comment and Discussion

“Strategic Choice and Maritime

Capabilities”

(See J. Eberle. pp. 65-72, April 1982

Proceedings)

Victor Wolf Jr., President, The Astro­labe Group Inc.—After almost 30 years in the U. S. Foreign Service (1952­1980). I am convinced that Admiral Eberle has struck a note of profound truth when he asserts that the sym­biotic and, indeed, unified nature of politics and national defense in West­ern national security policy is the key to all. As Admiral Eberle infers and history demonstrates that linkage has not received sufficient attention from the political leadership of the Free World. For example, there should be no argument that public support is needed for the large proposed budget expenditures for national defense over the next years to be enacted by the Congress. There can be no argument about the thesis that increased ex­penditures are needed in the national interest. Yet. how do we deal with the disturbing lack of confidence which many in the United States and other countries in the Alliance have in their governments’ national defense deci­sions? The issue is one of credibility.

One essential element of national defense is appropriate levels of the

strategic Triad to ensure an effective (deterrent) counterstrike force. While accepting as inevitable a minority seeking unilateral Western disarma­ment in both the conventional and strategic spheres, the admiral's em­phasis on the need to produce an over­all strategy less dependent on nuclear weapons and to achieve progress in arms control negotiations is the es­sential point of departure of the West's national security policy. Such efforts would go far to reassure many of those on the nuclear freeze bandwagon.

If the nuclear freeze advocates were only leftists or eccentrics, the pres­sures for meshing national security needs with the political process in the various Western countries would be tolerable. But this is not the case. Even a cursory examination of the U. S. and European political scene reveals that forces behind effective arms control negotiations (perhaps merging the START talks with the Theater Nu­clear Forces discussions now under way) and a national security strategy, including a careful examination of bal­anced force structures and missions, are well nigh irresistible.

When Admiral Eberle calls for a re­definition of strategic balance in terms of equivalence of effect, he also im­mediately suggests how both our arms control negotiators and our strategic planners can be liberated to really do the job we all want them to do—get on with the development of an effec­tive and safe national security posture and environment. Why is this so? Be­cause he both assuages the fears of those wanting progress in the START field and makes specific proposals for a balanced force structure capable of performing the needed missions. It is essential in free societies to reassure the public. Otherwise, panic and fear may cause irresistible pressure to throw out the baby of continued effective na­tional defense forces for the Western countries with the bathwater of nu­clear weapons excess.

The admiral's argument for a bal­anced naval force, relying on mobil­ity, units aimed at the missions to be performed, and possessingonly enough attraction power to draw minimum at­tention upon themselves in the polit­ical sphere, holds a lesson for all of us. The advantages of carrier battle groups may not at a certain point offset their disadvantages. The emphasis in naval forces should be on units and missions that only the U. S. Navy can execute: some big carrier groups—of course. But also the myriad of other units that are needed to perform such tasks as antisubmarine warfare, interdiction of

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A disquieting story that is well worth reading. And remembering.              - THE A TLANTA JOURS A L

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enemy merchant vessels, and taking out the “big chips” of the opposition. The money will come from you and me: we had better be convinced that the mix of forces is the right one.

“PHMs: Unique Ships, Unique Problems”

(See A. D. Zimm. pp. 90-93. February 1982 Proceedings)

Captain O. C. Chisitm, U. S. Navy. Commander. Surface Warfare Devel­opment Group (SWDG)—Clearly. Commander Zimm has some strong perceptions about the PHM program in general and about the Pegasus (PHM-1) and the Surface Warfare De­velopment Group PHM tactics in par­ticular. 1 will not address these per­ceptions here, because 1 believe that he surfaces and perpetuates an insid­ious and far more important one. which compels this reply—the passed-over officer is incompetent.

He states, in discussing PHM tac­tics development: "A lieutenant com­mander (passed over for advancement fsic]) was assigned the project.” He then implies that, being passed over and hence not enthusiastic about his assignment, the officer spent little or no time on the project and so produced poor PHM tactics. Commander Zimm's message is clear: passed-over officers produce poor products.

