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Contents: Uncle Carl
The Value of a Forum
“Uncle Carl”
(Sec J. F. Tarpey, pp. 38-44, January 1982; R. C. Peniston. pp. 20-22, February 1982 Proceedings)
The Role of the U. S. Surface Navy in Nuclear War
Armed Confrontation Builds in South Africa
Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?
The Education of a Warrior
Forgotten Lessons of Riverine Warfare
Pride, Professionalism, and Morality
Notable Naval Books of 1981
The Waves in World War II
Battle Group Tactical Proficiency
You Can Lead an Ensign to Water, but . . .
The Offensive-Passive Ship
Where Have All the Oarsmen Gone?
The TV Trial of General Westmoreland
The Soviet Merchant Fleet Wins By Losing
Changes in Status of Ships
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
No Place for Women
Tomorrow’s Fleet
Admiral H. P. Smith, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Peniston's letter left unanswered Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s 1957 request to Mr. Vinson that Admiral Spruance be promoted to fleet admiral. I have Mr. Vinson’s last word on the subject.
At Fleet Admiral Halsey’s funeral in 1959, Fleet Admiral Nimitz represented President Eisenhower who was not in the city. After the funeral, I returned to my desk and a full basket. I heard a commotion in the outer office, and in came Admiral Nimitz. 1 report only Admiral Nimitz’s remarks:
“Admiral, I have come to pay my respects to the Chief of Naval Personnel. You know I had this office once.
“I have two requests to make of you. First, I am told that General Marshal will soon die. I’m sure the Army will ask me to attend his funeral. Havingjust buried old friends, Leahy and Halsey, 1 just feel that I cannot attend another Arlington funeral. The next funeral of a five- star officer I attend will be in San Francisco [his own, of course]. Will you appeal to the Army for me?
“Secondly, will you call on the Chairman (Sic), present my great respects, my apologies for not calling in person, and ask him if he will not now promote Admiral Spruance to Fleet Admiral.
“The Chairman will remember that when consideration was given to filling the fourth Navy billet to five-star rank, there was almost equal support given to Admirals Halsey and Spruance. Bill Halsey was selected.
“Now, I am the only surviving Fleet Admiral.
“Remind the Chairman that Admiral Spruance is an old man. His promotion won’t cost the country much, and it is richly deserved.” As soon as Admiral Nimitz left I called Mr. Vinson and was invited to come to his office at 0730 the next morning. I paid Admiral Nimitz’s re
spect to the Chairman, and put the request for Spruance to him.
With his glasses on the end of his nose, he stalled for thinking time. He began, “Admiral, who were the Fleet Admirals?” And, “Who were the Generals of the Army? . . . We created the five-star ranks and promoted those great leaders in the course of a World War.” I interrupted to remind him that General Bradley was promoted after the war. He continued, “Yes, and we made a mistake (Sic). We should not have done that, but we did want to elevate the rank of the Chairman of the JCS for the first incumbent. We have not repeated it. . . . We should, in the future, hold five-star ranks for our leaders in a grave national emergency. So, please present my deep respects to Fleet Admiral Nimitz, and say that we must leave it just like it is.”
The Value of a Forum
John C. Havens—I have been a subscriber to Proceedings since late last year. I have had no previous experience with the military, aside from a three-year study of political and military relations during the post-World War II era.
I want to take this opportunity to congratulate you and your staff on an exceptional magazine. I am pleased to discover so many critical articles on training, morale, and the complications arising from a “high tech” navy. I worked for a large corporation for five years and was discouraged from presenting any original or contrary ideas that might aid in its success. It is refreshing to find articles written by all echelons of personnel. I am sure that many of them are hesitant in presenting opinions or solutions that may not sit well with their superiors, but they must realize that even the lowest rating may have a valid answer to the problems at hand.
If the Navy continues to air its grievances in a magazine that is available to both civilian and military personnel, I am positive that even the most difficult obstacles can be met and defeated in record time.
“The Role of the U. S. Surface Navy in Nuclear War”
(See J. D. Douglass and A. M. Hoeber, pp. 57-63, January 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander T. Q. O’Rourke, U. S. Navy—Dr. Douglass and Ms. Hoeber seem to predicate their risk analysis of the survivability of the U. S. surface fleet during a nuclear— or even conventional—conflict on two basically tenuous assumptions: (1) American naval strategists are ignorant of true Soviet thoughts, views, tactics, strategy, concepts, and even fleet movements; and (2) in any conflict, Soviet units will immediately, absolutely, and unquestionably achieve a totally effective, surprise, coordinated attack on the U. S. fleet.
Without doubting the calculations or intentions of these eminently qualified mathemetician-authors, it appears somewhat simplistic to predicate a combat model on conditions of total ignorance on one side and minimum risk on the other. Although convenient, such a model cannot truly simulate the high uncertainty, extraordinary risks, and possible cataclysmic consequences associated with a combat environment. In any such combat situation, be it nuclear or conventional, both Soviet and American naval forces will operate in conditions closely simulating a heuristic model.
Although conditions of certainty are unlikely to ever be achieved, continuing studies and interpretations of published tactical and strategic Soviet thoughts on naval and nuclear warfare can at least reduce American uncertainties as to Soviet intentions during such conflicts. Such studies cannot, however, reduce the risks associated with a confrontation between Soviet and American units. Risk reduction can be achieved only by ensuring that the United States has sufficient naval forces at sea to respond rapidly to any Soviet challenge, and that these forces have sufficient quantity, quality, and diversity of offensive strength to destroy opposing forces in any proposed scenario. Withdrawal of portions of American offensive naval strength, whatever the well-intentioned “marginal returns,” can only serve to decrease the risks and uncertainties for Soviet units attempting to oppose or destroy a U. S. battle group. Ultimately, the most cost-effective solution for U. S. naval forces is the further expansion and diversification of the offensive strength of all U. S. naval units.
According to Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, “the basic mission of navies of the great powers in a worldwide nuclear war is their participation in the attacks of the country’s strategic nuclear forces, the blunting of the nuclear attacks by the enemy navy from the direction of the oceans, and participation in the operations conducted by ground forces in the continental theaters of military operations.” To achieve these basic missions, U. S. naval strategy concentrates on using the integrated, coordinated, and diverse power of surface, subsurface, and (carrier) air units to support the total battle group concept. Withholding any portion of this triad as a reserve force, especially the naval air power of a carrier, would cost dearly in any confrontation with Soviet naval units. Splitting the force into one conventionally armed force and another nuclear-armed force or, worse, arming the fleet only with conventional weapons could only have the most dire of consequences.
