Professional Notes

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Th

^e Kidd DDG: The Non-Nuclear Standard.

“V Lie,

^utenant Commander John G. Morgan, Jr., U. S. Navy

I_rar) ^C ^ ^early 1970s, the late Shah of _strov°^{r erec}^ ^^our guided missile de- 'itto^ ^d)DGs) ^t0 be constructed by rati_0n ^S^ⁿ®^a^^s Shipbuilding Corpo- ^ar°^und h ^S^‘P^{S were t0} be designed itlg j ^{£ e} Spruance hull and engineer- the ^{and we}re to be armed with terns R ^available naval weapon sys- in ban ^e^^{ause c}be political upheaval

u

'"vse ^C^^{e S}^*P^{S we}re never delivered, the U 'o^I’^IGs b^ave been repurchased for (t)ly. ‘ blavy, renamed the Kidd-class

■ .^-993-0

join fleet

Th,

th a "⁶b ^and ^are beginning to »,cet cu ^Cet' 'Pbeir contribution to our Wd-_Ci °^U*^d significant. For the

I                    — *»*gnniv.aiiL. iui Luc

^ampi_es ^{SS Dc>Gs} are extraordinary ex­”          ° ^cost-efficient and battle-pro-

our dec^'^^^U*^*ⁿ^ ^t^^lat sb⁰¹¹!^ guide

fi,

^c'erit ,

We b,ru'°^{nS as t0 w}hat kind of ships

To '^{n £}^^e Mature.

ship_s s^^{6 r}b^e impact of building

ess_ay ^{as t}*^le ff^-class ddg, this

grew. * _r ^exaniine the following four > , ^ps of₍

How

questions: ^valuable will the new Kidds be

Out th ^^eet^ What is significant herL ■ ^e,r design? What utility will

into

? drived f o— ”““^l be f]_e . ^rr°^m their introduction

^ ^hat ly³⁰ We aff°^rd them? sttaingcj ^ln<aS escorts are we con_ ^ afford? Restricted by costs,

ways to understand the value of the Kidd class is to contrast it with com­parably equipped ships and examine the missions these types of ships are required to perform. This essay will limit the comparison to the Kidd DDG, the Virginia (CGN-38)-class nuclear- powered cruiser, and the Soviet Navy’s new Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruiser —see tables 1 and 2. The discussion of the cost issue will be broad because I believe that detailed construction and operating costs are subject to so many interpretations and so much manipu­lation that they can often obscure the argument.

The combat systems of the Kidd ddg and the Virginia CGN are nearly iden­tical. Remarkably, the Kidd DDG also matches the Kirov CGN in every type of installed weapon system, and does so while using about a third of the Soviet crew size and roughly half of the overall ship size and displacement. While I have not calculated dollar-for-dollar savings of building a Kidd as compared with a Virginia or a Kirov, I suspect they

are significant. If that is the case, then the Kidd represents, in my estimation, the optimum size, cost, and armed ca­pability for the price. She is capable of fighting in any mission area and, there­fore, provides the type of utility the United States needs in its cruiser/de- stroyer force.

The Kidd is the best shipbuilding buy the surface Navy has made in recent times. Previously, we have built far less capable ships at what was presumed to be cost-effective savings. In the process, however, true utility has been sacrificed by designing ships for specialized mis­sions. For example, review of the weapon capabilities of the Sprt/ance (DD- 963) and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) classes demonstrates that we are build­ing surface combatants that possess a marginal capability to perform multi­ple missions.

In his September 1980 Proceedings article, “Planning for the Navy of the 1980s,” Vice Admiral M. Staser Hol­comb explores several factors regarding the adequacy of today’s force levels and

INGALLS

^a buju- ^Undertake? If not, do we have ^ I_{s Q} 'ⁿ^ aiternative?

Ml b^U,^{r CUrre}nt hi-lo mix of escorts buity _a^ariCed? What costs of oppor- Hvestjjj ^{6 assoc}iated with our existing bip_{s> t}^^nt posture? Would more ^vHe °^u8h each is less capable, pro­ions can be drawn from

be v ^{at c}°nclus

^'dd

tUr,

desi

^ecisio_ns^^lpbuildin8^/shiP

^llue

*0,

^ICee<U

-Phalanax Close-in Weapon - AN/SPS-55 'AN/SPG-60 ,AN/SPQ-9 ^AN/SPG-51D

Mk-26 Mod 0

Table 1 Platform Comparison

iirov Cffsfff^

M-4 Lau^nche'^S \ Vertical nch Syst^enl Vertical nch System 4-14 La^uncb do Tubes j-1000

j-6000

-mm- ^ nm. Mou»^tS

Hormone*

hi"

addresses the Navy’s investment pos­ture. While voicing concern over the shrunken size of the Navy, Admiral Holcomb states, “These reductions may mask unmistakable qualitative im­provements in our capabilities, but they do drive home how thinly the U. S. fleet must be spread to carry out com­mitments which have changed very lit­tle during the same period.” It is my worry that we have not been building enough of these improved capabilities into our surface combatants. Because we are stretched so thin, however, we

are going to require all of those ships to perform missions for which they were not intended.

To expand on my concern over the mission capabilities of the dd-963 and FFG-7 classes, Admiral Holcomb’s ar­ticle defines the dilemma this way: “One can also see a clear shift from a cruiser and destroyer surface combatant force to one oriented more around frig­ates. In large part, the reason we have emphasized less capable and less costly ships and aircraft in recent years is af­fordability. As in many business oper-

ations, the Navy has to I‘^v‘j _l0ct^e>i' bounds of limited resources an „ ing demands on those resou^rce^ ^

Admiral Holcomb makes

cuss"

jo"

point that is critical to the ¹⁵ of ship cost versus utility ‘■^e’’ ability versus battle profi^c*^en, ujlii)' A third factor of af*T -

states,

results from the need for P^r°

.duct

it"'

res"¹

provement. Such improvem^^jjrf

J"'

in cost increases in real terms- the Forrest Sherman (DD-93 0

i-cla^sS

a"

e*'

----------------------- -----------  '                            r £1*

stroyers, built in the 1950s ample of an ‘original type ^an

/juir

Table 2 Sensor Comparison

^,re Control System; GMLS = Guided Missile-Launching System.

^°te: FcTT^ ~

^rrtan ^^,Cark°^{n C}°PV ^tbe Forrest Sher- stattti |,^{e rriust} have one that is sub- ^torno—y ,^^etter in order to deal with

^and can they be used

’ ^may be needed?

b,

#nce (rjp.

as _a             ^c*^ass> built in the 1970s,

to_esta^eP.^acen>^ent type.”’ He goes on crag_e g_r '^{S l t}^^lat replacement costs av- Us_ef_ui pf ^^6r ^^Car throughout a ship’s "ty_e ^{1 C an}^ concludes by saying, that°^u^ⁿ t get by with a new ship

*^S a Carhr,^ ------------- , r,             r..

Ce7^{s th}r-"

Oliver ’ ^are ^P^ruance destroyers and tially b ^a~^ar^ Perry frigates “substan- ^vis the !i.^{eT re}pl^acement ships vis-a- they rv,„^U^,^ *^{n a}b the roles for which

4 rr

boohi_n„           versus Battle Proficiency:

ets/fti ^0tliy ^at those cruisers/destroy- °Ur escQ^teSf^t^^{at we are} building today, Oliver H ^{f orces a}re being replaced by ^anc_e,_Q^“^Za’’^ Perry-class frigates, Spru- ^Il'issi|_e j ^cstroyers, Kidd-c\&ss guided ^cWr cruj_s^eStr°^^ers’ Virginia-class nu- ^The S/>_r^^S' and Aegis-class cruisers. Plet_{e> an}^^,/le program is nearly com- Starrt ^tFle Oliver Hazard Perry pro- ^ub_Vj₀ .             ¹ >nto its production run.

Pr°xi_mat^y; '^V*^t^¹ -’0 DD-963S and ap- class^ ^ ^ ^FFG-^7S planned, these Out ^CS ships represent the bulk ^ Vears ^C°^rt ^°^rces b°r the next 15 to

^“^Zard t^rUance destroyers and Oliver |b'ps _w ^erfiy frigates are the kinds of ^ari!e _nu ,^ave been able to afford in °fshjp_s ^{171 ers}> but are they the kinds ^•nlc ^nee<^ ^t0 do the job? I do not ^eCaUs_e ^afe’ b°^r two reasons. First, affordability constraints, we are forced to initially design “less ca­pable and less costly ships," and then, we are further constrained to commis­sion these ships with a mere fraction of their intended armaments. Second, and even more important, we design these ships based upon operational anal­ysis which calls for them to perform only one major mission—i.e., ASW for the DD-963S and open-ocean convoy es­corting for the FFG-7S.