We. in our Navy, continue to brush our passed-over shipmates with the tar of incompetence. This is wrong. The majority of naval officers who “fail to select” can and do continue to make vital, worthwhile contributions. Any who do not should be fired. Making them the butt of continuing innuendo and disparagement is insensitive and unprofessional.

Lieutenant Commander William K. Sharpe. U. S. Navy (Retired)—Com­mander Zimm foolishly insults all passed-over lieutenant commanders with his assertions about the uniden­tified officer assigned to the PHM tac­tics project.

1 for one made my most significant contributions to the Navy after being passed over for commander. My fit­ness reports and numerous letters of commendation attest to this fact. I was shocked at your poor judgment in publishing these remarks. I can only hope it was just a momentary lapse of otherwise fine judgment.

“Thinking Offensively”

(See T. W. Parker, pp. 26-31. April 1981:

T. Q. O'Rourke, p. 21. June 1981: H. K. Ullman. pp. 75-76. July 1981: S. K. Lee. pp. 25-28. August 1981: J. S. Brunner, p. 95. December 1981 Proceedings)

Captain C. C. Pease, U. S. Navy—I have no quarrel with the proposition that we should improve the offensive surface-to-surface weapons suites on all our ships. I am concerned, how­ever. with Commander Parker's call for the offensive as an end in itself, and his failure to consider the contri­butions which other services could and should make to a U. S. maritime strat­egy. He also does not address the mag­nitude of the threat which Soviet nucle­ar weapons pose to allied surface ships, and the consequences for ship design, ship weapons suites, and choice of tac­tics, which that threat should impose.

Parker begins with a quote from Ad­miral Thomas Hayward, the outgoing Chief of Naval Operations:

”, . . U. S. Navy forces must be offensively capable. The geo­graphic range of the Navy’s re­sponsibilities is too broad, and its forces far too small, to adopt a de­fensive, reactive posture in a world­wide conflict with the Soviet Union. I can't believe any Americans would want their navy to be one that is only reactive to Soviet initiative, that doesn't have the capability to be sent wherever necessary, under what­ever conditions, and to be able to survive and win that battle. We must fight on the terms which are most advantageous to us. This requires taking the war to the enemy’s naval forces with the objective of achiev­ing the earliest possible destruction of his capability to interfere with our use of sea areas essential for sup­port of our own forces and allies.” To be offensively capable, one must have a set of weaponry which pos­sesses superior reach over the oppo­nent’s. Reach is not just greater range. It is a combination of surveillance, range, accuracy, ability to penetrate enemy defenses, killing power, and ability to escape to attack again. Reach is a relative capability: the U. S. sub­marine with a torpedo has reach over a Soviet submarine or surface ship: the “Backfire,” with AS-4 or AS-6, has offensive reach over the carrier air wing. If the nonnuclear carrier bat­tle group (CVBG) offensive is to be a viable Navy option in the 1980s, we will either have to develop a CV con­ventional weapon system with reach superior to the "Backfire.” or else turn to an alternative such as using nuclear weapons in the inventory (e.g., ICBM or SLBM) to execute an offensive strategy.

To be offensive without reach is to invite defeat. Blind adherence to an offensive posture was disastrous for the British Army early in World War I. because the defensive power of the machine gun was superior to any offensive weaponry available un­til the introduction of the tank. The Royal Air Force (RAF), using radar- directed interceptors, dealt a fatal blow to the German air offensive in the Bat­tle of Britain. Likewise, the British daylight air offensive against Ger­many was defeated by superior defen­ses. If similar attrition could be ex­acted by allied sea-based air defenses against the "Backfire,” the case for a Navy offensive on "Backfire” bases would be even less attractive than it is now.