According to Admiral Gorshkov, “. . . [in] the battle for the first salvo . . . delay in the employment of weapons in a naval battle or operation inevitably will be fraught with the most serious and even fatal consequences.” This “battle for the first salvo” recognizes the effectiveness of the integrated surface, subsurface, and (carrier) air units of the U. S. battle group; an effectiveness that will be severely degraded if portions of the battle group or its weapons are withheld as a reserve force (or as a supply ship). Thus, “the equipping of the [entire] navy with strategic [and tactical] nuclear weapons . . . [becomes] a most important factor in deterring his [Soviet] nuclear attack.” Withdrawal of those weapons could only serve to decrease the uncertainties for Soviet units attempting to launch a coordinated surprise attack, decrease the associated risk factors to the Soviets, and thus ultimately increase the probability of such an attack.
In addition to not recognizing the significance of carrier air power in any confrontation with the Soviets, the authors appear to place great reliance on the B-52s of the Strategic Air Command. Although sea surveillance, antisubmarine warfare, mine delivery, and neutralization and destruction of enemy naval forces are collateral Air
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Force missions, an authoritative Air Force source has stated that". . .these are really paper missions rather than real capabilities” (Colonel Wolfgang Samuel, “Atlantic Passage: A Vital Guarantee for Deterrence and Survival,” Naval War College Review, Sept.-Oct. 1981). This same source points out that there would be substantial command and control problems with integrating Strategic Air Command units within the Navy’s battle group concept—problems reminiscent of the World War II Navy versus Army Air Forces confrontation over the control of land-based patrol aircraft. It should be remembered that this collateral “paper mission” of the Strategic Air Command is the primary mission of the Navy’s long-range P-3 aircraft.
Antisubmarine warfare has always been the forte of the P-3. Operating independently or as an integral part of a battle group, the P-3 has always had and continues to maintain the ability to localize and destroy Soviet submarines. The advent of the Harpoon missile greatly increased the offensive capability of the P-3 in the antishipping mission. If properly equipped, these same long-range aircraft could foil any attempt by Soviet units to gain the element of surprise on a U. S. battle group. Although the Harpoon missile has greatly increased the P-3’s offensive capability, the addition of certain specific weapons and sensors would expand and diversify its mission capabilities and could very well assure the survivability of the entire battle group in a confrontation with the Soviets.
For example, arming the P-3 with both Harpoon and Phoenix missile systems, as was suggested by John S. Brunner in a comment on page 95 of the December 1981 Proceedings, would not only ensure that the P-3, operating several hundred miles from the battle group, survived long enough to warn the battle group of an imminent attack, but could very well break up the coordination of Soviet submarines, ships, and aircraft involved in a surprise attack. Similarly, outfitting the P-3 with additional specific active and passive sensors, including advanced radar and electronic support measure and electronic countermeasure systems, would not only extend U. S. naval striking power against enemy naval forces, but, in the event of actual engagement, could ensure the attainment of favorable attrition ratios against any attacking Soviet launch platforms.
Maritime superiority of the U. S. Navy is fundamentally dependent upon the offensive strength offered by the integrated battle group. Restricting the weapons available to the battle group will needlessly reduce this offensive flexibility. Withdrawal of carriers from the battle group would reduce, if not eliminate, the air superiority achieved by tactical aviation at sea, greatly increase the vulnerabilities of the remaining units, and reduce the offensive capabilities of those remaining units. Rather than attempting to limit or withdraw portions of U. S. naval offensive capabilities, every attempt should be made to further increase and diversify the integrated offensive strengths of the battle group concept. Increasing the offensive strength and survivability of the P-3 is but one of many ways to achieve this goal.
“Armed Confrontation Builds in South Africa”
(See J. Kapstein, pp. 34-39, December 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Roland M. Andersen, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—In many years of enthusiastically reading Proceedings, I never thought that our magazine would become a purveyor of free lip service to anyone who had ulterior motives to poison our readers against the fantastically successful and really only staunch supporter of freedom and free enterprise that the Free World has left in Africa.
South Africa, with all its problems, cannot be equated with the United States and what we have endured and are continuing to endure in our efforts for equality for all. The vast majority of our citizens know little or nothing of the history of South Africa and its struggles. We have been poisoned to believe that a white minority is browbeating unmercifully the rest of the population into servility, when in reality, the majority in South Africa is many times better off than in any other country in Africa.
Our gravest sins are in siding with the Communist world in trying to destroy South Africa with the excuse that we want them to have a one-man, one- vote society. God forbid that the Communists ever get South Africa, for then there will be a no-vote society.
This incessant cooperation with forces destined to destroy South Africa from within or without leads only to further destruction of the Free World to the full benefit of the Communists. If we lose South Africa, we lose friendly blacks and whites.
We need the South Africans more than they need us right now. We need all the friends we can get, and both economically and militarily, we dearly need the critical mineral resources with which South Africa is blessed.
We let Communists take over Angola simply because we were tired of Vietnam and refused in Congress to appropriate some meager funds that would have helped Angola defend itself. We fell for the “down-with-the- white-majority” theme orchestrated from the Kremlin with terrorism that gave Rhodesia to Communist rule (which, for some unintelligible reason, was to be better than white minority rule). We are poised to help Communist-backed Southwest Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) take over Southwest Africa, just so the South Africans and their white minority, our true friends, can be further punished.
Proceedings is no place for the persuasive marketing of forces in opposition to our friends, who are all South Africa’s people, not just the whites.
If I were ever lost or captive anywhere in Africa, next to being rescued by an American, I would want to be helped by a South African of any color. It is high time that the United States stands up for the South Africans and helps them to protect themselves. After all, they are only about a generation behind us in getting their house in order, and we have a long way to go. We still have Indians on reservations.
Commander Kapstein is negative and fatalistic and not even accurate. He concludes his article, “The black position has fixed on nothing less than majority rule. White South Africa will give up everything but that. Since there are no prospects to bridge the gap, the field is sadly left to bloodshed.” I don’t buy that, because I don’t buy negatives, and the “black position” Commander Kapstein mentions is not the South African black majority position but, instead, is that of a minority of blacks goaded on into rebellion by the Communists and do-gooder elements in the Free World who know not what they do!