Inevitably, these ships will be re­quired to perform in a larger context than for which they were intended. Because these two classes represent such a large percentage of our surface com­batants, they are going to see a great deal of action if we go to war. Com­mander James R. Stark, Commanding Officer, USS Julius A. Furer (FFG-6), summarizes the problem well. He states, “The rub comes when FFG-7S are used in a high-threat environment, and the real world, in contrast with ops analysis studies, dictates that we fight or employ in a crisis the units which are readily available. In many cases, these will be the FFG-7 ships; vessels designed for a mission which renders them inadequate for the demands of a world poorly attuned to the strictures of statistical analysis.”

Intended to be a cost-efficient, open- ocean escort, the FFG-7 succeeds in meeting her designers’ conception. But can she effectively perform in any other capacity if required to? Furthermore, what kind of battle utility have we planned into this class? Even presum­ing the FFG-7S will be backfitted with

Navy tactical data systems and close-in weapons, and that lamps detachments will be embarked, this class still has but one single-arm missile launcher, one single-barrel gun, a short-range hull-mounted sonar, and no ASROC ca­pability. There is no weapon redun­dancy in any mission area, and in an ASW engagement, the FFG-7 is almost completely dependent upon other plat­forms to attack the threat. What battle utility will an FFG-7 provide to a convoy if ASW aircraft or direct-support sub­marines are not available to attack en­emy submarines? How effective will an FFG-7 be in battle if she suffers even a minor casualty to her sole missile launcher or gun?

Turning to the Spruance destroyer, we have the potential for a great fight­ing ship. Indeed, both the Kidd DDG and the Aegis CG are built around the Spruance design. Their hull design and engineering plants are the best the sur­face Navy has ever produced. Also, the Spruance destroyers have been perform­ing exceptionally well during demand­ing deployments, and they have set new standards for the cruiser/destroyer force in antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare and naval gunfire support mis­sion areas. But they possess a very lim­ited antiair warfare capability, and yet we expect those ships to support our battle groups in a multi-threat envi­ronment. We like to disguise the an­tiair warfare limitations of the Spruance by saying that she is principally an ASW platform. But, then, does the “Char- lie”-class nuclear-powered guided mis­sile submarine represent only an ASW threat? The Spruance destroyers clearly need more muscle, and we should give it to them as quickly as possible so they can evolve into effective “replacement” ships.

The surface community is not alone in facing these types of problems. There seems to be a growing concern over the adequacy of the new F/A-is Hornet air­craft to perform its mission in compar­ison to its F-14 and A-7 counterparts. However, a contrary trend exists in the submarine force. Presently, we are building bigger, better, and more ex­pensive submarines as opposed to “less capable and less costly [surface] ships and aircraft.” Clearly, the Los Angeles- class SSNs and Obio-class SSBNs are sub-

stantially better “replacement types” than the “original” Skipjack! Permit ssns and George Washington!Ethan Allen SSBNS. This approach to shipbuilding appears to signify an implicit qualita­tive baseline below which the subma­rine force is not willing to explore when building submarines.

Opportunity Costs: As Admiral Hol­comb points out, we cannot afford more capable ships in sufficient numbers. So the choice the surface community has made is to build large classes of less capable ships to be augmented by a few very capable, guided missile destroy­ers. Will 54 FFG-7S, 31 DD-963S, 4 DDG-993S, 6 CGN-36/-38S, and 16-26 CG-47S provide a balanced hi-lo mix? Approximately 75% of that mix is made up of FFG-7S and DD-963S. If we can judge the FFG-7 and dd-963 classes to be substantially better replacement ships, then the hi-lo mix we have built is well balanced. If not, then the cruiser/destroyer force mission will continue to be the most difficult mis­sion in the Navy to perform. If the mix is out of balance, which means that cruiser/destroyer crews often will be required to fight in every warfare arena in inadequate ships, then we will have made a serious and potentially costly error.

Once again, during its recent evo­lution, the submarine force has faced the same decision as to what kinds of ships to build. It has not opted for a building plan which creates a hi-lo mix of ships by consciously building less capable ships; rather, it has decided to procure substantially better replace­ment ships and allow older generation submarines to represent the low side of the mix. In so doing, it has been forced to afford a smaller number of submarines.

In my mind, the submarine com­munity’s approach is sound, and I think it is analogous to the introduction of the Kidd-class. Today, the Kidd-class represents the middle ground of the surface escort hi-lo mix. With the CGN- 38/CG-47 at the high end and the FFG- 7 on the low side, the DDG-993 not only occupies the well-balanced middle ground, but in so doing, it raises se­rious questions as to whether or not the low end of the mix is good enough.

The Kidd is a substantially better re­placement ship and is significantly less expensive than existing ships of com­parable capabilities. If, as a result of opting for surface combatants that are well balanced in terms of the reality of the missions they will be required to perform, we have to accept fewer ships, then so be it. At least as an adjunct to that choice in today’s world, we will also be able to better man more capable ships than we do today.

The consequence of not building substantially better replacement surface combatants and opting for large num­bers of less capable ships is that we are forced to sacrifice the fighting utility required to support a variety of assign­ments which are consistent with the current definition of a surface com­batant’s mission. That sacrifice is an opportunity cost we pay as soon as funds are committed to building ships like the Spruance destroyer and the Oliver Hazard Perry frigate. We tend to lose sight of those costs, and unfortunately, we neither have the flexibility nor the desire to forgo some of the opportu­nities. But, rest assured, we are giving something up. Let us hope that when it comes to fighting these ships, we will remember those costs and understand the limitations that are not so apparent in peacetime.

The introduction of the Kidd guided missile destroyers, however, affords us a great deal more optimism. We are getting a lot of utility in these ships. Their hull and engineering plants are already well proven. Their combat sys­tems have performed extremely well during demanding deployments to the Indian Ocean in the USS Virginia (CGN- 38) and the USS Texas (CGN-39). There is a major weapon and sensor system for each mission area, and every weapon system has at least one backup battery. And we have every reason to believe that the combination of the proven CGN-38 combat systems suite and the venerable Spruance hull and engineering plant will be the best available ship for the money.

Should we build more Kidds and convert existing Spruances to DDGs? I think the critical need for these en­hanced Spruances lies partially in the examination of the comparison among our existing escorts and the ships out­

lined in Table 1. From that exam"^ tion flows at least the insight rb^at^^ need to build surface combatants

can fight multi-mission engag^errien If it takes a Kidd or a Virginia to ^SUPP

a battle group or to stand up

Soviet threat, then those are

to

the

the tyP^tJ

of ships we really should build- ^ always going to be constrained > fordability. The issues are costs o portunity and utility. The ^{reS0 a} lies partially in the realization ^£ * we sacrifice utility in the design o ^ batants we potentially incur enof costs.

-imally

Conclusions: The Kidds are opt' ^ _a sized, properly armed, procure ^ reasonable cost, and capable ^st* '_S ing alone, if necessary, against to mutli-dimensional threat.                _iS

If the Kidds prove to be ^ecl^u* _e)(. proficient as CGN-36/38S, then t pense of building future nuclear ered cruisers is prudent only f°^{r 1} ^efl

numbers of such ships. We shou

link the production of nuclear ^c ^

to the production of nuclear carrier⁵

build two such cruisers per

carriet'

ers-

We do not need cruisers/desrr° ^ or battleships for that matter, than the Kidd. The only ^reaS^^>_tgjp should build bigger surface com is not to permit them to be ^D powered but to carry more weap

more important, bigger mag^az

ine⁵'

ship⁵

. -¹⁰

We need to procure more occupy the middle ground or ^c mix, as the Kidd does now. Iⁿ_^s0 ^ce we can correct the hi-lo mix im that exists today with the la^rS centage of low-mix escorts.

