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The word “strategy” is one of those much used and misused words, and there is, in the mums of many people today, much confusion about the terms in which we talk about military strategy, Por instance, the overall strategy of the NATO Alliance is described by the phrase defense and cctcn e. ^ But where then in our strategy does “deterrence stand? Does it not invite misunderstanding that the words nuclear and deterrence are so frequently used together, when it is the whole spectrum of our nuclear and conventional military power that is aimed at contributing to the prevention ot war Have we not exaggerated the difference between deterrence and defense, with over-reliance on the former at the
expense of the latter?
Strategy is concerned with the deployment ot power; and military power can be applied at sea on the land, or in the air or the space above it. Maritime strategy is but a component of a wider military s ra egy. It will allow us to achieve certain things but not others—as in similar vein, can action on lan achieve certain things but not others. We may, therefore, use the expression “maritime strategy to encompass ideas which describe how we can employ military power at sea and how we can count^r it when employed against us. Power is not only tne capacity to destroy, but the capacity to influence.
But there is no meaningful choice between a maritime strategy and a land or continental strategy, the elements in which modern war must be fought are so interdependent that one cannot sensibly choose a maritime strategy and disregard land strategy, or vice versa. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery ot Alamein recognized this when he wrote, “From the days when humans first began to use the seas, the great lesson of history is that the enemy who is confined to a land strategy is in the end defeated.
People become further confused by apparent contradictions between words and actions. We frequently
refer to the flexible response strategy adopted by NATO in 1967, and in support of which, the NATO Defense Planning Committee called for strengthening of our conventional forces to ensure the credibility of the new strategy. And yet, throughout the 1970s, NATO’s conventional capability, measured against that of the Warsaw Pact, steadily declined in both quantity and quality.
In the maritime field, there continues to be a glaring contradiction between the often repeated acknowledgement that the NATO nations depend strategically and economically upon the free use of the seas, and the reluctance of European governments to provide the maritime forces which military commanders have sought in order to meet the Soviet naval challenge. No wonder that this confusion of words, ideas, and actions results in a lack of understanding by the ordinary person. An explosion of doctrine leads to more horrifying weapons, a reduced sense of security for our people, higher and higher levels of defense spending, and an apparent arms race from which there is no evident way out. In these circumstances, we should not be surprised at the growth of the antinuclear movement.
By any rational definition of sufficiency, there exists today a vast excess of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery—reported to be equivalent to more than ten tons of high explosives for each person of the world’s population. At the strategic level, the U. K. Government claims, and it is not an unreasonable claim, that the Royal Navy’s Polaris force, with a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 48 missiles immediately available for launch, provides the threat of unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union. Then, even allowing the greater scale of a superpower confrontation, how much direct security to the United States or to the Soviet Union is obtained from the additional 2,000 missiles and more which bring their
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Unnerved by a reduced sense of security, higher and higher levels of spending, and an arms race from which there is no evident way out, protesters took to the streets in Belgium, above, Holland, right, and Germany in the fall of 1981. The growth of anti-nuclearism—but also of pacifism— among Europeans might well undermine public support even for conventional military forces.
For the Soviet Union, military power is not just a means to an end but is an end itself, a symbol of state power. Because of the diminishing attraction of its ideology and the failure of its economic system, military strength is a troubled government’s only source of leverage within and beyond its borders.
totals to the limits set by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty? Surely, the vast preponderance of these missiles are but overkill. However, the fact that they exist is chiefly because of past attempts by both sides to obtain balance and to maintain an essential strategic equivalence.
The balance of power is a concept which has existed from the earliest days of recorded history; there is much evidence to support the proposition that arms races have not led to war—but that a major cause of war has been a mismatch in the balance of military power, when one side is strong and another is weak. And, of course, the history of alliances is the history of attempts to maintain a balance of power between groups of states whose interests were, or could be, in conflict. Prior to the existence of nuclear weapons, this concept of balance made clear sense, for a dominant military power was able to use its' military superiority to impose its own political, economic, or social order on another state. But in the era of nuclear weapons, this concept of balance needs to be reexamined.
