Needed: Flying Squadrons For Flexibility

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even worse consequence. Only time will tell what

The Lack of Flexibility: To respond to the Iranian hostage crisis which began in late 1979, the Navy was forced to divert ships from other duties. In many respects, this is not surprising, considering the fact that since 1969, the fleet has shrunk from just below 1,000 ships to fewer than 500. In responding to the crisis, the Navy had to strip the two sup­posedly ready, forward fleets, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, of one carrier each, something not done even during the Vietnam War.

Understandably, this diversion of ships has both military and political consequences. Even in a small, relatively closed sea such as the Mediterranean, one carrier cannot do everything, and one carrier in the vast Western Pacific is even less able. Politically,

this has worried our allies and could have cn^use' problems. For example, when President Park Ch Hee of South Korea was assassinated in October 17 and there were some fears that North Korea m'S take advantage of that crisis, no American card^er group was available in those waters to serve as a terrent.

While the carrier problem has received the 11(105 attention from the news media, there have been oth^e strains. Generally unnoticed is the fact that 1 marine amphibious groups from the Sixth ^afl Seventh Fleets have also been rotated to the Ind>^an Ocean for periods of time, depriving the ready A^eetS of those assets during their absence. Strains have al^s° been placed on the cruiser/destroyer forces and ^ shrinking auxiliary fleet. And, perhaps, there <^s

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The term “flying squadron” stirs the imagination as it evokes the dashing image of Spanish-American War ships sallying forth to protect the U. S. East Coast. Now that American interests are global in scope, there is a legitimate role for a new flying squadron of aging but still powerful U. S. warships.

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gent, as have the Australians, including their

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America, especially in the Caribbean where the

ultimate effect will be on morale and readiness.

Possible solutions to the problem have been of­fered, but a closer examination of all these sug­gestions shows some serious problems:

►  A Fifth Fleet for the Indian Ocean. Long before the Iranian crisis, there was a perceived naval “gap” in this area, especially after the British pulled out their ships from “East of Suez” in the late 1960s. While the French have maintained a few ships in this area, the only permanent U. S. presence was provided by the Middle East Force—a converted amphibious transport dock (LPD) as flagship and a couple of de­stroyers or frigates. Considering the fact that the In­dian Ocean contains the sea-lanes for most of the West’s oil, this was a serious strategic flaw.

The difficulty the Navy would encounter in trying to create another permanent fleet is the problem that exists now—too few ships. A fleet really needs two carrier battle groups and with two each in a Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleet, this would mean back-to- back deployments for the current carrier force. Such deployments simply could not go on. There would, of course, be similar problems with other naval forces. Even if the ships could somehow be main­tained, there would be serious doubts about morale. There are just not enough ships to create another forward fleet.

►  Decreased Forces. Of course, there is the option of decreasing the forces in each fleet. It has long been suggested in some quarters that the Sixth Fleet be permanently reduced to only one carrier. In addition, with one carrier home-ported in Japan, maybe only one more would be needed occasionally for the Seventh Fleet. If the fleets were simply there for presence or political uses, having only one carrier group in each fleet could be a solution. However, from a strictly military viewpoint, this would be more than just a 50% reduction. First, there is the time-honored military rule of redundancy—that is, having something in reserve. Having only one of anything would tend to make a military commander extremely cautious, especially if that one item were something as important as an aircraft carrier. Perhaps an even more important factor is that having two provides the means for mutual support, additional missions, different directions of attack, more surprise capability, and so forth, that simply are not available with one, whether that one is a plane, tank, or ship. Decreasing the size of our forces would be a risky business.