Before committing funds *^or^_nnjn? ing battleships to service or P $t follow-on surface combatant⁵’^ _[t, should immediately allocate 1° ^ > convert Spruance-class destroy^er ^ _vCr- DDGconfiguration, perhaps using tical launching system.           .. _e (o<

The Kidd should be the bas^e ^ the Navy’s next destroyer (D ^ jn we should prepare to build _Qtr sufficient numbers to maxim*^ze

omies of scale. Most important,

.id b^e

the Kidd ^sh^_i|tUre ih⁵

the standard by which we bui ^ surface combatants. Future

must be capable of standing . . ..      -—.al n

against a multi-dimension.

j 9*

shi ^{Cn Start} Holding these kinds of

V^{t e}y ^w‘h become the standard by

°ur capabilities are measured.

are committed in the foreseeable ‘uture m tu

tent ■ i ^{Ctle C0nce}pt of ^a battle group the ^Crt • ^arouni^ the aircraft carrier, and

quatel^UlSer/deStr°^yer ^^{orce cannot} ade- of c| ^y P^erform its mission in support _sh: ³ incept unless it procures more ^pS ‘>ke the Kidds.

k°^ugh the Shah of Iran apparently

first appreciated the real cost-effective­ness and utility of the Kidds, the U. S. Navy designed and built these ships. One of the legacies of the Kidd class may be the realization that we in the surface community will have to become more persuasive in convincing those who allocate the shipbuilding funds. Procuring marginally capable ships will cost us far more than it will save when the time comes to use those ships for the mission they will finally have to accomplish. We must realize that the Kidd guided missile destroyer should represent the non-nuclear stan­dard by which our shipbuilding and ship conversion policies should be gov­erned for the next 10 to 15 years.

Commander Morgan has recently completed a tour as the operations officer of the USS Robert E. Peary (FF-1073).

N

^ayal Reserve Officer Leadership: An Institutional Failure

^cnant Douglas R. Burnett, U. S. Naval Reserve

ti_ng               °^^cer attending a “wet-

^reserv "r- ^party for newly promoted bitt(._rs ° ^^{cers w}ould find the party’s o\v_n e ,^{Weet atmos}phere foreign to his ^rt>ann_tf^tr*^ence' ^He party, in a familiar Halim | ^CXh'bits its traditional festive officer/f’ ^laudatory celebration of the pte_Sen ^^rtunes in being selected. Also ^Culiar to °^Wever’ *^{s c}bc sad fact, pe- the cl_e° ^rtServe officer promotions, that ttiotej ^ ^ma*^ority °f the newly pro- thejf _u ^tn‘^or officers are forced out of "^vo]_u ^{s t0 a} future without pay in officers ^ ^dr*^{d un}*^ts- Most of these they reach^dr‘H ^as volunteers until ^aH the ^C| ■^t*^{le 20}'y^ear retirement mark; ttiotiv... ^de> tbeir training, skills, and _Thj^atl°n wither.

^acr_0ss 5 ^Vent *^s repeated and magnified °ffice_rs 6 United States as hundreds of tfsentgj³^ tttiHions of dollars rep- y the Navy’s training in­career with three to five years of active duty. During this period, the Navy makes a major investment by putting the officer through numerous schools, ranging from short-duration profes­sional schools like 3M and damage con­trol, to major programs in surface war­fare, flight training, and nuclear propulsion. Add to this investment the irreplaceable gain to the Navy from the officer’s operational fleet experience, and it becomes obvious that when the officer leaves active duty and begins a reserve career his or her training and experience are valuable assets of mo­bilization defense. In my case, as a sur­face warfare officer, the Navy's invest­ment in education amounts to four years of college, seven months of lan­guage school, and more than five months in schools like electronic war­fare and drug abuse. Aviators and sub­joins the reserve, he is a perfect match of experience, training, and rank, a basic tenet of sound leadership. As he proceeds in his reserve career, however, the gap between his rank and his ex­perience and training widen. Annually, a reserve officer is limited to two weeks of active duty training or experience. This divergence continues until the of­ficer is a commander or captain; his experience and training, however, are that of a lieutenant (junior grade) or lieutenant. Despite official myths to the contrary, any combination of civilian jobs and reserve duty cannot match a regular commander’s or captain’s train­ing and experience. Presently, the Navy does not recognize that, in the absence of additional extended active duty training or experience, it is unrealistic for limited reserve officer training to do more than maintain the same level

^Vestm_ent

^{te Waste}d- The Navy's ”up- °^^cer_{s c} ^^rorn°tion policy for reserve v^ad‘fie_Ss^UtS *^{nt0 t}k^e sinew of military ke_bi -d breeds poor leadership. ^Utlflr_ecj_s^eSp ^^oser is the Navy, not the bi[|_e ⁰ °fficers without meaning­ly _ty^{S and} Paychecks.

P*^Cal reserve officer begins his

mariners show even higher training in­vestments. Of course, there is no meaningful measure of an officer’s ex­perience and leadership until he is mo­bilized, but they exist and must be counted in evaluating the officer’s value.

As the officer leaves active duty and

MARGARET MCWETHY

of training and experience that the of­ficer had when he left active duty. When the reserves are mobilized, the Navy will find itself loaded with senior officers with the experience and train­ing of junior officers, and very few ju­nior officers of any sort.

An analysis of the reserve training

'seat

center in Denver, Colorado, as a typical reserve training establishment, makes this point. Of the 701 reservists at­tached to the center on 7 January 1981, 194 are officers broken down by rank as follows:

0-1 =                                 3

0-2 = 4 0-3 = 43 0-4 = 74 0-5=51 0-6 = 19

There is one lieutenant commander, commander, or captain for less than every 3.5 sailors. In some units, this rank imbalance is even more pro­nounced and makes a ridiculous mili­tary organization. For example, one naval control of shipping unit of 16 officers and 9 sailors includes 3 com­manders and 9 lieutenant commanders, hardly a realistic manning, and far in excess of the specified manning of 1 captain, 1 commander, and 3 lieuten­ant commanders. This situation is typ­ical of national reserve officer manning and contrasts sharply with the needs of the Navy. In an emergency, the Navy needs large numbers of experienced ju­nior officers, and not inexperienced sen­ior officers whose rank confines them to positions of leadership exceeding their experience and training. Only shortsighted management and foolish leadership place a reserve captain, who has not been on active duty since he was a junior officer 20 years before, in command of regular officers like, for

tion system achieves opposite results.

The same promotion system ensures an annual migration of experienced of­ficers from the reserves, and instills low morale in the remaining officers. As mentioned, the training and experience the Navy invests in these officers are lost as they are promoted out of their units and into no-pay volunteer units where their abilities are grossly under­employed. This expensive attrition is automatic and non-discretionary. There is no attempt to evaluate the officers’ fitness and qualifications against the needs of mobilization defense. It is sim­ple; promotion to commander guaran­tees most reserve officers several years of duty without pay in billets with no practical mission.

Cuts into morale take place because the officer is not a true voluntary driller. The officer drills because he has no other alternative to avoid losing his retire­ment investment. The Navy takes ad­vantage of the officer’s plight and uses him for free during the remainder of his career. Patriotism is alive and well among naval reserve officers, but it is difficult to eat patriotism or use it to send kids to college. The unavoidable result is that the reserve officer is pres­sured by his family or civilian job to quit the Navy as soon as he can retire, often years before the investment in training and experience justify the de­parture. Many reservists see the Navy as violating its unwritten commitment “to take care of its own.”

The up-and-out promotion policy for

fense questionable. Finally, this p° ^ forces officers out before they have ^0,3 their full contribution to mobifi²³⁰^ defense in a manner which saps motivation and enthusiasm. These ^ suits cannot help but affect the man¹¹ in which these officers lead.

The remedy to correct this delk¹^ requires a revamping of the P^totn. $ policy for reserve officers to maxi their utility to mobilization strengthening the institutional ^ra work in which reserve officers e .

leadership. First, pay scales m^uS^ separated from rank. Second,

,tion^s

be

there

for

should be no permanent promo¹ reserve officers beyond the l^aSt , held by the officer on active ^ Thereafter, permanent pro⁰¹⁰ would be based solely upon periods the reservist spends on ^ duty of an extended nature, jjfyin^ months to one year or more. Q^ua _at tours would include attendant schools like the Department ^ course of Surface Warfare Scho° ^ ^ Naval War College, or a nor⁰¹¹¹ ^ ployment with a ship or squadr⁰⁰^

dentation P^_jf

■tive

ISP

addition

_act^|Ve

easy short-term augme would be adopted which wou the reserve officer to return ^ duty whenever there was an °P and his civilian career allowe a tour. Similar programs are ¹⁰ _yje$i in the U. S. Army and othe^{f n}^_aVy like the Royal New Zeala⁰ ^ _fl0- which allows reservists, with ^s ₀(i tice, to sign on for deploy⁰¹^ _a|_So board warships. This policy w°^u

