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Jellicoe
John Winton. London: Michael Joseph, 1981. 320 pp., £12.50 (Approx. $23.75).
Reviewed by Captain John O. Coote,
Royal Navy
After his earlier, widely acclaimed, lighthearted accounts of his own life in the postwar Royal Navy, John Win- ton turns his facile pen to sterner stuff and confirms that he is a naval historian. Jellicoe is a penetrating objective analysis of the life and times of Admiral John Jellicoe, whose eight Dreadnoughts formed the nucleus of the largest naval force ever put under the tactical command of one man: 28 battleships, 9 battle cruisers, 34 cruisers, and 77 destroyers.
On 31 May 1916, this unwieldy formation rendezvoused off Jutland with its preordained destiny, the Kaiser s High Seas Fleet under Admiral Reinhard Scheer. On paper, this first general fleet engagement for the Royal Navy since Trafalgar should have been a pushover for the British. They outnumbered the enemy 3:2 and had an even greater superiority in firepower. But a combination of typically poor North Sea visibility, patchy and contradictory intelligence, sloppy enemy reporting procedures allied with inadequate communications, some unlucky breaks, and a devastating first strike by the enemy denied Admiral Jellicoe the crushing victory he had been trained for throughout his naval career of 40 years. His inexorable rise to supreme command took him through the Boxer Rebellion and service all over the world during the final transition period from sail to steam to armored ships with director-controlled main armament broadsides of previously unimaginable range and power.
Admiral Scheer led his bruised squadrons back to Wilhelmshaven with the loss of two capital ships, three cruisers, and a number of destroyers. They received a hero's welcome from the Kaiser, medals all around and, more importantly, first blow in the Battle of Despatches which followed the action. Meanwhile, Vice Admiral David Beatty’s flagship HMS Lion was booed and jeered on docking at Rosyth, having left on the seabed, among others, three of his beloved battle cruisers, with only eight survivors from their
total complement of 3,317 officers and men. History has grudgingly given Admiral Jellicoe a technical knockout, in that Scheer’s fleet ventured out only once more, two months later, when it again ran for home in the nick of time. Thereafter, it suffered the rundown of morale and efficiency expected from two years’ swinging round their anchors, while Admiral Jellicoe lost no time in correcting most of the tactical and some of the materiel failures of Jutland. It was his fleet which held undisputed command of the high seas from May 1916 onward.
That this was recognized in Britain at the time by few people other than
King George V was in large part because of Admiral Jellicoe’s total disdain for the media or politicians at any level. He believed that if any case needed to be made for the conduct of his fleet at Jutland, the Admiralty would say it all for him in due course. They nearly did. After much dithering, the official record was nearly signed on 24 October 1919 signifying Admiralty approval of its findings. But it was held over for the incoming First Sea Lord— Admiral Beatty—who arrived ten days later.
He wasted no time having history rewritten his way. Unfortunately, the brave, charismatic Admiral Beatty is best remembered for this discreditable stage in his career. John Winton makes it clear that during the three years following the battle Admiral Beatty showed total loyalty to and understanding of his commander in chief s conduct. His own cronies were not so circumspect and appeared to have the ear of those who made Admiral Jellicoe’s closing years at best an anticlimax, if not humiliating. It was put about that Admiral Jellicoe was solely responsible for victory having been denied the Grand Fleet. Innuendos from these sources fell just short of accusations of cowardice. The various official Admiralty accounts of Jutland were mostly published while Admiral Jellicoe was safely out of the way as governor general of New Zealand in 1923. It was in character with the man that he should have stood aloof from controversy until the damage had been done.
John Winton’s balanced view of the man and his times is long overdue. Admiral Jellicoe’s shortcomings were largely bred into him on a diet of unquestioning loyalty to the service and total dedication to the creed of the infallibility of flag officers. In his view, only the most trivial decisions were delegated to subordinate commanders
or staffs. Therefore, sooner or later he was bound to find himself, as he did on 31 May 1916, in charge of events of such scale and complexity as to be beyond resolution by the snap decisions of one man—distinctly short on combat information—on the flag- bridge of the Iron Duke miles away from the center of events.
