This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Contents:
Leadership: Again and Again Their Command and Control Not in My Navy Lessons of the Falklands Crisis Ticonderoga: Another Hood?
Their Merchant Fleet The Navy As Neighbor Their Mine Warfare Capability Britain’s Choice of Threats The Fleet Connection The Captain One Hornet, Two Stings A Basis for Tactical Thought Atlantic First
Their “Voyage of the Damned”
Their Sea-Based Aviation ZANLA’s War in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Operation Rosario CVNs Forever! Forever?
Soviet Snow Job The President’s Address Summer Cruise Blues The Offensive-Passive Ship
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Leadership: Again and Again’’
(See H. G. Rickover, pp. 129-130, October
1982 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. Wilson Leverton, U. S. Navy (Retired) — You fell headlong into the trap. He baited you, and you bit.
You protesteth too much. You did break your own house rule. You did editorialize.
I usually disagree with Admiral Rickover about things I know something about, not that that will worry him. And this time is no exception. However, you gave Admiral Rickover space for his disclaimer, then you blew it by defending yourself instead of permitting proven leaders to take the challenge.
You are doing well in giving space to less than erudite and sometimes fairly outrageous stuff. If you can let an officer advocate scrapping the surface fleet and relying on submarines for our sea power, then surely you can let this prominent, if not universally popular, admiral have a couple of columns without succumbing to knee jerks.
I recall one CNO, when pressed for his views on Admiral Rickover, saying, “He keeps telling me how to run the Navy, but so do a lot of other people.”
Major Kenneth W. Estes, U. S. Marine Corps — It strikes me as tragic that one of our most highly respected flag officers, indeed one whose influence will tell upon the post-2000 Navy, spends his initial months of retirement railing against the supposed enemies within and without the service. Admiral Rickover’s latest diatribe against leadership discussion in the Proceedings proves most unfortunate and unbecoming an officer of his stature.
I suspect that the rationale for such discussion has its origins in the very questions Admiral Rickover raises in his second paragraph. There seems little doubt that our officers are inadequately prepared at the Naval Academy; some officers are obtuse; nonAcademy officers suffer neglect at civilian colleges and so on.
Part of the problem, and perhaps some of Admiral Rickover’s ire, rests in the slippery nature of the beast. What is “leadership?” Is it modern managerial technique set to a military context, or is it the two-fisted variety of the dockside foreman? A positive iteration of leadership concepts proves far more difficult to establish than a critique of leadership failure. (It’s similar to defining fascism; it is far easier to describe what the philosophy is against than what it advocates.) Most successful officers learn leadership during their commissioned service by watching the trial and error of their superiors and using that experience when they reach the position of their former bosses. This method may constitute a negative approach to the problem, and I am only too pleased to read articles in the Proceedings, such as J. L. Byron’s “The Captain,” September 1982, pp. 39-45, and other professional journals postulating a positive approach. These views are helpful to those of us far enough removed from the bureaucracy to still be leading, because they (1) offer encouragement that positive action may work; (2) suggest new approaches or affirm old ones; and (3) give hope for the future by suggesting that somebody out there is running their unit in a sensible fashion.
If Admiral Rickover scoffs that one can write about it, how is it possible to teach leadership to those too embryonic to apprentice to the fleet? I have often thought this to be the more difficult task. Yet, Admiral Rickover’s successor, while Superintendent of the Naval Academy, increased the formal leadership course load fourfold. This was an extraordinary action, considering the practical limitations of the Annapolis setting.
By inference, we may conclude that Admiral Rickover wants us to stop talking about leadership and just do it.
If leadership were a science governed by accepted paradigm, that might seem feasible. If leadership is an art, though, it may require another “70 or 80 years” of effort by the U. S. Naval Institute and other institutions in order to define, conserve, and nurture it as a common practice.
C. O. Triebel—About a year ago, after reading too many articles on leadership by young officers, I scratched out a protest, then filed it away thinking, “Why add more words when you’re saying that there are too many being written already?”
But, I can’t resist Admiral Rick- over's request for the views of others. He so seldom asks. Leadership is a character trait that a young officer should constantly strive to develop. Listening, observing, evaluating, and practicing—the paths are many, though the destination is clear. What is right for you may be wrong for me. The lives and careers of famous successful leaders are readily available for study. I don’t think a young man should be in a hurry to make a pontifical public statement on the subject of leadership.
But, surely it’s a worthy ambition to write for publication. Old science, new technology, strategy, tactics, people problems—the fields are limitless for study, thought, and analysis. Thought expressed in words must be logically and lucidly presented in order to persuade the reader that something new and worthwhile is being submitted for his consideration.
Knowledge not articulated is not very useful to others. Our critic has not been reticent in presenting his views on a wide variety of subjects. Publication of any original article in the Proceedings is an accomplishment that demonstrates the result of concentrated hard work. Young officers especially should be encouraged to Participate.
Back to the subject of leadership. In the February 1981 National Geographic, Amory B. Lovins quoted Lao-tzu on this subject as follows: “Leaders are best when people scarcely know they exist, not so good when people obey and acclaim them. Worst when people despise them. Fail to honor people, they fail to honor you. But of good leaders who talk little, when their work is done, their aim fulfilled, the people all say, ‘We did this ourselves.’”
Captain John J. Noel, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—It is true that a newly commissioned officer has a “guaranteed promotion” for a grade or two if “he keeps his nose clean, does not ruffle any superior’s feathers, and does his routine job properly.” Most commanding officers (COs) would be happy with young officers reporting aboard who could be so described. After an officer establishes a record and a reputation, however, he will be promoted only if he has exhibited professional skills and proven leadership qualities and shows potential for growth. Admiral Kickover knows that the Navy's officer structure resembles a pyramid, with room near the top only for carefully selected people. Those who are promoted often include the people who have shown marked creativity and the ability to produce changes in the U. S. Navy.
Admiral Rickover implies that only creative officers are worthy of promotion. The Navy also needs officers with a highly developed sense of responsibility and moral courage who know their jobs and who follow orders as well as the unwritten rules of the service. These are often the outstanding leaders who run taut ships with high morale. COs who have had to qualify officers of the deck under way to stand night watches know that creativity or even professional brilliance is not what the candidate must have. Leaders must, above all, have the sense of responsibility, the mother wit, to awaken their COs if or when they (the candidates) are in doubt. This is the sturdy character COs cherish, because it lets them place their trust in their men and quickly drift off to sleep in their sea cabins.
To question the need for any discussion of leadership in the Proceedings is quixotic indeed, but perhaps Admiral Rickover is only trying to stimulate a useful dialogue. When he was an embryonic officer in the 1920s reporting aboard his first ship, he performed his routine chores more or less as an apprentice. A junior officer at that time rarely had much responsibility thrust upon him as a division officer until he had a year or two to observe and learn. His men were usually of high quality; it was often more difficult to get into the Navy than it was to get into many colleges. Few officers faced complicated personnel problems. Hence, it is not surprising that the Proceedings was partial to articles on more dramatic professional subjects.
In those days, leadership was not considered a subject necessary to teach at the Naval Academy. The traditional view of leadership was that it was an art based on traits that could be developed by discipline and hard professional learning. As late as the early 1950s, the sole content of the leadership course at the Academy was military justice. Although some 90 hours were devoted to the rifle and pistol ranges, the Academy’s curriculum did not include basic management or elementary human relations.
But, the Navy was aware that there were social, and thus personnel, changes taking place both within the Navy and society. In 1946, officers were being selected for advanced degrees in personnel administration. Several boards of visitors to the Naval Academy noted in their reports that many NROTC officers going to the fleet were more broadly educated than their Naval Academy counterparts. This had a positive effect in modernizing the Academy curriculum. More important, perhaps, in stimulating change were the strains involved in suddenly manning a larger fleet for the Korean War. It became obvious that junior officers needed formal training in handling their men. The apprentice system was out-of-date. In 1952, with the enthusiastic support of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Naval Institute published the Division Officer's Guide as a companion volume to the Watch Officer’s Guide. Leadership discus-
Don't
forget
to
renew your membership for
1983!
sion in the Proceedings tended to be more concerned with the practical application of well-recognized management techniques than with the traditional inspiration of John Paul Jones.
Another factor that stimulated the Navy’s interest in leadership was its evaluation of its own leadership in World War II. There was satisfaction and pride in the performance of Naval Reserve officers, many commissioned hastily from civil life. There was no doubt that the small prewar professional Navy, officer and enlisted, must have had the right stuff. The Navy could also take pride in the performance of its senior and flag officers, although a few exceptions emphasized the difference between the demands of peacetime operations and those of war.
Yes, Admiral Rickover, if I may belabor the obvious, people are just as important as weapons and require the same meticulous care if they are to perform well. How could our Proceedings not publish articles on leadership?