In strategic nuclear terms, provided that the capability to launch an effective counterstrike against a surprise preemptive attack is maintained—and that a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force does of itself assure such a second strike capability- then, allowing a degree of insurance, there appears to be little utility in a level of nuclear force above that which will inflict unacceptable or total damage on the enemy. If such additional overkill has so little utility, then the concept of balance need not imply an equality in missile or warhead numbers. It can imply an equivalence in effect—at its lowest level, the effect of unacceptable damage, and at its highest level, total destruction. We need to be aware, however, that the concept of strategic nuclear balance measured in terms of numbers is deeply ingrained in the SALT process.
In addition to the strategic or central systems, long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) exist to help complete an interlocking spectrum of nuclear response, and to provide a “Euro-strategic balance,” a term to which attention was first publicly drawn by Helmut Schmidt in his 1977 International Institute for Strategic Studies lecture in London. There are good reasons for considering LRTNF within the total balance for strategic weapons since, for instance,
the U. K.’s Polaris missiles are by definition long- range theater nuclear forces while assigned to NATO; taken in a national context, they are strategic or central systems. But for a number of reasons, including the nonratification of SALT II by the U. S. Government, this seems unlikely to be the basis upon which the forthcoming LRTNF arms control negotiations will be conducted. However, the consequence of trying to reach agreements on the basis of our present concepts of balance, within each element of the spectrum of nuclear forces, is that inevitably we become involved in a leapfrog process. This is seen, by the layman at least, as a prime contributing factor to the escalation of nuclear arms.
At the level of short-range battlefield nuclear weapons, there are different and more obscure arguments relating to quantity and quality and thus to the definition of balance. Because of their inherent short range, the factor which most determines the number of nuclear battlefield weapons is the requirement that they be available at a specific time and place. It may well be that only a relatively few weapons would be needed to establish local battlefield control, or to stop a massed attack by tanks, or to provide the demonstration of nuclear intent which must be part of the aim of any such low level use of nuclear weapons. But to ensure that these battlefield weapons are available in the right places and at the right times, a total arsenal far above the number required for actual use in any reasonably foreseeable circumstances is needed.
Whether this total is as much as the present number of weapons possessed by the Soviets is a matter for the appropriate experts. But the decision of the U. S. Government in December 1979 to withdraw unilaterally 1,000 warheads from Europe suggests that the
concept of balance for battlefield weapons is, at least, less sensitive than has been the case for strategic weapons. For weapons used on the battlefield, too, there is not the same overriding need for quality that ensures credibility in the strategic case. For, on the battlefield, credibility is largely established by being able to create a clearly recognizable nuclear explosion at a particular place and time. It is of interest to note that the one area in which the nuclear balance has achieved scant attention is in maritime tactical systems, an area in which the Soviets probably hold a significant advantage, and where, it is argued, the penalties and risks of escalation are least.
Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses of our strategic nuclear doctrine is that its authors have concentrated too much on the means systems, basing modes, accuracy, throw weights, and all the jargon of the nuclear strategist—and not enough upon the ends—upon what our nuclear policy may be expected to achieve. We need to be clear on what nuclear weapons can and cannot do. They do not deter organized violence between states, as the^numerous wars since 1945 demonstrate, not even it t e states involved possess nuclear weapons, as U. S. and Soviet interventions demonstrate. It would seem, however, that nuclear weapons can be expected to limit the political aims for which a state might meaningfully decide to use force, as well as the degree of conventional force that it might consider using to pursue lesser aims. For if these aims or actions touch upon the vital interests of a state which possesses nuclear weapons, then the aggressor treads t e an gerous and uncertain path of the nuclear threshold.
The nuclear issues are very important not only because of the nature of the weapons themselves and the terrifying prospects if they were to be used, but also because of their direct influence on the concept of balance which needs to be applied to conventional forms. Furthermore, if Western g°v^n' ments are unable to produce an overall strategy that relies less on nuclear weapons, if they are unable to make progress in arms control negotiations aime at deep cuts in the available number of nuclear weapons, if NATO is unable to resolve without serious dissent such issues as the production ot t e neutron weapon and the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces, then they risk strengthening the case of those who say, “If this nuclear business is the only way in which I can be defended, then 1 would rather not be defended at all.’ Such growth, not only of anti-nuclearism, but also of pacifism, might well undermine public support even for our conventional military forces.