Two quotes survive: Admiral Beatty’s laconic, “What’s the matter with our bloody ships today?” as the second of his battle cruisers disintegrated in front of his eyes. The question was not answered until 24 May 1941 when HMS Hood went the same way for the same reason. The other, which cannot be satisfactorily answered by retrospective analysis, was that “Admiral Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost World War I in an afternoon." But, given the chance, Admiral Beatty might have managed it.
Captain Coote was a Royal Navy submariner who saw war service off Norway and in the Mediterranean and later held four sea commands, 194854. At age 38. he resigned to go into newspaper publishing in Fleet Street, ending as Deputy Chairman of Beaverbrook Newspapers.
Defense or Delusion? America’s Military in the 1980s
Thomas H. Etzold. New York: Harper and Row, 1982. 259 pp. $14.37 ($12.94).
Reviewed by Dov S. Zakheim
The Naval War College faculty has acquired a reputation among many defense experts as the most imaginative and outspoken of all the war college faculties. Thomas Etzold, prolific author of works on strategy and political/ military affairs, frequent contributor to the Proceedings, and a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, enhances that reputation with Defense or Delusion? America’s Military in the 1980s.
The author is neither a budget cutter nor a knee-jerk advocate of acquiring every military system in sight. Nor is he a starry-eyed reformer, expecting to overhaul the way the Pentagon has gone about its business for the past three decades. Instead, he recognizes that the interaction among strategy, security policy, congressional and bureaucratic politics, weapons procurement, and manpower requirements is highly complex, demanding a patchwork of solutions that will probably satisfy no one in the short term.
Dr. Etzold’s book is different from others of this genre in another respect: His academic calling in a service college enables him to combine analytical perspectives with anecdotal history, underscoring his observations with particular cogency. Nowhere is this more apparent and effective than in his discussion of the problems the military faces recruiting and retaining qualified personnel.
Dr. Etzold knows military people and their problems. His discussion of personnel issues ranges far beyond that of pay to health care, personnel reassignments, and job satisfaction, and to the impact of all these factors on service personnel and their families. It is difficult to argue with his conclusion that “pride, pay and opportunity” sum up what U. S. military manpower needs.
The author also is extremely effective when describing the quirks of the bureaucratic and congressional environment in which weapon systems decisions are made. He is far less satisfying, however, inpresentinghisown perspectives on the decisions that should be made. To be sure, he never loses his sense of proportion, admirably reflected in his case against choosing too rapidly a basing system for the MX, his argument for retiring Titan missiles, or his balanced discussion of the virtues of both high- and low-mix systems. Nevertheless, he is carried away by the image of the Iranian rescue as the archetype of U. S. military ills, by the primacy of readiness as “the only sure basis for response to unforeseeable eventualities” (how can he then justify with minimal analysis the need for more naval forces and airlift?), and by the significant degree to which the United States carries the military burden of its alliances.
Possibly as a result of his enthusiastic acceptance of such shibboleths. he is prone to errors large and small in his discussion of weapons acquisition and its underlying policy rationales. Large errors include the assertion that the United States alone provides NATO’s maritime capability. In fact, not only do the Allies contribute 40% of NATO’s tonnage, but they also are critical elements in certain maritime tasks such as antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, and local operations in the smaller European seas. On a lesser scale, one finds numerous minor errors of detail. For example, contrary to Dr. Etzold’s data, the Warsaw Pact has far more than 46 division equivalents in Northern and Central Europe; Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley never assumed the status of a commander in chief when he commanded the Rapid Deployment Force; the United States does not own enough shipping to move one-and-one-third Marine Corps amphibious forces; and George Bush’s Team B did not function in 1977, when Jimmy Carter was President.
In fairness to the author, he has tried to cover a huge subject—defense policy and all its ramifications—in a very few pages and in a scholarly fashion that is nevertheless intelligible to a layman. In a work of this sort, errors are inevitable. His effort is valiant, and, in general, he succeeds. Despite its rather hyperbolic title and similar lapses in the text, this is a book worth reading.
