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J
Leadership”
®ee H.G. Rickover, p. 82, January 1981 Proceedings)
On Leading Snipes”
®ee J- Stavridis, pp. 74-76, January 1981 Proceedings)
The Education of a Warrior”
^ee T. B. Buell, pp. 41-45, January 1981;
A. Dun, p. 21, February 1981 Proceedings)
Moral Leadership”
(See J. B. Stockdale, pp. 86-89, September 1980; D. M. Lee, pp. 77-78, November 1980; G. E. Miller, p. 82, January 1981 Proceedings)
Commander G. IV. Loveridge, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I sincerely hope that Admiral Rickover’s succinct comments will precipitate a speedy demise °f the Proceedings Leadership Forum. Admiral Rickover’s criteria cover in ltfle more than four column-inches d'at which Lieutenant Stavridis reared some 48 column-inches to state- Further, the "bantering give- and-take” between officers and enlisted personnel suggested by Lieutenant Stavridis is remarkably representative of the type of discourse ad- cessed in the last sentence of the admiral’s comment.
T R- McDonnell—Over the years, the r,jceedings has performed an extremely Valuable service to the Navy in provides an open forum for people con- Cetned about our maritime strength. “/Sain, it has enabled a problem to be ■scussed and the cause identified.
The January issue had both articles a°d comment and discussion items c°ncerning the proper balance of ^chnology, management, and leader- mp- For example, Commander Buell Stated in his article: “There is a perva- SlVe mood in the Navy today that marine engineering skills are the key combat readiness—that if only the Davy’s propulsion plants can be made more reliable, other problems will /‘mehow become more manageable.” °mrnents about retention brought to m*nd the major problem the Navy has with its premier technological program—nuclear power. Better retention is the CNO’s number one objective, and judging by the size of the new bonuses paid to nuclear-trained officers, retention of these officers is the Navy’s number one people problem.
In an extraordinary set of circumstances, a cause of the technology/ management/people problem was unintentionally identified when Admiral Rickover provided us with his principles of leadership in his discussion item. Not one of his four principles includes anything about attributes which result in inspiring our people to perform above and beyond their normal abilities. In fact, Admiral Rickover dismisses such attributes as “sophomoric drivel.”
The comparison between Admiral Rickover’s comment and the one immediately following is striking. Admiral Rickover’s approach of strong supervisory management principles versus Admiral Miller’s comment about Admiral Stockdale’s moral leadership could not provide greater contrast between a person who confuses management with leadership and a person who really knows what leadership is. More important, I submit that it points out a major cause for poor retention of nuclear-trained people and that is a lack of understanding of basic leadership principles at the top of the nuclear power program.
Commander L. D. Chirillo, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Rickover’s attack on “young inexperienced officers” dismisses debate, using age as authority. Forums, such as provided by the Proceedings, are indispensable for peacetime tests of opinions on naval matters.
Leadership is not esoteric and undefinable. It is concrete, and so important that it demands continued expression by each and every officer.
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Leadership
On Leading Snipes The Education of a Warrior Moral Leadership Lord Louis
Combined Amphibious Operations in Northern Europe
The AVF—Making It Work
P. D.-59: The Beginning of a New Nuclear Strategy
The Quest for Ancient Gold
The Path to Four Stars
Pentagonese, Be Gone!
Degrees of Naval Warfare
Which Williamson Turn?
Compared with Admiral Rickover’s four principles, Douglas Freeman put it better: “Know your stuff; take care of your men; be a man.”
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My
Lord’s trip was to prepare him fof 3
desks. Another friend, whose Pro:
,fes-
be
filled me in on what it was like to
caught red-handed by the KGB roll of film of the Kola Inlet in °neS briefcase seem greatly to be preferred-
of the
“Lord Louis”
(See Duke of Edinburgh, pp. 26-35, February 1980; J. D. Ferguson and F. Poole, p. 22, April 1980; G. Newcomb and L. E. Vargas Carballeo, pp. 87-88, July 1980; B. M. Simpson, p. 101, October 1980 Proceedings)
Captain John Coote, Royal Navy (Retired)—An irreverent—aren’t they all?—headline writer might have created "Rickie Snubs Dickie” to de
scribe the 1955 non-meeting between Admirals Mountbatten and Rickover, in which I played a small role.