Since you have challenged the Proceedings to reexamine its policy in regard to leadership discussion, perhaps
Iyou should tell us how you learned to be a good division officer. What are your ideas on the subject? In your letter, you mention “the leadership concept.” Could you not define this term? More useful to the service than a blanket and many faceted indictment would be some constructive and creative ideas that would befit your position as one of the Navy’s most distinguished elder statesmen.
Tim Rishel II—Admiral Rickover’s comment shocked me. I am a high school senior and the cadet company commander of the NJROTC unit in Shelton, Washington. I find that in acquiring a leadership technique, the leadership articles in the Proceedings help quite a lot. The experience written into those articles, my naval science textbooks, and practical application show me what works and what doesn’t. Commander Byron’s “The Captain” taught me many things. I used his suggestions in commanding my armed drill team, and they worked wonderfully.
I hope to become a naval officer, and I look forward to more of these articles for further development in my college years.
“Their Command and Control”
(See D. L. Sedgwick, p. 45, October 1982 Proceedings)
Commander Michael Hardcastle- Taylor, U. S. Navy—Commander Sedgwick poses a question of profound tactical and strategic importance. We must define the appropriate minimum level of command and control (and communications) required to operate in wartime. Our professional pride and love of technology may have heretofore inhibited careful evaluation of this issue. In addition, we must learn all we can from the Soviets about their ability to disrupt our command and control and how best, during war, to minimize the effect of attempts at such disruption.
Why define a minimum level of command and control? Partly because in tactical and strategic conflict, commanders are going to be too busy fighting to be continually reading message boards and drafting minute responses to queries. Also, we should be training to fight in periods of confusion and disruption of communications in battle, even at the expense of a delayed standard requisition and issue procedure or administrative message.
Commander Sedgwick’s assertion that we can legitimately expect, even demand, more from our command and control system in peacetime than during war does not go far enough. Why not define how little command and control is absolutely required to guide our submarines, ships, and aircraft? Once this minimum level of command and control is defined, we must then strive to make it efficient and so redundant that we can realistically expect to rely on it during battle. We can achieve this by assuring ourselves that we have a doctrine which calls for a manageable and realistic level of command and control.
Professional pride notwithstanding, we might well beat the Soviets at their own game of redundant command and control by borrowing their best and rejecting their worst. First, if it’s simple but it works, let’s not necessarily throw it away. I cite the effective lapse of a capability to communicate in other than the satellite mode in some remote ocean areas of strategic interest to the U. S. Navy. What happened to the redundancy offered by high-frequency communications and the ability to send and receive short, simple, manual Morse messages?
What we need is intensive training to efficiently employ minimum surviv- able and redundant command and control. We should allow technology to help us win battles with less command and control instead of letting it force us toward even more. We should not lull ourselves into overreliance on that which is most vulnerable — rapid fire, shotgun command and control that requires us to employ massive and complex communications circuitry during the heat of battle.
“Not in My Navy”
{See S. A. Paolantonio, pp. 38-43, August
1982: L. B. Brennan, p. 23, October 1982;
J. A. McNitt and R. Hartmann, pp. 29-33.
November 1982 Proceedings)
Eric G. Postel, former lieutenant (Junior grade) in the U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Paolantonio’s article was both pertinent and constructive. His guide for division officers should prove to be of assistance. However, it also has a relatively narrow focus. A broader analysis might include some of the following factors and potential solutions.
The stereotype of drug users being emotionally immature, poor performers, and “doing it for kicks” is a generalization that does not apply in many cases. Certainly, many offenders appearing at captains’ masts do fit this characterization. However, in many other cases, the drug user is one of the better performers on the ship. Some have even been named “Sailor of the Quarter” or been awarded Navy medals. This applies to the officer corps as well. Furthermore, while the figures in the Burt Study may indeed be accurate, my personal knowledge of two naval vessels leads me to suspect that up to 25% of the junior officers in some commands have used drugs on liberty. Naval leaders must realize that drug use by Navy personnel is not restricted to “dirt bags.” This realization should not alter the Navy’s formal policy regarding drug abuse. It should, however, affect the communication regarding this subject. The naivete of many officers, executive officers, and commanding officers is astounding.
Once we realize that people from all walks of life use drugs, we can have a broader perspective of the causes of drug abuse. Some of the causes include: ► The Navy's False Advertising: There are some long-term problems with ad
campaigns such as “It’s not a just a job. It’s an adventure.” Potential recruits are not told that in addition to fixing jet engines or radars, they will also be washing toilet bowls. They are not told that their stay in exotic St. Croix will only be two days in the middle of 30 seagoing days without a single night of uninterrupted sleep. Potential recruits are also not told that when they do pull into port, cleaning up the ship and curfews will restrict their hours ashore, and they will have to restrict themselves to the proximity of fleet landing — usually in a port town with nothing more to offer than “sailor bars” and indifferent hosts. Nor are the would-be sailors told about the drastic effect Navy schedules have on most attempts to establish a normal life, such as keeping up with non-Navy friends and familiar haunts in home port. False expectations usually lead to disillusionment. “Quick fixes” are often an attractive outlet.
► Poor Leadership: Many highly educated members of American society regard the armed services as being populated with mediocre people. To some extent, they are correct. At the same time that the many superb individuals are striving for excellence, many of the Navy’s policies, born of expediency, encourage or reward mediocrity. Examples, such as superstars who continually receive extra assignments because of their abilities, abound. What incentive is there for others when an officer is relieved for cause and is forced to endure two years of missed deployments while collecting per diem and promotion to lieutenant (j.g.) while on temporary shore duty? Encouraging mediocrity leads to bad attitudes among those affected. In the officer corps, encouragement of mediocrity and retention of mediocre performers result in too many poor leaders. The Navy realizes that superior leadership is often the only differentiating factor between a “retention superstar” and a command with subpar retention rates. Yet, somehow that lesson has not been learned in the drug abuse arena. Drugs offer escape and release. Few people who have enjoyable careers and personal lives wish to escape them.
► Overzealous Officers: Many officers feel the need to reinvent the wheel during the course of their tours. If they didn’t, what would their boss have to write about on fitness reports? Thus, we often find the perfectly well-meaning officer telling the crew to work late in order to wax floors and put brand- new sheets on racks the night before an important inspection. Or having two accident/incident drills a week before a naval technical proficiency inspection, only to skip such drills for the seven months thereafter. Junior officers often don’t have the strength or confidence to withstand continual orders from other officers to “fight fires” and thus unwittingly ignore past inspection lessons learned or render long- range plans worthless. Then, the senior officer returns to a shore duty billet, leaving the crew holding the bag. The next officer assigned to the ship is often initially unprepared for the job and is certainly unfamiliar with many past lessons learned, and he uses the same exhortations as the previous senior officer. Short tours generate frequent infusions of energy, new ideas, and more commanding officer/execu- tive officer/department head billets. They also cause officers to adopt shorter-run perspectives and ignore long-term effects of their actions. The Navy should take advantage of the current recession-fueled increase in retention. All assignments to sea duty should be of equal length: 30 months. This will lead to more stable work environments and a greater concern for morale. Morale and drug use are inversely proportional.
Lieutenant Paolantonio’s article implicitly assumes that the Navy has tough punishments at its disposal. Although the Navy’s punishment for possession of one joint may be tougher than the state of California’s, the regulations don’t engender as much fear as is often assumed. First, the rules of evidence are too lax. For example, a pot-smoke-filled room is often not enough hard evidence to find someone guilty of smoking pot. Second, different commanding officers give varying punishments. Third, a repeat offender does not receive a drastically worse sentence than that he received from a previous offense. In fact, he often gets exactly what he has come to want: “out.” And what if it is an other-than- honorable discharge? Some employers do not know the difference between an administrative discharge and a good conduct discharge, let alone actually check on the terms of discharge.
“Not In My Navy” offers effective, short-term actions which may be taken by division officers. But, such actions amount to putting a finger in a leaking dam. Broader analysis and response are required by the Navy’s leadership to solve (versus contain) the problem.
“Lessons of the Falklands Crisis”
(See D. A. Dyer, p. 90, July 1982; B. Baker and S. Costa, pp. 81-86, August 1982; J. B. Soper, pp. 20-24, September 1982 Proceedings)
“Ticonderoga: Another HoodV'
(See S. Morss, pp. 116-117, August 1982;
E. L. Beach, p. 134, October 1982; T. S. Woback, pp. 90-93, November 1982 Proceedings)
Chester H. Holtyn, Program Engineer, Engineering and Technical Services, Reynolds Metals Company— The sinking of the British destroyer HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982 during the Falklands Crisis, precipitated a flood of adverse comments on the use of aluminum in naval warships. Antialuminum stories spread with the subsequent losses of the Ardent, Antelope, and Conventry.
