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When the American admiral visited Shaikh Khalifa of Bahrain in 1956, the signs of British influence were everywhere, from the uniforms of the honor guard and political agent to Royal Navy warships patrolling the Gulf. Two years later, the revolution in Iraq changed everything, inset, and, with the British lion gone, Persian Gulf nations knew they’d jolly well better have navies of their own.
It is superfluous to dwell on the crucial importance of the Persian Gulf to the Western world. Gulf states produce half of the world’s crude oil and own more than half of the world’s proven oil reserves. Much of this precious liquid is produced in fields that are close to the Gulf’s shores, and most of its exports to the West are shipped out of the Gulf in tankers.
This situation has created grave strategic problems. To the West, the security of its principal source of oil has been a constant preoccupation. To the Gulf states, oil has been almost the exclusive source of income. And to the Soviet Union, the West’s dependence on this vulnerable area has constituted a constant temptation to exploit this dependence. No wonder all these actors have made efforts to project military power into this area.
At first glance, a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf makes very little sense. Measuring only 92,500 square miles, with a maximum width of 210 miles and length of 615 miles, the entire Gulf can easily be patrolled and controlled by land-based aircraft. Furthermore, land-based guns and tactical surface- to-surface missiles (SSMs) can cover a substantial portion of its area. Nevertheless, naval vessels are indispensable for the effective control of the Gulf: they are capable of much longer continuous operations than aircraft; they are far more flexible than land-based weapon systems; and they can reach any part of the Gulf. They are vulnerable to attacks by aircraft, but large vessels can carry effective antiaircraft weapons and smaller ones are difficult targets. As for the threat from ground fire, both its range and accuracy are limited. Given these factors, every one of the eight Gulf states has chosen to form a modern navy.*
The Great Powers: The activities of the two external actors—the West and the Soviet Union—will be discussed only briefly. From the early 19th century until 1958, the Persian Gulf was virtually a British lake. It was patrolled by the Royal Navy, surrounded by five British protectorates (Oman, The Trucial Coast, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait) and three allies (Iraq. Iran, and Saudi Arabia), and unchallenged by any external power. This idyll ended in July 1958, when the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by the pro-Soviet General Qasim. In 1961, Kuwait became independent, and in January 1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Great Britain would withdraw its military forces from East of Suez (including the Persian Gulf). The last major British garrison pulled out of the Gulf in November 1971, and during the second half of that year Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (formerly The Trucial Coast) declared their independence. Oman, formally independent, but in reality a longstanding British protectorate, joined the United Nations in October 1971.
Unlike in 1947, when the Truman Doctrine swiftly substituted U. S. defense for British defense of Greece and Turkey, the United States was slow to take up the British responsibility in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East Force (two destroyers and a flagship) the United States was permitted to keep in Bahrain under a 1971 agreement merely provided symbolic presence. Finally, in January 1980, the
*Smaller vessels of limited combat effectiveness, such as coastal patrol craft (including hovercraft), inshore minesweepers, and service and utility vessels, have been excluded from this survey.
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Carter Doctrine announced a U. S. commitment to use “any means necessary, including military force,” to repel “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region.” This doctrine yielded an “understanding” with Oman in June 1980 allowing U. S. forces limited use of Omani air and naval installations in return for military aid and the establishment in April 1981 of a major U. S. military organization—the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)—to respond to threats in distant areas like the Gulf where local facilities and support could be expected to be very limited. The use of Omani and Bahraini facilities by the United States, however, is severely restricted and the RDJTF, scheduled to be fully operational in three to five years, is already beset by both interservice rivalries and Gulf states’ resistance. Hence, the United States cannot be considered to have an effective military presence in the Gulf.
The Soviet Union has confined its direct presence in the Gulf to periodic naval visits to Iraq. These began in 1968, and since 1972, the visits have become routine, but this does not constitute a real naval presence.
Despite the deployment of large U. S. and Soviet naval forces in the adjacent Indian Ocean, the local states have perceived the Gulf as being essentially free from foreign control. This perception has set the stage for a fierce local naval race.
Iran and Iraq: The first Gulf state to establish a fighting navy was Iran. As early as 1949, it purchased from Britain a used "Loch”-class frigate and “Algerine“-class minesweeper. These two ships maintained for Iran a locally dominant naval position in the Gulf for a decade, since the only other vessels present were four coastal patrol craft owned by Iraq since 1937 (all of which are still in service).