Id P⁽

to *^c'. ,

such effe^£t

example, a lieutenant commander with 12 years of current operational experi­ence. The technological changes in the intervening years alone make this pos­sibility unrealistic. Effective leadership requires commanders with sufficient experience to evaluate and lead their subordinates. The up-and-out promo­

naval reserve officers is an institutional failure of leadership. Regardless of the individual leadership ability of reserve officers, their best efforts fall short of their potential because they are pro­moted to ranks exceeding their training and experience, and in numbers which make their utility to mobilization de­

tional pipeline for manpower ^ lieve the strain on regular om Jr

Ids⁰ -oOl

with difficult inspections ployments. This policy wou way in keeping permanent

rai

nk

reserve officers in step with the' ^ experience and training. Seni°^r

res¹

er

/ juW

^t0 k‘-1 ^W^^{en rn}°t^>ilize<d would be able _efk ^{3 t}^^lc'^r active duty subordinates _rrik^CtlVely ^aru^ make a worthwhile con-

aviation TU ■

goal u ^{1 nis} approach recognizes the ^w°uld ^ ^tra‘ⁿ‘ⁿ8 f°^r reserve officers j_Rg ^{e t0 ma}mrain the core of train- _tj,_e . ^experience they possess when thtd ^{CaVe act}‘^{ve d}my, and to improve the ^{f rca<}^’^ness >ⁿ the units to which ^-signed for mobilization. ficefc'¹ *^{n t}*^{1e reserv}e organization, of- to se ^W°^u*^ temporarily promoted desju.¹¹¹⁰¹^ ^ran^^s when they filled billets f°r senior officers. For ex- _moted’ ^Wltf’ ^a new co temporarily pro-

f°^rrncr ^ ^ ^rank ^commander, the ne_nt ^{T C}° ^Would revert to his perma- tvithin^L^ heutenant, probably tr_ai_nj ^{e satne} unit where his reserve is recalf |^{S most va}luable. If the unit in ^e ’ ^aH officers will be called up that         ^C^^e kdlet they occupy at

Thi_{s t} ⁰¹⁶’ P^errnanent or temporary. offic_trs^{nSUrtS t}^^lat the number of senior Navy'_s ^{m C}^^{e reserves} never exceeds the the ^actual needs, and provides what be_rs   ^needs in wartime: large num-

quicj-i   ^exP^erienced junior officers

"I'll

officer^{1 t0 t}^‘^s P^^an ‘^s separating the ^ejtartiDl ^ ^^rom h‘^s rank. In the above resetyg^{6, t}^^le officer who finished his hey_te ^Career in the permanent rank of that a ^{101 rece}i^ves the pay and benefits ^recei_Ve^COl?^mand^er or captain currently *^aiitL.^rr^din.s a reserve officer was ^ante_ecj ^^{tS an}d qualified, he is guar- f hete ^{years m} the reserves with pay. ^w°uld be no need for “volun- sional and physical standards for all re­serve officers drawing pay. The officer, in return for the Navy guaranteeing him a 20-year career with pay, agrees to keep his part of the bargain by main­taining his military readiness. Improv­ing military readiness by providing bet­ter motivated leaders is the purpose of this plan, not giving reservists an un­justified secondary income at the tax­payer’s expense. Every officer must be ready for mobilization.

First, each officer must be physically fit. This system provides a large num­ber of older junior officers. They have no mobilization value if they are phys­ically unable to perform the tasks re­quired of junior officers in the fleet. Therefore, the condition of the officer must be evaluated annually, both for medical and physical fitness. Existing medical examinations, with more at­tention to obesity, satisfy the medical standard; but there is currently no ver­ification of the officer’s physical fitness. This needed evaluation can be easily carried out by an annual test for officers to include a timed-mile run, sit-ups, pull-ups, and dips. Unlike fleet units', reserve units have easy access to facil­ities for physical fitness testing and preparation. The benefit to the Navy in preventive medicine for heart attacks and other physical fitness-related ill­nesses and diseases would more than compensate for the single drill required to test a unit’s officers.

With physical and medical fitness covered, the next area of military pre­fare specialty in the fleet today. Thus, the test would be, as an example, one for a lieutenant, surface warfare spe­cialist. Essentially, it would cover the personal qualification standards ex­pected of an officer in that grade and warfare specialty. The second exami­nation would apply specifically to the officer’s current mobilization billet and would be prepared by the unit's active duty parent organization. Thus, a naval control of shipping unit would be tested by the Military Sealift Com­mand, while a unit assigned to a reserve frigate would be tested in an exami­nation prepared by the ship’s com­manding officer. Whenever possible, these examinations would be "hands on,” using, for example, Naval Reserve Force ships for ship units or shipboard simulators.

In order for the reserve officer to keep his billet and pay status, the officer would be required to prove his level of military preparedness by passing a medical examination, a physical fitness examination, an examination of knowl­edge and skill for an officer of his rank and warfare specialty, and an exami­nation related to his specific mobili­zation billet. Officers failing any one of the four examinations would be given a specified amount of time to correct the deficiency before being dropped from the Naval Reserve.

Reforming the system as proposed here will keep officers with proven abil­ity and enthusiasm for their mission in the Naval Reserve, for they will be

units;

^COritinuc₍|^USed' ^^ter 20 years’ service, ^reserv_e ^{6 serv}*ce would be limited to ^tank _Qr . ^cers with permanent senior ^obii;, l^Uru°^r reservists required by The ;^t,0n ^e.

Troa_ch ^rnai^or element of this ap- ^t0 develop rigorous profes- paredness is professional competence. Annually, each reserve officer would be given two examinations. The first ex­amination would test the officer’s main­tenance of his core level of training and experience when he left active duty, and additional information required for a junior officer of the same rank and war­ready for the call to active service. These leadership qualities will not be lost on the sailors they lead.

Lieutenant Burnett was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1972 with a major in foreign affairs. A qualified surface warfare officer, he left active duty in 1978 and joined the Naval Re­serve. He is a lawyer in civilian life.

^laKS / J_Uly ₁₉₈J

103

An Insider’s Look at the Navy’s Main Battery

By Lieutenant Richard T. McCrillis, U. S. Navy

Because the Navy's ability to wage war on the high seas is primarily vested in a nucleus of embarked attack air­craft, this force must routinely and carefully be scrutinized for its realistic and potential utility in battle. I suggest that, given current and proposed weap­onry and the significant effort we ex­pend on war-at-sea plans for seemingly modest gains, the attack airplane has seen its day as the heart of the naval strike force.

Current trends in defensive antiair missile and gun systems make the ap-

But does this really expose a prob­lem? Yes. Let us take a cold look at some hard facts. First, Russian surface- to-air missile systems are good, and getting better. Although our ap­proaches to their ships scrupulously avoid most of the longer range envel­opes, we are constrained to maneuver our airplanes into the heart of multiple point defense systems to deliver the lion’s share of our load. Facing a for­midable backup of naval antiaircraft fire, our brief exposure during weapons delivery is fraught with deadly odds.

lace

doff

j

munitions we have available, we p heavy reliance on our limited s^£an weapon capability to generate the tial shock of the attack. This ^^aCt° _s critical unless terrible losses of ai^fP ^a and pilots are to be the rule. Ours cards, then, would seem to phT

the hand of standoff weapons. ^ pon appears t°

the salvation of the attack ^a‘^rcri ^ allows the pilot the luxury of laun^ ^ a lethal weapon reasonably outsi range of most defensive systems- catch is, however, that in order to

The standoff weapon appears to ^

proach to enemy surface units a tenuous prospect indeed. Do not conclude, however, that we will not approach them. Many hours have been and will be spent devising cunning routes toward a given target. My own air wing even worked on a tactic last sum­mer developed by one of Washington, D. C.’s beltway bandits. We in the attack community believe that a rea­sonable degree of surprise can be had, and present aircraft delivery systems give us good first-pass accuracy with even the simplest of weapons.

Second, the primary weapons load- out for our aircraft carriers are Mk-80 series general purpose bombs. They are fine bombs for general destruction, but basically very limited. Their inherent design requires that they be carried right to the target site and very care­fully released if they are to do any good.

These factors have led to the devel­opment of various coordinated attacks, and careful orchestrations of anti-ra­diation missile and Walleye missile launches with the in-bound tracks of multiple strike divisions. With this tactic we can obtain remarkably good kill probabilities against single enemy warships. However, a complete surface action group (SAG) significantly lowers the strike’s effectiveness. Poor pre­launch targeting will destroy it alto­gether. We can ill afford to plan and execute such complex raids only to find our target to be the SS Exxon California.

Because of the very nature of the

range, one must know to with^,n' ^

or so where the target really to

Shrike missile is flexible enoug ^

a wag—i.e., one can loft it⁾ⁿ _: in

eral direction of the enemy P*^{at 0} ₍\\t

hopes it will detect somethin# , ff ^r i -i Mpstan^u.

way down. But other avanao* ^ ,|i systems are much more restn^c

their release parameters.