Defense of carriers may well foster a defensive attitude in surface ship sailors. The relative advantage which attacking aircraft and submarines would enjoy is good reason for the smart surface ship commander to think defensively. I doubt, however, that many U. S. submarine sailors would be considered defensive in tactical thought. Submariners possess the stealth to give them reach over surface ships and are therefore generally very aggressive in their tactics.

There is nothing defensive about the way an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft crew goes after a sub­marine. because the ASW aircraft commander knows that he is in the position of hunter while the submarine is prey. But place the patrol aircraft in the role of attack aircraft, against a surface ship armed with surface-to-air missiles, and common sense demands that the aircraft commander exercise much more prudence than he would against the submarine.

America has been on the strategic defensive since 1945, and there is no indication yet of sufficient collective will to change that posture. The ma­jority of Americans, through their elected and appointed representa­tives. have ensured that U. S. posture is merely reactive to Soviet initiative, and is deficient in capability to be sent wherever necessary, under whatever conditions, to survive and win any battle. Furthermore, since 1945. rep­resentatives of the American public have ordained that their Navy should shrink from a force of 5.000 ships to one of about 500 ships. The size of our navy would not be of such concern if it did not have a continuing, perhaps expanding, peacetime role and an ab­solutely essential role in U. S. alliance strategy. The problem of dwindling fleet size is compounded by the fact that professional naval officers have been slow to recognize the realities of emerging technologies. It is not just greater numbers of traditional ships we need in the near future: it is very different types of platforms. It is time for a radical change in our attitudes. More of the same will not solve our problem for war against the Soviet Union, even if it does ease the burden for coping with lesser threats.

The Navy cannot be sanguine about its prospects for dictating the terms under which we will fight. Our free­dom of action has been, and is likely to remain, constrained by the enemy. U. S. political hierarchy, sister mili­tary services, the public, our allies, evolving technology, and our own ser­vice decisions.

To quote the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Frank C. Car- lucci, in testimony before Congress: "In the decade ahead, we face an adversary who funnels an abnor­mally large portion of his GNP into an aggressive and threatening mili­tary machine. We can overcome the resulting imbalance in part through fostering more teamwork among our military services and allies."

By concentrating on the capabilities of naval forces, we risk discounting the potential of the other services for implementing a maritime strategy— vice naval strategy. For example, while we are concerned with the antiship ca­pabilities of the "Backfire." we have the potential for a weapon system of greater ability—an antiship version of the B-52/air-Iaunched cruise missile (ALCM) system. The Air Force is al­ready tinkering with B-52 ocean sur­veillance and short-range air-to-sur- face missiles (ASMs). A B-52/ALCM ASM system could have up to five times the reach of the "Backfire" AS- 4 and perhaps a ten-to-one advantage in salvo power: the necessary hard­ware exists. There is no Soviet fleet air defense available to counter the B- 52/ALCM ASM. The system could be operational in two years: it only re­mains to be integrated into a dedicated weapon system manned by specially trained aircrews. We admit that a land- based aircraft with ASM is a potent naval weapon in the hands of the So­viets. Why not provide such a force of our own?

If the United States is serious about building a viable capability for non­nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union, a similar case could be made for a land-attack B-52/ALCM system using nonnuclear cruise missiles. Sail­ing a carrier battle group to within 1.000 miles of Soviet airspace and then launching A-6 and A-7 aircraft into the Soviet air defenses may satisfy our parochial offensive macho, but it is certainly not as smart as letting B-52s stand off 1.500 miles to launch salvos of nonnuclear cruise missiles, at least as a precursor to the attack by our fleet.