Throughout the duration of the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq, that country showed no interest in challenging Iranian naval supremacy. This changed after the 1958 revolution, when General Qasim turned to the Soviets for political support and military aid. Qasim was anxious to start a navy, but Iraq was hampered by an almost insurmountable problem—the 36-mile Iraqi coast and its mudflats, which become partly covered at high waters rendering construction of a naval base almost impossible. The British had resolved this problem by building a naval base in Basra, more than 100 miles up the Shatt al-Arab waterway. This was satisfactory until 1958, but after the revolution the base became useless. Much of the Shatt al-Arab skirted the Iranian border, leaving the approach to the base completely exposed to the now-hostile Iranians.
Iraq had only one alternative. In 1941, the British had built a small military port near the village of Umm Qasr, 65 miles up the Khaur Abdallah lagoon west of the Shatt al-Arab. The port was later dismantled and abandoned. Immediately after the revolution, however, General Qasim borrowed $150 million from the Soviet Union to reconstruct a port at Umm Qasr. Since the 1972 signing of a “friendship” treaty between Iraq and the Soviet Union, the Soviets have helped the Iraqis build a major naval base there. The Iraqi Navy’s headquarters remain at Basra, but the Iraqi fleet has been operating from Umm Qasr for several years.
Yet, Umm Qasr, too, is strategically vulnerable. Although safe from Iranian ground fire, it is located near the Kuwaiti border. Kuwait dominates the Iraqi fleet’s approaches from two islands located at the entrance to the lagoon, Bubiyan and Warba. Although Kuwait has never threatened Iraq’s security, since 1958 Iraqi leaders have attempted to deal with this situation.
Following Kuwait’s declaration of independence in 1961, when General Qasim announced that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq, he doubtless coveted its fabulous oil resources. But the strategic factor also loomed large. Iraq would have received an ample gulf coast, enabling Qasim's navy to effectively challenge Iran’s naval supremacy. However, because of Arab and international pressures, Iraq's Ba’ath regime was compelled to recognize Kuwait’s independence in 1963.
In November 1971, upon completion of British withdrawal from the Gulf, Iran seized three small islands at the mouth of the Gulf in order to gain control over the access to it. This act not only infuriated the Iraqis, but also heightened their resolve to become a credible Gulf power. In March 1973, the Iraqis demanded that Kuwait “lease” Bubiyan and Warba to Iraq. Upon the expected Kuwaiti refusal, Iraqi forces occupied a Kuwaiti border post on 20 March. Bowing to Arab pressures and Kuwaiti dinars, the Iraqi forces withdrew in April, but until a disengagement of forces agreement was concluded in July 1977, Iraqi violations of Kuwait’s territory were reported periodically. Although Iraq still demands the “lease” of the two islands, as it made clear in a strongly worded statement in July 1981, Kuwait refuses to give up the islands and continues to control approaches to Umm Qasr.
Nevertheless, since the 1958 revolution, Iraq has been building a navy clearly intended to challenge Iran's. In 1959-60, it acquired from the Soviet Union 12 “P-6”-class fast torpedo boats. Because of their large number, speed, and maneuverability, these vessels indeed matched the two aging Iranian ships. The Iranian-Iraqi naval race had begun. Iran was determined to resume its naval supremacy in the Gulf. In 1961, it ordered four new “PF-103”-class corvettes from the United States. Two were delivered in 1964 and two more in 1969. Together with the older British-built vessels, they constituted a far more powerful force than the light Iraqi fleet.
The As Siddiq is the first of nine fast attack craft, each of them armed with four Harpoons, which were ordered by Saudi Arabia in 1976 from Peterson Builders in Wisconsin. With gunboats such as these, German-made torpedo boats, U. S.-made corvettes, and French-made frigates, the Saudis must try to defend two widely separated coasts.
In the mid-1960s, Iran became the first Gulf country to enter the missile age. In 1966, it ordered four new Sm/m-class frigates from Britain. Originally scheduled to carry four British-made Seacat surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), they were delivered in 1971-72 with five Italian-made, short-range Sea Killer II SSMs and nine Seacats. This acquisition marked the beginning of a massive Iranian naval buildup that left the Iraqi Navy far behind.
In January 1967, an ex-British World War II “Battle”-class destroyer was transferred to Iran. She was received after a three-year modernization with four Seacat SAMs. In 1975-76, the destroyer was refitted again with eight U. S.-made Standard-1 medium-range SSMs and 16 Seacat SAMs. In 1972, two ex-U. S. World War II Allen M. Sumner (FRAM-II)-class destroyers armed with eight Standard-1 SSMs were delivered to Iran. These replaced the old frigate and minesweeper that were taken out of service. In 1974, Iran ordered from France 12 “Kaman”-class fast missile boats with four modern, medium-range U. S.-made Harpoon SSMs. Nine of these were delivered by the end of the Shah’s regime. In the same year, the Shah also ordered from the United States six modern modified Spruance- class destroyers (two were cancelled in 1976), and in 1977, he ordered three 7Y///£-class submarines. Also, Iran ordered from Europe six “Type-209”- class submarines and 12 “F-122”-class missile frigates. (None of these vessels, however, was actually delivered.)