God forgive them!
“Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?”
(See B. D. Bruins, pp. 52-56, January 1982; C. H. Amme, p. 27, March 1982 Proceedings)
“The Education of a Warrior”
(See T. B. Buell, pp. 40-45, January 1981;
R. A. Dun, p. 21, February 1981; J. R.
McDonnell, p. 15, March 1981; J. T.
Hayward, pp. 21-23, April 1981; J. E.
Lacouture, pp. 77-79, June 1981; A. T.
Isaacson, pp. 78-80, July 1981; C. C.
Holcomb, pp. 71-75, August 1981; P. F.
Sloane, pp. 84-87, November 1981; M.
Johnson, p. 76, January 1982; C. H. Amme,
p. 27, March 1982 Proceedings)
Captain T. C. Buell, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The title question of the article is addressed from two points of view. The final paragraph, presumably a summary of the author’s thesis, asks if the opportunity to become a naval strategist is best sought through the civilian defense ladder, or through a service academy and a uniformed career. Thus, the issue boils down to career opportunity.
On pages 54-55, however. Bruins states that, “the Navy does need strategists.. . .But. . .‘Does the Navy need uniformed strategists?’ ” This is clearly a second question.
These questions of career opportunity and of need are discussed entirely in the context of today’s defense structure and decision process. These questions dramatize the reality that senior uniformed officers have an ever diminishing role in formulating and executing national strategy.
In the article by Tom B. Buell (my distant cousin) and subsequent prolific comment, the emphasis has been on the education of naval strategists, primarily at the Naval War College, and much less so on the reality of civilian domination of this field. This predicament came about over a period of time but was initiated in post-World War II defense reorganization.
There is no question that the aura of nuclear weapons—i.e., so-called strategic bombing—was one powerful influence on the nation, and especially the Congress, during the restructuring of the Defense Department between 1947 and 1958, as well as its subsequent evolution. A second factor was the political advantages of unanimity in defense planning and execution.
The changes in law to restructure the Defense Department were taken, in part, to find a way to resolve or suppress interservice disagreements. They did exist during the war and flared openly in the great defense debate afterward. The solution became centralized planning and decision-making, done increasingly by amateurs.
In retrospect, between 1947 and 1958, we totally dismantled a national defense system that had just won decisively our greatest war—the greatest war of all time—with few strategic mistakes and almost unflawed execution. In its place, we substituted a wholly untried system, without a shred of evidence that it would effectively direct our national defense. After the worst military disaster in our history—Vietnam—we made no searching inquiry whether our nonnuclear strategy and the national decision process were at fault and made only insignificant changes in the law.
Whereas there are political advantages to unanimity, there is little or no evidence that Washington’s wartime debates adversely affected the war in the field. In fact, it may well have helped by airing different concepts for presidential decision. There is, however, a wealth of evidence to show that the unanimity achieved by highly centralized direction results in poor decisions and worse execution, e.g., Vietnam. At least on the naval side, many senior officers were in partial or total disagreement with the strategy and conduct of the war that was directed almost wholly by civilians.
Since World War II, our nonnuclear forces have been involved in two unsuccessful wars and other encounters too numerous to mention. The success rate of these encounters has steadily diminished as the decision process has gradually shifted from professionals to amateurs.
The Cuban Missile Crisis is the only identifiable nuclear confrontation, and it is debatable whether the issue was resolved by our nuclear superiority or our nonnuclear capability to stop Soviet ships and forcibly remove their missiles. (The fast-paced construction of a wide-ranging blue water navy by the Soviet Union dating from 1961 is at least a partial answer to that question.) Thus, the nuclear forces deter and are not used; the nonnuclear forces are frequently engaged. And, in the long run, we will stand or fall on the performance of our nonnuclear forces.
Dr. Bruins’s discussion of “a Corps of Naval Strategists in mufti” is specious at best. He compares such a corps with the Medical or Engineer Corps, which are support or staff activities and not core military functions. Moreover, this concept implies the assignment of planning and execution to different organizations. This arrangement has had the hallmark of failure stamped on it wherever it has been used. In effect, we already have an ad hoc Corps of Naval Strategists, and the system does not work very well!
If nuclear deterrence works, and we have staked our future on that, then we had better learn a winning nonnuclear strategy and how to execute it. Imaginative, innovative, professional strategists are a necessary part of that course of action.
“Forgotten Lessons of Riverine Warfare”
(See C. A. Abel, pp. 64-68, January 1982
Proceedings)
Robert Enrione—In Lieutenant Abel’s fine article, I found one glaring omission—absolutely no mention of the Mesopotamia Expedition in World War I. Although this was a British operation, it is relevant to us as a lesson of what can happen in a riverine operation. In addition, the location of the expedition is as timely as today’s headlines.
With the outbreak of World War I and the attendant possibility that Turkey would side with the Germans, it was decided that a naval covering force should be sent into the Persian Gulf to the Shatt al-Arab in order to rescue the Abadan refinery and its oil products. An additional fear was that Basra would be turned into a submarine base. Hence, an invasion was planned, the object of which was Baghdad.
It took the British three years to capture Baghdad—much longer than expected. Among the problems encountered were operating in a desert area, erratic weather, supply line maintenance, a plethora of navigational problems, and a stronger enemy than expected. It should be noted that the last was by no means the least of British problems, for at one point the Iraqis were able not only to stop the invasion in its tracks, but also forced a large portion of the invading army to surrender. The loss of a crack British reinforced division of about 12,000 men—as well as more than 40,000 casualties—gives grim testimony as to the enemy’s effective defense.
“Pride, Professionalism, and Morality”
(See D. A. Carroll, p: 77. November 1981:
T. P. Rack, p. 22, February 1982 Proceedings)
Michael T. Dickerson—Commander Carroll has difficulty distinguishing moral leadership from moral dictatorship. In advocating the banning of “salacious literature” such as Playboy, Play girl, Old, Penthouse, and similar publications from the Navy resale system, the author would force his morality upon the Navy under the guise of “consistent moral leadership.”
The only consistency in his argument is its similarity to those advanced by the would-be censors of the “moral majority.” The author s contention not only implies an inherently superior morality on his part, but reveals a blatant disregard for the constitutional rights of all Americans, which he is sworn to defend.