Commander Parker’s statement re­garding one-for-one attrition might be true if like platforms were to oppose each other. The Imperial Japanese Navy sailed for Midway in 1942 with 200 ships, lost four aircraft carriers, and the battle. Because the Soviets have only four aircraft carriers, pre­sumably one could argue that the United States could afford one-for-one losses and somehow come out ahead as we have 13. Which would we prefer to lose in a war with the Soviets—four aircraft carriers or four Trident sub­marines? Would loss of all eight be worth the cost if we held on to key land positions as a result? Loss of bat­tleships at Pearl Harbor was not as strategically damaging as loss of the fuel tanks and shipyard facilities might have been. My point is that ship counts and attrition have to be considered in the broader context of war as it might evolve in space, in the air. and on land. Numbers do make a difference, but much depends on the manner in which units are tactically and strategically employed, not just gross exchange rates.

We need to spread our long-range (ship versus ship) firepower among more platforms to equal or surpass en­emy surface-mounted reach in any fleet engagement. Possession of Toma­hawk missiles by a U. S. surface com­batant force would give it a potent edge over any surface force which the So­viets could now assemble, provided that over-the-horizon targeting were also available to the U. S. tactical commander. However, the fleet en­gagement that Parker envisions may not take place in the future. In World War II. battleship sailors had very few

The Soviets have their “Backfire” bombers armed with air-to-surface missiles; the Americans could pose more of a maritime threat by employing the B-52s with air- launched cruise missiles.

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opportunities like the Battle of Suri- gao Strait for a classic surface en­gagement. Land-based aircraft and missiles, or submarine-mounted mis­siles, coupled with ocean surveillance systems, could make surface ship bat­tle group engagements with enemy surface fleets a rarity.

Blind adherence to a strategy of CVBG or surface ship battle group of­fense would be suicidal in the early stages of a war with the Soviet Union. U. S. carriers enjoyed considerable stealth relative to the Japanese in World War II. Today, satellites and long-range aircraft reconnaissance have made it almost impossible to operate a battle group undetected. Jimmy Doolittle had to launch his raid early because the carriers were sighted by a Japanese fishing boat. Today, the ocean sur­veillance satellites would give the So­viets much greater early warning. Un­til the Soviet surveillance and early warning system could be blinded, we would need a force the size of Task Force 58 off Okinawa in 1945 (11 large and 6 small carriers) to fight with con­ventional weapons. Nuclear weapons and surveillance satellites would make an Okinawa campaign impracticable.

The Soviets are war-fighting ori­ented and tend to try to reduce risk to a minimum, usually with excess num­bers. but increasingly with quality. In the past, our ultimate superiority in long-range nuclear weapons permitted us to be deficient in other elements of defense. That superiority was con­sciously surrendered by our political leadership, as was our numerical su­periority in Navy ships. We had es­calation dominance in long-range nu­clear systems and tactical dominance in short-range systems at sea (the ag­ing legacy of our World War II con­struction programs coupled with a continuing program of marginal tech­nical improvements to the basic CVBG concept which evolved in the 1930s). And we enjoyed the fruits of our vic­tory in World War II. exercising con­trol of the sea unopposed by any other nation. All that has changed. We have "essential equivalence." a euphe­mism for insufficiency in long-range nuclear systems, and total abrogation of any defense against Soviet long- range nuclear systems. At sea. the So­viets have built a specific counter to our CVBG concept—satellites plus missiles. All this adds up to a real weakening of our ability to control events, not just the illusion of weak­ening. The danger is not that the So­viets will perceive this weakening, but that the U. S. political leadership and public will fail to understand its con­sequences.

Parker is correct in calling for a con­tinual review of U. S. and allied rules of engagement (ROE)—this is pre­cisely what is happening. In fact, even before the recent review, there was considerable latitude in the set of pos­sible rules. In the last few years, mar­itime ROE lists have become an ex­tensive menu of options which permit the political leadership to communi­cate more quickly and more precisely with the on-scene commanders. Rede­sign of the list of options has also stim­ulated innovative tactics for dealing with possible enemy first blows, de­fensive tactics which have been dem­onstrated effectively in fleet exercises. And the designer of any Soviet set- piece centrally orchestrated initial at­tack must understand that he is going to have to contend with a great un­known—the individuals on-scene, who will be free within broad constraints to implement many ad hoc defensive measures without consulting anyone. In this situation, an initial command concentration on defense is certainly appropriate, and it need not prevent the allied commander from being fully prepared to go on the offensive once the first shot is fired.