Thus, at the end of the Shah’s rule in early 1979, the Iranian Navy was a formidable force. It possessed three missile destroyers, four missile frigates, nine fast missile boats, and four conventional but modern corvettes. Three missile boats were on the verge of delivery, and 4 missile destroyers, 12 missile frigates, and 9 submarines were on order. This enormous force was served by an expanding personnel of more than 20,000, operating from three modern naval bases on the Gulf alone.
relatively sluggish. Iraq acquired from the Soviet Union in 1972-76 six “Osa I”-class (two since deleted) and eight “Osa II”-class missile boats equipped with the effective “Styx” SSMs. Two exSoviet “T-43”-class ocean minesweepers, the only vessels in the Gulf capable of laying mines, were also delivered. In 1977-79, Iraq received four Polish- built ex-Soviet “PoInocny”-class tank landing craft (LCT) with rocket launchers and guns, also the only ones of their kind in the Gulf. Although Iraq acquired unrivaled capabilities of laying mines and
The Iraqi response to this huge naval buildup was
landing tanks, it was clear by the end of 1978 that its navy was no match for the Iranian fleet—incontestably the master of the Persian Gulf with bright prospects of remaining so in the future.
This outlook suddenly changed when the dramatic events of 1978-79 resulted in the virtual dissolution of the Iranian armed forces. The Khomeini regime hastened to cancel all the naval orders in the United States and in Europe, insisting only on the delivery of the remaining three already-paid-for fast missile boats from France. (These were delivered in August 1981, but one was hijacked en route to Iran and held briefly by Iranian monarchists.) Because of the departure of the American and British maintenance teams and Iran’s inability to purchase spare parts, a number of ships have been laid up.
Iraq quickly capitalized on Iran’s plight. In 1978, it ordered from Yugoslavia a training frigate capable of carrying four SSMs (reportedly delivered in 1981); in 1979, it ordered six modern French-made fast missile boats, and according to unconfirmed 1981.) By 1980, Iraqi naval manpower had rapidly increased to more than 4,000, and it is scheduled to expand to 28,000.
Thus, since mid-1980, the tide has turned. Even if the unconfirmed deals are excluded, Iraq’s vessels (including those on order) outnumber and outrank Iran's. Iraq possesses 11 major missile-equipped vessels, 20 small missile craft, 12 torpedo boats, 2 minelaying vessels, and 4 tank-landing craft; while Iran possesses 7 major missile-equipped vessels, 12 small missile craft, and 4 conventional major vessels. Moreover, part of the Iranian Navy is out of commission and its further expansion is terminated.
But Iraq was not content with the prospect of surpassing Iran in naval hardware; it still wanted a safe naval base. One of the reasons Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 was without doubt because of its desire to push the Iranians far enough from the Shatt al-Arab waterway to enable Iraq to control the access to Basra. Better yet, Iraq hoped to occupy the Iranian naval base at Khorramshar on the
reports, three Soviet-built “Foxtrot”-class patrol submarines and ten Soviet-made gas turbine-powered “Nanuchka”-class missile corvettes. In early 1980, Iraq completed a deal with Italy for the delivery of four 2,500-ton modified Lupo-class gas turbine frigates with eight Teseo (Italian Oto- mat Mk-2) over-the-horizon SSMs and eight Italian- made Albatros SAMs, and six 650-ton corvettes with four Teseos. (After being held up for more than a year because of U. S. objections [the gas turbines are U. S.-made], the deal was approved in March
Shatt, which is far closer to the Gulf than is Basra.
Iraq’s expectations for a blitzkrieg failed, and the Iraqi forces have been bogged down in an indecisive and costly war. Recognizing this, Iraq’s officials have indicated that Iraq would be satisfied with the Shatt al-Arab itself and that withdrawal from all occupied Iranian territory is possible. In other words, Iraq has given up its strategic objective.
Hence, despite its prodigious efforts to reverse its inherent weakness as a Gulf power, Iraq has been forced to live with the reality of depending on two naval bases whose access is entirely controlled by foreign (and, in one case, hostile) countries. This weakness is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, partially hampering Iraq’s naval challenge to Iran even if it maintains its projected material superiority. Furthermore, in the only reported major naval battle of the Iraq-Iran war (November 1980), Iran claimed it sank 11 Iraqi naval vessels. Iraq announced it sank three Iranian naval units. Although no reliable reports of this battle have been made available, military observers believe Iran scored a major naval victory.