The author states flatly that the sale of such literature is contrary to the guidelines of the Ship s Store Afloat with Supply Corps Officers (NAV- SUP-487) and suggests that selective enforcement of such regulations fosters selective rebellion. He glosses over the fact that these are merely suggested guidelines for screening materials, not regulations.
More remarkable still, he says matter-of-factly that, “The third guideline violated by the sale of literature of this nature states, ‘materials that are not acceptable ... are those that impede the lawful execution of the mission of the military establishment, or encourage failure or irresponsibility in this regard.’ ” Yet, he offers not a single shred of proof that such publications have such an effect upon the reader. Since when, I must ask, does the reading of Playboy impede the execution of the mission or encourage failure or irresponsibility?
I cannot help but wonder whether the author has ever made an Indian Ocean deployment, or has been to sea at all, for that matter. Unless he were totally isolated from the ship’s crew, he could not help but notice the morale-boosting effect provided by the
availability of such publications.
Certainly, many people are offended by the nature and content of these publications, and that is fine. They have a choice in whether or not they wish to purchase one. But this in no way gives them the right to deny others the same choice.
It is precisely such an arbitrarily dictatorial mentality (along with such factors as erosion of benefits and pay) that heavily influenced my decision to leave the Navy.
With the multitude of challenges confronting naval leaders today—most notably, in this context, retention—1 am amazed the author could find no more important topic to address in this forum.
If he is so morally outraged over the sale of these publications through the Navy resale system, I suggest he resign his commission and join ranks with Reverend Jerry Falwell, who I’m sure would appreciate his concept of “consistent moral leadership” more than the men under the author’s command.
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“Notable Naval Books of 1981”
(See C. L. Symonds, pp. 85-89. January 1982; R. B. Carney, pp. 68-73, March 1982 Proceedings)
Richard W. Cunningham—As a former enlisted jarhead committed to combat, I take umbrage in Manchester’s superimposing some 60 days on “Okie” over the whole Pacific war, then claiming to be a “brother marine” in his Goodbye Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War.
In the flyleaf of the book, 12 other Manchester titles are listed under various headings such as history and biography. However, if they are as carelessly done as this one, all 12 should fall under the “fiction” heading. The doddering Devil Dog makes such hilarious statements as on page 144, “saluting the ensign on the fantail even though you couldn’t see him.” And long may he wave. Or on page 71, “grabbed his carbine by the stacking swivel.” Come on, mate, carbines got no stackin’ swivels.
Then there’s his arrogant observation on page 166, “and an inept submarine-borne raid on the Gilbert Islands by Carlson’s Raiders,” a statement he’d best not repeat near a survivor of the Second Raider Battalion of the Makin Operation.
That sort of stuff is bad karma, but does not compare with combat segments such as the blood and thunder Saipan operation, wherein on page 271 —after reporting the Suicide Cliff sequence—he states, “Because my eardrums had been ruptured and I was partly blind, my memories of my first brief visit to Saipan are fragmentary.” This transpositional bit of legerdemain implies his participation, but it’s not until page 398 in the author’s note that he reveals he was evacuated to Saipan after having been wounded on Okinawa.
The book should not be identified as a memoir, but a tragedy. First, it’s a tragedy that a topnotch literary talent should prostitute himself in stooping to such a devious form, and then there’s the tragedy that the content might be used by future hip shot researchers who—swept up by his mastery of the language—accept his account as gospel. As a historian, I am constantly confronted with the waste of untold precious hours in verifying the accuracy of other Manchester-like reporters whose material has infiltrated source literature. Principally, it’s his juxtaposition of personal events with inappropriate time frames that renders much of the detail as the scrapings of the mess gear at the garbage rack.
“The Waves in World War II”
(See S. H. Godson, pp. 46-51, December
1981 Proceedings)
Mary W. Beyer— As a Wave who served during World War II, I enjoyed reliving many of the situations Susan Godson described. Many times stand out in my mind of my seven-and-a-half years in the naval service, first as an aviation support equipment technician attending Mount Holyoke Officer Training and finally as a regular Navy Supply Corps lieutenant. In December 1943, going through training at Mount Holyoke, one of the impromptu songs we sang ended with the plaint, “Pin your affections on an Army man, and only be a sister to the Navy— if you can!” This was early in the game when we were not even permitted to date Navy men!
Another matter of great interest is the fact that, from the inception of women in the services, we were given the identical pay and allowances as the men. The present generation seems unaware that this is, and has always been, one of the prime examples of “equal pay for equal work.” The services have been pioneers, and yet this is seldom advertised by the recruiters.
Thank you for publishing this brief history.
“Battle Group Tactical Proficiency”
(See D. L. Knuth. pp. 108-111, December 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Kendall J. King, U. S. Navy—Commander Knuth's assessment of U. S. Navy battle group proficiency was far too grim to reflect current status accurately. Emulating the Royal Navy has merit, but its impact is far less essential than the current improvements in progress. Certainly, coordination problems with battle group tactics may remain, but I believe battle group proficiency is alive and well and getting better.
Recently, in the Indian Ocean, the U. S. battle group (Commander Carrier Group Six, the USS America [CV- 66], USS California [CGN-36], and USS Preble [DDG-46J) operated effectively in antiair warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and antisurface warfare (ASUW) environments. Multi-threat tactics were practiced whether as an exercise or in a real-world situation almost daily. These evolutions were repeatedly practiced using current and newly developed tactics until the battle group was thoroughly professional.
The U. S. battle group overcame any lack of experience by practice and a constant exchange of information among units and warfare communities. Experienced officers shared their ideas as new tactics were developed and practiced and as lessons were learned and analyzed. A significant cross-decking program among units permitted battle group officers to view situations and exercises from varying perspectives. In some cases, the composite warfare commander provided only general guidelines, as in several surface warfare engagements, to enable the surface unit commander, the resident expert, to implement his own surface action ideas. In this way, the battle group maximized its experience and capability levels.
Many of Commander Knuth’s recommendations are valid and are already being implemented. Tactical Training Group courses have been expanded to include prospective operations officers, and just recently a tactics course was started for senior enlisted personnel. Tactics are practiced at sea, and lessons learned are discussed at various conferences and briefings. Battle groups do exercise together prior to deployment and in transit to gain proficiency. The written knowledge level is expanding as more experienced battle groups return from the Indian Ocean and incorporate their experience into TacMemos and instructions. Overall, the U. S. Navy’s battle group proficiency appears to have realized many of Commander Knuth’s recommendations and to be in far better shape than he depicts.
