Soviet Nuclear Submarines

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^an overall nuclear effort. There are numerous ^ences to interest in releasing energy from the

^ln Soviet writings of the 1930s, with a star- £ ^935 article describing an aircraft powered by a

J ^c'^s difficult to ascertain exactly when the Soviets’ _tho^nuclear submarine program started. Western au- ^ntles differ even on when the Soviet Union be­

atom tlin

^ ubatomic ’ engine. The Soviets had a nuclear re- of I ⁿ ^^roS^ram under way before the German attack _Mo;^ne 1941 that drew the Russians into the war.

ost likely, after the attack nuclear research was dis- t>ear ^nUe<^ ^as research resources were diverted to _a| ^r'^term weapon programs. But by 1943, possibly _r ^{rte k}y spies of U. S. progress in nuclear weapons ^ch, Soviet nuclear efforts were restarted, nav' ^ter              War II, both the U. S. and Soviet

s were looking into the possibilities of nuclear ^ P^L1 sion for submarines. Published material on the cal ^C^^ort ‘^s limited. Part of this absence is politi- J°seph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, did not be-

Soviet

Nuclear

Submarines

By Norman Polmar

nuclear technology would seriously affect

could

triumph over Western technology. But

ft f^'^{S a ke}Y indication from the writings of the late n_ers ^^abnin, the dean of Soviet submarine desig- Ptop'i,?^ ^Carly recognition of the potential of nuclear that

, — ------------------------------------------------------------------

ton. Malinin was involved with Soviet sub-

liev_e _

ti_0n ^ ’ believing that Soviet mass and determina-

the

tific ^aesign from the 1920s on, was a senior scien- kes_e^aSSOc'^{ate at} the prestigious Krylov Shipbuilding St_ajj_n p¹ Institute during the war, and received the In ^fI2e ^°^{r 0ne                   su}bmarine designs,

ratio ^{<ln ear}'y 1947 paper, Malinin outlined the ⁿ,^{a e} l°r nuclear submarines:

^ls possible to say with complete justification the invention of radar and its use in the _er^b'gle against submarines has put a high [final] t° the old prewar types of submarines. . . .

The Soviet Navy's submarine service has in common with its U. S. counterpart the use of the dolphin as part of its identifying insignia. It also has a record of remarkable technical development of submarine operational capabilities—exemplified here by a ship of the high-speed deep-diving “Alfa" class.

launching a missile counterattack.”

vith a

ted him i ister

Gorshkov to Moscow in 1955, and promo head of the Navy and a deputy defense minis¹-'- January 1956. Gorshkov, who had a reputation innovation, was directed to scrap the ^ battleships and cruisers; instead, he was to ^c0^_£S,

trate on missiles, nuclear weapons, and submai ^ In his later writings, Gorshkov describes this as a “revolution” in Soviet military affairs, a erable accolade in the Soviet lexicon.        . _vVils

Probably in late 1955 or early 1956, the kee

At

sub'

Radar was a special type of broom which made a clean sweep of everything located above. ... A submarine must become an underwater boat in the full meaning of the word.”

Malinin saw the submarine remaining a formidable naval weapon only with “. . . the appearance of super powerful engines, powered by intranuclear (atomic) energy.”

Research was under way on submarine nuclear power plants by the late 1940s. During this period, despite Stalin’s conservative attitude concerning the potential impact of nuclear weapons, the Scientific and Technical Council (organized in 1943) acceler­ated nuclear weapon efforts. In 1949, the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb and on 12 August

1953     detonated a thermonuclear (hydrogen) device. This occurred less than a year after the first U. S. H-bomb was exploded and was in advance of Ameri­can predictions. Although the U. S. weapon was more sophisticated, the Soviet effort was plainly in­dicative of the massive nuclear program. That same year all Soviet nuclear programs were shifted to the new Ministry of Medium Machine Building, a move that elevated the status of the Soviet military and peaceful atomic energy programs (with the latter being split off into a separate state committee in 1956).

Naval-related nuclear efforts became visible in

1954     when the world’s first atomic power station was put into operation near Moscow. According to some sources, the turbines and certain other components were of naval design, and naval personnel were di­rectly involved with that project. Also, according to a former Soviet naval officer, construction of an ex­perimental nuclear submarine plant began in 1953­1954.