►  Increased Shipbuilding. A longer term solution would be increased shipbuilding. While this author supports such a proposal wholeheartedly, there are some very real, practical problems, the most impor­tant being the time necessary. Newport News Ship^­building, the only yard now capable of building nuclear-powered carriers, has just started the fourth Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carrier with the keel laying scheduled for later this year. The ship, CVN-71, will not be completed before 1987. Even if Newport News were authorized to build another carrier be* yond CVN-71, the later ship probably would not be ready until perhaps 1990 or later. Thus, in order to have sufficient forces for another fleet—at least fo^ur new carriers—the Navy would have to wait until around the turn of the century. While frigates, de­stroyers, and auxiliary ships could be built more quickly, there would still be time problems. short, it is virtually impossible to build enough ship⁵ to have another “fleet” anytime within the near f^u ture.

► Increased Allied Support. Still another possible solo tion that has been suggested would be for more alh^e support, especially in such areas as the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. The allies have, in fact, m^a quite a few contributions to the temporary India⁰ Ocean task force. The French have a strong f°^rce with everything from a carrier to some minesweep^erS that would have been vitally needed had the Strait Hormuz been mined. The British have sent a contm carrier. In general, the allies should be applauded °^r their response to the Iranian situation.

While the allied navies will be important, ^eV^ vital, in any serious crisis or war situation, they “ not have the quantity or quality of ships to supP > much help on a permanent basis. Like the Ametk^ fleet, generally the allied fleets have also sh^ over the last decade. A critical problem would lack of air power. While Britain, France, Italy. ^atl^ Spain are all building vertical or short takeoff ^atl^ landing (V/STOL) carriers, only France maintain⁵ credible air power capability in two conventional ^cat riers. A multinational force like the NATO Standing

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Naval Force Atlantic could be a solution, but t has serious political problems.         .

The long acknowledged fact which the It^an crisis brought home is that the Navy does not n enough ships for both normal requirements and c^fl response. The only foreseeable alternatives are to n ^ reduced capabilities in certain forward areas °^r ^ have reduced reserves able to “surge” forward, liance on allies is, at best, only a temporary soluti^or^

Also, although the Indian Ocean is a vital area, highlighted by the Iranian crisis, we should not myopic. There are potential problems in Soutn Africa. There have been serious problems in La

t_er w^taC^ ^tde United States. The Spanish Minis- acine did, in fact, after the sinking of the destro ^a<^^V*^se Admiral Pasquale Cervera to be ready to th_en ^t^^le -American base at Key West, Florida,’ and I\f_av ^t0 blockade the U. S. East Coast. While the of g Preferred to keep its Atlantic Fleet intact, fears fleet ^an*^S^ ^attacks brought forth a compromise. The k_ear ^d‘^v*ded mco two main parts. One, under Ke_y                            William T. Sampson, was based at

ag_aj ^est’ Florida, ready to take the offensive Flyj ^St ^^uba and Puerto Rico. The other, called the Schff Sq,^Uadron- was under Commodore Winfield S. foil- r ^and operated as a mobile fortress out of Nor- Th°^rp^t*^le P^roteccl°ⁿ of the Atlantic Coast. mos_ti ylog Squadron was not without its critics, Alfr^ -f ^ecause cc split the fleet. As Rear Admiral bayer Mahan observed afterward, “The need

haT^ ^t0 have a permanent force but now only ^a command.” Many commentators have won- ^ered why there is no permanent U. S. Navy pres- ^^Ce in the North Atlantic region which would be a a!°.^{r area} °h conflict in any war. There are potential _ar ^{erns ln f}he Southeast Asia area, especially _ar°^{Un c}h^e Philippines and Indonesia. All of these _a ^as ^^anh probably more) could have equal claim for

in^^{errnanent deet} °^{r at} ^^east P^resence- 1° fact, creat- the ^ hleet could simply lock in more ships in pj^£ ndian Ocean as some critics contend the Sixth ct has locked ships into the Mediterranean. _res ^{n s}^^ort> ^fhe Navy does not have enough ships to ^pond either militarily or politically to serious °the^{S W}*^t^^{0ut r}°hbing Peter to pay Paul. On the «           « should be apparent that something

its T ^{e d}°^ne' While history does not exactly repeat fou J *^{S n0t} ^^{rst tlme t}h^e United States has _anjⁿ ccself in a similar situation with too few ships coo many commitments.