The U. S. Navy and the Aluminum Federation in the United Kingdom have confirmed that, contrary to earlier reports, steel—not aluminum—was used in the superstructure of the 3,500-ton “Type-42”-class destroyers Sheffield and Conventry. The 2,500-ton “Type-22”-class frigates Ardent and Antelope had aluminum superstructures and steel hulls. To the best of our knowledge, the cargo vessel Atlantic Conveyor was of all-steel construction.
News releases issued by the Aluminum Federation and the Aluminum Association have attempted to set the story straight. Some of the adverse comments made during the height of the Falklands Crisis were completely and technically inaccurate. Other comments wove a blanket of suspicion from a single thread of truth. Unfortunately, some of these misconceptions are still being reported as facts: Does aluminum burn?
No, contrary to Commander Morss’s claim of “actual ignition," aluminum doesn't burn. Under specially controlled conditions, as in a finely divided powder, it can be made to burn; but in the sheet, plate, and extruded product form of a superstructure, it will neither burn nor support combustion. The U. S. Navy Office of Information news
/W- ..uatvtS-
^ ISBN:
I ORDER NOW! Presidio Press
I P.O. Box 892P6 Novato, CA 94948-0892
■ NAME _________________________
release, dated 27 May 1982, stated unequivocally that aluminum does not burn.
Will the substituting of steel for aluminum improve the superstructure’s resistance to ballistic attack and fragmentation?
Commander Morss states that an unarmored aluminum superstructure provides little ballistic protection. An aluminum deckhouse typically would be built from .250-inch to .313-inch plate. An equivalent weight steel plating would be about .0833-inch to .104-inch thick, which would also not provide much ballistic protection. If armor is required, specified, or desired, then heavier gauges of aluminum or steel will be needed. The additional weight of armor would, of course, require a trade-off in other areas of the ship’s design and mission characteristics. Aluminum armor is recognized today by armor specialists as superior to steel in both fragment and armorpiercing resistance. This is not an idle claim by one associated with the aluminum industry; it is a fact easily verified. The claim is supported not only in theory, but through years of development and testing and field experience.
Does aluminum contribute to the rapid spread of fire?
Some articles and news reports focused on the relative melting points of the two materials—1,300°F for aluminum and 2,600°F for steel. 1 he temperature of shipboard fires is generally estimated to be in the range of 1,800°F to 2,200°F. However, there are reports that temperatures in the range of 2,800°F to 4,000°F have been met. A steel bulkhead, which may not melt in an “average” fire, will not, however, prevent the spread of fire unless it is insulated. Every combustible, including paint, will ignite on the opposite side of the uninsulated steel when the combustible reaches its ignition temperature.
Captain Baker describes the efforts to make aluminum more survivable through the use of refractory felt, and relates the Navy’s decision to build the DDG-51-class destroyer with a steel superstructure. If the DDG-51’s steel house is not insulated against fire, it will be no more survivable than HMS Sheffield was with her steel house.
Does aluminum shatter easily?
Some articles have stated that aluminum is more susceptible to shattering than steel. Data generated during the Middle East engagements, however, indicate that less casualties were found in aluminum vehicles than in steel vehicles because of aluminum’s excellent low fragmentation characteristics. One armor-piercing projectile hitting an aluminum vehicle created one or two fragments, but one armor-piercing projectile hitting a steel vehicle created 50 to 100 fragments. This is why aluminum is being specified in vehicles today.
Is aluminum cheaper than steel? Some news reports, and also Captain Baker’s discussion, described aluminum as “cheaper.” On a pound-for-pound basis, aluminum has always been several times more expensive than steel. On a struc- ture-for-structure basis, aluminum will cost about twice as much as steel. The word “cheaper” is obviously incorrect, but it helps to build a case against aluminum for those who are so inclined. “Cost-effective” is another matter. Aluminum helps, according to the Navy’s Office of Information, to achieve a more cost-effective vessel by reducing displacement approximately 5%. The overall cost savings have been reported to be about 2% in favor of the vessel with an aluminum superstructure.
The key, though, is not cost reduction per se but being able to incorporate the weight advantage of aluminum into a “superior ship system.” Aluminum allows the designer to meet the speed, maneuverability, range, stability, and habitability criteria while providing maximum offensive and defensive capabilities.
High-level Navy officials have recently stated, as reported in Captain Baker’s discussion, that the U. S. Navy is planning to use steel for its new class of destroyers. This decision was made months ago. There is little doubt that the DDG-51-class destroyer can be designed and built with a steel superstructure. Whether or not all of the established ship characteristics and mission requirements will be met remains to be seen. How much margin will the ship have? At some point within the design synergistics, there will be an effort to reduce weight, particularly topside weight. The re-
ON STRATEGY
A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War Harry G. Summers, Jr.,
Colonel of Infantry "could be the most important analytical military literature produced by a member of our Armed Forces since Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his great treatise on seapower, almost a century ago."
—A rmor Magazine What went wrong in Vietnam? Col. Summers’ critical analysis of the military as a whole provides a damning indictment of America’s professional military for its loss of professionalism during this tragic period of history. Could things have turned out differently for the military, for Vietnam, for the United States? Summers says yes and provides cogent, hard-hitting reasons why.
ISBN: 0-89141-156-9
You’re eligible for three free issues of Proceedings if
you’re a Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard officer commissioned during the past twelve months.
Send in this coupon today! U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. 21402
r------- YES!------ 1
j “SEND MY THREE FREE PROCEEDINGS'.”
Name
Rank & Service Address
City & State zip'
□ Check here if you are already a Naval Institute Member.
Commissioning Source and Date Signature WC^J
duction can come from the communication system, sensors, armament, defensive countermeasures, or structures. As an option, the beam could be increased with the attendant loss in speed and/or range.
Captain Baker reports that the LSD- 41 was one of the new class of naval ships designed with steel replacing aluminum. The LSD-41 will be equipped with 96 ballast tanks in order to remain within its stability requirements. Rather than accept all of the attendant pumping and piping problems imposed on the design by the excessive number of ballast tanks—more than any other ship in the fleet—he suggests a two-foot increase in beam. A simpler option might be to reduce some topside weight.
All of us who have an interest in a strong U. S. Navy have a common goal: the design and construction of the best possible fighting ships. Aluminum offers some distinct and easily recognizable advantages to help achieve this objective. If other materials are more suitable for this application, they should be used. The tradeoff analysis should be made, however, from engineering fact, not rhetorical fiction.
“Their Merchant Fleet”
(See R. E. McKeown. pp. 160-167, October
1982 Proceedings)
Edward J. Bender, Jr.—Congratulations on an outstanding October issue on the Soviet Navy!
Captain McKeown’s article is very interesting. The Soviet Merchant Marine is an integral part of the Soviet Navy, and, as Captain McKeown suggests, the ships in the Soviet Merchant Marine are designed and constructed to be naval auxiliaries and/or intelligence collectors in either peace or war.
Our Merchant Marine does not offer the same flexibility to U. S. Navy commanders. Not all U. S. merchant ships have received national defense features subsidies, and, since the beginning of the current administration, those subsidies have been nonexistent.
In this respect, I have to take issue with Captain McKeown, or at least with the source of one of his references. Most U. S. roll-on/roll-off ships (RO/ROs) were built without construction differential subsidy (CDS) from the Maritime Administration (Mar Ad) because they were intended for domestic instead of international trade, and, therefore, were not eligible for CDS. When the national defense features legislation was changed in October 1980, the use of CDS for the retrofitting of all U. S. flag ships with the features was authorized.
Unfortunately, the funds have never become available to carry out the program. RO/ROs are key ships for the movement of military cargo, especially wheeled and tracked vehicles, like M-60 tanks. M-60 tanks weigh almost 50 tons. When 1 was the National Security Planning Officer at MarAd, I was dismayed to find that, although most U. S. RO/ROs could carry M-60 tanks, such carriage was restricted to only one or two decks on each ship. This was because the ships only had limited deck space that could accommodate a weight of 50 tons, greatly reducing the lift potential of the ships. 1 am confident that Soviet authorities would not allow their merchant ships to be built with such a limitation.
“The Navy As Neighbor”
(See C. Jampoler, pp. 50-56, September 1982
Proceedings)
Marilyn S. Perry—As a city council member and former mayor of Mountain View, California, I commend Captain Jampoler for his thorough analysis of the Navy housing issue in our community.
Mountain View has always enjoyed excellent relations with Naval Air Station Moffett Field. The community has shown little anti-Navy sentiment, which is all too often present in other areas. Many members of the community are former Navy personnel, or have been connected with the Navy in one way or another—including some members of the city council.
From the beginning, the Navy and the city have sought the same goal— additional high-quality housing units at an economical cost. The city council has long recognized the Navy’s need for more housing in this tight and expensive market. Additional Navy family housing units would benefit not only Navy personnel, but the community as a whole by providing a larger housing stock. The disagreement has been on the means to achieve this end.
The concerns raised by the council and community members evolved from the lack of opportunity the city had to review a project developed through the "turnkey” process.