Dr. Zakheim is Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). He was a Principal Analyst with the National Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office.
Rickover: Controversy and Genius, a Biography
Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
744 pp. Ulus. Bib. Ind. $20.75 ($18.67).
Reviewed by Peter Braestrup
Perhaps the best capsule portrait of Hyman George Rickover in this book is taken from a 1977 appraisal by Captain Edward L. Beach:
“. . .a compulsive, driven, fiercely competitive person, who relishes that role and will never give it up. A genius at managing people, who has discovered the singular ability to establish perfection as commonplace among those working for him ... a man adept at flattering the Congress or the press ... a man self-serving to an unbelievable degree, devoid of appreciation of or sympathy for the differences in people, intent only on getting his job done as he and he alone conceives it should be done.”
Perhaps no other figure in recent history has so divided the Navy, so exasperated presidents and defense secretaries, so captivated the Congress and the press. A martinet in a
ing, more heavily-armed nuclear attack submarines, even though theirs were also noisier and less advanced in some systems. The authors suggest that there were other costs, as well: Rickover’s overwhelming insistence, often echoed in Congress, on expensive nuclear-powered ships—subs, carriers, and escorts—may have hurt the Navy in terms of today’s and tomorrow’s ship numbers and operational flexibility.
But Rickover stayed on. He lectured on education, the decline of morals, and the need for hard work and self-sacrifice. "As Captain Rickover, he had done more than any other naval officer to build something no one had ever built before,” the authors conclude. “As Admiral Rickover, he tried to build a world in which he fashioned even the people who operate his creations.”
Without Rickover, it will be a different U. S. Navy. The full benefits and costs of his 30-year reign may not yet be susceptible to an accurate final accounting, but Polmar and Allen lay out the broad outlines and the arguments on all sides. Now the pro- and anti-Rickover folk can jump in.
Navy that might otherwise have settled for mediocrity, H. G. Rickover, the “father of the nuclear submarine,” survived countless efforts to dethrone him, created his own navy within the U. S. Navy, and, only this year, was relieved (unhappily) of his official duties at age 82.
This full-length, semi-popular biography—cum chronicle of the nuclear Navy—is the work of Norman Polmar, a naval analyst and editor of Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet, and Thomas B. Allen, a National Geographic writer-editor. Their book, which Rickover refused to help, is often impressive in its detail, candid in its admission of unresolved questions, rich in Rickover anecdotes, and sober in its final conclusions. It suffers from a helter-skelter “topical” organization,
and from a pedestrian, often diffuse prose style. Happily, a chronology and other appendices assist the lay reader in keeping track of the story.
What are the Polmar-Allen conclusions? There is little argument, they say, over Rickover’s role as a captain in expediting the construction and deployment of the first nuclear-pro- pelled submarine, the Nautilus (SSN- 571). In 1948, the only formal Navy nuclear-propulsion project was a heat- transfer experiment at Westinghouse. By mid-1953, under Rickover’s lash, there was a full-scale submarine reactor operating in the desert at Arco, Idaho. And the Nautilus was abuild- ing at New London, to be launched in
January 1954, joining the fleet in 1955.
“A careful review of the entire nuclear energy scene during the late 1940s leads to the conclusion that another officer could probably not have done what Rickover had accomplished,” say the authors.
Was the Navy, as Rickover contended before Congress for 30 years, opposed to nuclear-powered submarines? Not really, say the authors. After all, with the endorsement of his superiors, it was Vice Admiral Earle W. Mills, Chief of the Bureau of Ships (BuShips), who attacked the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission (A.E.C.) in 1948 for inaction on nuclear propulsion and who assigned Hyman Rickover as BuShips-Atomic Energy Commission liaison to get the program moving.
In 1951, when the Navy decided that, after directing the program for three* years, Rickover should move on, Rickover was passed over for promotion to rear admiral. He mobilized his allies and used his few contacts in Congress and the press, notably Clay Blair, Jr., of Time (who later wrote The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover in the admiral’s office), to fight back. Rickover won; he was promoted in 1953.