In the past, we could sleep under our strategic nuclear umbrella, secure in the notion that Mr. Khruschev was not willing to attack U. S. aircraft car­riers and that the only realistic threat to our naval surface ships was the sec­ond-rate air and naval power of Third World opponents. In short, the threat at sea would be nonnuclear, obsoles­cent. numerically small, and manned by inferior talent. With the advent of essential equivalence, we are facing an era when nuclear weapons could well be expended in the no-man's land of space or the open ocean. None of our surface ships (merchant or naval) is capable of enduring for long in a nuclear environment. The nuclear at­tack submarine (SSN), by virtue of her high tensile strength hull and self- contained atmosphere, can very well survive all but a direct hit by a nuclear weapon: and the stealth of the SSN makes direct hits very difficult for all but a few relatively short-range fire control systems.

So we must face the fact that we need a qualitatively different type of fleet if we intend to contest the Soviets for the surface of the world oceans. We need a revolutionary kind of battle fleet made up of ships and other forces which combine stealth, firepower (de­fensive as well as offensive), and pas­sive defense against blast, radiation, and electromagnetic effects. And we must admit that the Soviet Navy need not sail a single surface ship in harm’s way to deny the United States use of the oceans in a nuclear war. Soviet geography permits them control of the heartland of the world island without use of the seas.

And Soviet long-range nuclear ar­tillery may be enough to deny the United States access to the rimland of the world island. Therefore, a U. S. maritime strategy must include the means to defeat Soviet space-based surveillance, land-based nuclear bal­listic missiles, long-range naval air­craft. and missile-equipped subma­rines. We will need tough-skinned 200- knot skimmer craft and/or submerged heavy-lift vessels to successfully fight an amphibious campaign in a nuclear war: our current gator navy is unsuit­able. Our ship designs must be com­promises between hardness, stealth, and defensive firepower against nu­clear weapons. Only if we build rad­ically new ship designs with the intent to fight in a nuclear environment, will we have a fleet and merchant marine able to sail in harm’s way.

“Armed Confrontation Builds in

South Africa”

(See J. Kapstein, pp. 34-39, December 1981;

R. M. Andersen, p, 18, April 1982

Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) William D. Hartley, U. S. Naval Reserve (Re­tired)—I write from a basis of having worked as a correspondent in South Africa in the late 1970s (and, yes, it should be noted, as an acquaintance of Jon Kapstein). The white minority Afrikaner Government in Pretoria manages its propaganda exceedingly well. The message is that South Africa is really not as bad as the nasty West­ern press paints it, and if the West leans on South African whites to share power with blacks, then surely the demon communist will emerge triumphant on the southern tip of the dark continent.

Lieutenant Andersen seems to have swallowed that argument without gag­ging; that certainly seems to be the thrust of his intemperate outburst against Commander Kapstein’s ex­cellent article on South Africa. At the very least, Andersen shows a startling lack of knowledge of the history of and conditions inside that country.

Andersen calls the Afrikaner Gov­ernment “staunch supporters of free­dom.” This of men who in World War II let their hatred of the British lead them to open support of the Nazis. This of a government so petrified someone might have a thought differ­ing from its dogma that it rigidly pros­cribes what all its citizens, black and white, may read, see, and hear. This of a system that allows without trial indefinite imprisonment or exile within the country.

Andersen repeats the threadbare claim that South African blacks are “many times better off” than those in the rest of Africa. To begin with, that is hardly true, as a trip through the grinding poverty of rural South Africa will demonstrate. But even if it were true, the parallel is nonsensical. The comparison should not be made be­tween how a black in South Africa contrasts with one in Mali, Chad, or elsewhere but how he compares with his white fellow South Africans in his own country.