Any development built in a city has a direct effect on the surrounding areas for many years. For this reason, the city has design review power within its jurisdiction. This was an especially sensitive issue for the Moffett site, because of its highly visible location on two of the main thoroughfares in the city. Local residents must live for years with the effects of any government construction projects in their area, especially when housing construction is not part of the main naval base. If the Navy should cease or reduce operations in an area, the effects can be even more profound. The decaying, unoccupied housing on main streets around Newport, Rhode Island, is a prime example.
Fortunately, a creative solution has been found which meets the needs and desires of both the Navy and the city. Captain Jampoler and his staff are to be congratulated for their efforts in developing an alternative approach^ one which will provide the quality living environment desired by and for Navy personnel, and which will be an asset to the city as a whole. The model developed here for federal/local cooperation should also be of value for other projects in other areas.
As an epilogue, I am pleased to report that the Mountain View City Council acted on 28 September to approve the proposed Navy housing. The council voted unanimously to endorse the design concept and site plan that was presented to us. I am convinced that the few minor points of discussion which remain will be resolved with continued cooperation. The city also plans to work with the Navy to urge congressional funding so that this much needed housing can soon become a reality.
“Their Mine Warfare Capability”
{.See T. S. Wile. pp. 145-151, October 1982 Proceedings)
Gordon J. Douglas, Jr.—The coverage of the Soviet Navy in the October issue was both comprehensive and detailed; of special interest was Commander Wile’s article. The implications of an aggressive mining campaign in a NATO context are very serious. Reinforcement of NATO with troops and heavy equipment must be rapid (a matter of weeks) in most scenarios. Delays because of offensive mine fields could be a fatal blow to an effective NATO defense.
Submarine-laid minefields can be placed covertly and renewed as needed. This task is accomplished at some risk to the submarine. She has to contend with enemy antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, navigational hazards, and her own minefield.
A submarine-laid minefield will eventually become known, usually through loss of ships in a previously safe area. Once this happens, a countermeasure of Mk-60 CAPTOR mines should be laid in order to restrict the ability of submarines to replenish their own minefield. CAPTOR, a special mine that uses a Mk-46 ASW torpedo, attacks only subs and not surface traffic. If such mines can increase the attrition rate of enemy minelaying submarines, it will buy precious time for our own, limited minesweeping forces. Minesweeping can be extremely time-consuming, so that any limitation on the quantity of mines to be swept would be of enormous value.
CAPTOR can be laid by surface ship, by aircraft, or by submarine. Because of the short supply of such platforms and requirements for them elsewhere, commercial vessels and fishing craft can be used, with portable minerails, to lay such fields. Indeed, considering the great quantity of such mines that would be needed just to cover U. S. and French ports, a universal CAPTOR should be developed. Using a basic “bus” and control system, such an ASW mine would be able to take the homing torpedoes of any NATO member. Torpedoes that are entirely suitable against submarines in the open ocean could still find use against a slow, minelaying submarine.
“Britain’s Choice of Threats”
(See J. Cable, pp. 26-32. August 1982: J.
Eberle. p. 20, September 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, U. S. Air Force (Retired)—Sir James Cable’s article is a splendid piece of work—as is his book. Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979 (St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1981). The latter should be required reading for all who aspire to command at sea. Yet, both his book and his article should be assimilated with due attention to the qualifications and limitations so briefly alluded to in the article’s last paragraph.
Cable’s assertion that the long, conventional war on NATO’s Central Front probably will never occur is highly persuasive, and is a healthy corrective to the U. S.-NATO “company line.” It does not follow, though, that the alternative use of navies would be as instruments to achieve behavioral changes without violence, or with a minimum of violence. Cable is not talking about the U. S. Navy; he is prescribing only for the Royal Navy. And his generalizations—even for the Royal Navy—should be applied with caution.
Cable asserts that neither submarines nor aircraft are sufficiently visible to serve as persuaders in the same way that surface units (gunboats) have always done. Take the incident involving the Mayaguez. The desired result was the release of the prisoners and the ship. The Mayaguez had been seized on Monday, and from early Tuesday morning onward, the U. S. Navy P-3s were overhead, quite visible to the Khmer decision makers or their agents. At the onset of the crisis, the Cora! Sea (CVA-43), then approaching Australia, changed her course for the scene of the action, but the Khmers had no way of knowing that. The Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) and some other surface ships, as well as some amphibious vessels, were also ordered to the scene—but were equally invisible to the decision makers. Through Wednesday evening, the only forces visible to the persons whose behavior we were trying to change were the P-3s and the Air Force aircraft attacking the Cambodian gunboats travelling to and from the scene of action. During that night, according to the testimony of the Mayaguez's skipper, the leaders in Phnom Penh were making the decision to release the ship and crew shortly after daybreak. They were indeed released, just minutes after the marines landed at Koh Tang (by helicopter while the surface combatants and the Coral Sea were still many miles distant and quite invisible to Phnom Penh.) Several hours after both ship and crew were in American hands, the first bomb fell from the planes off the Coral Sea. Thus, in this case at least, the behavior of the adversary could hardly have been affected by the gunboats involved. If the threat of force had any impact at all, the P-3s and the Air Force units were responsible. In short, aircraft carriers off Australia are no more visible to Phnom Penh than are submarines under the Gulf of Siam.
Therein lies the rub: aircraft carriers are slow and expensive—P-3s are faster and less expensive.
One possible generalization that Cable does not make enough of is that the force necessary to persuade is probably inversely proportional to the time it takes to apply it. Time is important! In the case of the Mayaguez, the mere, sinking of a few outdated gunboats seems to have caused the desired behavior change; a much greater application of force against the North Vietnamese through the techniques of “gradualism” brought no change at all. Perhaps one could generalize that “gradualism” is built-in to gunboat forces made up of surface ships. Cable was ill-advised to use the Falklands Crisis as an example. Maybe the presence of an appreciable force of surface vessels would have made the Argentinian decision makers act differently. But, the Suez and Hungarian Crises of 1956, as well as many others, suggest that trouble comes in bunches. In order for the United Kingdom to have kept an appreciable naval force standing offshore in the South Atlantic, how many other dictators would have been free to do their thing? Neither Britain nor the United States can afford enough gunboats to cover all areas of strategic importance. Even when the mobility of surface vessels is enhanced by on-board aircraft, the problem remains—aircraft carriers are too slow in getting their aircraft into range, their aircraft cannot reach trouble spots that are too far inland, and there are so many planes devoted to auxiliary roles that there are not enough left to apply the “ample” force necessary that Cable advances in his book. Though the Coral Sea launched four waves of aircraft during the Mayaguez action, only 15 planes actually delivered ordnance against targets on the Cambodian mainland, and all of them arrived after the decision had been made!
Cable rightly says that Britain ought to be selective about the missions it formulates for its navy. He says that “For different tasks, there are other allies.” He might have added “and other arms,” for the Royal Air Force was in the Falklands—as the U. S. Air Force was over the Mayaguez.
(Continued on page 84)
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 34)
“The Fleet Connection”
(See R. Boyle, pp. 57-61, September 1982; C. Weikel, p. 33, November 1982 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer C. W. Bond, U. S. Naval Reserve—Mr. Boyle’s article fails to recognize that there are two sides to a spinning coin. The plight of GS-13/15s in the naval development field has been created by negative thinking, inaction, “guard the pension” paranoia, and the classic, “not- invented-here” syndrome.
Many programs have been yanked away from the Naval Ship Research and Development Centers (NSRDCs) and program managers because, frankly, they didn’t know what the programs were about, and double- talked the “bluesuit” side when asked for a solution.
A bureaucracy has only one clear duty: to perpetuate itself. Mr. Boyle’s plaintive article is another illustration of that compulsion, and one must realize that research effort is frequently productive inversely proportional to the numbers of people involved.
The role of the contractor in new product development is distorted by Mr. Boyle, and his contention that the systems command method is superior is not especially valid. In most cases, a contractor has done a great deal of development, both basic and applied, before he approaches the Navy with his bright idea, and indeed, he may be the expert on the particular subject. Yet, it is common to see the Navy’s civilians second-guess a concept to the point where it becomes unrecognizable to anyone, including its originator.
Mr. Boyle is rooting for his team, the in-house researchers, against the sinister profit-motivated contractors, and is asking for a virtual blank check with no questions asked. Certainly, the sinister civilian contractor doesn't get a break like that and has to show timely results within the budget to survive. Yes, restore the credibility of naval research labs, and simplify the process for the attainment of a valid in-house technology base. But do not create such a stiff-necked group of untouchables that the not-invented-here motto becomes written into public law. The United States’ past history in this general area suggests that without the contributions of industry and the private sector, we’d still be building ships of live oak and yellow pine, and guns of cast iron. Certainly, one cannot discount the contributions of the “operators" and of those exceptional and hardy souls in uniform who become proponents and advocates of good (though unpopular) concepts ahead of their time.