But, say the authors, “the fight changed Rickover.” To stay on in the Navy, he cultivated a formidable phalanx of supporters on Capitol Hill who raised a rumpus whenever Rickover seemed threatened by “the admirals” or “The Pentagon.” Only the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover seemed to enjoy equal immunity from criticism or ouster.
And within the Navy, Rickover’s power grew. He ensured that all Navy nuclear propulsion efforts were directed by his Naval Reactors Branch (NRB). He picked the key people for the nuclear fleet. He thwarted independent research on alternative propulsion systems by civilian contractors, or even the Navy’s own Office of Naval Research. In 1955-57, however, the Navy chose Rear Admiral William Raborn, not Rickover, to push through the Polaris program.
When should Rickover have departed? Possibly in 1960, five years after the Nautilus went to sea, when her first successors were joining the fleet. Late in the decade, when U. S. subs designed during the early 1960s (under Rickover’s aegis) were going to sea, the Soviets were producing more numerous, faster, deeper-div
Mr. Braestrup is editor of The Wilson Quarterly, and author of Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis ofTet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington.
Soviet Strategy
John Baylis and Gerald Segar, Editors. New York: Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1981. 263 pp. $31.85 ($28.66).
Reviewed by Captain Paul Schratz, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, does not come readily to mind as a major center of strategic studies such as the Rand Corporation, Harvard, or Brookings. Yet editors John Baylis and Gerald Segal, lecturers at Aberystwyth, have produced a superior, balanced, and carefully analyzed study of Soviet strategy. While the arguments of extremists—the “hawk” on the right and the “dove” on the left—can be relatively simple, the work of the analyst in the middle is far more complex, if only because he is a moderate. It is an added treat, therefore, to find such analysis in simple, clear English prose with a nice sense of history not often found on this side of the Atlantic.
Part One, The Evolution of Soviet Strategy, includes essays by Robert L. Arnett on Soviet attitudes toward nuclear war: he asks if nuclear war can serve as a useful instrument of politics and, if so, does the U.S.S.R. feel it could win? This is followed by Ken Booth’s historical perspective on “The Military Instrument in Soviet Policy. Part Two, Contemporary Issues, includes an essay by Benjamin Lambeth, “How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine,” contrasting issues such as strategic stability with U.S. views. Also included are Dennis Ross’s "Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy” and Raymond L. Garthoffs “The Soviet Military and SALT,” both discussing various factors affecting deterrence and defense, the Soviet view of the world, and the role of the Soviet military in policymaking. Part Three, The Use of the Military Instrument, analyzes new capabilities of Soviet air, naval, and ground forces through penetrating essays by Hannes Adomeit, “Soviet Risk Taking and
Crisis Behavior,” and Michael MccGwire, “The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower.” MccGwire’s article, a reprint of a Naval Review essay (May 1980) having the same title, is an important study for the maritime professional. His background as a retired Royal Navy commander, an intelligence specialist, a leading authority on Soviet naval policy, and now a research associate at the Brookings Institution, shows in his wrap-up of Soviet sea power and the Soviet drive for power and influence in the world which is a brilliantly penetrating study. MccGwire’s precise, detailed account of Soviet trends toward a more active overseas policy since 1961, the internal struggle by the navy within the army-dominated military leadership, and the consequent underuse of the navy as an instrument of policy, reads almost as though he had free access to Soviet internal records.
The Soviets do not have a grand design driving a coordinated oceans policy in support of overseas objectives. The leadership’s inability to see the navy’s potential leads to the underuse of the navy which in a maritime war could lead to disaster. Despite the new willingness to use naval forces to counter Western military intervention, the navy is seen as an expensive necessity—perhaps not unlike sentiments sometimes expressed in this country.
Like the earlier book produced at Aberystwyth. Contemporary Strategy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), by John Baylis and others, Soviet Strategy is outstanding in every respect. The current concern with the role of the Soviet military, in the nuclear weapons debate and in contemporary issues such as Afghanistan and Poland, makes this carefully balanced discussion a most timely contribution.