In the struggle between totalitarianism and democracy, it will, by the very nature of the systems involved, be easier for a totalitarian regime to bear the social cost of high levels of military expenditure. And we should remember that, for the Soviet Union,
military power is not just a means to an end, but is an end itself, a symbol of state power; because of the diminishing attraction of its ideology and the manifest failure of its economic system, military strength is the only effective source of leverage. At present, the balance of conventional military power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, whatever its absolute level, is in relative terms swinging in favor of the Soviets. If we allow this to continue, we should recognize four inevitable consequences:
►Western countries will have less influence in a changing world.
►The deterrent effect of our military forces will decrease.
►If deterrence fails, our military commanders will have less flexibility in executing our conventional strategy.
►The nuclear threshold will fall.
But if the West is to halt this swing in the conventional military balance, and in the face of the Soviet defense expenditures continuing to increase in real terms at some 4% per annum, then we seem almost inevitably to be faced with a further escalation of defense spending with its associated heavy economic and social lost opportunity costs.
As a starting point, let us consider the quotation, attributed to a Polish officer in 1939, “There is only one principle of war—be stronger than the enemy.” To this statement, which may indicate an unsophisticated mind but surely shows great realism, might be added the qualification, “at the vital point.” If this qualification is added, then we bring to the fore one outstanding factor in the military equation—the mobility of force—in both a strategic and tactical sense: the rapid ability to concentrate the maximum available forces at the vital point. Such a mobile concept is the antithesis of the ideas of static defense of World War I and the Maginot Line thinking of the 1930s. It is the close relative of the strategy of indirect approach and a classic solution to the problem of inferiority in numbers. It is a concept perhaps well characterized by the expression of a no less doughty fighter than Muhammad Ali whose trainer described his style with the expression, “Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.”
NATO’s concept of forward defense on the Central Front in Europe is heavily overlayed with political considerations and was militarily based on the measure of overall strategic superiority possessed by the NATO Alliance. This superiority has now dissolved, but the concept has led to a structure of Allied ground and air forces which is increasingly becoming suited only to a framework of a largely static defense. If, without rejecting forward defense, a greater measure of strategic and tactical mobility can be restored to our full-time forces, backing them within Europe by the wider use of reserves, then not only would the flexibility, and thus the military
effectiveness, of NATO forces be improved but also their political utility would be extended. For one of the major problems confronting NATO today is how a regional alliance can be made to meet a challenge that is increasingly global in character. This “outside NATO” role does not imply that NATO, as an alliance, will take action outside the treaty area. But it does involve the coordination of political, economic, and military measures by those countries whose interests are at stake. It embraces two concepts: that of horizontal escalation—which is the widening of the geographical scope of military action in an area of your own advantage and choosing—and that of vertical escalation, in which an inherently weaker force (a hostage force) is interposed between Soviet forces and their objective, thus forcing upon the Soviet Union the risks associated with a direct clash of Soviet and Western forces. In both these cases, the United States cannot reasonably be expected to act alone when the major interests of the whole NATO Alliance are at stake.
In turning to particular aspects of maritime strategy, several points need to be considered. It is vital to understand the nature of maritime power. Maritime power is of course concerned with sea-based resources, resources which are playing an increasingly large part in the world economic order. But in military terms, maritime power well can be described as the effect of the latent threat to use force at sea. However, force needs to be used against something. There is no need to threaten force in order to control an area of ocean if no one else wants to use it! Maritime force is normally applied against ships by sinking or capturing them, or by threatening to do so. This is perhaps what Corbett had in mind when he wrote, “The freedom of the seas is one of those ringing phrases which haunt the ear as they continue to confuse the judgement.”
In historical terms, it is the defense of merchant ships which has been the prime aim of the great trading nations. And so it remains today. Thus, we need to consider the pattern of merchant trading at sea which is changing. NATO naval planners have been slow to recognize that 65% of the world’s merchant fleet is still under the control of the 14 seagoing nations of the alliance; or to take account of the increasingly multinational nature of seaborne trade, whose volume increased by some 50% during the last decade; or to tackle the problems presented by ships operating under flags of convenience. Also, merchant ships have become larger and fewer and more specialized. The average size of a modem cargo ship is now almost three times the size of its forerunner of the last war. And we have not come to grips with the problem of how to defend merchant ships which, at their best speeds, are often faster than the sustainable speed of an escort force.