Under our system, those operators (the fleet) are at the mercy of the several material systems, and if they get ships, weapons, or other goodies that don’t work, who can they blame? Well, one might say the systems people, but the feedback process doesn't permit one to do that in any timely manner. File it and forget it.
By illustration, I cite a certain air- search radar installed in a certain destroyer type. It was then removed because it never worked. In the process of attempting a fix, it was found that the specific gear had never worked. The radar had been in three other ships (when it wasn’t in a warehouse) and after 15 years, nobody had caught on— “the fleet connection,” indeed!
The Pentagon is filled with people who have come out of the fleet, outside of D. C., who call upon Mr. Boyle’s side for advice, solutions, and a multitude of necessary activities. All too often, they get excuses, nonresponses, and lots of tap dancing regarding restraints, money, people, and the plight of the poor GS-14 civil servant.
Pushing some programs by putting in a “bluesuiter” as boss may not be as productive as one might imagine. It’s rather like driving Jell-0 with a sledgehammer; pretty soon you’re up to your armpits in Jell-O and have lost the hammer. A comparatively inexperienced junior- or middle-grade officer may be solid technically, but can still be flabbergasted by the system’s plank owners who haven’t done anything in 30 years, and sure ain’t a-gonna start now!
Yes, I’d like to see naval research capabilities improved, made more compact and efficient, and be of greater service to the end beneficiaries of the naval effort—the fleet. But I’ll have to agree with Mr. Boyle in his concern over the decreased excellence in some research facilities. Diminished morale in GS grades below 13/14 is a serious matter, because the younger technologists are the enthusiasts and the doers. They are the ones who will get something done, while the “plank owners” will tell you it’s impossible.
Complete in-house research and development capabilities are not feasible in this country; we must depend on industry, academic effort, and the private sector. Mr. Boyle’s estimates of cost are not factual, and do not take into account the administrative costs inherent in research: studies, studies, and more studies are our curse. I’m sure I could design and build a ship in less time than it would take the systems researchers to complete a study for it.
If, like the British and others, we had “private ventures,” developing warships, or “tight” design efforts, such as the Soviets or the Israelis, we might be well ahead in that field. I’ll leave it to your judgement, as to whether or not we are. When the shooting starts. I’m sure we’ll find out.
“The Captain”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 39-45, September 1982; R. K. TeVault, p. 14. November 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant (Junior grade) C. A. Abel, U. S. Coast Guard—Commander Byron’s article is the finest collection of advice concerning command at sea that I have read to date. Perhaps the most important portion of the work is the paragraph which accurately points out that, in deciding how to proceed in dealings with outsiders, the captain must constantly remember that “he always acts for the good of the command. Nobody cares as much about his ship as he does! Nobody!”
Moreover, this bit of wisdom is especially valuable for those junior officers who are in command afloat assignments. All too often, one of our number comes face to face with the intimidating choice of being a "dutiful” subordinate or “making waves" in the interest of advancing the lot of his ship and her crew. Yet, as Commander Byron has pointed out, there really is no decision involved at all since our own men and women deserve to have their captain go to bat for them every bit as much as does the crew whose captain happens to wear four stripes instead of two.
I would urge both the Navy and the Coast Guard to obtain reprints of Commander Byron’s article, and then attach one to every set of command afloat orders issued. Each service deserves nothing less than the very best from their respective captains and advice such as that offered by Commander Byron can certainly help to make that goal a reality.
Editor’s Note: Reprints of “The Captain’’ are available from the Naval Institute Book Order Department at the following rates: $.35, 1-10 copies (plus $.35 postage); $.30, 11-50 copies (plus $.75 postage); more than 50, $.25 (plus $2.00 postage).
“One Hornet, Two Stings”
(See R. E. Stumpf, pp. 115-119, September 1982; J. C. Lacouture, November 1982 Proceedings)
Art Hanley—l confess that I am not an enthusiastic proponent of the F-18 Hornet. Yet, I heartily agree with most of what Lieutenant Stumpf says.
Undoubtedly, the F-18 is a better fighter than the F-4 (except for the seats), and a better attack aircraft than the A-7E (except, possibly, for pay- load/range), but those facts are not germane to the F-18’s continued production. The real question is not whether the F-18 outclasses a 1958 fighter and a 1965 attack aircraft—is it better than 4.3 A-7Es?—but whether it is better than the F-14, A-7X, or other alternatives.
Except for the sustained visual dogfight (which historically does not play a significant role in air combat), the F-14 Tomcat is clearly a superior fighter, though not as much fun. If it is given its design thrust, which we could easily afford if we cancel the Hornet, the F-14 will take that title, too. (Air-to-air with AIM-7s and -9s, the F-18’s thrust/weight is approximately 1.04 with half fuel; the F-l4D’s is about 1.11 or better). Even the Department of Defense has been convinced, as can be deduced from its dropping the requirement for one Tomcat and one Hornet fighter squadron per carrier, and allowing two F- 14 squadrons per carrier as originally planned.
For custom-designed displays in the toughest environments, Hartman “total display capability” consistently meets the challenge!
I”V KZ HARTMAN SYSTEMS COMw!nYHERNATIONAL
I 360 Wolf Hill Road, Huntington Station, New York 11746
Write or phone for additional information: 516 427-7500 TWX: 510 226-6982
HARTMAN!
Dual Scan High-Resolution Military Displays
selected for the unique Command, Display and Control System (COMDAC) designed for the U.S. Coast Guard’s “Famous” Class Medium Endurance Cutters (WMEC-270).
The A-7X also seems to be the better choice for the light attack mission. Using 90% of the existing A-7E structure and at least 70% of the parts already in the fleet, the A-7X (with up-
dated attack avionics) should be able to duplicate or exceed the F-18 attack performance at half the procurement cost. It would not have the F-18's fighter capabilities, but in view of the limited proficiency flying available to deployed squadrons, this is probably a good thing. If our pilots are worried now about not having enough practice, tasking them with two different types of missions would make the situation worse. One might wonder if Vought really can get Mach 1.6 out of a higher-thrust, stretched A-7. Fortunately, in a remarkable display of foresight, they built 1,261 supersonic aerodynamic testbeds called the F-8. Another alternative, cheaper than the F-18, would be to combine heavy and light attack, and have the A-6 do it all.
We’re paying a lot to get the Hornet. In March 1981. the F-18 test team noted that the aircraft was provisionally unacceptable as a fighter and had limited attack potential. Yet VFA-125 was ordered to integrate the F-18 into the fleet prior to correction of problems and even before the operational evaluation. The AV-8B is years behind schedule and costing much more primarily because of the F-18; F-14 and A-6 production is being arbitrarily held down. Years ago, it was known that the F-14, AV-8B, A-6, or P-3 would have to be terminated in 1981-82 to pay for the F-18; this year, the P-3 was terminated (since rescinded). In 1981, the Marines had the opportunity to get full-blown AH-64s for only about 18% more than they were going to pay for equal numbers of VFR-only AH-ITs. But this 18% had to go to the F-18. One possible reason for the cancellation of the Oriskany (CVA-34) reactivation was the fact that there never was a requirement for the F-18 design to be capable of landing on an Essex- class ship. F-14 specifications have such a requirement. So, after reading Lieutenant StumpFs factual, informative, and interesting article, we must still ask, “Is the F-18 the most effective and economical choice for the Navy’s fighter and attack missions?” The answer remains, “No.”
“A Basis for Tactical Thought”
(See T. C. Taylor, pp. 27-33. June 1982.
K. A. Lee, p. 27, September 1982
Proceedings)
Theodore C. Taylor—Clearly, Commander Lee is not one who could benefit from my attempt to lay a logical foundation for tactical thought. He evidently had already mastered the simple ideas offered, found them obvious, and could summarize them all. quite fairly, in 44 words. I am sincerely glad for that and hope that there are many more like him.
I am grateful for, admire, and even envy the service that Commander Lee and his colleagues render to us all. I look forward to reading some substantive ideas on the subject of tactical thought in future issues of the Proceedings. But they will appear only if those having ideas—obvious, simple, or otherwise—take the trouble to write them down for our study and consideration. Commander Lee has some ideas, expressed as “the need to engage . . . press the attack! . . . seize the initiative. . . . stop analyzing and shoot the S.O.B.!” Such ideas, if clearly explained, are possibly much more to the point of tactical thought than a mere attempt to identify, organize, and characterize the most rudimentary mechanics of the subject.
My essay took up the challenge posed by Commander Miles A. Lib- bey III (.Proceedings, January 1979. pp. 52-57), and closed with the same challenge. The more who take up that challenge constructively, the more likely we will come to a useful understanding of the subject. I look forward to reading the products of anyone’s constructive, careful effort, including Commander Lee’s.