Andersen’s main argument is that only a tiny, disaffected handful of rad­ical blacks want a one-man, one-vote system—black-majority rule—in South Africa, and if this frightful scenario comes to pass then the hammer and sickle will surely follow. That is Pre­toria rhetoric at its finest peak of ab­surdity. I am reminded of the hoary slogan of the diehard segregationists of the American South in the 1950s and 1960s: It is “outside agitators” that upset “our darkies” and if they would just go away all would be well.

The truth is that when handfuls are measured it is those blacks happy with their lot who are a minority in South Africa, if indeed they exist at all. The vast majority seek change, at the least, sharing power and the nation’s undis­puted riches with whites. Sadly, if the blacks must, they will turn to com­munism for help if no one else will assist them.

The tragedy of the white man in Southern Africa is that he has never known when it is time to bend. Wit­ness the stubborn refusal of the Por­tuguese to give up Mozambique and Angola until they abandoned the two lands to chaos. Witness the defiance of Ian Smith as he led the white Rho­desian into war against unwinnable odds. It is not at all strange that blacks seeking their independence in those countries turned where they could— to the East—for help, nor should it surprise anyone that communist influ­ence surfaced when the battle ended.

Yet, if in the early days white lead­ers had moved to share power with their black majorities, it is likely that Marxist influence would be muted to­day, and that whites in those lands would have emerged with a much bet­ter deal than they have now.

The lesson for Pretoria is this: If communism ever does take over South Africa, it will not be because whites brought blacks into government, but because whites kept them out too long.

“The Offensive-Passive Ship”

(See R. C. Powers, pp. 46-49, January 1982;

A. Jones, p. 25, April 1982 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Carl O. Schuster, U. S. Navy—The U. S. Navy has operated in an active emissions environment for too long. This emphasis on active sys­tems has manifested itself not only in the excessive use of radars, but also an excessive proliferation of com­munications circuits. This over-reli­ance on active systems may indeed prove hazardous in future naval en­gagements. Shifting to a completely passive approach, on the other hand.

offers little succor to the already hard- pressed battle group commander. Being blind and limited to a point de­fense strategy is neither comforting nor acceptable. Fortunately, this is not what Captain Powers is suggesting.

The use of off-ship sensors to pro­vide a surveillance picture is not a new concept and can be practiced with the airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft currently available. Although vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft do not yet have the performance necessary to support Captain Powers’s ideas, the development of conformal radar ar­rays for aircraft and future break­throughs in microelectronics offer some promising possibilities for future V/STOL aircraft as sensor size and weight are reduced concurrent with improved performance. The use of modular weapons/sensor systems, such as those of the F/A-18, also holds much promise for his concept. It may indeed be possible, by the mid-1990s, to sta­tion multi-mission, modular V/STOL aircraft on such an offensive-passive ship. Some evolving technologies sug­gest that AWACS aircraft may even be able to provide mid-course and ter­minal guidance to long-range antiair­craft missiles fired from surface units. All of which augurs well both for Pow­ers’s ship design and suggested tac­tical concepts.

The only possible improvement that can be suggested for the former is that some type of powerful phased-array radar be included in the design to pro­vide some area surveillance capabil­ity. Such a modification is feasible without greatly altering the design, since phased arrays can be molded somewhat to a hull design. The ship needs such a sensor for those times when her position has been discov­ered and the planes cannot fly, or when the aircraft’s radar is down, or the data links are disrupted or jammed. Over­reliance on airborne or other external sensing systems can be as fatal as over­reliance on own-ship systems. Each has its own advantages and weak­nesses. Recognizing this highlights Powers’s most important point: the reexamination of our tactical ap­proach to naval warfare.