The late Nikita Khrushchev, in his published re­miniscences, gives credit for these nuclear propulsion efforts to academician I. V. Kurchatov:“He was the driving force behind our harnessing of nuclear energy. Thanks to him and atomic scientists like him, we were able to fulfill one of our fondest dreams, which was to have nuclear-powered engines for our submarine fleet.” Kurchatov, a nuclear physi­cist, is generally given credit for having had a key role in the development of the Soviet atomic bomb. He, Malinin, and others associated in public writings with Soviet nuclear submarines were “technicians” and were not in any direct way involved with the training, manning, or operational aspects of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet.-

In the meantime, Stalin had died in March of 1953, and his massive fleet building plan was im­mediately reduced. The reported plan to build 1,200

postwar diesel submarines was cut back severe y- When the boats already on the ways were complete ^ all submarine building ended at the 1 *' (Ordzhonikidze) and Nikolayev shipyards.

Emphasis in naval programs now shirte “cheap” systems—missile-armed destroyers and craft, and submarines. Khrushchev, who emerge ‘ Stalin’s successor, is alleged to have later writte “I’ll admit I felt a nagging desire to have son [aircraft carriers] in our own navy, but we cou afford to build them. They were simply beyon<- ⁰ means. Besides, with a strong submarine force, felt able to sink the American carriers if it ^carn|^_c_ war. In other words, submarines represented an e tive defensive capability as well as reliable means

By 1954, test firings of a cruise missile wi' range of 150 nautical miles were being carrie and by 1959 the first “Whiskey”-class submat had been converted to fire improved cruise mi ^ At the same time, ballistic missiles were bemg^j veloped. Like the cruise missiles, they were largely on German technology, and in Septe 1955 a Soviet “Zulu” submarine launched a ba ^lS.^ missile, several years before the first ballistic n ^ firing by a U. S. submarine. Several “Zulu SSB “Whiskey” SSG conversions followed.         . _fS

The efforts by Khrushchev and some naval lea to end big-ship programs in favor of missile s^ marines and coastal defensive craft, and exp the new missile and nuclear technologies, ^ strongly opposed by Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov' had been head of the Soviet Navy since 1939, ^e ^ for a period of exile to the Far Eastern fleet in 1951. Finally, Khruschev fired the 53-year-°l q netsov, after having brought the 45-year-old '

in

Sovi^et

,d

laid down for the first Soviet nuclear submarine that time, the U. S. Navy had its first nuclear marine, the Nautilus (SSN-571), at sea and                                                                                  j_ei

SSNs under construction or on order. The ■> naval nuclear program was clearly in a ca situation.   _up

Whereas the U. S. Navy began its nuclear pt^T ^ sion program with submarines, the Soviets

\yj_th , _t

_Ur| 1 ^{e lce}breaker Lenin. There was a submarine of _area characteristics reported in the Leningrad ^d about 1956-1957. Labeled “Whale” in the there is some possibility that the craft was

^est,

^clear- a

for ‘'P^ropC'lled. But she could have been a test bed A snrC^CW design or advanced nonnuclear plant.

surface i •                  ⁰             .                                              .

t₀ ^{e slll}P such as an icebreaker was much easier

^c°nst ■^{rUCt t}^^{an a} submarine because of the latter’s

^r‘^l<ned hull dimensions and increased water

Pressure

bes>

environment. The Lenin was probably ^ln 1954-1955, laid down in August 1956, _{a tl}v'.|^Unc^^ecl In December 1957. The ship was truly S_hi ^ldn undertaking, being built at the Admiralty rhat °ⁿ Galernyi Island in Leningrad, a yard •j.^^Vas_iⁿ°t engaged in any naval construction work.

^,e8u_n

and

of ~ ^ship’s three reactors, however, may have been

H, ^lval d«if

"^t" design. While the Lenin was fitting out,

rfosij --------- * H. G. Rickover, accompanying Vice

bteaf. ^ent Orchard Nixon to Russia, visited the ice- o_{n t}^^Cr'ⁿJnly 1959. Rickover’s last-minute inclusion t)_epu^ ^‘xon trip came because he had shown First Aruo,. ^ ^^rem*^er F. R. Kozlov through the first \'aoj_a^ICan civilian reactor at Shippingport, Pennsyl-

kj_cj. ’ ^ln June and, having been born in Poland, Visi^was ^an impressive symbol during Nixon’s