Some of his other recommendations are not really relevant. There is no correlation between engineering qualifications and tactical mastery, as Commander Knuth mentions, but none is expected. There can be, however, a combination of the two traits, as is reflected by the number of nuclear- powered cruiser commanding officers who perform effectively as battle group members. Learning from the Royal Navy can prove to be valuable, but it is not the sole panacea for overcoming battle group problems. In fact, with the U. S. Navy’s growing experience level, in particular with dual carrier battle group tactics, the Royal Navy may no longer hold the state-of-the- art expertise. Finally, relieving the commanding officer of any kind of administrative burden is a nice idea, but, in the peacetime Navy, it can only be that—an idea. However, time is being found for tactics training and discussions at the command level.
Battle group proficiency may not have reached the ultimate standard of excellence, but our battle groups today can meet the challenge of the multithreat environment successfully.
“You Can Lead an Ensign to
Water, but . .
(See W. H. Huff, pp. 50-51, January 1982
Proceedings)
Larry L. Booda, Editor, Sea Technology—It was about the same time that the January 1982 Proceedings was on the presses that Bill Huff met an untimely end on 23 December. But, as his wife of 40 years, Muriel, states, he met it the way he would have wanted, flying. While taking his flight training early in World War II at Corpus Christi, he met Muriel, a Navy “brat” who had followed her father to the naval air station there.
Bill’s military and civil flying included a wide variety of duties from patrol squadrons and one electronic intelligence (ELINT) squadron to ten years with Air America, and other scattered covert and overt assignments ranging from the Middle East to Libya. Not all of his flying experiences in other parts of the world can be recounted because they are still highly sensitive.
Our paths crossed many times, the first when I relieved him on the staff of the monthly Naval Aviation News published by Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). Eventually, he introduced me to the girl who became my wife. We were both on duty in Japan when he was flying ELINT missions. He described an incident that took place over the Sea of Japan. He was hopped and chased by Russian MiGs. They fired one salvo, which fortunately missed, just before he was safely within Japanese territorial waters. It was a mismatch because the Martin P-4M Bill was flying was a hybrid-powered aircraft with two reciprocating engines and two jet engines, while the MiGs were turbojets.
When he retired from the Navy, Bill decided to become a stockbroker in Washington where I was working as military editor of Aviation Week and Space Technology. He gained his license in six months. He was a natural at commodities trading and earned good commissions, but he was obviously restless.
One day he informed me he was quitting his job to fly for Air America, the Central Intelligence Agency’s not- so-secret air operation in the Far East. He had simply answered a three-line classified advertisement in The Washington Post. His credentials on security, loyalty, and professional competence were impeccable. In short order, he was flying four-engine aircraft from Japan to Taiwan, Saigon, and Bangkok and back. Muriel joined him.
Soon he was transferred to Saigon, flying mostly “Gooney Bird” Douglas DC-3s and Curtiss C-46s to all sorts of landing strips in South Vietnam. Two incidents among his many “hairy” experiences are worth repeating.
Flying a DC-3, Bill and his copilot, with an Australian Army major as a passenger, left the airstrip at Da Nang and headed south for a planned stop at Quang Ngai on the way to Nha Trang. As the aircraft made its final turn to land at the coastal grass strip, a Vietcong hidden in tall grass raked the plane with automatic weapon fire. Unbeknownst to Bill and his copilot, impacts had ruptured the starboard wing root tank and set it afire. They landed and parked the DC-3, exiting it from the port side rear door.
Bill showed me a series of pictures in color taken by one of several people waiting for the three of them to walk to a small terminal shack. The reception committee was waving and shouting, but the three thought it was some sort of welcome. The series of photos shows the DC-3 in the background pouring gasoline and blazing ever higher as they ambled nonchalantly away. When they finally heard what was being shouted, they turned their backs to the camera. The last shot shows them standing helpless as the pyre cremated the seven coffins con
taining the bodies of Vietnamese soldiers, the cargo.
Bill flew these missions while Muriel worked for the U. S. forces in Vietnam. They stayed nine years, relieved by three home leaves. Then Bill left Air America to return to the stockbroker job which had been held open for him. That lasted less than a year as Air America importuned him to return. He did.
When the last days of the United States in Vietnam arrived. Bill was ordered to fly a load of Vietnamese Air Force officers and their families out of the country. As far as he knew, his flight was the next-to-last out of Saigon’s airfield, Ton Son Nhut. As he took off in the DC-3, the starboard engine was hit by gunfire and had to be shut down. He staggered to a small island off the coast which had a manned airstrip. The crews managed to repair the engine, and Bill again took off carrying a full load of fuel. He flew 900 miles across the South China Sea to Brunei, the British possession on the northern tip of Borneo. From there, they flew to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.
That ended Bill’s involvement with Air America. Again, he became a stockbroker. Yet, again, he disappeared, reportedly flying in Lebanon. In mid-1979, he began flying for Libyan Air Lines, and Muriel followed him once again. That ended in February 1981.
This time Bill made no effort to return to stockbrokering. At first, he flew cargo at night out of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; then he switched to McAllen, Texas, in the Rio Grande Valley, Muriel with him. It was to be his last employment. His assignments were flying cargo into and out of Mexico. On 23 December 1981, he flew a load in a Super DC-3, similar to the Navy’s R4D-8, to Loma Bonita, Mexico. After the cargo was unloaded, he took off for the return flight. At this point, reports are conflicting. Some say the plane exploded in the air; others say that it exploded on impact with the ground. In any case, it became Bill Huff s funeral pyre.
McAllen’s American Legion post held a memorial service, chartered a plane, and gained the Navy’s permission to scatter Bill’s ashes over Corpus Christi Bay. That was where he completed his flight training in PBY Catalina seaplanes.
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“The Offensive-Passive Ship”
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 46-49, January 1982
Proceedings)
Captain Allen Jones, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—The concept presented shows an open mind to change, but it contains a fatal technical flaw. The SWATH ship depends on a small waterplane to function. This means that to change the weapons, aircraft, and fuel loads results in a maximum change in draft. To enter port, aircraft, ammo, and fuel would need to be unloaded to reduce draft.