I arrived in Washington, D.C., in April 1955 for a two-year appointment as the submariner on the British Joint Services Mission. Only weeks previously, Commander Gene Wilkinson had flashed the historic signal from the Nautilus: “Underway on nuclear power.” At the very moment that 1 reported to my admiral in the old Main Navy Building on Constitution Avenue, she was surfacing off San Juan, Puerto Rico, having averaged 16 knots submerged on a 1,400-mile shakedown cruise from New London.
On 20 June 1955, Congress ratified the U. S./U. K. Military Atomic Co-Operation Agreement which, at first glance, augured well. It stated, inter alia, that “the USA may exchange with the UK such atomic information as the USA considers necessary for the development of the UK’s defense planS . . .” Just who was going to exercise the discretion ominously permitted by the wording of the agreement was not at first apparent. We were soon to find but.
A visit to Washington by our newly apointed First Sea Lord (Admiral Lot Mountbatten) was planned for November. The CNO, Admiral At leigh Burke, shared the views 0 Commander Submarines Atlantic (Rear Admiral Frank T. Watkins) that it would be appropriate for Mountbat ten to be the first British officer to g° to sea in the Nautilus, and thus t0 have his well-known instant enthusiasm sparked off. The itinerary was drawn up accordingly.
contribution to the First Sea
meeting with Admiral Hyman R'c over. It seemed to me like briefing Romanov to meet Rasputin. I "aS well aware of the unprecedented step5 which had been needed to get R|C over promoted to flag rank.
By invitation of one of his staff 'v happened to have ridden my boat dot ing the previous year’s Flag Offi^ef Submarines’ Summer War, I got as ar as having coffee in Admiral Rickovet outer office with (could it have been- Lieutenant Jimmy Carter shuffling t02 secret papers out of my sight at one or t sional qualities were of the highest orde^
rejected for the nuclear program afief being catechised by the admiral. On 1 whole it made the prospect of be'n$
with a
My personal acquaintance
admiral at that time was limited to a one-sided discussion on the tarmac of Honolulu Airport. Oddly enough, it was during a long break between aircraft movements that he suddenly turned on me and asserted that, next to O’Hare, Honolulu was the busiest airport in the world. I fell straight into the trap, mentioning Heathrow as a possible contender for that dubious honor. I promptly got both barrels at full caliber, complete with statistics and all their sources. The ensuing ride to San Francisco was in total silence. Presumably he was getting his thoughts straight after the first holiday he had taken in seven years—a two-day stopover in the Islands. I started writing my piece for the First Sea Lord.
I told Mountbatten how, despite a frustrating and friendless naval career, towards the end of it (sic) Rickover had emerged as the single-minded, singlehanded progenitor of the nuclear submarine. From the day Admiral Chester Nimitz signed his famous letter to the Secretary of Defense in December 1947 stating a firm military requirement for the nuclear-powered submarine, Rickover took off. Here are extracts from what I wrote nearly a quarter of a century ago:
“The story of the building of NAUTILUS reveals a restless, lonely and ruthless man, working around the clock to get the boat to sea regardless of opposition. It is said that he stoops to quite unethical methods if the end justifies the means—as they always have in his book. For example, he would play off one firm or department against another by attributing quite untrue statements to each other.
“It is difficult to assess Admiral Rickover’s true importance today. One must presume that, by virtue of continuing to hold the chief responsibility for the development of naval reactors both in the Bureau and the AEC, he is now engaged in implementing the USN’s recently declared policy to put nuclear propulsion into all ships which will be employed in offensive roles, includ
ing CVAs and their escorts.
