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The Indians Are Coming!
Since the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, the balance of power in the Indian Ocean has shifted in India s favor. But power stays neither balanced nor unbalanced very long and, if an ambitious India is ever to join the Superpower Club, it must dominate the Indian Ocean across which flow the raw materials so vital to the industrial nations of the Free World. More, it must extend its influence westward to the Persian Gulf where 60% of the world's oil is held hostage.
Because Pakistan, Soviet Afghanistan, and Iran present such formidable obstacles to India's landward expansion, India must win its way west by sea power. Sea power? Indian sea power?
When the superpowers withdraw from the region, as they inevitably must—as the Royal Navy did—the Indian Navy will become the largest and strongest navy in the Indian Ocean. With its ability to build warships, a large merchant fleet, a significant electronics industry—not to mention an ability to wheedle a generous supply of new and used hardware and software from the Soviet
Navy—India has made its fleet into a major naval power. Moreover, India's fast-growing military-industrial complex is a source of great concern not only to its neighbors (and friends) but also to saner elements of the Indian society. If India's military-industrial complex continues to grow unchecked, the country is headed on an irreversible course toward adventurism and aggression.
At present. Pakistan is the only Indian Ocean country which, given the tools, could build a barrier both to Indian adventurism and to the continuing Soviet resolve to reach warm water ports. Despite setbacks and many handicaps, the Pakistani Navy is capable of becoming the highly skilled and formidable force it once was.
But Pakistan's needs are many and its resources limited. It cannot continue, as it now does, to station its naval personnel in many of the Muslim countries of the Gulf to train officers and enlisted personnel from those countries. It cannot, in fact, even afford to modernize its own navy.
It is, therefore, up to the countries of the region, especially the Muslim countries, and the Free World to build up the Pakistani Navy.
Is it unrealistic to talk of a small, developing country—a country with no industrial base—like Pakistan as a potential power at sea? The question invites»another question: if not Pakistan, around what country— Saudi Arabia? Indonesia?—can the region rally to frame a viable maritime strategy?
While most of the Muslim countries have the financial resources to acquire the tools of sea power, they have neither the traditions nor the professional experience to forge their navies into a major sea power. By helping Pakistan to modernize its naval forces and assuring long-term assistance, the rich Muslim countries can ensure a favorable balance of power to prevent an aggressor from cutting the lifelines.
The Indian Ocean can only become a “Zone of Peace” if a Muslim sea power can prevent any regional or non-regional power from establishing hegemony over the area.
A small, but highly efficient, modern Pakistani Navy could prove to be a worthwhile investment both for Muslims and the Free World to make toward security and peace in the Indian Ocean.
Book Reviews
William C. Adams, Editor. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1981. 167 pp. $17.50 ($15.75).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U. S. Marine Corps
A recent “Cathy” cartoon strip showed her watching television and
thinking, “I watched the morning news, the noon news, the evening news, the national news, and the world news. I watched 'news brief’, 'news break’, ‘news update’, 'news close-up’, ‘news wrap-up', 'news highlights’, 'news analysis’ and 'news review.' ” Visibly upset, Cathy shouts at her TV, “Why don’t I know what’s going on?”
This perceptive, fact-packed collection of essays provides a thought-provoking answer to Cathy’s question. Focusing on television news coverage of the Middle East since 1972 (with emphasis on more recent stories), eight hard-hitting articles argue that television news content is like the head on a glass of beer: froth on the surface. Perhaps this is because the purpose of television news is not so much to inform as it is to sell.
Not surprisingly, network executives care about the gross numbers.
Proceedings / March 1982