The one thing that has not changed is the ubiquity
of Western merchant ships—their presence in all the seven seas. Increasingly valuable ships thus continue to be vulnerable throughout the oceans of the world. Very recently, it has been brought sharply home to us that our tankers are just as vulnerable in the Arabian Gulf as they might be in the Eastern Atlantic. This worldwide vulnerability is threatened by the expansion of the Soviet Navy toward a global capability, a threat which is exacerbated by the very powerful combination of the antiship missile and the nuclear-powered submarine, as well as by the increased hitting power of missile armed patrol craft, commonplace among navies of smaller nations.
But it is not only merchant ships that can be attacked. An option always available to an adversary is to concentrate his attack on his opponent’s warships. If he can effectively eliminate these, then the control of merchant ships falls straight into his hands. This is the area where the increasing size and value of warships may be an embarrassment to an operational commander’s freedom of action. As Winston Churchill once warned, “By steadily increasing the size of destroyers they will turn from being hunters to being hunted.”
Thus, if too many of our warships become too large and too expensive, we breed a defensive mentality, we lose the initiative, we suppress boldness, and we rapidly find ourselves becoming bogged down at sea solely in defensive concepts of blockade, by submarine or surface or air barriers concepts not far from a form of Maginot Line thinking. And it is this thinking that allows us to spend pointless hours arguing whether a future war might be short or long— when that choice, barring a decision to surrender, will not be in our own hands. And what greater incentive can there be for an adversary to conduct a long war than the sure knowledge that his opponent s planning is based upon the concept of a short war? Furthermore, the capability for sustaining conventional operations in a long war does much to keep the nuclear threshold high.
In describing Western vulnerabilities, we should not forget the Soviet vulnerabilities. The Soviet Navy suffers considerable geographic constraints. Two of its fleets, the Baltic and the Black Sea, must transit narrow straits between NATO territories before gaining access to the open ocean, while the remaining two fleets in the North and in the Pacific have their access to the open seas only after long transits through waters where they are readily subject to attack. NATO’s maritime concepts of operations must, and do, seek to exploit these disadvantages. The large Soviet maritime research and merchant fleets also represent a significant vulnerability. The latter now consists of some 1,800 ships of 10,000,000 gross weight tons. In the event of major aggression at sea, it needs to be a clear part of the maritime task to ensure that none of these ships are
permitted the luxury of uncontested return to a safe
haven. . .
Unfortunately, the situation is not a reciprocal one. For the Soviet Union, defeat at sea would be a serious matter—but it would not be disastrous. For the West, defeat at sea would destroy the underpinning of our economic survival. Western naval leaders must appreciate that, should deterrence fail, our naval forces cannot win the war—but they can
certainly lose it. .
A relatively new factor which has profoundly affected the likely course of war at sea is the surface- to-surface missile. The problem of naval gunnery was once how to hit the target and to keep hitting. Now, with precision-guided missiles it is not ditncu t to obtain a hit with a single missile; and available evidence indicates that even one hit with a modern missile is likely to cause a major loss of capability
to its target. . ,
Against such a capability, an air defense system of great complexity, size, and sophistication is re quired to prevent saturation of the defense by a relatively few closely spaced attacking missiles. Ships are, of course, no more vulnerable to such precision missiles than aircraft or shore facilities. But since the latter are on sovereign territory, it is argued that attacks on airfields or naval bases would be highly escalatory and that such shore facilities t ere fore enjoy a degree of protection as sanctuaries which will-not be enjoyed by forces at sea. There is some merit in this argument, but over-reliance on such protection carries with it very high risks.