“Atlantic First”
(See B. D. Cole, pp. 103-106, August 1982 Proceedings)
Commander James F. Giblin, Jr., U. S. Navy—Commander Cole proposes the drawdown of precisely the instrument that acts as a restraining influence on Soviet capabilities in the Pacific—the U. S. naval forces. Soviet concentration on Asia, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean in the past four years demonstrates that the Soviet Union has both the will and the capability for far more substantial involvement there in the future. Soviet interaction with China, its presence in Afghanistan, and the basing arrangements in Vietnam support this thesis. With the increasing importance of Siberia and the Soviet Pacific coastal regions to the Soviet Union’s economy.
the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean will assume added significance. Indeed, while there is a growing concern in Asia and the Pacific over these Soviet moves, likewise, there is an increasing recognition by both the noncommunist and communist states of the region that the United States may be both unwilling and unable to stand fast in the defense of its interests and those of its friends in the Pacific. The aftermath of Southeast Asia remains very hard to shake!
Though his analysis of the “Plan Dog” strategy of World War II is good, Commander Cole ignores certain lessons of the discipline in which he is so eminently qualified. The moral condemnation of the Stimson Doctrine, the veiled threat of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech, and the State Department’s feeble attempts at hard-line deterrence in the embargoes of 1938 and 1940 failed to dissuade Japan from its chosen course. There simply weren’t sufficient capabilities to back up these empty policies because of the self-imposed limitations of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its successors, and the resulting lack of capability in the Pacific and Asiatic fleets. Moreover, Commander Cole neglects to point out that Admiral Harold R. Stark recognized the very real possibility of a two- ocean war and presented four options to Roosevelt. One of these alternatives was the very antithesis of the “Atlantic first” policy—a “Pacific only” strategy. Moreover, Stark’s argument for the “Atlantic first” option was based principally on the notion that the continued existence of the British Empire would ensure the status quo in the Western Hemisphere, guaranteeing U. S. national interests, and not on an analysis such as Commander Cole developed.
Commander Cole’s analytical process also exemplifies two of the dominant themes of the American interaction with Asia and the Pacific: ignorance and myth. We have accumulated our intellectual, cultural, and national security “baggage” based on our experience in the region of Asia and the Pacific, and the perception of that experience has not always been to our liking. Yet, contrary to Commander Cole’s suggestion, we cannot ignore the fact that more trade has crossed the Pacific than the Atlantic since 1977. Given Commander Cole’s failure to recognize this fact and the
cultural and political importance he attaches to the Atlantic theater, it is not surprising that our force-sizing policies do not operate in a free market. Indeed, they may already be biased toward the Atlantic and would be even more so if his approach to revising U. S. naval strategy were advanced.
Sun Tzu believed that “the aim of strategy is not so much to seek battle as to seek a situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the desired situation, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this.” An “Atlantic first" policy would seriously undermine U. S. ability to rely on the first portion of this concept in the Pacific. Though Commander Cole recognizes that the Pacific has always been, and still is, a naval theater, he does not give full recognition to the idea that naval power is heavily dependent on the context in which it is framed. An “Atlantic first” policy is an analytical way of saying that the Pacific Fleet should be employed in a manner reminiscent of that established by Admiral Stark’s “Plan Dog” strategy. Would such a policy, or at least the appearance of a commitment to it as a strategy, lend any real credence to our statements about remaining a Pacific power? I doubt it. The bottom line remains that capabilities can alter the international system’s structure. With a balanced and coordinated approach to the articulation of naval strategy, an appraisal objectively assessing our interests from which national security, (and force allocation) policy then flows.
“Their ‘Voyage of the Damned’ ”
(See P. G. Tsouras. pp. 74-81, October 1982 Proceedings)
Marvin O. Miller, Manager, Underway Replenishment Department, Na- vai Ship Weapon Systems Engineering Station — Captain Tsouras writes an imaginative piece about the Imperial Russian Navy's attempts to reinforce its First Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur with a Second Pacific Squadron made up from its Baltic Fleet.
The major challenge for the Baltic ships was the logistics required to make the 18,000-mile voyage to the Pacific. Russia had no coaling stations en route and most foreign countries with coaling stations were not friendly toward the Russians. The author reports that the Second Pacific Squadron required 500,000 tons of coal to make the voyage. Since they were denied many coaling stations, the Russians chartered some 60 merchant colliers so that the squadron could replenish coal at sea, using an underway replenishment system developed by the U. S. Navy.
In March 1902, Spencer Miller, a consulting engineer who had been developing coaling at sea systems for the U. S. Navy, installed his latest system in the battleship Illinois (BB-7), then under construction. The battleship would tow a merchant or naval collier about 400 feet astern. A highline from the battleship was passed aft and over the collier’s mast. A sea anchor was attached to the end of the highline and towed behind the ship. The sea anchor, when the ships steamed at about six or seven knots, generated 18,000 pounds of tension on the highline. The battleship carried high-speed hauling winches to pull 3,000-pound loads of coal on a trolley riding the highline between ships, at the rate of nearly one load per minute.
Also in 1902, the Imperial Russian Navy negotiated directly with Miller and the Lidgerwood Works of Brooklyn to supply it with a system similar to the one installed in the Illinois. The Russian battleship Retvizan was equipped with the U. S. Navy system, and on 30 August 1902, official trials
The system of highlines, winches, and trolleys used to coal the battleship Illinois, above, in 1902, was adopted by Russian Navy battleships and used in their “Voyage of the Damned.” took place in the Baltic Sea.
The Illinois completed construction and, in September 1904, tested her replenishment system. However, the commanding officer, B. B. Bradford, was strongly opposed to putting all the replenishment-at-sea gear and winches on board the battleship because the ship was already overloaded with machinery. His view was shared by many other senior officers. As a result, since this time, replenishment-at-sea machinery has been installed in U. S. Navy underway replenishment ships and not battleships.
*
The Russo-Japanese War commenced on 8 February 1904. Contrary to Captain Tsouras’s statement that “for four months after the start of the war, no effort was made to improve the condition of either the Black Sea or Baltic Fleets, . . .” Miller reports that within 30 days he had received requests from St. Petersburg for eight more replenishment-at-sea systems like the one the U. S. Navy supplied to the Retvizan.
Ship and Aircraft Photographs
Over 35,000 available for purchase! Dating back to 1883. Send for FREE BROCHURE • Photo Service • U.S. Naval Institute • Annapolis, MD 21402
First time available — Special program combines three exciting U.S. Navy productions at a great low price.
FOR YOUR PERSONAL HOME VIDEO LIBRARY
A limited opportunity to acquire all three films on a single cassette — choice ol VHS or Beta.
WINGS OF EAGLES. WINGS OF GOLD
— From the decks of the USS Langley to Pete Conrad's moon landing — Naval Aviation through the years . . . including nerve-shattering lootage of the Pacific War
— Midway. Coral Sea. and Doolittle s B 25s launching from a carrier deck.
DOWN TO THE WIRE — Rare insight into the preparations of five Naval Aviation Cadets as they qualify as carrier pilots: their special techniques beautifully filmed. FLIGHT TO THE SOUTH POLE - Our Naval Airmen in the peacetime conquest of the South Pole, where a day lasts six months, and you land atop nearly two miles ol solid ice. Spectacular footage from the original Byrd expedition to modern flight operations.
83 minutes of action... ONLY $69.95
ORDER TOLL-FREE
(800) 854-0561, ext. 925
(In Calif. (800) 432-7257, ext. 925)
U S and Canada add S2.50 shipping Other foreign orders, add S3 50 CA res add 6°o Sales Tax
SPECIFY BETA or VHS. Visa & Master incl no & e*p
Send lo. FERDE GROFE FILMS. Dept. W.
702 Washington SI..Suite 168.Marina del Rey. CA90291
Within a few months. Miller and the Lidgerwood Works had outfitted a total of ten Russian warships with his coaling-at-sea gear. One difference between the Illinois’ gear and the Russian gear was that the Russian winches used to haul the loads of coal between ships were portable electric winches that, although weighing 8.000 pounds each, could be moved around on deck. This feature made the installation on the various warships at Kronstadt Harbor much quicker.
Miller attempted to impress on the Russians the importance of practicing with his gear. He finally got them to rig up between two of the ships in Kronstadt Harbor. Some exercises were conducted in port for a few days but apparently only a few personnel were trained. Miller reported that none of the equipment was ever tested at sea before the Second Pacific Squadron sailed because Admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvensky “could not spare even a single ship from squadron drill.”
Admiral George Dewey observed that it would be immensely valuable if the system could be used to unload merchant ships at sea. This system is being implemented today by the U. S. Navy. Instead of battleships, U. S. Navy underway replenishment ships carry all the transfer gear. A Navy fleet oiler can come alongside a merchant tanker and pass over her modern tensioned spanwire and hoses. The tanker pumps fuel through the hoses and tops off the fleet oiler. This system is particularly efficient in remote areas of the Indian Ocean and reduces the number of fleet oilers required to support battle groups.