Unless deception and passive/ac- tive tactics are practiced, they will never be perfected. External sen­sors—even the human eye—can be deceived. Deceptive marshalling pat­terns, formations, stationing, and off-

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ship decoy devices, even chaff, can do a lot to confuse the enemy’s tar­geting problem, but only if they are done in the proper fashion. A suc­cessful deception requires good plan­ning based on a thorough understand­ing of all the environmental and technological factors that can influ­ence sensor capabilities and observer perceptions. In short, the deception unit must move and act like that which it portrays. Otherwise, the effort is wasted. The next decade promises some revolutionary changes in naval warfare. Now is the time to start pre­paring for these changes.

Leadership Forum

Admiral H. D. Felt. U. S. Navy (Re­tired)—Some years ago. when morale in Bancroft Hall was low. a plebe asked me, “Admiral, what is leadership?” At that same time, the Naval Institute introduced its Leadership Forum, in­viting discussion on the subject.

Points made over the years have been largely manners of doing—said better by an officer writing to the Pro­ceedings: “In all the discussion about the topic, there are countless ideas on how this or that approach to leader­ship works.” I saw some feeling for the ingredients: "Care from the heart about those you want to lead." These quotes are the beginning of an under­standing that leadership can be inter­preted as an aggregate of elements. I look forward to seeing in future lead­ership essays the identifications of those elements.

“India: The Neglected Service Faces the Future”

(See J. Larus. pp. 76-83. March 1981: M. Y. Siddiqui. pp. 67-68. March 1982 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Lane E. Napoli. U. S. Navy—The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was, as Dr. Larus's article stated, a border conflict involving air and ground units. The minimal participation of na­val forces in the war was grounded in India’s desire to restrict the magni­tude and geographical scope of com­bat operations.

Commander Siddiqui's comments on the 1971 war are extremely inac­curate. He states that the Indian air­craft carrier Vikrant was stationed in the Bay of Bengal, without opposition from a single Pakistani Navy unit. Commander Siddiqui neglected to mention that the Pakistani submarine Ghazi sank off Visag Harbor in search of the Vikrant. which before hostilities was sent to the Andaman Islands.

At the commencement of hostili­ties, the Vikrant''s Sea Hawks at­tacked targets in Bangladesh at Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. In addition. In­dian troops landed at Cox's Bazar to interdict Pakistani troops trying to es­cape to Burma. The Indian Navy so successfully carried out the war in the east that only one Pakistani naval unit escaped to Penang. Malaysia. In the Arabian Sea. the Indian Navy bottled up Pakistan with an effective block­ade. The use of Indian missile boats in the war was anything but ineffective as Commander Siddiqui suggests and was one of the reasons the Pakistani surface units did not venture effec­tively out of Karachi.

“Naval Diplomacy’ in the Persian Gulf”

{See K. B. Jordan, pp. 26-31. November 1981; L. Wedin. p. 10. February 1982 Proceedings)

John D. Gibson. Librarian. Technical Institute of Naval Studies, Royal Saudi Naval Forces—Soviet heavy-hand­edness in international relations is anathema to Arabs, not to say the world. One would guess because of it, Arabs would indeed desire a U. S. presence as a bittersweet alternative to having Soviet soldiers in their streets. At the same time, U. S. sup­port of Israel must be brought to a balance with Arab interests in the Middle East. The past imbalance of U. S.-Israeli support has exacerbated the conflict, preventing constructive discussion between the two sides be­cause of overwrought suspicions.

Lieutenant Commander Wedin sug­gests on the one hand that the Soviet Union has good reason to invade and subjugate a people because its inter­ests are threatened by that people’s religion: and on the other that a U. S. presence may be difficult for the Arab countries to accept. To equate the So­viet Union’s subjugation of Afghani­stan with an invited U. S. presence in the Middle East is grossly illogical. It is, of course, the sort of reasoning the Soviet Union would promote.

“PEB: Is It Working?”

(See A. Greenberg and R. M. Blauvelt, pp.

34-40, February 1982 Proceedings)

Commander R. T. E. Bowler III, U. S. Navy—Captain Greenberg and Com­mander Blauvelt say that "the PEB concept is ripe for quantitative anal­ysis.” I agree. A valid question is: "PEB: How much is it costing?”