The reverse argument is sometimes applied mi discussion of the defense of merchant shipping. y> it is argued, should an opponent pursue the difficult task of disrupting merchant trade at sea, when e same effects may be achieved by attacking the sources of supply or the reception ports? The reduced number of specialized terminals which can handle modern containerships make these ports particularly attractive targets. But again, to assume that because ports are vulnerable, shipping at sea does not need strong protection is a direct encouragement to an enemy to attack at sea—as will a failure to provide protection for the ports be an invitation to an enemy to attac the ports. Effective defense has to be an interlocking panoply of measures, in which any apparent gaps will inevitably be exploited by the enemy.
To return to the precision-guided missile. This has not so much solved the problem of offensive surface warfare—but has shifted it. The problem is no longer how to hit the target; it is how, at over-the-horizon ranges, to identify the correct target, to know what target has subsequently been hit, and reliably to assess the resulting damage. Progress in solving these new problems has been greatly facilitated by improvements in long-range maritime search aircraft, by information available from satellites, by better
tactical intelligence and electronic warfare techniques, and by the use of shipborne helicopters. These same improvements in maritime reconnaissance have also profoundly affected the ability of surface naval force? to conceal their movements. There is on the surface of the sea almost no place to hide, although there is still a great deal of room in which to confuse.
In the development of maritime strategy and the capabilities to support it, we must be mindful that we have no recent experience in war to give us confidence that any new operational theories will stand the test of actual fighting—and we should be particularly careful before we discard previously hard- learned lessons of war such as the risk of operating surface ships in a hostile air environment, the threat presented by conventionally powered submarines, particularly in shallow water, and the proven effectiveness of convoys. But what is clear and unchanging is that the opportunities for and the importance of the successful commander’s traditional qualities—initiative, boldness, ingenuity, and that unquenchable spirit that prevails to have just one more go when all seems lost—are just as great today as they have ever been.
The foremost task of navies is to contribute to the prevention of war, and we seek to do this by demonstrating in peace the capability and the will to protect our vital interests and to fight and win at sea should hostilities break out. Success in war would be assured if NATO countries, supported by the other maritime democracies, were manifestly able to achieve worldwide sea control. The classical solution for achieving sea control has been to seek a decisive fleet engagement against the main forces of the enemy. In 1916 at Jutland, the result was not conclusive. At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese achieved initial success, but failed to follow this up in subsequent engagements. At Midway, the U. S. Navy
From its modest, three-submarine Polaris force, the Royal Navy has immediately available for launch between 16 and 48 missiles which constitute a threat of unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union.
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NATO seeks to prevent war by sending some of its ships on flag-displaying missions to, for example, a Norwegian port, as a reminder of its capability and will to protect its vital interests. German minehunters at sea are less subtle reminders that, should hostilities break out, NATO stands ready to fight and win a war at sea.
achieved a decisive result which was to be the turning point of the war in the Pacific. But the establishment of worldwide sea control in the face of the growing Soviet Navy would inevitably be a most costly strategy for the West. The Soviet Union, however, has no need to pursue such a strategy because its use of the sea is not essential. For the Soviet Union, the strategy of sea denial—denying to NATO and the West their use of the sea, which is essential for our survival—is more attractive.
An alternative to a sea control strategy for NATO is preventing the Soviet Union from successfully implementing a sea denial strategy against the West. This might seem attainable by placing a high priority on our own defensive capability to ensure survivability. But the capabilities of the surface-to-surface missile make such defense extremely difficult and risky. And such a defensive posture would be very expensive indeed, since at sea, unlike on the land, the margin of advantage lies with the attacker and not the defender. The additional ships required to produce an effective defense add further to our own vulnerability.