Aft° ^°*^and °n the same trip. gj_ne ^{tr to}uring the Lenin, including the ship’s en-

spaces, Rickover told reporters, “I don’t <vl

p_0v; ^abead of them in the production of atomic

after ^are far

^1C ts any more advanced than our reactors,” ^bich he added, “I think they realized that we

-d vessels.”

hj_s ^ln8 how the Russian engineers had answered see l^Utsti°^ns freely once he had gained permission to ^e nuclear plant, Rickover observed, “1 think

they have done a fine and creditable job. The equip­ment is good, and, although it is difficult to esti­mate its efficiency at this stage, the design is adequate for their [icebreaker] purposes.” Interest­ingly, a decade later, Rickover, in telling a Senate committee about the Lenin, would remark that the ship’s engineering plant was a “sloppy job.”

The Lenin had three pressurized-water reactors, two of which could power the two 22,OOO- horsepower turbines with the third available for tests or maintenance.¹ The icebreaker, the world’s first nuclear surface ship, was the first ship to get under way with a multi-reactor plant, going to sea on trials two months after Rickover’s visit. (The two-reactor USS Triton [SSRN-586] went to sea 15 days later.)

While the Soviets had not yet revealed a nuclear submarine, Rickover had also described the Lenin's reactors as “similar to those we use in our naval units.” There were several indications that nuclear submarines were being built in the Soviet Union.

The first Soviet nuclear submarine was a “November”-class SSN, launched in 1958 at the

¹ For footnotes, please turn to page 39.

Severodvinsk (formerly Molotov) shipyard on the White Sea, near Arkhangelsk. (The Severodvinsk- Arkhangelsk area was a target of the ill-fated U-2 flight of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May I960.) The “November” SSN was a 360-foot, 4,200-ton torpedo attack craft. Early U. S. Navy intelligence estimates apparently gave the “November” a speed of just over 20 knots, similar to that of the smaller USS Nautilus. However, later observations indicated a submerged speed of at least 25 knots. This meant that the “November’s” nuclear plant produces more than the approximately 15,000 horsepower of the Nautilus’s plant.

Several characteristics of previous Soviet conven­tional submarine programs were applied to the nu­clear submarine design, development, and construc­tion efforts: Soviet shipyards would build several classes of submarines simultaneously; the Soviets were ready and willing to take—to exploit—foreign ideas and technology; and, advanced submarine de­signs would be placed in production before they were thoroughly proven and possibly without an opera­tional prototype.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the initial Soviet nuclear submarine program was its size and scope. Whereas the Nautilus and subsequent Seawolf (SSN-575) were one-of-a-kind submarines, followed after a brief interval by the four Skate (SSN-578)-class submarines, and then several more one-of-a-kind ships, the Soviets immediately began series produc­

tion of three classes of nuclear submarines.

The first “November” SSN was completed in 19 - with series production under way at Severodvin The following year the first “Hotel”-class SSBNs wer completed, also at Severodvinsk, and in 1961 ' submarine yard at Komsomol’sk finished the ¹ “Echo”-class SSGN. Subsequently, the Severodvin⁵ _ yard joined the “Echo” program. Only eight H SSBNs would be built, reflecting the 1959-1960 sion to take the strategic missile role away f^r0™ ^ Navy. This shift may account for the five ^ I”-class cruise missile submarines which lack ^c mid-course guidance radars of the “Echo II^s ^ have only two bow torpedo tubes. Possibly ^c SSGNs were built from hull components and react of cancelled “Hotel” SSBNs.²

Thus, three production classes had been taken from the start, albeit using the same

undet' reactor for the

plant, informally called HEN in the West three classes in which it was used. And, in the five years of the Soviet nuclear program, almo^st nuclear submarines were completed. In a ^siaV

1959)-

period after the Nautilus’s completion (1955 only nine U. S. nuclear submarines were comp Admittedly, U. S. reactor technology ^{was U} ^_ve advanced, with those nine submarines having different types of reactors.

Also significant, parallel to each Soviet submarine class, an advanced diesel submarine j was initiated, the “Foxtrot” SS, “Golf’

lete-

id-

nucl^e3f

Table 1 Submarine Force Levels, early 1981

Other NATO*

•Includes France and Greece. .