“But there are many who are eager to point out that his mission was accomplished with the launching of NAUTILUS; and that he will now be discarded as not being whole-heartedly behind nuclear power for surface ships. In any case, they say that he is not a physicist so much as a hard-driving co-ordinator of a specific engineering project, who has made too many enemies w the process for his survival in the Navy.
“Much of this is wishful thinking by his detractors. The USN Submarine Force freely admits that, but for him, NAUTILUS would not be at sea today. They regard him as being more influential than any other serving officer, except perhaps the CNO himself. They accept as a painful necessity his dictatorial methods. Some even explain his boorish manners and insulting conversational gambits simply as devices to make his listeners remember what he has to say.
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“One thing is certain: Rickover will pursue his self-appointed course regardless of the opinions of friend or foe, particularly friend. Even his bitterest enemies cannot deny his single-minded devotion to duty. Nor have they ever attributed to him ambitions for commercial or financial rewards—now or in the future. Nor can he be dismissed outright as a megalomaniac. Whilst he shuns personal publicity of any sort, he has carefully built himself a solid political lobby and the support of the most influential voices in the media and in the highest corridors of power to maintain the priorities he needs for the continuation of his nuclear programme.
“In this respect he bears an uncanny resemblance to the Royal Navy’s Jacky Fisher, who became First Sea Lord in 1905 at the age of 64 and proceeded to ram through his revolutionary DREADNOUGHT programme, which gave Britain the lead in high-speed, hard-hitting capital ships long before the Great
War broke out. Nothing was allowed to stand in his path, even those amongst the highest in the land who mistrusted his methods and feared for sacred naval traditions being dismantled.
“To further his aims, Fisher used the Press and friends in Parliament to a degree hitherto unknown. He wrote anonymous articles in ‘THE OBSERVER’. Friendly journalists got special briefings from him. Soon the public took up his cry: 'We want eight, and we won’t wait’. The resemblance does not end in the two Admirals’ drive and ruthlessness, as their portraits show. But to find out what makes Hyman Rickover tick, it is necessary to start by taking account of a lifetime spent in antipathetic surroundings. In the end one has to settle for the fact that he is motivated by a love of the Service which he joined as an expedient and which has repeatedly reminded him how unwelcome he is, rather than by hope of honours, self-aggrandise
ment or financial reward.”
It should be said that Mountbatten himself was no slouch when it came to manipulating official or public opinion. For him also the end justified the means, but he got his way with kid- gloved finesse. Note how he used the Emperor of Ethiopia at a reception in Buckingham Palace within earshot of Prince Philip to railroad a distinctly reluctant Prime Minister Churchill into endorsing his appointment as First Sea Lord on the spot.
Unhappily, he did not meet Rickover during his first visit to Washington. At the 11th hour, the trip in the Nautilus was blocked, much to Admiral Burke’s chagrin and embarrassment. Instead, a flying visit to Key West was arranged so that Mountbatten could see for himself how the Al- bacore performed, while dived, at 30 knots. The trip made a lasting impression, for the First Sea Lord always set great store by precise ship-handling at high speeds.
(.Continued on page 99)
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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 21)
£ on of the top-level U.K. Nu-
Lord Louis”—Continued
Nor did our Flag Officer Submarines, Rear Admiral Sam Woods, are any better when he came over early the next year. Again there was much embarrassment and some un- Pr,ritable explanations offered.
The Uranium Curtain had been "'ell and truly rung down.
The official explanation was that e 1955 Agreement was never intended to cover nuclear propulsion. Ven the Supplementary Agreement Passed by Congress on 14 June 1956 ‘h not immediately open an SSN’s 0re'hatch to British officers. It was ^lacted to permit “the exchange of in- rmation on military power reactors, deluding those for the propulsion of j^aval vessels.” Objections were raised y the AEC and the Joint Committee ?.n Atomic Energy, so the Secretary of efense and indeed the White House ad to settle for the British having acCess °nly to data on the Nautilus and ®eneral information about nuclear ship Pf°pulsion reactors.