I strongly recommend it as a war college text and for general readership.
Captain Schratz graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1939 and established a distinguished record in the submarine force during his naval career. With a Ph.D. from Ohio State University, he is widely known as a writer on foreign policy and national security affairs. He is currently writing a book on military strategy.
WEYEFfS
Warships of the World Flottentaschenbuch
' Selected by the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
as a Notable Naval Book of 1980 “For the individual collector this volume may be the best choice because it is small and affordable ”
January ’81 1
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A handy and accurate reference. Take it with you to sea. Use it conveniently at home.
This portable friend of naval ship enthusiasts is the classic recognition guide to the 123 navies of the world.
Weyer’s is back:
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is well-read, and intersperses his narrative with references to ancient and recent history, films, books, and current events.
the strength of character necessary to endure such an experience.
Michael Vlahos. Newport. RE: Naval War College Press, 1980. 214 pp. Append. Bib. Ind.
The Overlook Illustrated Dictionary of Nautical Terms
Graham Blackburn. Woodstock, NY.: The Overlook Press. 1981. 349 pp. Illus. $17.95 ($16.15).
The principal benefit of this book as compared to other such dictionaries is the inclusion of more than 600 line drawings to accompany the definitions of nautical terms. Altogether, there are more than 2,500 terms defined, from aback to Z-twist.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Lee: The Last Yeqrs
Charles Bracelen Flood. Boston, MA.:
Houghton Mifflin Company. 1981. 308 pp.
Illus. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
As one of America's greatest tacticians and military heroes, a great deal has been written about Robert E. Lee as a commander of troops. Relatively little, however, has been written about his postwar years as president of Washington College and symbol of southern pride. The author of this sympathetic account argues that by his quiet courage and dignity, Lee set an example for the entire South, and that the five years
-*r*SK|
NAVAL AFFAIRS
The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan
Ronald Lewin. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1982. 332 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
In his newest book, the author of Ultra Goes to War (McGraw-Hill, 1978) exposes the important role which intelligence decrypts—known as "Magic' —played in the war against Japan. Mining not only official sources (including newly declassified documents), Lewin also relied upon many interviews with participants. He explains how the codes and ciphers were cracked and offers specific illustrations of how the intelligence was used during the war. In addition to being an important contribution to our understanding of World War II, it is an engrossing, well-written story.
The American Submarine
Norman Polmar. Annapolis. MD.: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing c°"1P“"y- 1981. 172 pp. Ulus. Append. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
This handsome and lavishly illustrated volume surveys the history of U. S submarines from David Bushnell's Turtle in 1776 to the present. Polmar traces the developments in the design of U. S. submarines along with the changes in their assigned missions. The many illustrations include cutaway drawings and rare photograp s. Appendices cover deep submergence vehicles and submarine-launched missiles. This is an attractive book for enjoyable reading as well as a useful reference.
Believed to be Alive
Captain John W. Thornton, U. S. Navy (Ret.) with John W. Thornton. Jr. Middlebury, VT.. Paul S. Eriksson. Publisher, 1981. 272 pp.
$14.95 ($13.45).
In March 1951, then-Lieutenant (junior grade) Thornton flew his rescue helicopter deep into North Korean-controlled territory to rescue three U. S. intelligence officers who had become trapped behind enemy lines. Though his own chopper crashed, he helped supervise the evacuation of the three men. He, however, was taken prisoner and spent three years as a prisoner of war (POW) in North Korea. At a time when more attention is finally being focused on the courage of U. S. POWs in Vietnam, here is an example of courage from an earlier war that will remind us of
The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941
In this monograph, a Johns Hopkins University scholar argues that the U. S. Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, was "the home of thought" in the U. S. Navy in the interwar era. As such, it was the place where the Navy’s professional officer corps, isolated from the values of civilian society, developed its own ethos. “As a culture within a culture," Vlahos writes, "the Navy represented a distilled, distinct subset of the aggregate of national beliefs and values." Moreover, it was that set of values that sustained American naval officers through the early years of World War II.