**SSN type fitted with Harpoon cruise missile.

#Includes USSSeauolf (SSN-575) used for research and five ex-Polaris SSBNs. ## Includes USS Gray back (SS-574) configured as troop transport.

34

Proceedings

/ July

Table 2 Nuclear Submarine Construction Rates (Submarines Completed)

^ⁿ‘^ted States                      13

Union                                 3

Total

1954-1960      1961-1970      1971-1980 Built Lost Reserve Active*

^I<1S Solaris and "Yankee” SSBNs being converted

78                             30                        121            2                    5                    114

77                       ~95                     ~175               1               ~5                 -170

to attack configuration; the U.S. Navy's nuclear research submersible NR-1 is not included.

_D ^U,^lett SSG. The reasons for this approach were _tj ^b 7 limitations in nuclear machinery produc- _anj ’ availability of additional submarine yards, ^sut> ^^Uest‘^{ons a}bout the reliability of early nuclear 've ^rnf^r'^neS-          U. S. diesel combat submarines

^U^^{C a}^^ter ^959.) At the same time, Gorshkov "K ^Start‘ⁿ8 ^UP ^a new surface ship fleet, with the "o, ^a 'class large destroyers/cruisers armed with

■ ^ac^°ck missiles and other warships being laid ⁿ in the late 1950s, with design efforts (if not

do ^actual

hef ^Construction) starting on the Moskva-class

^Copter-missile cruisers.

Irnr

Echo

Proved successors to the “November”/“Hotel”/

classes were obviously on the drawing boards

of th                                 •                      -

bo;. ,^{e Su}bmarine department of the Krylov Ship- _a ,'ⁿ8 Institute when, in the late 1950s, there was ^rev* i ^c^^an8^e in Soviet defense policy. Khrushchev Jan ^t'^{le resu}l^ts oE ^fbi^s major defense shift in p_eri(j I960, announcing the formation of an inde­_vice          Strategic Rocket Force as the principal ser-

de>-'° Soviet armed forces. Massive research and

^aevel₀ >nt_e

iarg_e

Pment efforts would now be concentrated on ^c°ntinental ballistic missile development, to a

P ^extent at the expense of other Soviet services. ^cE^e Navy this caused the halt in the “Hotel” sjg_n program after only eight units were built. De- pabl ..°^{rtS were} already under way on the more ca- c_ar ^C 'Eankee”-class SSBN, which would be able to W_ea ⁰ ballistic missiles compared with only three

Eut i_t

^ari.

P°^ns in the “Hotel” and diesel “Golf’ classes.

•“at '^Voul^<J be ICBMs and not bombers or sub- Kh ^{nCS t}'^{lat wou}ld constitute the nuclear saber that p chev could rattle on the international scene, ^h^'dent John F. Kennedy, who came to the t_UrVe^e Elouse in January 1961, threw Khrushchev a g_ap., ' because the widely publicized “missile ^real or contrived—was a key political issue, Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense, Robert st_rar ^arnara, took office they accelerated both V_e ^glc missiles (ICBMs and submarines) and con- 1'h^JPlal ^WarE^are forces.

anj |^'^{S a}PPmach caused consternation in the Kremlin trie,. ^ October 1961, when the 22nd Party Congress ’ ^rbere was a change in Soviet defense policy to

provide improvements across the broad spectrum of Soviet military forces. There had been considerable momentum in submarine construction built up dur­ing the 1950s, in both shipyard capacity and compo­nent production. That momentum permitted a sus­tained production rate of about seven nuclear sub­marines per year during the early 1960s. After the demise of the “Hotel” SSBN program, the “November” SSNs and “Echo” SSGNs were continued, with 14 and 34 of those classes being completed, respectively. At the same time, diesel submarines were still being built.

Spurred on by the Cuban Missile Crisis of late 1962, when Soviet strategic forces were shown up as a flawed saber, major realignments were made in the shipbuilding industry. Severodvinsk on the Arctic coast and subsequently Komsomol’sk in the Far East, the first two nuclear submarine yards, were upgraded to construct the new “Yankee” class—7,800-ton SSBNs with 16 ballistic missile tubes apiece. Next, the Admiralty yard in Leningrad, which had built the Lenin but no warships for a decade, began the new “Victor” high-speed SSN. The inland Gorkiy yard began production of the “Charlie” SSGN. With the first launchings of these three new nuclear classes in 1967-1968, the Soviets had built up a capability that equaled the U. S. Navy’s seven-yard, 13- submarines-per-year rate reached during the height of the Polaris program in the mid-1960s. Severod­vinsk also launched the one-of-a-kind “Papa” SSGN about 1970, a large cruise missile submarine that did not enter production.