.To hark back to 1955: as
°untbatten flew home after being Publicly ostracized by the Nuclear ^Pulsion Club, he wondered how ‘ckover could be persuaded to hand ?Ver to the British the fruits of his ^ 8n endeavor, when he had shown •niself to be so out of sympathy with m°st flag officers in his own navy, let ne those in other navies. It took «y two years to bring about a etlng between them. The effort was
far-reaching as ‘r was unexPectecL
Lip6 lntroverl: ‘conoclast from the fame, who had, by his own efforts, en to be one of the most powerful t^en *n the Western world, fell under e spell and aura of Queen Victoria's ^tcat grandson. Yet, this unlikely 'endship overcame much of the th Ue deIay wLich the development of e British SSN had already suffered, g n March 1958, Rickover visited j^'tain. He arrived at the Ministry of go'etlCe w^de there was a meeting
clear Advisory Committee to consider a gloomy progress report of the British-designed propulsion system for HMS Dreadnought. Suddenly, Mount- batten entered the room with his guest from Washington at his side. He announced that the two of them had just shaken hands on a deal to install a complete Skipjack propulsion unit in our first nuclear submarine. Apart from his last-ditch attempt to retain an absolute veto on all Royal Navy officers appointed to our own SSN program, relations with Rickover thereafter went smoothly.
They were further improved in 1961, when Rickover finally met someone in the U. K. defense world whom he considered worthy of his confidence. Sir Solly (now Lord) Zuc- kerman was the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence. His qualifications and international stature as a scientist were such that they could not be brushed aside, as were most of our experts who came into the Rickover orbit when the 1956 Agreement finally led to bilateral talks. They became close and remain so, to the great benefit of the Royal Navy’s SSBN program in its formative stages.
By 1958, I was in my second year as Operations Officer to the Home Fleet and CinCEastLant. Still, no foreigner had been allowed on board a U. S. Navy SSN. Without any warning or explanation, a signal reached the flagship from the Admiralty offering us the operational control of the Nautilus for a week’s operational evaluation against our ASW forces. The exercise was code-named “Rum Tub” and took place in October 1958. It pitched Commander William Anderson and his crew against our top submarines, frigates, and airborne forces. It culminated in a spectacular event in. the North-West Approaches, when the Nautilus successfully acted as an integral part of the antisubmarine screen for the carrier Bulwark, maintaining her station and tactical involvement by UQC and sonar without the slightest difficulty. It was a devastating demonstration of her potential, which changed our thinking forever.
At the post-exercise conference at Londonderry, I was able to say so with some authority, having written into the “Rum Tub” orders that a Royal Navy observer should ride the Nautilus.
Maybe Admiral Rickover had forgotten our conversation at Honolulu Airport, or never got word of the name of the first Royal Navy officer ordered to sea in an American SSN under operational conditions.
“Combined Amphibious
Operations in Northern Europe”
(See J. H. Alexander, pp. 26-32, November
1980 Proceedings)
Major General Sir Steuart R. Pringle, Bt., Chief of Staff, Department of the Commandant General Royal Marines—I was much heartened and refreshed by nearly everything Colonel Alexander had to say. However, I write to correct a view he might have engendered in the minds of your readers on the deterrent role of the Royal Marines and our brothers in arms, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, in Northern Europe. For many years, we have seen a different emphasis in the nature of deterrent operations than that perceived by the U. S. Marine Corps, but it never, in my view, involves “walking ashore like gentlemen.” Whatever the nature of the reinforcing role envisaged, we would always plan to land tactically both as a counter to the unexpected and as a confidencebuilding measure to our allies; walking ashore through a port is a last resort and within the army’s capability.
“The AVF—Making It Work”
(See D. Evans, pp. 47-53, December 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Joseph B. Hamilton, U. S. Navy—The United
States deserves the military it now has. The underlying principle is that, in a free country, we will indeed get the military we pay for. The all-volunteer force will work, but we must pay the price.