Thus, there is need to emphasize offense as being the best means of defense. NATO must seek to develop offensive capabilities against Warsaw Pact warships; the West needs the capability to threaten attack throughout the full length of Soviet deployment routes, with offense in depth being exploited as far forward as possible. In the Eastern Atlantic area, NATO cannot just aim to contain Soviet maritime forces by barrier operations in the GreenJand-Iceland and U. K.-Norway gaps. Even if it were possible
to achieve this effectively, it would not deal with those ships that had been deployed before hostilities began; and it would surrender sea control of the Norwegian Sea to the Warsaw Pact. This would have serious implications forthe defense of NATO s Northern Flank and also make it that much more difficult to contain any battle in the Atlantic. By convincing the Soviets that Western nations have the means and the will to defend their vital interests and prevent the exercise of Soviet maritime force wherever this may be threatened, we may prevent
war at sea. . , . ,
One means of implementing a most forward element of an offense-in-depth strategy would be for NATO to have the capability to attack the Warsaw Pact naval bases. However, such bases are almost entirely on Soviet territory and, even in a full-scale war, attacks on them must be considered highly escalatory. They are also heavily defended, and none less than the vital Northern Fleet bases in the Kola peninsula. To pursue an effective carrier-borne aircraft attack in the north would, it has been estimate , invo ve no fewer than four U. S. aircraft carriers which would be required to fight their way into the Norwegian Sea against concentrated air, surface and subsurface attacks before reaching their launch positions. This would clearly be a high-risk operation.
But it would be wrong if the Soviets were allowed to believe that their bases were immune from attack. Cruise missiles fitted in submarines and shore-based long-range attack aircraft, however, can .provide credible deterrent threat. Offensive submarine mining may also be an effective means of such forward containment; but it is not clear that a oa carried by submarine (any other means of minelaying appears very vulnerable) would be as effective as a load of torpedoes or missiles which the mines wou have to replace and which could be used with much greater tactical flexibility and selectivity.
The U. S. aircraft carrier battle groups are major elements of sea power. Such groups have a very good capability for establishing local sea control by posing a severe threat to enemy surface warships and submarines at sea or in port. However, as major elements of sea power, they attract a very high level of political and military value. If they are to be placed at risk, then, they must fulfill missions which cannot be fulfilled in other ways. Their role in war will be varied, and their capability for applying pressure on the Soviets, both directly and indirectly, is high. But priority for their use must lie in areas where lack ot air bases precludes the effective use of shore-based
aircraft. , x .
The principal and most difficult threat to counter
is the submarine, both in its nuclear and conventional versions. The SSN is principally a deep-water problem, while the antisubmarine submarine (SSK) is more likely a shallow-water target. However, we
need to remember that SSNs must deploy through shallow water—and that some SSKs may well be operated in the deeper oceans, and that while the characteristics of deep-water ASW and shallow-water ASW are different, there are certain common threads.
In the deep water, we must make use of all available sensors and platforms both in peace and war. In the deep water, passive systems seem likely to play the greatest part for the next ten years, while in shallow water, the active systems are likely to hold sway.
In both cases, however, an active/passive mix will be essential.
However, it is necessary not only to be able to find an enemy’s submarines, but also to sink them. This requires an accuracy of location that is much more precise than is needed for effective peacetime surveillance and a weapon performance which for obvious reasons can seldom, except in war, be fully tested. In the attack process, we need to exploit the speed and relative invulnerability of the long-range maritime patrol aircraft, the stealth of the submarine in the ASW role, the localization and attack capability of the helicopter, the ability of the antisubmarine mine to restrict the freedom of movement of enemy submarines, and the potential of the surface ship to provide continuity of local presence and to act as a command and communication interface between the air and subsurface elements.
The way in which these assets should be used, in barriers, in area ASW, in defended lanes, or in direct support of convoys, has been a subject of some controversy. The idea that escorting convoys is a purely defensive measure is a breach of a vital strategic principle (the principle of offense) on which the British, the Americans, and the Japanese have all blundered in the past at great cost to themselves. But how ASW assets are employed is a matter of tactics—not of strategy. To provide successful deterrent posture in ASW, it is necessary to be able to deploy all elements of ASW capability. And if we are to be able to afford them all, we must ensure that none are overly complex and more expensive than is necessary for the part which they must fulfill.
Effective offensive operations against enemy surface forces are less difficult than against submarines. Against surface warships, NATO needs to exploit the flexibility of shore-based maritime attack aircraft armed with antiship missiles and the relative invulnerability of the missile-armed submarine. This is not to say that surface warships do not need to be able to pose, or respond to, the threat of another surface warship—but only that the requirements of antisurface warfare (ASUW) should not be a major determining factor in deciding their shape and size. In defense of NATO’s own surface ships, there is a need to emphasize the area air defense responsibilities of shore-based fighter aircraft over sea as well as land areas—and to provide these ships with both an active and passive self-protection capability against missile attack whether launched from on, under,'or over the sea.