The timing involved in coor

dio^at

silt*

in l

an¹

the attack of our standoff ^rnlSS'j_iat

manned aircraft is designed ^S°, ₀fe^

two hit within a short interva ^

(lO¹

at-

other. Thus, if the profiles are ecuted against a known position nd ^ tack will degenerate rapidly ^a j _sllp- likely fail altogether. This disn^ ^ position is the product of m° ^.j_s 1 a few multi-division practice _tarff¹ have flown against non-hosti ^_£(e ships, only to find the ship *^{s n}° ^ tb^e she was “supposed” to be, ^yoe event of a real contact, she ^vv

the

potential, the notion that an

ultra”

^a'tack

Th«

artplaner* Of course not.

is „ ^Uyin« and ^shi| ^ ^

°bai_r._t0^SU^^rnarl^ne’ yet the very nature PendiV k^>r°^und combat invites the ex- ^S|ve air i ^{1 these} increasingly expen- ^Credibl^^{> lnes}' "hheir thin skins and in­take _t^^0rnPh^cated systems interfaces Hl-disposed to taking and A ⁿ8 hits, ngainsr . .

task force ³              defended SAG, a

^c°mmander will dedicate and

^ ^^ssed it the £_xxgn California. ref ■ ’ °^{ne Can alwa}y^s hear the popular

had³¹" °^{f the attack} P^ilot: “^{If 1 onI}V

belie^{1 Stanc}^⁰^ ^weapon. . I do not real ^ ^t*^{1at tke stan}d°ff weapon is a .^{0 ut}'°n, nor is it the reason attack '^rf¹are built.

tn; ^{are to} fly rhe attack airplane ⁰ >rs full,          ^{7                      F} _rriUs . rHrssile will make it better j_n„ discarded. That kind of think-

huneh ^{,UCeS tke attack} aircraft to a of_tL Platform" in the truest sense the p ^Worcl' Witness the outfitting of Port ^W'^tk Harpoon—a patrol trans­War- ‘^nStant*y becomes an offensive -u ^sea platform. Is it, therefore, an p>t_0s attack community faces the rti_0re^eCt °b passing the torch to other, at ^CaP^able forces for the first strike and ff "^{at 1 see as tbe} roost likely pl_arr ^oroable answer is: a manned

r⁴airQt--_ i

Where e ^{Can know} beyond a doubt that ca ^{6 tar}8^et *^s’ ^a manned platform ^ta>ned ⁰ °^Ut P^un*shment in a sus- ^,1'anne'_r ^accurate’ and unjammable can _s ’ ^an<^ ^a manned platform that at_morer^{e ln} harm's way by being Tw ’ ^Slmpl^e, and reliable. battl_e !^^atb°^rrns can fill this bill: a ^^orthy *i_P or an attack sub-

of buw ^SkoulA this be? The sheer cost

outfitting an air wing

ni_B ■  " much (if not more) than a

-^{F 0r} subn very likely lose a significant portion of his total offensive strength. Would he not be more inclined to commit units that could make short work of enemy weapon systems, take some hits, and then withdraw for a massive and sudden follow-on by the carrier air group? Given current assets and future pros­pects, it seems to be the only reasonable alternative. Further, our present elec­tronic warfare suites are woefully in­adequate for actual threats; our air­planes are too slow; and our munitions too limiting to be effective in the high- threat environment.

I do not, however, advocate the aban­donment of attack aviation, only a re­alignment of priorities in its use. Against land targets, there is nothing better. Known geographic references, terrain masking, and the relative non­maneuverability of potential targets play right into the pocket of modern attack pilots. Even highly defended sites are fair game because, once estab­lished, their system weaknesses and fixed geographic surroundings can be effectively exploited.

Pilots who are given a reasonable chance of survival can devastate ground sites with tons of cheap bombs accu­rately delivered. The meticulously planned coordinated strike can be flown properly because the target is not going to move away or change its defensive disposition in the span of a few min­utes, as can a SAG. Finally, there is the overwhelming psychological advantage of having death rain down from the sky.

I believe we have two choices.

► Attack aircraft will continue to draw first blood. If they do, a few things need to be improved. We do need a standoff weapon—one that is long range, fast, accurate, positively targeted, reliable,

. . . and devastating. Stockpile vast quantities of anti-personnel/anti-ma- terial and Rockeye cluster bombs. They are the number one semi-sophisticated air-mud weapons we have. Building in quantity will lower their overall cost and give attack aviation plenty of what we consider to be the best weapon for a wide variety of enticing targets. Send us an airplane that is: dependable, fast, maneuverable, cheap, fuel efficient, flexible with any weapon, accurate, and resistant to electronic warfare mea­sures.

► Attack aircraft will be used in support of harder hitting surface and subsurface units. Given the previously discussed trends in the attack community, this is the way we are headed. What will this strike unit be? The nuclear-pow­ered strike cruiser proposal of a few years ago was a step in the right di­rection—a high-endurance, hard-hit­ting, and autonomous platform well suited to the quick, bloody strike. The stealth, dependability, and astounding firepower of modern attack submarines probably make them the best anti-sur­face weapon the Navy can employ. Very real problems exist, though, in tactical coordination between submarines and a supporting air strike. This factor must be addressed in force planning.

If present trends continue, attack aviation’s advantage in tactics and equipment will be lost. The choice must be made soon and acted upon with vigor.

A 1975 graduate of the University of Idaho, Lieu­tenant McCrillis has more than just 1,200 hours and just shy of 400 carrier landings in the A-7 Corsair II. He is currently assigned to VA-174.

u

^^er the Ice in Submarines

’ Ca,

Plain

Alfred S. McLaren, U. S. Navy

the _ar •

s_Ucc ^mment of the North Pole b$S Aj_S/^eS^^u^ ^transpolar cruises by the ^US ^^SSN’⁵⁷¹) and USS Skate Grid’s '^{n Au}S^ust 1958 focused the

n_Uci^{attention on tbe ca}P^ability °A

hlorg _e^^{ar sub}marine to reach and ex- ^nsive areas within hitherto

inaccessible portions of the Arctic Basin. The achievement of the Nautilus, significant as it was, was not a culmi­nation; but it was a major milestone in efforts which began as early as 1898 in the United States. In early 1903, off Newport, Rhode Island, a lake sub­marine, Protector, became the first sub­marine to cruise under and surface through ice. These explorations con­tinue to the present day.

The first serious attempt to explore the Arctic with a submarine began in 1930 when Sir Hubert Wilkins con-

KARA SEA SEVERNAYA

"NOVAYA

ZEMLYA

The Arctic Ocean and contiguous marginal sea ice zones pictured bare long occupied the interests of submarines.

EAST SIBERIAN ^r* SEA

i                             ,«rf^^ZEMUA

' *                                       ’St

^SIBERIAN •                                                          ™

ISLANDS            ^          .           V '

tracted to outfit an obsolete U. S. sub­marine, the 0-12, for a polar crossing. The plans for this cruise included a number of controversial modifications to specially equip the 0-12, renamed the Nautilus. A wooden skid or “sled runner” was installed, supposedly to enable the submarine to glide along the underside of the ice while permitting automatic depth changes as ice thick­ness changed. A 30-inch elevating con­ning tower or “ice drill” with a rotat­ing cutting head was also installed. This hydraulically raised tower was thought capable of cutting through 13 feet of ice to permit a person’s escape through the top upon completion of drilling. Two nine-inch drills were in­stalled to provide engine in-take air and exhaust for charging the batteries while under the ice; for emergencies, both drills were designed to extend 60 feet upward by the addition of sections. The most successful modification was the installation of an airtight chamber with a hatch fitted into the bottom. The chamber could be pressurized and the hatch opened while the submarine rested against the underside of the ice. A winch could then be used to iower Nansen bottles, reversing thermome­ters, and bottom samplers (to bring up cores). A plankton-collecting device was also installed.

After many delays, the Nautilus ar­rived at the ice edge northwest of Spits­bergen on 19 August 1931. Although a polar crossing had become out of the question, Sir Hubert insisted on exten­sive oceanographic tests and an under­ice drive, despite the loss of the stern planes due to sabotage. On 3 1 August, the Nautilus was trimmed down by the bow, kept positively buoyant, and dri­ven under a floe. Sir Hubert’s narrative reported:

“In my opinion, the negative an­gle was too small and the positive buoying too great to permit a fair test of the maneuver. The vessel went half its length under the ice and stuck. The noise of the ice scraping along the top of the vessel was ter-

BERINQf SEA j

f WRANGEL

ISLAND                      • <•

I kL -

■ⁱy\ a

CHUKCHI '

- &

I V

y

V^;

\ B

A

j

X.

rifying. It sounded as though the whole superstructure was being demolished. . . . We tried to work the large ice drill, but the drilling shaft gave way. ... We tried to work the drill with the emergency hand-drill gear, but this worked very poorly ... it was not possible to penetrate the ice. ...” (Sir G. H. Wilkins, "Nautilus Submarine Ex­pedition” (Unpublished report, 1947).