Major Evans states that it is too early to consider returning to the draft. I would go further: Conscription is slavery and should be considered an unacceptable solution to military personnel problems. Besides being morally wrong, the draft will provide few professionals in the job areas which the military drastically needs filled.
“P. D.-59: The Beginning of a New Nuclear Strategy”
CSee E. F. Black, pp. 93-94, January 1981 Proceedings)
Robert C. Smith—After the sixth paragraph, General Black’s feature begins to suffer from extremes of misinformation. General Black states that a counterforce attack would be directed against unpopulated areas in the main. That will surely be a comfort to all the people in Little Rock, Arkansas, when their city is subjected to near misses directed against the Titan II-equipped 308th Strategic Missile Wing and the 97th Bomb Wing stationed nearby. Many other installations are also located near major population centers.
Calculations do not show only “several million dead Americans” so casually dismissed by the general, but somewhere between 1% and 11% of the population as immediate fatalities. In either case, the impact on a nation that has managed to avoid any trace of war on its shores for nearly a century can be quite significant, despite the statements to the contrary by General Black. In fact, the lower casualty rate assumes that the United States has some sort of civil defense network in operation at the instant of attack. Unfortunately, even the poorly conceived Crisis Relocation Plan will not be operable until the late 1980s at the earliest, and even then, the entire effort will depend on absolutely accurate intelligence data and its prompt interpretation to allow this plan to even get under way. Thus, to use General Black’s own words, we will be exposed to a preemptive strike by the Soviets during our “window of vulnerability and will not have the means available to protect our population.
Equally, we do not have “an ace m the hole.” The concept of launch under attack presupposes that we will have instantaneous warning of an attack (the 30 minutes General Black mentions). The difficulty is that the Minuteman force could well be pinned down by a series of continuous attacks by SLBM detonations over the silos- The missiles simply could not get through the massive barrage of blast* thermal, and radiation effects and would be forced to remain in their silos until the ICBMs arrived.
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This attack could very well take place given the fact that an SLBM coul be over a missile field in a matter
f've to six minutes. Even assuming that the launch was detected immediately, this time span falls well W|thin the period necessary to funnel [fie information to the president, re- P°rt, make a decision, and return confirming orders for launch. This does n°t assume that any time is wasted at any stage of the operation, and that (he wimex computer is on line and is n°t assumed to be acting up again.
fact, the launch-under-attack strategy js severely destabilizing in rhat it implies a hair-trigger reaction 'fiat is not consistent with the various 'teaties that the United States has entered into over the years and further assumes that the Soviets will not take
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Vantage of a series of pindown at- |acks to eliminate the dangers posed y the Minuteman force. The possibil- "y °fi human or mechanical error in SUcfi a response is great, and there is n° way that we can guarantee the ‘multaneous elimination of the 0viets’ slbm platforms to prevent SUch an occurrence.
“The Quest for Ancient Gold”
(See S. M. Voynick, pp. 66-7 1, December
1980 Proceedings)
Daniel F. Buckley—I found it disheartening that the Proceedings would print such an unworthy article. These pillagers of history don’t deserve encouragement; instead, they richly deserve condemnation for their greedy efforts to recover gold and artifacts from historical wrecks at the loss of any enlightening discoveries which might have been made had the wreck been excavated by trained archaeologists.
Archaeology and treasure hunting need not be viewed as being at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Indeed, they can work hand in hand, but the only reason that the two are not combined is that it would take extra time and money to do the research, thereby diminishing the financial return to the seagoing pillagers.
I chose to believe that the editorial decision to run “The Quest for Ancient Gold” was a temporary lapse in judgment and not a forecast of worse to come.
“The Path to Four Stars”
(See R. M. Ancell, pp. 46-5 I, January 1981
Proceedings)
Captain A. Jones, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I was sorry to find out how the system really works. During my career, 1 believed the myth that all officers had free and fair access to promotions based on merit.
The deadly defect with the Nitze system is that when the Secretary of the Navy decides to play God, he produces people in his own image.