7^ Precedent for a Flying Squadron: During the Pachsh-American War, the United States, for tvar ^{lfSt t}*^me’ b^ad co fight a far-flung two-ocean l89^^n<^ ^{at t}^^{le same} cime protect the homeland. In ty ’ ^P^a‘ⁿ was not a major world power, but it Che ^cons*dered ^a power and had colonies in P'oes ^a/'^^^{ean an<}^ che Far East, with the Philip- °_n ? ^e*ng che most important. The Americans, Suest^{6 0t}^^er hand, were just completing the con- Fj_ni^{St r}h^eic own Western frontier. Although the heslP ^^tates had some modern cruisers and bat- P,,,. *^^S’ ch^ ^not have the large navy of some ^tU^Pean countries.

Sp_a ^t,^0u&h subsequent events showed that the at _t/^S hlavy was vastly overrated, there were fears ^w°uld ^egmninS ^{tdie war r}b^at ch^e Spanish fleet

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for keeping the Flying Squadron in Hampton Roads was imaginary.”¹ However, the Flying Squadron did provide much-needed psychological support for East Coast residents which should not be overlooked, and, it was available for the final battle against Admiral Cervera off Cuba.

A Modern Flying Squadron: Mahan, as usual, does bring up a very valid point—that forming another squadron by taking away ships which are ful­filling other requirements is shortsighted. Therefore, the first requirement for a new flying squadron should be that it would not detract from the present fleet. To do that would mean using older ships, ships not now in service, or ships which might be in tem­porary surplus. A second requirement is that in to­day’s environment, any such squadron should have air power. While this might sound like a tall order, one flying squadron could be formed as early as 1982 and another, for the other coast, could be formed by the end of the decade. The first could be formed around the Coral Sea (CV-43), which until recently had been scheduled to replace the Lexington (AVT-16) upon commissioning of the Carl Vinson (CVN-70) in 1982, and the second could be formed around the Midway (CV-41) with the building of CVN-71.

A brief explanation is needed. The Navy has, and needs, 13 aircraft carriers. It is generally accepted that there should be at least two carriers in the two forward fleets for a total of four. According to normal procedure, to keep one on station requires three al­together: one on station, one in training/reserve, and one in upkeep/overhaul. Therefore, to keep four for­ward requires a minimum of 12 carriers. However, an added problem is that the newer conventionally powered carriers are going through a service life ex­tension program (SLEP) which takes them out of commission for about two years. So, to keep 12 in the fleet requires 13 total. That is how many the Navy now has. However, it has now decided that the Coral Sea will be extended for active duty through 1986, so the Navy will temporarily have 14 carriers, a “surplus” of one. “Surplus” is in quotes because the Iranian crisis demonstrated how desperately another carrier is needed, but it is surplus according to the normal requirement of 13-

As early as 1982, a new “flying squadron” could be formed around the Coral Sea. Since she would be out of the rugged forward operating fleet cycle, it might then be possible to extend the carrier to the 1990 period. While admittedly a very old ship by the 1990s, the Coral Sea would still be more power­ful than the new Soviet carrier just being built. With the commissioning of the fourth, as yet unnamed,

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Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Best yet, this coil be done without detracting from the other U- ' Navy commitments.

► Political. Perhaps even more important than ^c military potential of the squadron would be its sy¹¹¹ bolic value as a political force. And this is one of rh^e

oft-

quoted Brookings study stated a few years ag° “Naval units participated in 177 of the 215 '^nCl dents, or more than four out of every five. 1 study continued:

“In short, the Navy clearly has been

carrier of the Nimitz class, the Midway would become available for another flying squadron in the mid to late 1980s.