A more complicated system currently under development is required to transfer ammunition and stores from merchant cargo ships. Initial tests last year between the cargo ship Northern Light and the underway replenishment ship Butte were highly successful with hundreds of tons of all types of ammunition transferred in a wide variety of weather conditions.
“Their Sea-Based Aviation”
(See K. Lynch, pp. 46-52, October 1982 Proceedings)
R. D. Layman—I take exception to Lieutenant Lynch’s statement that “Neither the [Russian] Imperial Navy nor its air arm distinguished itself’ during World War I. This denigration of the czarist navy, common among Western writers, belongs more to the realm of folklore than history. It is especially inaccurate as applied to Russian shipboard aviation of 19151917.
During those years, the Russian Navy ranked second only to Great Britain’s in the number of aviation vessels (seaplane carriers), with one in the Baltic and seven in the Black Sea, and in the number of aircraft embarked. The Grigorovich flying boats that were the mainstay of Russian carrier aviation boasted a performance at least equal to comparable aircraft of other nations; the technical and tactical skill with which both carriers and aircraft were employed was exceeded by no other navy.
Russian shipboard aviation reached its zenith in the Black Sea operations, where the fleet employed its air arm innovatively and aggressively. It was the first to integrate aviation vessels with a battle line—years before other navies followed suit. On at least two occasions, it used seaplane carriers as the major striking force of an operation, subordinating battleships to the escort/screening role. On at least two other occasions, its carriers launched between 14 and 19 planes for a single mission, the greatest number of shipboard aircraft put into the air at one time during the entire war.
The Black Sea carriers played an important part in the continuing naval campaign against Turkish coastal shipping, which—because of inadequate road and rail transportation links in Anatolia—was vital to the supply of coal for the Turkish Navy and industry. Attacks by sea-based aircraft on Anatolian sea-lanes and coal-producing centers contributed considerably to coal shortages in Constantinople (Istanbul), and virtually immobilized the two German warships that were the main strength of the Turkish fleet. This may well have been the first instance of shipboard aviation used in pursuit of one of the goals of strategic air bombardment.
The list of innovations and achievements could be extended; suffice it to say that in 1916, Russian shipboard aviation was more advanced than that of the U. S. Navy two years later. This advance was stopped by events of the October Revolution and subsequent civil war.
“ZANLA’s War in Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia”
(See P. Melshen, pp. 118-119, August 1982
Proceedings)
Dann C. Bennett—The central reason for ZANLA’s ultimate success had little to do with its military tactics; it succeeded by maintaining effective control over the black African population, in both the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) and the rural European (white) farming areas.
The ZANLA forces were essentially predatory barracuda, swimming in the Maoist “sea” of the people. The black African tribesman and rural laborer were the primary targets of ZANLA—not the security forces or the white settlers. This is reflected in the casualty statistics.
Terror, in the form of murder, beatings, land mines on black African roads, and torture of the most hideous nature were the rule and not the exception. “Political indoctrination” is infinitely more effective when backed up with credible consequences for the unconverted.
During the 1980 elections and the months immediately preceding, I was liaison officer and de facto commander of the Weya TTL Detachment of the Special Forces Auxiliary (SFA). At this time, ZANLA had impressive control over the local population. Even individuals who had been horribly burned by ZANLA terrorists refused to seek medical treatment. Such was their fear of further reprisals. Relatives and villagers would allow these persons to die before informing the authorities.
The primary role of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (and its sister units: Rhodesian African Rifles and Police Support Unit) was that of a strike force, or reactionary airborne “Fire Force.” The strategy and tactics of light infantry were not a decisive factor in countering ZANLA’s activities.
ZANLA’s deathgrip on the black African population was loosened only by seizing, controlling, and permanently occupying the contested TTL. This mission was carried out by the SFA. The program was less than a year old at the time of the elections which brought Robert Mugabe to power. It has been suggested that Mugabe agreed to participate in the peace process leading to the 1980 elections because he feared that his internal base of support in the TTLs could become jeopardized by the SFA operations.
“Operation Rosario”
(See R. L. Scheina, p. 120, June 1982
Proceedings)
Captain David Rosser-Owen, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies—We at the RUSI were very closely involved at the London end with the day-to-day events of the Falklands Crisis, and one wonders what Dr. Scheina’s sources were for his account of the Argentine invasion of British sovereign territory.
In the Falkland Islands, NP 8901 (consisting of 83 Royal Marines) was alerted on 31 March to expect an Argentine invasion on 2 April. Observation posts (OPs) were put out, and a reaction section was placed on immediate notice. By 0035 on 2 April, Moody Brook had been vacated and all defense positions were occupied by 0200. From 0230 to 0600, contact reports were being received of naval movements off Cape Pembroke, east of Port Stanley.
The initial landing was carried out by some 150 Argentine Special Forces (SF) personnel, who were much later reinforced by about 1,000 marines and soldiers with armored patrol craft, with further reinforcements on board ship. The SF troops landed by helicopter at Mullet Creek, some seven or eight kilometers southeast of Moody Brook Camp, and five kilometers south of Government House. Operating in two groups—one for each objective—the first attack was put in against the camp at 0605, and the second against Government House at 0615. The Argentines were undoubtedly out to kill “bootnecks” (Royal Marines), for the accommodation quarters at the camp were wrecked by grenades and mach- inegun fire. The initial assault against Government House was beaten off under heavy fire.
A section of Royal Marines at the old airfield east of Port Stanley withdrew, pursued by 16 Argentine LVTP- 7 amtracks at about 0640. It engaged them with 84-mm. medium assault weapons (MAWs) and 66-mm. light assault weapons (LAWs) stopping the lead vehicle. The projectiles hit the front and the passenger compartment: No one got out. The sections withdrew toward Government House. Some patrols and OPs were overwhelmed. It has not yet been substantiated, but there was a report that a loaded LCVP was sunk also.
During the fighting around Government House, at least five Argentines were killed, 17 injured, and three taken prisoner. There were no casualties sustained by NP8901. As Major Mike Norman of the detachment commented, “They were trying very hard to hit us—but they weren’t very good at it!” The Royal Marine garrison was ordered to cease fire by the Governor at about 0920, after three hours of fighting.
At 1030 on 3 April, the Argentine ice patrol vessel Baliia Paraiso radioed the British Antarctic Survey base at Grytviken on South Georgia that “following our successful operation in the Malvinas Islands the ex-Governor has surrendered the islands and their dependencies to Argentina. We suggest you adopt a similar course of action to prevent any further loss of life.” In effect, this was an ultimatum. The Bahia Paraiso was informed that there was a British military presence on the island (21 Royal Marines), which had instructions to resist a landing.
An Argentine Puma helicopter landed eight marines and a second Puma headed for the Royal Marines' position: the eight Argentines opened fire. The RM detachment fired on the Puma, which landed heavily on the far side of the bay trailing smoke: No one got out. Two Alouette III helos dropped off small parties of Argentines on the far side; one of them was downed by small arms fire, and the other was hit by 20 rounds, but got back to the Bahia Paraiso.
An Argentine frigate engaged the Royal Marines with heavy 40-mm. gunfire from about two kilometers’ range and closed in. It was fired on by machine guns, rifles, and antitank weapons. It was hit by more than 1,000 7.62-mm. rounds, holed below the waterline by an 84-mm. projectile from the Carl Gustav MAW, and several 66-mm. LAW rounds landed near the forward turret. A further 84-mm. MAW round hit the forward turret, damaging the mechanism and jamming the gun in a fixed elevation. After a two-hour firefight and with their escape route cut, the RM detachment surrendered, having obliged the Argentines to use military force to take the island. The Argentines suffered at least 20 casualties in this operation while the Royal Marines had one: Corporal Nigel Peters, wounded in the upper arm.
Obvious discrepancies exist between this account and that given by Dr. Scheina.
“CVNs Forever! Forever?”
(See G. O'Rourke, pp. 20-26, July 1982;
S. L. Llanso, p. 94, September 1982; J. E.
Lacouture. pp. 124-129, October 1982
Proceedings)
Captain P. J. Doerr, U. S. Navy—If an ex-carrier commanding officer can criticize the decision to seek two more CVNs, it is only just that a destroyer squadron commander take the opposing view. While it is difficult to argue with Captain O’Rourke’s wish for development of newer capabilities, his arguments against the CVN are weak and flawed.
“For. . . Midway (CV-41) and Coral Sea (CV-43), the sands of time are rapidly running out.”
The Midway is hale and hearty, her hull and propulsion plant are sound, and she is being beautifully maintained by her crew and the Ship Repair Facility, Yokosuka, in a continuous overhaul during every homeport period. There is no reason the Midway cannot continue to serve in the Western Pacific through the 1990s.
. . almost certain knowledge that the ships will suck up the lion’s share of all naval funding for the foreseeable future, leaving next-to-nothing for research and development of new forms of naval surface ships, aircraft, submarines, satellites, and missiles that may be required.”