Steichen at War: Naval Aviation in the Pacific
Christopher Phillips. New York: Abrams.
1981. 256 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $40.00 ($36.00).
More than 200 of the best photographs of World War II are included in this handsome, oversized volume. Edward Steichen headed up the team of photographers who recorded much of the Pacific War in memorable photographs. The editor of this collection has arranged his selections topically: life at sea, combat, light moments, and the sailors’ reaction to the death of Roosevelt and the end of the war. It is not a photographic history of the war, but is a good photographic essay on men at war.
MARITIME AFFAIRS Halfway Around the World: An Impossible Journey
Gavin Young. New York: Random House,
1981. 473 PP- Maps. $16.50 ($14.85).
This is a fascinating and readable travelogue of a seven-month adventure from Greece to China via Turkey, Lebanon. Egypt. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Borneo, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The author hitchhiked on 23 different vessels, experiencing both terror and gracious hospitality. Many stages of the voyage were arranged on the spot and Gavin Young’s account is full of local color. He
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between Appomattox and his death in 1870 were his finest.
Death March: The Survivors of Bataan
Donald Knox. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1981. 482 pp. Illus. Maps $19 95 ($17.95).
The author of this dramatic account relies heavily on the memories of survivors to piece together this history of the Battle of Bataan and the infamous "death march” that followed it. He argues that Americans were used to thinking of victory and therefore had difficulty accepting defeat, surrender, and captivity. Unprepared for the experience, they stumbled through the nightmare of imprisonment, kept constantly off-balance by Japanese unpredictability and occasional random cruelty. This is a moving human portrait as well as a detailed military history.
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The Military Balance, 1981-1982
The International Institute for Strategic Studies. New York: Facts on File, Inc 1981 133 pp. Tables. $17.95 ($16.15).
According to this newest edition from the International Institute for Strategic Studies HISS) in London, the balance of forces in the world, and particularly in Europe, have moved slowly but steadily in favor of the East. The West is losing—or has lost—the technological edge it needs to overcome the eastern bloc superiority in numbers. The editors conclude that although the balance of power is still close enough to make military aggression a risky undertaking, there is “sufficient danger in the trend to require urgent remedies."
FICTION Mission M.I.A.
J. C. Pollock. New York: Crown Publishers 1982. 274 pp. $12.95 ($11.65).
It is 1982 and the wife of an American soldier listed as missing, presumed dead since 1975, receives a letter from her husband, who reports that he is being held in a secret POW camp near Quang Tri province. The U. S. Government will take no action and so it is up to the missing man’s former comrades-in-arms—ex-Green Berets now pushing 40—to attempt a "Mission Impossible” type rescue. It is an interesting scenario but one that is overwhelmed by massive violence as the story unfolds. This is a classic exploitation novel: it exploits the hopes of MIA families and nurtures the bloodthirsty image of ex-GIs.
REVISION
American Merchant Seaman’s Manual (Sixth Edition)
William B. Hayler. Editor in Chief.
Centreville, MD.: Cornell Maritime Press,
1957, 1980. 615 pp. Illus. Ind. $22.50 ($20.25).
The editors of this newest edition have retained the format of the original version edited by Felix M. Cornell and Allan C. Hoffman. Chapters cover all aspects of seamanship from handling small boats under oars to ship sanitation and medical procedures. Material has been updated to include the newest information on Ioran, satellite navigation, and other recent advancements in seamanship.
REPRINTS
The Defeat of the Spanish Armada
John Knox Laughton, Editor. London,
England: The Navy Records Society, 1895,
1981. Volume I. 365 pp. Volume IL418 pp. Append. Ind. £15 each. Approx. $28.31.
These two volumes contain the state papers relating to the Spanish Armada originally gathered together by Laughton nearly a century ago. The Navy Records Society has reprinted them in the original typeface, thus making accessible to individual collectors what was previously available only in the rare book sections of libraries. The first 80 pages contain Laughton’s introduction and the remaining space is filled with private letters and public documents of Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins, Sir Charles Howard, William Cecil Burgh- ley, and the other participants in the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588.
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