In addition to air power, a truly flexible flying squadron should have some amphibious capability, ideally a versatile amphibious assault ship like the LPH or LHA. While the size of the amphibious war­fare fleet is shrinking, with seven ships of the lwo Jima (LPH-2) class and five of the new Tarawa (LHA-l) class, one at a time could be rotated for tours with the flying squadron. These ships, with 2,000-odd men apiece and 20 to 30 helicopters would add another dimension to the squadron. Just this two- ship squadron of the Coral Sea and an amphibious assault ship would constitute more power than most navies could muster.

A third ship that should be considered is the Oris- kany (CV-34), an Essex (CV-9)-class carrier now in the reserve fleet. Congress attempted last year to recom­mission the Oriskany, but it failed for two reasons— the question of whether there would be enough men for her crew and a question over her mission. The latter problem would be solved in a flying squadron. One of the arguments against recommissioning the Oriskany was that she would be able to handle only attack planes such as the A-7 and therefore would have to work in company with a larger carrier that had fighters like the F-14. In other words, she really could not carry the load as the second independent carrier for the forward fleets, because she would need carrier protection herself. However, placing the Oris­kany in the flying squadron with the Coral Sea would make sense. The Coral Sea could have the fighters, while the Oriskany would have the attack aircraft (which would be especially useful, of course, with the marines on board the LPH or LHA). Plus, with two carriers, there would be the mutuality of sup­port, some redundancy, that is needed. While the Oriskany with her Navy tactical data system (NTDS) is the best maintained carrier in the reserve fleet and the most logical for recommissioning, perhaps one of the others, maybe the Bon Homme Richard (CV-31), for example, could be refurbished enough for the second flying squadron built around the Midway. As escorts, I suggest the use of some of the older classes like the aging Forrest Sherman (DD-931) destroyers. These ships, which were built in the 1950s, will probably be retired within the next few years. Taking them off the front line might give them a few more years.

There are several potential uses for a flexible flying squadron, some obvious, but some, perhaps, not so obvious.

► Military. The first thing to recognize is that each squadron would be a very potent military force in its own right. A flying squadron formed in 1982 of the Coral Sea, Oriskany, an LPH, and five Forrest Sherman destroyers would be (except for other U. S. forced the most powerful squadron afloat. No allied navy> not even the French with their two smaller carrier⁵’ could match it in power. The Soviet Union certainly could not match it for the foreseeable future. Their Kiev-class VTOL carriers are no match for the Cora Sea. And, although details are still very sketch) about their new carrier, it appears that she will be ^a Midway-size ship of around 60,000 tons. We can an ticipate that it will be many, many years before their air power would match that of the Coral Sea.

Besides outclassing other naval forces, the Cord Sea squadron would be more than enough for most Third World crisis situations. When the other fly^,nS squadron was formed around the Midway, these t"° squadrons would be able to operate in just about any environment. Together, they would include m°^re ships than the force stationed off Iran. This f°^rte could be considered the Navy’s contribution to most important uses of naval power. As the the

foremost instrument for the United States’ cal uses of the armed forces: at all times, ⁱⁿ places, and regardless of the specifics of the sit^ua tion.”²                                                                                f

This could be considered simply a reaffirmation^ Mahan’s writing about the influence of sea power, course, the Navy can still be used as a political t°^c^ with or without a flying squadron, but it should pointed out that during much of the period cove^fe by the Brookings study, 1946-1975, the U. S- ^^ee was about twice its present size.              .

To make the flying squadron a truly syrnb° force requires that it be made a permanent force- must be distinct. This does not mean that the phibious assault ships or the frigates and destroy could not be rotated, but the carriers should be ^ permanent, distinct force under the command ⁰ ^ flag officer. For more significance, it should not ) be another squadron, or even another fleet, but *> a symbolic name like “Flying Squadron” which ¹ ^ itself, a very descriptive phrase. For even more sy¹¹