Nonetheless, in the short run, Iraq is likely to achieve naval superiority over its adversary. Iran’s deepening internal political crisis has affected the capabilities of its navy, which may be approaching total paralysis. Iraq’s naval expansion, by contrast, will probably continue smoothly. In the long run, in order to reverse this trend, Iran will need a stable regime intent on surpassing Iraq’s naval strength by using Iran’s superior resources and naval bases.
Saudi Arabia: In the meantime, a third Gulf state has joined the naval race. In 1969, Saudi Arabia purchased three modern torpedo boats from Germany. In January 1972, it signed an agreement with the United States for a ten-year program to provide six missile corvettes and four LCTs. Four 815-ton “PCG-1 ’’-class corvettes, each armed with eight Harpoon SSMs, ordered in 1977, are being delivered, as are nine U. S.-made 384-ton missile craft, each armed with four Harpoons. In October 1980, Saudi Arabia ordered four French frigates equipped with eight long-range Otomat SSMs and Crotale Navale SAMs.
Saudi Arabia has also rapidly expanded its naval manpower, which already exceeds 2,000. When its present naval program is completed, it will have eight major missile-equipped vessels, nine missile boats, and three torpedo boats. This would put it in the same league as Iran and Iraq. With four adequate naval bases on the Gulf and virtually unlimited financial resources, Saudi Arabia should be in a good position to surpass both the Iranian and the Iraqi navies in the not-too-distant future. However, it still has the problem of defending two widely separated coasts.
The Other Gulf States: Taking their cue from the “Big Three,” all the other Gulf states have joined the naval race. Oman was the first, ordering three gunboats from England in January 1971; four more of the same type were ordered in April 1974. Oman was also the first minor Gulf state to enter the missile age when it had its three original boats refitted with two short-range, French-made Exocet SSMs in 197778. One of these was lost in a hurricane in December 1978, and consequently Oman ordered a larger replacement missile craft. Two more are now on order. In addition, a 2,000-ton British-built landing and command ship joined the fleet in 1979.
In late 1977, the United Arab Emirates ordered six “TNC-45”-class missile boats with two Exocet SSMs from West Germany. (The first two were delivered in 1980.) From the same source, Bahrain orderd two “TNC-45”-class missile boats with four Exocet SSMs, two gunboats in 1979, and two missile boats in 1980. Kuwait ordered eight missile boats from West Germany in 1980 and is believed to be in the market for a frigate. Qatar ordered three “Combattante”-class French missile boats in September 1980.
Hence, all the minor Gulf states have already joined the naval missile age or will do so in the near future. Clearly, however, none of them has made any effort to approximate the enormous naval programs of Iran, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia. Their motivation in establishing small missile-equipped navies seems to be a mixture of mutual jealousies and a quest for security and prestige. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any navy depends more on the quality of its manpower than on the numbers and types of its vessels. In this respect, all the Gulf states suffer from equally serious weaknesses.
Conclusion: Despite the wavering U. S. efforts to take up the old British role of naval control in the Gulf, the naval race among the local Gulf states is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Its significance far exceeds the narrow confines of the Gulf. The security of the oil’s shipment to the West through the Gulf will partially depend on the protection provided by the Saudi Navy and the navies of the minor Gulf states. Since the Saudi naval units are not only eminently suitable for this particular task in the Gulf but also totally restricted to it, it is in the West’s interests to aid Saudi Arabia's naval buildup more than the expansion of its ground and air forces. Although the combined strengths of the navies of Saudi Arabia and the five small Gulf states protect the West’s oil resources, the Iraqi Navy constitutes a potential threat to them, and Iran has been hostile to the West and its local allies since 1979. The events in Iran have clearly demonstrated that for the West, reliance on local allies in the Gulf region is nothing more than a stopgap policy. The United States will be able to provide long-term security for the West’s oil sources in the Gulf only if it can respond rapidly and effectively to any threat in the area.
Mr. Danziger received a Ph.D. in Near Eastern studies from Princeton University in 1974. For five years, he taught modern Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa in Israel and later Middle Eastern and European history at the University of Washington in Seattle. He has served as a consultant on Middle Eastern affairs for the Hudson Institute, and in addition to a book and a number of articles on 19th-century North Africa, he has had several pieces published on the contemporary Middle East in the Los Angeles Times and Seattle Times.