The next recorded claim of a suc­cessful under-ice sailing was attributed to the Soviet submarine Krasnogvardeyets in the Denmark Strait in 1937. A few years later, during World War II, a significant number of German U-boats successfully operated along the Soviet northern sea route from the eastern Barents Sea to the Laptev Sea. They rounded Novaya Zemlya and pene­trated the Kara and Vilkitski straits.

Germany’s Professor Hermann An- schutz-Kampfe (1872-1931), the in­ventor of the gyrocompass, reached the conclusion that while it would be pos­sible to penetrate far into the Arctic with a submarine, a major difficulty in Arctic navigation would be course de­termination, because all compasses lose their directive force when near the poles, and at the North Pole all direc­tions are south. Other problems and needs cited by experienced German submariners, such as suitable under-ice acoustic detection equipment, resulted in the development of the basic re­

quirements for a special Arctic marine able to conduct non-c° _)S operations in the Arctic regions- ^ interesting to note that most o requirements have been fully ⁱⁿ ,„_t

rated into modern nuclear subm^iir'

From 1946-51, the U-S-

ines-

■                                                      A rc^c

committed several submarines to ,

and marginal sea ice zone (MSIZ) ⁰ j

ations. The USS Atule (SS-403),

with the first upward-beamed F^at

eter for measuring ice thickness ^ head, participated in “Operation ^ nook” between Greenland ^an j. Canadian Archipelago in 19^6 lect environmental and scientific In the winter of 1946—47, the P^s* ^ nett (ss-408) participated in Op^era^_ot High Jump” in the Antarctic- ^ only did the Sennett demonstrate

pability to track pieces of float<ⁿ?

she also defined the first basic

ice-

un^^er’

the

ice sonar and solidly establish⁶¹ ^ feasibility of submarine operatic¹ ice for the U. S. Navy. During ^d [,e

1947,      the USS Boarfish (ss-327) m^ade ^ first excursion under pack >^ce

Chukchi Sea; her upward-beam^e sounder provided excellent traces _f ice canopy overhead. In Sep ^4.

1948,      the uss Carp (ss-338) made * ^ mile penetration inside the p^aC ^ the Chukchi Sea and develop^e . .q

are^aS

,m^^r

niques for making vertical ascents the descents from polynyas (i-^e- of open water in sea ice). In the su of 1952, the uss Redfish (ss-395) ^ ducted extensive oceanography

Sea^USt'^C °^^servat‘^ons *n the Beaufort Her upward-beamed ^c1^U|pment

sounder was expanded to include

Potvs ^tUrn‘ⁿg back only because of a ‘ ^{r fai}*ure in he)

Way f* J Nautilus cruise paved the

Thi

future under-ice expeditions orn the standpoint of operational y ^and that of scientific research

_de‘^tl0na‘ sounders along her main i_n ^wHich enabled her to perfect div- M's^ ^ascent procedures. The Red- ^corri |^CrU*^{SC Was} considered to have VYj_tL ^6te<a 'fi^e series of experiments peat ^COnvent'°nal submarines. A re­fee (;^CrUlse ‘ⁿ next year resulted in ^rriertt "of ^°^rma* proposal for develop- TK ¹ P°*^ar submarine, new ^{6 auturrin} °f 1957 ushered in a subm^{ra W}^^en *fe^e world’s first nuclear p_enet^arine’ 'he uss Nautilus (SSN-571), Spitsh^⁶^ beneath the pack ice near tq_uj ^Crgen- Carrying the Redfish’s before ^nt’.^{She reached} 87° N Latitude

in her gyrocompasses.

^CaPabili_t.

^P^Cltv Q L

^sp_ee(j ^y ‘ ^{ne wa}s able to transit at high ^ould ^Un<^^er *^ce> find openings which U0_Us ^^errnit surfacings, take contin- an_dm °^{tt0rn and} under-ice profiles, perati^{taSure and} record horizontal tem- In .^an<^ ^sal>n*ty profiles. ptep_ara^ar ^ *958, the Nautilus began

feg '^0ns ^^{or £}h^e first polar cross-

tional *^3erat'^on Sunshine.” Addi- cluded^eC*^uiP^>rnent and capabilities in- ^a high ³ⁿ '^nert‘^a* navigation system, for Unde^CS°^^Ut'^{0n m}'^ne detection sonar Sai] t , '^{lce w}°tk, and a strengthened ^s°nar_c °f ^an effective ahead-looking fe J_UnJ^Xl3ility caused her to turn back btayy ⁶ *^^8 when she encountered fathom^{Ce W}*^C^ drafts to 80 feet in 27 btyj_n ^S °f water. In late July, by fol- b fee ru ^e<^*’^e °f 'he ice pack eastward tow 5_ea ^hchi Sea and using the Bar­'s pass'^{1 alle}y> the Nautilus was able At_ctic !!ⁿ^^er 'he ice pack and enter the ‘‘1^ b,^aS*ⁿ’ ^ August, the Nau-

^t'^lr°^uSh^{Carne r}^^e **^{rst s}b^,‘P ^to P^ass Cto_{Ssin >} ^t*^le North Pole. Her total ^^feenla [^r0rn Point Barrow to the Qq^? 8ea took just 96 hours, fee ^ following the Nautilus was ^et)Ujp , ^3?e(SSN-578) which, similarly ti_Sion ^e, ^w‘^th the addition of a pre- *V_th ^ePth recorder, reached the ^Octgj °'^e °ⁿ 12 August and con- las. pj^Sorne nine surfacings in polyn- tnost significant accomplish­ment was being able to maneuver at will in high latitudes yet still maintain an accurate position. On 17 March 1959, in the first winter operation, the Skate became the first ship to surface at the North Pole, after breaking through hummocked ice about 12 inches thick in a small polynya.

In early I960, the USS&trgo (SSN-583) departed on the most arduous under-ice expedition to date. She entered the Arctic Ocean by transiting 900 miles across the very shallow water (depth 125 to 180 feet) of the Bering-Chukchi Shelf. During winter, this area is cov­ered with drifting ice, including many ridges extending almost to the bottom. The Sargo was able to accomplish this crossing with the aid of an under-ice piloting sonar as she cruised 25 feet above sea bottom. The Sargo spent 31 days in the Arctic, surfacing in com­plete darkness some 16 times through thick ice. On the outbound transit, the inevitable occurred when she collided, south of the Bering Strait, with a deep pressure ridge. Jury-rigged repairs to her piloting sonar enabled her to clear the ice field.

Equipped with an improved under­ice sonar, the USS Seadragon (SSN-584) departed Portsmouth, New Hamp­shire, on 1 August I960, with two primary objectives. The first involved a thorough test of the new sonar in the iceberg-infested waters of Baffin Bay. Achievement of this objective resulted in the Seadragon's becoming the first submarine ever to pass beneath ice­bergs—some of quite deep draft and masses exceeding several million tons of ice.

The Seadragon's second objective was to be the first ship in history to com­plete the classic Northwest Passage by way of the Parry Channel. This second objective was also successfully achieved, but not without considerable risk. The route to be followed by the Seadragon had never been completed by any ship as the heavy ice encountered in the Barrow Strait had defeated them. In fact, the deepest penetration had been made by Parry in 1819.

The Parry Channel from the Barrow Strait west was essentially uncharted. The sum total of all information avail­able upon the Seadragon s departure in­dicated only very sparse soundings, a high probability of shoal water, and the presence of uncharted pinnacles and in­accurately charted islands located within the strait. Finally, heavily ridged and hummocked ice with deep draft keels, some of which were aground on the pinnacles and shoals, were also expected.

The Seadragon's capabilities and su­perb under-ice seamanship enabled her to locate and survey thoroughly a safe

°⁶6CU

^ln8Ts / j_uiy ₁₀₈₁

107

all-season deep-water passage through the Barrow Strait. Upon completion of the survey, she transited the remaining and largely unsounded 400 miles through the Northwest Passage, com­pletely submerged under heavy ice, using her under-ice navigation sonar.

On 31 July 1962, the Skate and the Seadragon rendezvoused in the deep Arctic Basin and proceeded in company to the North Pole where they both sur­faced in the same polynya. The Skate also made the first transit of the Nares Strait into the Lincoln Sea en route and later became the first ship to transit the Northwest Passage from west to east by way of the Parry Channel.