An egregious exaggeration.
“When holed in sufficient manner, each will sink.”
So what? The smaller ships proposed will sink with fewer holes.
“They require deep-water ports and a tremendous amount of highly specialized pier-side support for repairs.”
True, but we have the ports and the support in existing base facilities almost worldwide. We are operating these ships successfully now, and maintenance of the infrastructure will be required for the existing CVs. ”... the large aircraft carrier is not very useful, efficient, or even safe at common sea control missions, where submarines, land-based aircraft, and long-range antiship missiles represent the major threats.” The best counter to the "Backfire” is the F-14 and E-2C, which are only operable from the large aircraft carrier. The best counter to the “Echo II” is coordinated S-3, destroyer or frigate (with towed array sonar), and nuclear- powered attack submarine in direct support, within the framework of battle group operations, including a large carrier. The best counter to Soviet surface combatants is a coordinated A-6 and Harpoon-armed destroyer operation, followed up by a war-at-sea strike by A-6 and A-7 aircraft, operating from a large carrier. More important, doing any of these things simultaneously requires a large-deck carrier.
“. . . is it realistic to even consider multiple carrier combat operations?”
Yes, and in the Seventh Fleet, we do as much of them as we can.
“. . . when the shooting started [in the Arabian Sea], the utility—even the survivability—of the CVN would be questionable.”
Measuring utility and survivability absolutely is difficult, but there can be no doubt that, relatively, the utility and survivability of a CVN-based battle group are much greater than that of any smaller ship-based battle group or surface combatant task group. "The presence mission, long the forte of naval forces, is becoming suspect in today’s nationalistic but communicative world.”
I know of many academicians and politicians who suspect this, but nationalism has been with us for hundreds of years, and the national strategy of forward deployment is alive and well. “Steaming a magnificent warship into the grand canal of a capital city is more often the occasion for ugly demonstrations and mob scenes than official receptions and state dinners.”
I have participated in hundreds of official receptions and state dinners during the past six years in WestPac and the Indian Ocean; more are scheduled in the next six months. I have never seen an ugly demonstration or mob scene and know of no more than a very few by semiprofessional agitators and antinuclear activists.
“. . .mobility. . . is irrevocably lost when ship’s deployment commitments are made to ‘station forces’ in any single area.”
Those ships which have deployed to trouble spots worldwide over the past decades, either because of their stationing or in addition to it, must wonder at their “lost mobility.”
“Most of the so-called new missiles are merely rehashes of older, relatively incapable ones.”
We need more air-capable ships. I would like to see some strike cruisers
or through-deck cruisers for low-intensity combat missions. We need to pursue research and development on short or vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. But. for the foreseeable future, the large deck-based battle group is the prime combat force for both sea control and power projection; we need more of them and as soon as possible.
“Soviet Snow Job”
(See E. J. Thaubald, pp. 62-68, June 1982;
A. P. Guzowski and M. L. Hewlett, pp. 2224, August 1982; R. P. Hallion, pp. 122-124, October 1982 Proceedings)
“The President’s Address”
(See T. B. Hayward, pp. 17-21, August 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Steven L. Hull, U. S. Naval Reserve—Commander Hewlett implies that the Reagan Administration’s efforts have a righteous monopoly on what is best for the United States, and that the opposing misguided liberals seek only political survival at the expense of national security. He appears to agree then with Secretary of the Interior James Watt’s statement that one is either an American or a liberal, but not both.
Is a 600-ship Navy more important than a 10% unemployment rate? If so, how do we convince unemployed industrial workers in Michigan that it is? Explain to a teacher in Wyoming why reactivating four World War II battleships is necessary, and why cuts in government aid to education are part of the price that must be paid in order to put these ships back to sea.
Obviously, these types of questions must be handled skillfully and intelligently, and not simply ignored as the wailings of the “liberal element.” Hopefully, the upper echelons of the Navy’s leadership will continue to attract men like former CNO Admiral Thomas B. Hayward who appreciate the complexities of our political process. I recommend that Commander Hewlett review Admiral Hayward’s address to the Naval Institute that also appeared in the August issue, which aptly describes capable, competent, and effective officers as those who "... understand the national issues .... know our defense needs. . . . [and] understand and appreciate the stress and strain placed on the nation while it seeks to cope with the military threat and world instability.”
“Summer Cruise Blues”
(See S. J. Bannat, p. 90, June 1982; R. C.
Peniston, pp. 24-25, August 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant John D. Hearing, U. S. Navy—Commander Bannat ad
dresses some important issues on the subject of midshipman summer training. The job we do on summer training definitely reflects on how many midshipmen remain in the program past their second year. Ship’s officers should put more emphasis on planning cruise activities, monitoring progress during the summer training, and submitting required reports within the al- loted time. Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) units and the Naval Academy should not hesitate to contact the ships which do not comply with the summer training manual (copy of the correspondence to the offending vessel’s immediate superior in command) to find out why the evaluations were not received.
I cannot, however, agree with Commander Bannat’s solution of creating specialized training squadrons for midshipman summer training. There are problems with his proposals:
► Many midshipmen look on the summer cruise as a chance to get away from the pressures of the classroom and face a new challenge. To send them back to school for another six weeks in a school ship might drive them away rather than encourage them to stay in the program.
► While ships with only 7.6 days at sea might not be the best ships to train in, they are still part of the fleet. Midshipmen don’t just need underway time; they also need to take part in constructive activities such as planned maintenance and watchstanding to see the real Navy in action. Such activities are not to be found on a ship in which the midshipmen outnumber the regular crew. These activities would be available on ships in overhaul and postdeployment standdown, but they should not be used for training midshipmen because of the lack of any underway time.
► A ship with, let’s say, 12 midshipmen on board can provide much more individualized attention than a training ship with 150-200 midshipmen embarked. A good example was the cruise of the USS Francis Marion (LPA-249) to Great Britain’s Silver Jubilee in 1977. One of my friends who was on board for that cruise remarked that there weren't enough watch stations or running mates for everyone, much less any individualized attention.
► Last, it would be difficult today to find enough amphibious ships or surface combatants that could be detached for five or six weeks for nothing but midshipman summer training. Our amphibious and surface forces are hard pressed to meet their required commitments without adding the extra burden of losing ships to another special mission.
The solution is in the system we have presently, with some extra effort on the part of all parties. Commanding officers must assign a good midshipman coordinator who is willing to do the job correctly. A commanding officer with an active interest in the training program will make a great difference in the effectiveness of the training. In our recently completed cruise period, the commanding officer of the USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) met once or twice a week with the midshipmen to talk with them and answer questions. Squadron and group staffs should be aware of the program and of the ship’s needs. This is not to say that they should legislate the program, but they should be available to assist ships in arranging tours, trainers, and visits.
Finally, NROTC units must prepare midshipmen for cruises by sending them with proper medical records, pay records, and uniforms. They must also assist ships and midshipman embarkation teams (METs) by informing them of the travel plans of each midshipman; unfortunately, most midshipman coordinators have not developed the extra-sensory perception necessary to guess which airline, flight, and airport a midshipman may use. Invariably, the officer-in-charge of the MET and the ship’s coordinator must guess, and it usually costs them a lot of wasted time and the midshipman in question a lot of money for a taxi to the ship or base. This situation could be eased by the NROTC unit sending a one-line message to the ship stating when the midshipman will arrive. At the end of training, NROTC units and the Naval Academy must not be afraid to contact the ships which don’t submit required evaluations.
Our present system does train midshipmen and expose them to the real Navy. It merely needs some extra attention from all sides to cure the “Summer Cruise Blues.”
“The Offensive-Passive Ship”
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 46-49. January 1982;
A. Jones, p. 25. April 1982 Proceedings)
Captain James M. Patton, U. S.Navy, Commander, Naval Ocean Systems Command—Captain Jones’s comment that it will be necessary for SWATH (small water-plane area twin hull) ships to offload aircraft, ammo, and fuel in order to enter port indicates a lack of understanding of the SWATH concept. The SWATH offers the seakeeping performance of large ships in a small platform.
The Navy’s SWATH ship, SSP Kaimalino, was designed as a range support craft for the rough waters around the Hawaiian Islands. In the seven years since she began serving in this role, she has demonstrated the ability to accomplish assignments that could not safely be completed by ships ten times her displacement.
SWATH combatants should have no problem negotiating all but the most limited of military and commercial port facilities in a fully loaded condition.
The U. S. Navy’s only SWATH ship, SSP Kaimalino cuts a wide swath in a run carrying a SH-2 helicopter. Congress, on the other hand, is dragging its heels in appropriating the funds needed to use the SWATH hull design for the Navy’s SURTASS ships.
Also, the small water-plane area and consequent small tons-per-inch of immersion will allow SWATH ships to achieve substantial reductions in draft through the discharge of modest quantities of ballast water, thus providing an extra degree of flexibility not achievable in monohull craft.