More was to come. The Sudomekh yard at Lenin­grad, which had built only diesel “Foxtrots” after the last of 30 “Quebec”-class coastal boats was launched in 1957, became the fifth submarine yard to enter the nuclear program. Probably in 1970, the yard launched a nuclear submarine that NATO intelligence would dub “Alfa.” Thus, the shipyards in the U.S.S.R. reportedly launched 17 or 18 nuclear sub­marines plus one diesel boat in 1970, a year in which U. S. shipyards put only three SSNs in the water.

The Soviet Navy’s leadership did not forget the value or cost-effectiveness of diesel submarines.

Sudomekh continued a small “Foxtrot” program (for Soviet and foreign use), Komsomol’sk built four “Bravo”-class target/training submarines, and Gorkiy began series production of the improved “Tango”- class torpedo attack submarine.

About 1970, both the U. S. and Soviet navies could claim to have some 90 nuclear submarines in service. But there would be no nuclear submarine “race." The later Vietnam War budgets, the postwar attitudes, efforts toward arms limitations, and other factors would ensure that the U. S. Navy would not even match the U.S.S.R. in numbers of nucs, let alone total submarines.

Qualitative leadership is more difficult to define and ascertain. As early as 1970, Admiral Rickover told Congress:

“Numerical superiority, however, does not tell the whole story. Weapon systems, speed, depth, detection devices, quietness of operation, and crew performance all make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of a submarine force.

“From what we have been able to learn during the past year, the Soviets have attained equality in a number of these characteristics, and superior­ity in some.”

While pleading with Congress for more funds for his submarine programs, Rickover’s assessment was indicative of the views of at least some intelligence analysts. While U. S. nuclear submarines were get­ting large and, retaining the same S5W reactor, going slower than their predecessors during the 1960s and early 1970s, the new Soviet classes were going faster. The “Victor” SSN, at 30-plus knots, was the fastest combat submarine in the world from 1967 until at least late 1976 when the Los Angeles (SSN-688) was completed. For a while, there was some belief in the West that the “Yankee” SSBN had so much horse­power and speed in comparison with U. S. Polaris- Poseidon submarines that the Soviet SSBN might have a two-reactor plant.³ Soviet submarines were also

nderse*

credited with diving deeper than U. S. ^un' craft.

This Soviet obsession with high speed                                ^

based on tactical considerations, with the SSNs

could be

SSGNs having to gain attack positions against

fast •ed ^t0

carrier task forces. But there was also the ne< ^ counter U. S. submarine speeds. In June 1958, Admiral Ignatius J. Galantin, a top U. S. mariner, wrote in the Naval Institute Proceedingt ^ ”... nuclear submarine speeds of fifty knots or can be attained as improved methods of applyⁱⁿb ^ great power available are developed.” A yeat ^ the fast attack submarine Skipjack (SSN-585)                                                                                                  ^

completed, and journalists imaginatively wrote o craft’s 40- to 45-knot speeds.   _afe

While individual U. S. submarine weapons

S ovtfj

generally credited with being superior to their ■ counterparts, the Soviet submarines have more larger weapons. Soviet SSGNs, for example - ^ separate missile tubes in addition to a full bat^tel7₎^ torpedo tubes, giving them significantly ^ weapon launchers and weapons than the Ame submarines have. Most U. S. submarines built m 1960s and 1970s have only four torpedo ^tu^_cs), firing torpedoes, antisubmarine rockets (AS^ ^ and cruise missiles.⁴ The Soviets thus have a flexible weapons capability. (As often noted, ^ U. S. submariners do not like mines or cruise siles because they displace torpedoes.)        j

In the testimony quoted above, Rickover re to “detection devices” rather than sonar. On a set ^ set basis, U. S. sonars are probably superior to ^ equipment. But there are other methods ° marine detection, ranging from wake detectin'¹ psychic, and there is some rationale to sugg^eSt’._[), least on the basis of published material and P^aSt telligence shortfalls, that the West may not falty derstand how the Soviets will conduct antisubma ^ warfare.'’ Will submarines be guided to ' strategic submarines by external sensors? Will ⁰                                                                          ■>

hunter-killer forces be air-surface-submarine t

an

h»^v'^e

effe Warti ‘luiet:

^encm ^raSC ^^m'^ral Gorshkov’s alleged “better is the [^rs ^ °^8°od enough.” Weapons, tactics, and num- _th_e ^submarines will compensate for losses because ’^submarines are not quiet.