A four-year suspension of Arctic op­erations for the U. S. Navy appeared to result from restricted operations caused by the loss of the USS Thresher (SSN-593) in the Atlantic- in 1963. Meanwhile, in January 1963, the So­viet government newspaper Izvestia re­ported that the nuclear submarine Len-

L

inskiy Komsomol had reached the Pole in June 1962.  j ₀(i

When construction comment*-

a new class of U. S. nuclear atta< ^ marines in 1963, the U. S. ^^aV^_rcti^c

the capability to operate in

the

iirem^el

.(its-

year round to the design require For instance, the top of the *   ^

rudder of Sturgeon-class ^sU strengthened (with HY-80 stee j ^

masts have special ice caps, planes can be rotated for ^sU _sSp through ice. This class also P^oS _[(jr a recessed secondary propulsi°ⁿ j_Se that can be lowered and used f°^r P _tjs- maneuvering. The general cha ^ tic of the under-ice sonar can ₀. in Figure 1. In a typical surfet^^jjje

, requn

lution, a polynya or tne ^ length is located, course is depth is decreased, and the ^s;_n0si^ is maneuvered into a hovering P ₍o* beneath its center. The secon im­

pulsion motor is used to m

ake

avo"

i a-

minute adjustments to ensure ^ ance of large blocks of i^ce °^V

^S'⁸ⁿⁱficant

alon,. ^^ah>ng under-ice measurements

K

°ⁿ8 the

^am_u

^exact track followed by the

Once fUi*

clear ” °^{C t0}^ ^sounc^^ers indicate ‘all _0v ^f’ ^or indicate ice sufficiently thin ^{r ea}d, a vertical ascent is com-

,^nced into the polynya.

isato¹^⁶^ ^{aS execut}'^ve °ffi^{cer a}°d nav- to >°^r °^{n r}^^e ^^{rst t}i^lese Sturgeon-class com° ^{t0 S6a}’ ^{ttle uss} Q^ueenfi^sh (SSN-651), lat-^l_]^ri'^ss*^oned 6 December 1966. In highl^{Uary                 we} departed for the

_Ms ^ triable environment of the ^a tve k ^^av'^s Strait. After spending d_er ^{6 aroun}d the icebergs, in and un­_Si_n ^^ac ’ the Qneenfish became the first thro⁶ f^Crew submarine to surface ^acousf' *^Ce’ ^and f°^und that the best shaii ^{IC COn}ditions in the MSIZ exist at

^ depths.

^expeditions that followed the rn_ari Q^ueenf^sh cruise involved sub- ati_0r^j^{S w}‘th basically identical oper- iectio^ ^C^^aracteristics and scientific col- a_ncj | ^CaP^abilities. For these reasons,

I _Can ^because of security constraints, All °ⁿ*^y °^utii^ne these expeditions. ^^0rm_a°^nt'^nUe^ ^{t0 c}°d^ect scientific in- UHcj, ^{n as} they explored previously and its^¹^ P°^rt'^ons °f the Arctic Basin ci_pai ^{S Cbnt}>guous ice zones. The prin- Se_a j_Ce^{SU rnar}‘^ne Arctic and marginal l%_y ^Z°^ne cruises conducted between 1. ^and 1979 are outlined in Table

When u

Atcti_c ■ ^C”^e Q^ueenfi^sh returned to the °ffice_r *»            I ^was her commanding

5qq v ⁿ Edition to surfacing within the 0^ ^s°fthe geographic North Pole, accomplished two other ^Volved'^an-^t °h)^ectives. The first in-

‘‘US \~)        ,                          .

an_alysis ⁴ years earlier. Comparative ^s °f the information taken by

both ships provided clues to the change in the world heat balance during that interval. The second objective involved tracing of several different fathom curves—completely in international waters—along the entire Siberian Shelf from the Severnaya Zemlya Island group through the Laptev Sea, around the New Siberian Islands, and contin­uing through the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas. A combination of highly variable sound velocity profiles (often severely negative, resulting in signifi­cantly reduced under-ice sonar ranges), heavy ice, and an extremely irregular bottom made this a very challenging task.

While ice conditions were quite fa­vorable in the Western Laptev Sea, they became increasingly severe (average drafts in excess of 70 feet) as the survey proceeded westward. Large icebergs were encountered throughout the Western Laptev Sea, and bottom con­ditions were discovered to be quite ir­regular, caused by many depressions and gouges, with the bottom shoaling up quite dramatically at times—e.g., over 50 feet in one ship length. More intriguing gouges were encountered in the East Siberian Sea as heavy deep draft ice was noted in the proximity.

Surfacings for satellite navigation fixes were difficult as a result of en­countering heavily silted water with a thick upper layer of jellyfish and brine shrimp from 90 to 140 feet beneath the surface. A dramatic decrease in salinity just below the surface required consid­erable de-ballasting. Completing the survey with a high degree of accuracy, the Queenfuh exited the Bering Strait in early September.

The many expeditions undertaken by the nuclear submarine since 1957 have conclusively demonstrated her capabil­ity to operate in, accurately survey, and collect scientific information through­out all portions of the Arctic Ocean and its contiguous MSlZs. Although the submarine is particularly well suited to the collection of acoustic information (i.e., sound propagation and ambient noise measurements), which remains a first-priority research task, she is also well equipped for continuously meas­uring oceanographic parameters of temperature, sound velocity, electrical conductivity, ambient light, and ice profiles or wave heights. The subma­rine can also measure gravity anomalies and be used for "ground truthing” for over-flying sensor systems (i.e., laser determination of ice profiles).

Finally, nuclear submarines may one day be of invaluable assistance in the location of potential oil resources and their transportation from the Arctic. Let us hope that the world situation will one day be such that these mag­nificent vessels can be fully employed for scientific purposes for the better­ment of mankind throughout the world.

Captain McLaren attended the U. S. Naval Acad­emy, the Naval Submarine and Nuclear Power Schools, and, while at the Naval War College, earned a master's degree from George Washing­ton University. He has also served touts on board numerous submarines, including a four-year tour as the CO of the USS Queenfish (SSN-651). He is presently on the Staff of the Naval War College.

°y c,

^sweeping Shrimp Boat? A What?_

^aPtai_n

Cyrus R. Christensen, U. S. Navy

full             ^tdc newspapers have been

^abi

Out

the

President Reagan':

•'esj ‘ . ^atus of our military readi- 7) _Corr ^lncreases in the defense budget ''ear _te^{ect s}°rne of the problems in the ^eavof^{11 ot}^^er °f military than _tj_le ^reM^uires remedial action more ^sur ^{6   Nay}y’^{s m}*ⁿe counter-

Atthi ^f°^rCeS'

rej'^S P°‘^nt *ⁿ time, our forces have ^Uced to 25 ocean minesweepers

(MSOs—22 are in the Naval Reserve Force), 7 minesweeping boats (MSBs), and 16 RH-53D minesweeping helicop­ters. These figures are alarming in view of an assessment of the mining capa­bility of the Warsaw Pact and the re­sults of "Solid Shield’’ fleet exercises in 1979 ^and .1980. All of the forces the U. S. Atlantic Fleet could bring to bear could not open one East Coast port in any acceptable period of time. New

mine countermeasures ships, equip­ment, and advancement of related state-of-the-art technology are clearly in order. We were recently reminded how rapidly a mining campaign could affect our country when it was only suggested that mines might be em­ployed by the Iranians to block the Middle Eastern oil routes.

Increasing force levels through the budgetary process is both time consum­

ing and expensive. The first course of action, now ongoing, is to increase the combat readiness of the mine counter­measures forces we have. Even upon completion of this program, however, our force levels will be woefully inad­equate. Therefore, an interim course of action to enhance our capability in the near term is necessary. A great deal of research into this matter has resulted in the conclusion that if the U. S. ports were mined an augmentation of our mine countermeasures forces could be made from the fishing and shrimping industry.

During “Solid Shield 80” (a port breakout scenario), a Charleston-based shrimp boat was rented at a cost of S2,000 per day and augmented into the exercise. Experiments were conducted with deep trawls, mine hunting, and the use of existing mine countermea­sures equipment taken from the shelf. The results of these operations were encouraging and indicated the concept could and should be pursued in earnest.

The East and Gulf coast ports were surveyed from Maine to Texas to de­termine the availability of assets. It was found that a significant number of boats could be used with little or no recon­figuration. It was also determined that at least 50% of the boats could not be used because of inadequate deck equip­ment and shaft horsepower. A program to identify the usable assets on a con­tinuing basis is now in the formative stages.