I am sure that Mr. Nitze must look back at his work of creating admirals and pronounce his creation good. But, the real world does not always agree with the image-maker’s plans. Can we say that the Navy after Mr. Nitze and his clones is stronger than the one they inherited?
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“Pentagonese, Be Gone!”
(See R. A. Fliegel, pp. 35-39, January 1981 Proceedings)
Captain Joseph K. Taussig, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—Through a rather colorful naval career and a tour as the Secretary-Treasurer of the Naval Institute, as well as the nominal editor of the Proceedings, I have been a lifelong aficionado of cutting out what Commander Fliegel calls “Pentagonese.”
1 recall the comment of my predecessor as Secretary-Treasurer, the late Rear Admiral Bruce McCandless, when he was taken to task by one of our purist semanticists for an alleged misuse of syntax. (Then) Captain McCandless looked the word up in the dictionary, and snorted, “Hell, I always thought that syntax was a special levy on a bawdy house.”
What Commander Fliegel is really getting at, and I suspect he is too much of a gentleman to say it, is that a bunch of intellectuals and directive jockeys have gotten together to insult the intelligence of naval officers. This is manifested in the plethora of bureau manuals and other directives, which would challenge anyone to wade through, and such nonsense as the Writing Guide for Naval Officers.
Our profession is—or at least mine was—to be fighting men. In my one trial by fire at Pearl Harbor, I vividly remember ignoring all the gunfire rules and procedures which I was supposed to follow as an antiaircraft director officer. I saw the Jap airplanes and yelled out: “Shoot at the sons-of- bitches!”
And darned if the crews didn’t do just that!
Commander Fliegel has gotten something by the throat that needs throttling; I hope he keeps up his efforts.
“Degrees of Naval Warfare”
(See L. Dale Smith, pp. 28-33, December 1980 Proceedings)
Major Robert P. Fairchild, U.S. Army—I’m bothered by the author’s assertion that “the officer . . . needs the degree ... for his own selfesteem.” I believe that sufficient selfesteem for any of us should derive from the privilege of wearing the uniform of any service of the U. S. armed forces. Edward Luttwak has noted m Parameters (the U. S. Army War College’s journal) that although masters and doctorate degrees are common among our officer corps, the study ° pure military and naval science has been neglected. He cites the faile April 1980 Iranian rescue attempt as evidence.
Credentialism, or the mania to acquire suitably inscribed certificate5’ afflicts the larger society, and 1111 afraid that in our officer corps it 15 made worse by the desire of many 10 prepare for civilian careers after then current military one.
Captain Smith is correct to exhort us to refocus on honing our skills 1° waging war, and to recognize, with>n our services, members who impr°ve themselves as wielders of the sword.
“Which Williamson Turn?”
(See O. F. Williams, pp. 112-113, July 1979’ J. A. Williamson, pp. 89-92, October 197 • J. Stilwell, pp. 86-87, January 1980
Proceedings)
Captain Paulo Bracy Gama da SiPa’ Brazilian Navy (Retired)—The f‘rSt time I ever heard of a “Willia111501!. Turn" was in 1948 when on a tout 0 duty on board the Harold J. ElHs°n (DD-864). I was then a lieutenant’ senior grade, and found that the ‘ liamson Turn” has been in use in 1 Brazilian Navy, at least since I waS midshipman (1934-38), but it waS known as the “Boutakow Turn.”
The description of the procedure’ exactly as it appears in the aftic under “The U. S. Navy Method, c*n be found in Arte Navale (1934), by ’ Baistrocchi. The only difference is tbfj Baistrocchi mentions the helm shou be shifted when heading 70° from 1 e initial course, instead of 60°. ,
During World War II, I practice^ man overboard drills many times an always used to turn 70° with my !'•' foot PC, with success. I would recorn mend that every skipper should d termine, with a few drills, the exact angle for his ship, because even ships of the same design require different angles for a precise maneuver.
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