The SWATH design was derived by Navy Laboratory civilians without sea legs. In other words, it was designed for comfort, not combat.
“Where Have All the Oarsmen Gone?”
(See D. Evans, pp. 132-133, December 1981
Proceedings)
Stewart S. Johnson—Although presented as a “Special Humor Feature,” this article may have been more accurately described as a tragedy. I , do not refer to the fictional loss of the Roman Fleet, but to the clear illustration that decision-makers within our defense establishment are not capable of employing all of the tools at their disposal. I have no doubt that Colonel Evans could supply all the pertinent data on whatever weapon systems he may have at his disposal. Yet, he seems to disapprove of subjecting that data to analysis. To reject analysis out of hand is to display the same mentality that proclaims that if man were meant to fly he would have been given wings. Such an attitude is accountable for many combat disasters.
I feel some comfort in that Colonel Evans does not support his conclusion. The command decision in his anecdote—made not by chicken entrails or a computer but by a person—was based upon overriding political considerations instead of recommendations based upon empirical data. At no time has it been stipulated that printouts or FORTRAN have usurped command authority or responsibility. Quantitative analysis may, however, be used as a scapegoat to rationalize poor command decisions. Although a cliche, the point that “statistics don’t lie—liars use statistics” is—if inadvertently—well made.
It is incumbent upon us to explore the problems of analysis.
The point made by Colonel Evans that there is a misunderstanding, on the part of those who should understand, of what quantitative analysis can and cannot do is well taken. All the inspections, assist visits, and surveys which pervade the system to ensure compliance with established standards serve as testament to a desire for excellence. Difficulty in defining standards and the inability to recognize substandard work are great inhibitors in the application of analysis. A military officer can spot a dirty weapon or recognize an inadequately covered defensive position, but he is not expected to recognize the threats to validity which may exist in a quantitative analysis. The misunderstanding of the decision-makers is, perhaps, aggravated by the recent Rand Corporation finding that the military tends not to put their best people in analytic positions. True or not, there is a common perception that those selected for higher education in computer science, for instance, are not necessarily selected on the basis of analytic ability, but are systematically relegated to non-command positions.
Even if we could assume that those in power fully understand analytic methods and that studies are commissioned (either in-house or contracted to “independent” researchers) with objective intent, the fact remains that the conduct of research is subject to bureaucratic pressures. That is, it might be considered a bureaucratic rule that “objective” studies tend to support the subjective opinions of those who hold power positions over the researcher. This is a systems problem which should be subjected to analysis before solutions are divined.
The use of computer hardware is no less valid when applied to quantitative analysis than when employed in fire control systems. Judging from Colonel Evans’s feature, we are weak in the area of application. I believe Colonel Evans deserves an A in Roman numerals, and I encourage him to further his education in higher mathematics and applied logic.
(Continued on page 87)
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Whatever service they are in, it is an armed force that is trained and equipped to fight wars. It war should occur, it is inevitable that there will be women among our casualties, just as there have been in the past. These casualties may be even greater, of course, if we find ourselves in a war involving our own lands.
Replacement of casualties: The support roles women fill are vital ones to overall mission success. Colonel Evans overlooks this point when he says that field commanders will experience a degrading effect on combat operations because they cannot use all available personnel assets to replace casualties.
Pregnancy: Colonel Evans s comments on time lost by pregnant women to about the sixth week following delivery and the inabilities of a woman in her third trimester of pregnancy need to be put in context. Of the over 172,000 enlisted Marines on active duty, approximately 7.000 are women. Of these, about 600 to 700 become pregnant each year. However, many elect discharge before the third trimester; approximately 200 to 250 women remain through that trimester. Given their random distribution, I seriously doubt that 250 women in that stage of pregnancy significantly impact on the readiness of a force of 172,000. Additionally, except for the Air Force, the rates for one major contribution to lost time for enlisted men, discipline, are more than twice the rates for enlisted women. All research we have available shows that, on balance, there is no difference between men and women in total time lost. However, since this is not a well researched area, we are continuing efforts to get complete and current data.
Sexual harassment and fraternization: The issues of sexual harassment and fraternization raised by Colonel Evans are recognized as problems in all the services, but I strongly believe that these are issues that can be appropriately addressed by leadership and training. Experience has shown
“No Place for Women”
(See D. Evans, pp. 53-56, November 1981;
C. Mollison. F. R. Hamlett. T. C. Nichols, pp 10-17, February 1982: M. A. Brewer, pp. 18-21, March m2 Proceedings)
Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics)—I read with considerable interest the article by Colonel Evans, and would like to make a few comments on it.
First, I believe that the main theme of Colonel Evans’s article—the number of women that should or should not serve in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF)—is properly the concern of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is conducting an analysis concerning that question, scheduled for completion in the spring of 1982. lam confident that any recommendations for change coming from that analysis will be based on solid data and defensible rationale.
Second, because the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have very recently completed an extensive background review on the subject of women in the military (October 1981), I am in the fortunate position of being able to compare a number of Colonel Evans's statements with our own findings. Therefore, 1 would like to set the record straight on some of the personnel management issues raised in “No Place for Women.
Performance: I cannot emphasize too strongly that our investigations in this area indicate that military women are performing their jobs and duties with the same high degree of excellence as military men. This conclusion is also supported by numerous statements by key military and civilian leaders in the services as well as by the many research studies and performance tests conducted by the services.
Casualties: I am aware that many share Colonel Evans’s concern about casualties among women in the event of combat. However, there are also many who feel that sharing danger is one responsibility that women assume when they elect to join the military.
us that these are leadership and training issues, and, if properly approached, they can be very effectively resolved. We are taking a hard look at this with each of the services right now, and 1 know that we can overcome these problems.
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During the past months, 1 have become very aware of the damage articles such as “No Place for Women" do to the morale of military women, no matter how well-intentioned the authors may be. The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service (DACOW1TS) recently has advised us of its deepening concern about the morale of women in the military and its impact on their retention and on overall readiness. DACOWITS reports that, as a result of 29 recent base visits by members of the committee, they “note an underlying uneasiness among service women about their perceived value to the military and the implied assumption that the presence of women denigrates readiness.” Our military women must be made aware that they are valued personnel resources. I agree with the Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert H. Barrow when he said that
women marines “deserve nothing less than outstanding leadership, equal treatment and equal opportunity for professional development.” I want that for all of our military women.