In pursuing the principle that offense by warships is the best method of defense for merchant ships, Western countries must not be blind to the military contribution of merchant shipping in war. The fitting of passive self-defense measures can provide a worthwhile element of protection for merchant ships. Roll-on/roll-off-type ships can be of value in transporting military forces. Small modifications to commercial tankers can make them suitable for refueling warships at sea. The capability of fish-finding sonars suggests that modern trawlers can play a useful part in mine countermeasure operations. The use of con- tainerships as platforms for the operation of ASW helicopters is a valid concept that has not been exploited. The West cannot afford to lose any opportunity for turning its economic strength in peace towards military ends in war, a process which will require a much closer relationship between commercial shipping and airlines and their ministries of defense than has been evident in most Western countries for many years. The Soviet Union suffers no such weakness.
In summary, NATO faces a situation in which the balance of military power, whatever its absolute level, is in relative terms swinging in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Because of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime, it will be easier for the Soviets to maintain the high level of military expenditure that is necessary to continue this swing than it will be for the West to halt or reverse it. Thus, to maintain balance, in the sense of broadly matching the increases in Soviet military power in general, and its increasing global capability in particular, will be increasingly difficult for the West. This situation is made more difficult by a confusion of doctrine. It may therefore be helpful if we reassess what we mean by balance.
At the nuclear end of the spectrum of defense capability, there may be merit in seeking a definition of balance in terms of an equivalence in effect rather than in numbers. At the conventional force level, a mobile strategy which would lay emphasis on the indirect approach by giving greater strategic and tactical mobility to our air, sea, and land forces could allow us to achieve a balance of conventional force at the critical place and time, with a level of force less than would be required to maintain balance in static terms. Such a mobile strategy would not require NATO to abandon its concept of forward defense nor to invent a new strategic doctrine. It would require a reinterpretation of our concepts of flexible response and the determination of nations to restore tactical and strategic mobility to their full-time forces while making wider use of reserve forces within Europe. Such increased mobility could, by increasing
both the military and political utility of our conventional forces, raise their deterrent value and thus the nuclear threshold. .
To support such a mobile strategy at sea, NATO has an option of pursuing the development of offensive capabilities as the prime means of preventing war and defending its merchant shipping. A strategy of offense in depth would pose a threat to Soviet naval deployment routes and would not rely on attacking or containing the Soviet Navy in its home bases. The maritime capabilities required to support this strategy would provide the ability to fight Warsaw Pact surface warships and submarines wherever they may be as a means of protecting NATO merchant ships, whether these be involved in carrying military reinforcements for Eufope, oil from the Persian Gulf, or going about their other worldwide commercial business. Against the submarine, NATO must seek a force mix that will employ and exploit the particular strength of all elements of ASW detection and attack capability. Submarines and shore-based maritime attack aircraft provide important elements for attacking surface ships within the NATO area. NATO’s shore-based area air defense capability must cover air space above the sea as much as it does air space above the land.
The force restructuring necessary to support a mobile strategy would be no cheap option. No such costing has been done, but we would only be deceiving ourselves if we believed that offense in depth could be effectively implemented at a lesser cost than that of our present programs. But a mobile strategy might provide the prospect of getting away from the apparently ever-escalating future costs of maintaining the balance of military power as it is now defined. The adoption of a mobile strategy and preparations for military tasks outside the NATO area might generate among some people the fear that Europe, having shed its colonial past, was falling back towards paternalist or aggressive attitudes.
But the United States cannot reasonably be expected to bear the whole burden of securing Western interests in vital areas such as the Persian Gulf and southern Africa. With some global military capability to support European interest abroad, global deterrence will be weakened, and European influence with friend and foe alike will be more limited than the political and economic status of Europe would imply. Such an absence of influence in a rapidly changing world should not be accepted lightly.
Since achieving flag rank in the Royal Navy, Admiral Eberle has held several key administrative posts, including Chief of Fleet Support. In 1979, he was appointed Commander in Chief Fleet, as well as Allied Commander in Chief Channel. He held these positions until May 1981 when he became Commander in Chief Naval Home Command.