^Vlet propulsion systems are designed to produce ^sP^eed, with a high horsepower-to-volume ratio. Jj ,,^{ls the}y have certainly been successful. While the _0Ver ‘ ^⁰⁵ Angeles class was able to double horsepower j_n ,.P^revious SSNs with an almost two-thirds increase ^sPlacernent, the Soviet “Victor”-class SSN is sev-

^(>Vl do the various elements communicate with one toi°^^ler> ^^ow satellites fit in? What will be the t'ral °^^°^v*^et diesel submarines? Will “netting” sev­^a less capable sensors produce a potent synergism?

¹ ated to ASW detection, of course, is submarine nvirting' ‘^{s a}l^so °h^ten stated that U. S. sub- tho ^{ntS are c}l^u‘^{et an}d Soviet boats are noisy, al­i °^uKh they are getting quieter. If quieting were J ^ortant to the Soviets, they could make their boats _0vv^ ^er‘ Perhaps they have “mirror-imaged” their _u ] ⁿ°ⁿ'^acoustic ASW efforts in designing their th* ^rSta ^^eet ^^{or a no}n-acoustic enemy. Or, perhaps (Stic ^^cl‘^eve that the sound surveillance system - .' ^and other Western acoustic sensors can be ^ctively blanked out, decoyed, or destroyed in . jne. Or, possibly the Soviets feel that the cost of ^ln8 is not worth the relative effectiveness—to

Another consideration raised when making sub­marine comparisons is safety. Both navies have lost nuclear submarines, a Soviet “November” SSN off Spain in 1970, the USS Thresher (SSN-593) in 1963, and the USS Scorpion (SSN-589) in 1968. It is unknown from public writings if the reactor plant was a factor in the “November’s” loss. The Thresher was lost to a chain of incidents, the first probably being a reactor scram or shutdown as the submarine neared her test depth during post-overhaul sea trials.

Both U. S. and Soviet submarines have suffered propulsion breakdowns at sea. Numerous instances could be cited for both navies. The Soviet instances are generally headlined in the Western press; the American ones rarely are. Radiation problems are another factor. While U. S. data have long been safeguarded under a cloak of security and Rickover obfuscation, it is evident that the Soviets have had major problems with radiation. U. S. Navy problems must be considered minor in comparison with Soviet ones, largely as a result of Rickover’s exacting stand­ards and discipline. The Lenin was laid up and aban­doned for several years, “too hot” after an apparent reactor accident. There have been submarine prob­lems, with some crewmen exposed to major amounts of radiation. In the Soviet Navy special submarine pay has been referred to as “childlessness” pay in rec-

. ^at'^0r*al status. Could the cause of delay be the

having a radical, advanced propulsion plant?

^eral k

a ⁿ°^ts faster than the previous “November” with Th_e ^SJ⁵^^acernent increase possibly as little as 10%. Pared u'^not-plus “Alfa” SSN cannot easily be corn­er,. ^ecause of its lightweight titanium hull. How- ^rhat submarine is unquestionably the world’s th_e ’ though technical problems—probably with ter, ^Vanced propulsion plant—resulted in almost °Pt_r^^earS between launching and the reaching of

"Alfa”

Among the latest in Soviet nuclear-(towered ballistic missile submarines are the “Delta 7” on the opposite page and the “Delta III" above. According to the latest edition of Combat Fleets of the World, the “Delta l’s" SS-N-8 missile has a range of4,200 miles, while the SS-N-18 carried hy the “Delta III" has a range of more than 4,000 miles.

ognition of the dangers involved. From the Soviet viewpoint, such accidents are minor considerations because of the absence of a free press or inquiring congressional committees.