The TV Trial of General Westmoreland
Reed Irvine, Chairman, Accuracy in Media, Inc.—Inasmuch as many Naval Institute members probably saw the CBS television program, “The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," which was aired on 23 January 1982, they may like to know how misleading and unfair this program was to the military and to General William C. Westmoreland in particular.
This program, narrated by Mike Wallace and based on charges originating with a former CIA analyst named Sam Adams, alleged that General Westmoreland, as commander in Vietnam, had suppressed intelligence information that showed that the enemy strength in 1967 was much greater than published reports had indicated.
It was the contention of CBS that the underestimation of the enemy's strength had led to overconfident predictions about the course of the war. CBS charged that because of this, the enemy’s Tet offensive came as a surprise and that General Westmoreland had refused to accept the higher estimates of enemy strength because of the possible political repercussions this would have had.
The information presented in this program is not accurate, and the conclusions drawn by the program are at almost complete variance with the available facts.
CBS did not even pretend to be objective. Mr. Wallace states at the beginning of the program that, “Tonight we are going to present evidence of what we have to believe was a conscious effort—indeed a conspiracy
at the highest levels of American military intelligence, to suppress and alter critical intelligence on the enemy . .
The conclusion reached by CBS is opposite to that reached by those in the best position to know the facts. The charges made by CBS have been denied by General Westmoreland, General Maxwell Taylor, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, George Carver, the CIA’s former top expert on Vietnam, Lieutenant General Philip Davidson, who served as General Westmoreland’s chief intelligence officer, Walt W. Rostow, National Security Adviser to President Johnson, and Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
CBS reported that General Joseph McChristian, at that time General Westmoreland’s chief intelligence officer. had come up with a higher estimate of enemy troop strength in early 1967 than previously existed. General Philip Davidson, who took over from General McChristian in June 1967, says that the whole dispute was an intelligence community argument revolving around the definition of “combatant” and around methodology. He says that he did not think that it was proper to include the Vietcong political infrastructure and the hamlet selfdefense forces in the order of battle because they were not, in his view, combatants. That was also General Westmoreland’s view. There were others who disagreed.
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Was all of this a conspiracy? Sam Adams and CBS say it was. The testimony is heavily against them. George
Carver, who was then with the CIA, was on the side arguing for inclusion of these disputed groups in the order of battle. He was the one who negotiated a compromise with General Westmoreland in the late summer of 1967. He states that this was a technical intelligence dispute, not a conspiracy to deceive the President and the U. S. public. In fact, Carver says that the entire matter was explained to President Johnson and his National Security Adviser. Mr. Rostow confirmed this in a letter to The New York Times.
CBS did not seek all of the facts. Mr. Rostow was interviewed by CBS, but none of the interview was used. George Carver was interviewed by CBS only after the program had been completed. General Davidson was never interviewed at all. Colonel Charles Morris, one of General Davidson’s top aides who shares his view, was interviewed by CBS but his views never appeared on the program. While General Westmoreland was interviewed, his statements were so edited as to prevent the viewer from properly understanding his position. In fact, he was presented as the accused while eight witnesses were assembled to testify against him.
The effort to discredit General Westmoreland is clear. During the taping. General Westmoreland was in error when he said that the enemy infiltration rate from the North was
20.0 a month in the fall of 1967. On 9 June 1981, General Westmoreland wrote to Mike Wallace to correct the error. He said that he had been unable to speak with precision during the interview on some of the details raised, and he pointed out that the 20,000 figure was not reached until January *968. He said that the estimate of 5,500 to
6.0 a month he had given on ‘‘Meet the Press” in November 1967 was generally correct. CBS actually used General Westmoreland’s mistaken figure of 20,000 a month to try to show that Westmoreland had understated the infiltration rate when he was on “Meet the Press” in 1967. CBS ignored the fact he had written to them long before the program was aired to say his November 1967 statement was correct and he had erred in his interview with Mike Wallace.
The reason that General Westmoreland made a mistake in discussing the enemy infiltration rate was simple. He was being asked about detailed statis
tics that were 14 years old and were not fresh in his memory. One might ask why he had not reviewed these statistics before the interview.
The answer to that question provides another revelation of the dishonest tactics of CBS News and its correspondents, Mike Wallace and George Crile. General Westmoreland went into the interview under the impression that CBS wanted to discuss the performance of American intelligence generally, especially in the Vietnam War. He had no idea that he was to be interrogated intensively on the 1967 order of battle data and the enemy infiltration rates that year. Not having been advised of the true intentions of Wallace and Crile and the nature of the program they were producing, he did not refresh his memory in advance with respect to those particular numbers. He has charged that he was, in effect, “ambushed” by Mike Wallace, having been misled as to the nature of the interview.
Crile, who helped Wallace put the program together, pointed out to the press that he had a letter sent to General Westmoreland describing the subjects they wanted to talk about. Among the questions was one about the 1967 order of battle controversy.
There was such a letter delivered to General Westmoreland at his hotel in New York City the night before the interview with Wallace. It listed some ten questions that Wallace ostensibly wanted to discuss. These questions started off with, “Did American intelligence adequately predict the Tet offensive and the nature of the attack?” And, “Was the Tet offensive an American victory or defeat?” And, “Did the press present a reliable picture of the enemy we faced and the state of the war?”
Far down the list was this casually introduced question: “What about the controversy between the CIA and the military over enemy strength estimates?” This was actually the one question on the list that Wallace and Crile were really interested in. This was the subject of their program. The other questions were merely camouflage. They appear to have been intended to divert General Westmoreland’s attention away from the real question that they intended to grill him about intensively.
In a letter published in Broadcasting magazine, 15 February 1982, General Westmoreland pointed out that even
if it had dawned on him that the order of battle controversy was the key question in Crile’s letter, he could not have prepared himself for the intensive grilling he was subjected to. The letter reached him only hours before the interview and not at his office in South Carolina where he had all his records.
General Westmoreland wrote: “I went to New York at the invitation of CBS thinking that they wanted to discuss the general question of intelligence and how our intelligence performed in the Vietnam war. I found that they had an entirely different purpose in mind. They wanted to put me in the dock, charge me with conspiracy to suppress vital intelligence information, and try to use my words as testimony against myself.”