Since 1972, the year the PEB con­cept was initiated in our conventional surface fleet, the average cost of a sur­face ship overhaul (even in dollars ad­justed for inflation) has skyrocketed. Most of that increase lies in the repair rather than the modernization portion of the overhaul. When analyzing over­hauls, however, man-days of work is a better measure than dollars.

A recent study, conducted under the auspices of NavSea PMS-306. Ship Support Improvement Project, ana­lyzed the overhaul history of the DDG-2 class from 1967 through 1979. The study showed a dramatic in­crease, particularly since 1972, in the number of man-days required to over­haul a typical DDG-2. Again, a much greater increase was seen on the re­pair instead of the modernization side of the overhaul. In 1972, the average DDG-2 required 27,000 repair man- days to overhaul. By 1979, that figure had ballooned to more than 75.000— nearly a 200% increase.

Is the increase attributable to the PEB concept? Not necessarily. The ships may have been over-extended in Vietnam operations to the point of material exhaustion. As the ships aged, more repairs may have been required to keep them steaming. Or our ship­yards’ productivity may have plum­meted—more man-days needed for the same repairs. The study did catego­rize the source of man-day growth; tempo of operations, ship age. and productivity accounted for less than 10% of the growth. The single largest category, accounting for more than half the growth, was "more standard repairs.” The number of components being routinely scheduled for repair, whether broken or not, grew by leaps and bounds with each succeeding overhaul.

A significant portion of the increase in "standard repairs” is a result of the PEB concept. If the reputation of a commanding officer or the shipyard commander hinges upon the success of a Light-Off Examination (LOE). the natural reaction is to repair everything that can be repaired—thus, an in­crease in “standard repairs." In no way am I denigrating the value of the PEB concept: the PEB has created an emphasis and consistency in conven­tional shipboard engineering that was long overdue. But it is difficult to change just one thing. Significantly higher standards cost money.

ComSurFLant. ComSurFPac. and NavSea have recognized the problem of sharply increasing repair man-days and have launched several initiatives to reverse the trend. A reliability-cen­tered approach (“If it ain't broke, don’t fix it”) to developing repair work packages is being tested on two up­coming DDG-2 overhauls. Diagnostic techniques (borrowed from the sub­marine community), such as machin­ery vibration analysis and infrared de­tectors, are being used to determine if a component is actually in need of re­pair. The flip side, however, to these repair-reducing initiatives is the rec­ognition and acceptance of prudent technical risk. The chance exists that a piece of machinery not overhauled will fail during the LOE evolution. The PEB will have to adapt to that reality just as it has adapted to other fleet re­alities. The alternative—ever-increas­ing costs and lengths of overhauls— would seem to be unacceptable.

Several of the authors' remarks re­garding engineering duty officers (EDOs) are flatly incorrect. I'm an EDO. and I resent statements like “the specially groomed engineers will be free to build and design ships unham­pered by shipboard and seagoing ex­perience.’ ’ Balderdash! Despite the ar­ticle's implication, most EDOs do not enter the community upon being com­missioned. The vast majority become engineering duty officers by transfer­ring from the unrestricted line, usually after completing two sea duty tours— many up through the department head level. Those officers who do enter the community directly (with the excep­tion of not physically qualified and fe­male officers) must go to sea and be­come surface- or submarine-qualified before they can become EDOs. EDOs fill either the chief engineer or main propulsion assistant billets in our con­ventionally powered aircraft carriers and the repair officer billets in our sub­marine and destroyer tenders.

I further submit that an officer can learn as much about shipboard engi­neering by being a ship superintendent during an overhaul as he can in a sea­going billet. Face it: Ships being de­livered to the fleet today are among the most complex machines ever built. Designing, building, and maintaining these ships is a full-time job. The EDO community is working hard to estab­lish and maintain its credibility to do an even better job.

My exception notwithstanding, this is still a great article: keep ’em coming.

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