Soviet submarine programs continue unabated at five yards (with Admiralty and Sudomekh now under a single administration). They are producing up to ten nuclear submarines per year of SSN/SSGN/ SSBN classes, plus a small number of diesel sub­marines. U. S. yards completed only one Los Angeles SSN in 1980, and recent authorizations will result in a U. S. rate of about three SSN/SSBN types per year by the mid-1980s. In this context, total U. S. nu­clear submarines in service will begin declining dur­ing this decade, to perhaps 110 by 1990 and only 95 submarines in 2000. There is little reason to doubt a sustained Soviet production rate of 8 to 10 nuclear units per year. Assuming a 25-year operational life, the Soviet Navy could have some 225 nuclear sub­marines at sea in 1990, plus conventional sub­marines.

The potential disparity is even greater, because the Soviet Union is credited by U. S. intelligence with having a capability of producing 20 nuclear sub­marines per year working on essentially a one-shift- per-day basis. This is twice the rate that they were actually produced during the 1970s. (Apparently only eight nuclear submarines plus four diesel boats were completed in 1980, indicating a probable slow­down as the yards shifted over to the “Oscar,” Tayfun. and possibly other new nuclear classes./'

Soviet qualitative improvements can also be ex­pected to continue. While the U, S. Navy gains a considerable antiship and land-attack capability with the torpedo-tube-launched Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles, the Soviet cruise missile submarines are being supplemented by major improvements in the antisubmarine and antiship weapons carried in the SSN force. Similarly, while the United States has led in the development of more sophisticated warheads for submarine strategic missiles (for example, ma­neuvering reentry vehicle and multiple indepen­dently targeted reentry vehicles), the Soviet strategic weapons outrange those of the U. S. Navy and have a larger payload, with multiple warheads now being deployed.

The “Alfa’s” titanium-alloy hull and highly effi­cient propulsion plant demonstrate the technological level of the Soviets in areas they wish to emphasize. Although some naval authorities have advocated deep diving and high speed for U. S. submarines, there have been no recent increases in U. S. sub­marine performance in either area. A review of the congressional testimony of Admiral Rickover and

other officials indicates no advances in speed over t <• Skipjack of 1959 and no advances in operating ^^eP^r since the Thresher of 1961. When Soviet d^eve^ opments are considered in concert with certain U-

intelligence and analytical shortfalls (such as

initial)

considering the main weapon of several wars *P classes the SS-N-10 as an antiship missile instea an antisubmarine weapon [SS-N-14]), the prosper

future Soviet submarine developments is ominous.

For the foreseeable future, the Soviet submat^|n^ force can be expected to remain between two three times the size of the U. S. undersea fleet, " increasing numbers of nuclear boats.

According to U. S. Navy and foreign staternen^ five types of submarines are currently being bui the Soviet Union:             _

► SSBN: Construction of the large “Delta” class tinues at Komsomol’sk with 34 completed by ^ 1981. The latest version to go to sea is the j III,” while a much larger missile submarine, re

to as the Tayfun (“Typhoon”) by the Soviets, has a^ been launched. The Tayfun displaces some 25,              ^

tons submerged and carries 20 missiles, each ^vv range in excess of 4,000 nautical miles.     . .

►SSGN: The last Soviet cruise missile submar^

observed at sea is an improved “Charlie”-class

of

armed with an underwater-launch version 60-mile SS-N-9 missile. A much reportedly 13,000 tons submerged and g^iven^_v, code name “Oscar”—is now being built at erodvinsk. Armament consists of 24 missiles ⁰ ^ SS-N-19 type with a range of more than 250 na

larger SSC^

_c[ea^f'

dto

miles. (These missiles are also carried in the nm

powered cruiser Kirov.) The submarine is believe

•                                                                                    ui her tv

have a speed in excess of 30 knots to enable ¹

keep pace with Western aircraft carriers.

► SSN: The high-speed, deep-diving "Alfa production at Sudomekh, with the lead ship ¹¹ made her First operational deployment in the "

of 1979-1980. Several additional units have _s built and production continues. The P^reV “Victor”-class SSNs are still in production Admiralty yard. Looking at Soviet submarine . _p chronology, it appears likely that a new SSN will emerge during the 1980s, an improvernen ^ the “Alfa” or at least incorporating some ⁰ techniques.     . _rlie

► SS: The Gorkiy yard, which built the SSGNs, continues to produce small numbers ⁰ p “Tango” diesel submarine, with about 12 now j mated to be in service. This indicates a ^r‘ slightly more than one unit per year.

►AGSS: Two auxiliary submarine classes are j_£ built. Assigned the code name “India,” the f>^rSt

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