What the viewers saw on the television screen was the CBS court-martial of General Westmoreland. It was a star chamber proceeding, with no defense witnesses allowed and no cross examination of the prosecution witnesses. In our courts of law, we have erected elaborate protections for the accused to ensure that we do not convict the innocent. In trial by television, the accused has no such protection. He is stripped of his rights. It is not a legal proceeding, but tremendous damage can be inflicted on the innocent.
In the case of General Westmoreland, his reputation and honor have been besmirched before millions by CBS. The question is why.
There are several possible answers. General Westmoreland has been one who has pointed out that the media have a great deal of responsibility for the disaster that has befallen Indochina. CBS may have wanted to punish him for daring to criticize the media. Another possibility is that they saw this as an opportunity to undermine the credibility of the military at a time when the administration is proposing a large defense buildup. Finally, they may have wanted to suggest subliminally that we ought not to trust what we are being told about the tinderbox in El Salvador and the rest of Central America, since we were, according to them, deceived about Vietnam.
CBS News and Mike Wallace deserve the censure of the American public for this disgraceful, unfair smear of a fine American to achieve these destructive objectives.
“Tomorrow’s Fleet”
(See J. D. Alden, pp. 113-122, January 1982 Proceedings)
Edward J. Bender, Jr., National Security Planning Officer, U. S. Maritime Administration—I have to take issue with the section on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and Maritime Prepositioning Ships. First, Commander Alden’s article uses the word acquire interchangeably with purchase and charter. The SL-7s have beenpurchasedby the Navy from Sea- Land; the Maine-class and Hansa roll- on/roll-off ships have been chartered from Lykes Brothers; and the lighter- aboard-ships vessels (there are two, not three as Commander Alden has reported) are under charter from Farrell Lines.
Second, the SL-7s remained competitive in the commercial market until the time they were sold to the Navy. Sea-Land has claimed that they made $64 million on the vessels in 1980 while operating them at 24 (not 33) knots, and that they were booking cargo for the vessels to almost full capacity.
Finally, his article presents, in great detail, the Navy’s energetic shipbuilding program. Perhaps it would be useful to show, in contrast, the exiguous U. S. commercial shipbuilding program. The U. S. merchant marine the fourth arm of defense—is not nearly as fortunate as the Navy in its wealth of projected building. If the current trend continues, U. S. merchant marine support of the naval establishment will certainly decline.
Captain James E. Grabb, U. S. Coast Guard, 270’ WMEC Acquisition Project Officer—Commander Alden inaccurately describes the contract for the construction of Coast Guard cutters WMECs-905 through -913. Although I do not wish to go into the legal technicalities of the case, the Coast Guard terminated its contract with Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for the second increment of nine ships only after a U. S. district court declared the Coast Guard s determination of unresponsiveness of Dereck- tor’s and Marine Power’s bids to be invalid. The contract was then awarded to Derecktor after an in-depth preaward survey, during which Derecktor demonstrated its ability to deliver the ships on time and in accordance with
the specifications. (Robert E. Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc., is the subleasee of a lease from the U. S. Navy to the State of Rhode Island for land and facilities which were formerly part of the U. S. Navy Base, Newport, Rhode Island.)
Tacoma Boatbuilding Company and Marine Power and Equipment Company, Inc.—the second low bidder- contested the award to Derecktor on the basis that it was against procurement regulations and that Derecktor was not a responsible bidder. On 17 June 1981, the court found Derecktor a responsible bidder and the award valid.
“The Soviet Merchant Fleet Wins By Losing”
(See J. W. Clark, pp. 70-74, December 1981 Proceedings)
John R. S. Robilio—Captain Clark’s article deserves special commendation. American businessmen would be wise to heed Captain Clark s suggestion as to the menace of Communist shipping.
Political motivation seems to color all of the Kremlin’s moves with the capitalist world, and shipping is no exception. The Soviet Union hungrily seeks Western capital, and its merchant marine offers a vehicle for its collection. Politburo members may boast of advances in defense and in space, yet Soviet citizens are still plagued with shabby clothes. The Soviet Union’s vast resources remain untapped because of a glaring lack of high technology.
Consequently, Soviet policymakers have directed their energies to acquiring vitally needed capital and technology from the West and Japan. In this regard, the Soviet merchant marine has performed commendably at the expense of no small number of Western carriers. Some U. S. businessmen have commented on the “extreme competitiveness” of Soviet oceanic freight rates. However, one should also note the unique structure of the Soviet merchant marine. Soviet seamen are paid a paltry $150.00 per month. Fuel is cheap since the state massively subsidizes the shipping industry. Most important, the profit motive is conspicuously absent; conventional profit and loss statements simply do not exist.
The Soviet merchant marine works
closely with the Soviet Navy. Commercial and military roles are frequently intertwined; the Soviet merchant fleet facilitates the (low of arms and strategic materials to revolutionary movements throughout the Caribbean area.
Any U. S. businessmen who consistently favor a Soviet carrier for their oceanic freight would benefit from psychiatric counsel; they are contributing to a system that would delight in the decline of capitalism.
I am the vice-president of our family-owned wholesale wine and liquor company which imports wines from around the world. Our company predominantly patronizes Lykes Steamship Company and Hapag-Lloyd. Morflot is purposely avoided.
I do not advocate stopping all trade with the Soviet Union nor any of its satellites. Equitable trade policies might lessen tensions between the East and West. Captain Clark has struck a crucial point by calling for legislation to end “predatory shipping practices.” Viable trade relationships are based on fairness and reciprocity; they are not rooted in “domination.”
“Changes in Status of Ships”
(See S. Morison, pp. 123-124, January 1982 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Bruce Keener, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As the officer who directed negotiations for the charter and purchase of the USNS Sirius (ex- RFA Lyness), I was dismayed by the Proceedings’ reported purchase price of $200 million.
In fact, at the insistence of the British Government, the negotiated purchase price is stated in pounds sterling, which at the time the contract was signed in November 1980 was worth approximately $18 million (U. S.). However, the appreciation of the dollar against the pound in the intervening months should bring the actual purchase price down to about $15 million (U. S.). The combined purchase price of the Lyness and her sister, the Tarbatness (now USNS Sirius and USNS Spica, respectively), should total about $30 million (U. S.), which is one of the greatest bargains the U. S. Navy has ever made. By way of comparison, building two new AFSs in U. S. yards would have cost more than $700 million and required eight years.