An encouraging aspect into com­mandeering civilian craft in a national emergency is the attitude of the boat owners and shipping companies. The few who have been interviewed indi­cated that not only would they volun­teer their boats, but also they would volunteer themselves. Clearly, patri­otism is not dead in this element of our society.

The opportunity to acquire a com­mercial shrimp boat for use by the U. S.

Navy on a permanent basis came when U. S. Customs seized the 63-foot Dixie in a drug raid off the coast of South Carolina in February 1980. The ship was carrying 12 tons of marijuana which was valued at $15 million. Sub­sequent to her seizure, the Dixie was held by U. S. Customs in litigation. The Atlantic Fleet mine countermea­sures forces were informed that the boat could possibly be turned over to the Navy if she met the requirements of a mine countermeasures vessel.

A group of experts from Mine Squad­ron 12 boarded the Dixie and found her to be well equipped with the proper winches and deck gear. In fact, the out­riggers had never been used—obviously, they were not required in the drug-run­ning business. The boat had been op­erating for three years between Col­ombia and the Southeast United States. She had been crewed by 12 Colombians and 1 American. (All are now serving

terms in prison.)

The first order of business after t^£ Dixie was turned over to the Navy September 1980 was to de-rat her aj¹ clean her up to Navy stand*¹ ^ Twenty-four rats were caught m engine room and the hold. The had to be completely stripped and infected. Two of the original c members were reported to have pulmonary tuberculosis.           .               '

The lessons learned from the shrit^, boat operations in “Solid Shield ^ were put to use on board the Dtx>^e ^ the installation of paravanes and pressors on the fantail for ^mo0^₍j minesweeping. The sweep wires ^ on coastal minesweepers (MSCs) found to be compatible with winches and were installed. An ^a ment of the power requirements

cated a need for a larger ship ^{s se} ^ generator, and one was obtained ¹ an old decommissioned MSO hu •

a Iqq⁰¹¹³^ ^‘^esel for a prime mover and The D'^ ®^enerator were installed, 'he r_e **** '^{S Soon t0} h>^e drydocked, and ^COrnpl °ⁿ^£^urat‘^on program should be ^ceio^f ^ ^August. Upon official she „ ^rorn 'h^e U. S. Federal Courts, swegpj 'designated MSSB-1 (mine­rs ^ ^s^^r*^mP boat), the first of her

There

fo *                                         -

^r 'he mssb-i involving deep

ul_ecj /^{e are} many experiments sched-

"awi_s

^eervj¹⁰^ ^C^^e development of types of

"'■nee „^a^^ainst close-tethered moored

^p_s                          ~ ^vciupmciit ui iypcj> ui

'he ^a®^a‘^ns' moored mines close to '"'race a         ,               ,

ial ^A sonar now used on the

cry veh^VV^^r^^are 8^rouP'^s swimmer deliv- hee_n r *^C ® Tor obstacle avoidance has

^SP«cial

hott_0rn^Un^ ^ehfoctive against moored and This s₀ ^fn’^{nes an}d will be installed.

was operated on the Shiekj gl ,^r'^mP boat during “Solid ^c°Ura,>^ ^and performed with en-

^U^ug results.

^SAtfrn^°^rta^le information-gathering ^f°t u_Se shack has been developed ^C°ⁿsists^Wl/^ ^t^*^{e MSSB_1}- This system Magnet' ° ^an ^-foot by 10-foot non- ^sha<l₀^, '^C dut from the Navy’s obsolete S^raph system equipped with a

fia_v

^QS-i °^{n s}ystem (Raydist-T),

the

°nar console, vhf marine radii

T-Ofan '•q¹,', ^{a s}*de-scan sonar, and ^take_n All of this equipment was 'he shelf from other Navy

Pro

)gr_ar^ ^1V- ^neir rrorn other INavy ■tciai °^{r Was} purchased from com-

^P°^ttabl_e^S°^UrCes' The pigs is completely ^Sl)‘'abl_e ^an<^ ^Can T*^e installed in an) ^ar> ho_Ur ^CraT' with a crane in less thar ¹ Such an equipped boat ther

becomes a minehunter. With this in­stallation, the MSSB-i will become a major player in the Navy’s channel con­ditioning program. This recently de­veloped program searches known ship­ping routes on the East and Gulf coasts for mine-like objects on a continual basis. The job can be done with 13 men and 1 diesel engine instead of 60 men and 6 diesel engines used by an MSO. The savings in fuel and manpower are significant.

The use of trawlers and shrimp boats for mine countermeasures is not an original idea. The British Navy has ex­pended a considerable amount of effort in this area. Mine countermeasures ex­perts from England have been working very closely with American mine coun­termeasures forces in Charleston, South Carolina, for the past few months in developing deep trawl rigs for use on the mssb-i.

A new mine countermeasures pro­gram in the formative stages will in­volve about 200 shrimp and fishing boats in the East and Gulf coast ports manned by naval reservists. This force, when trained, will be able to load the boats with equipment which will have been stored in the same geographic area as the boats’ home-ports for rapid con­version to sweepers and hunters. These forces will augment the Navy’s mine countermeasures forces in the event of a major mining campaign against the United States.

Although her past leaves a great deal to be desired, the MSSB-1 has a future that can make our Navy proud of her.

Captain Christensen is Commander, Mine Squadron 12 in Charleston, South Carolina.

The Royal Australian Navy—A Progress Report_____________________

By Sub Lieutenant J. V. P. Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy, and Sub Lieutenant P. D. Jones, Royal Australian Navy

The Royal Australian Navy (ran) is presently involved in a large-scale pro­gram of replacement and reconstruc­tion. Alarmed by the deteriorating world situation, notably the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the Australian Government has substantially enlarged the defense vote and hastened a number of development programs. Areas of ac­tivity include the replacement of a large part of the surface fleet and moderni­zation of the remainder. This discussion describes the various projects in hand and some aspects of the possibilities for future development.

The New Carrier: In September 1980, the Australian Government announced approval in principle for the construc­tion of a new aircraft carrier to replace hmas Melbourne, the elderly Majestic- class light fleet carrier which is the flag­ship of the Australian fleet. Although the requirement for a new vessel was accepted, the Minister of Defense, Mr. Killen, declared that no decision as to whether or not to acquire v/stol air­craft for the ran would be made until 1983. The fact is that v/stol still re­mains to be proven operationally at sea. The two major contenders for any con­tract, the British Sea Harrier and the American AV-8B, will by then have ad­vanced in development sufficiently to demonstrate which is the more suitable choice for Australia. It must be noted that the ran is not wealthy enough to afford by itself all the huge costs as­sociated with the introduction of such novel systems.

The decision as to which design will be selected for the new carrier will be made in late 1981. Two contracts have been awarded for the detailed definition of designs from America: a gas turbine variant of the lwo Jima (LPH-2) class and a sea control ship (scs). One scs, sched­uled for completion in 1984, is already under construction for the Spanish Navy, and the design is a modified and enlarged version of the original Amer­ican project. Each of the designs is not­able for its equipment compatibility with the American-built guided mis­sile frigates presently being brought into service.

The Melbourne's decommissioning, scheduled 1985, will probably tie in very well with the acquisition of the new vessel, since the commissioning crew will have to be available for train­ing and “standing by” well before completion of the latter. The old ship recently celebrated 25 years in com­mission, and with a hull and machinery of World War II vintage, enormous efforts are required to keep the Mel­bourne operational, placing a tremen­dous strain upon her crew and air group. The ship is due to undergo a refit next year which should see her through until the end.

The Escort Program: The Australian Government ordered four Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided missile frig­ates from the Todd Pacific Shipyard at Seattle. The lead ship, hmas Adelaide (f-oi), was recently commissioned and will shortly be followed into service by HMAS Canberra (F-02). The remaining ships, Sydney (f-03) and Darwin (F-o4), which are still on the slips, are of the improved FFG-7 type and will be com­missioned equipped with the Vulcan/ Phalanx close-in weapon system (Ciws) and will be capable of operating LAMPS III helicopters. The two earlier vessels may receive these modifications during later refits.

Coinciding with the announcement of the new carrier came the decision, subject to certain arrangements yet to be concluded, that two and possibly six additional guided missile frigates are to be built at Williamstown Naval Dockyard in Victoria. It is proposed that the first two vessels will be largely identical to the second group of Amer­ican-built Oliver Hazard Perrys. Details of the armament fit of the remainder have yet to be defined. A possible al­ternative includes the fitting of the Australian-designed and -built Mul- loka sonar system. A suggestion may also exist to fit the ships with a 5-inch gun and some kind of point defense missile system.

The existing escort force has as its mainstay three modified Charles F. Ad­ams (DDG-2)-class guided missile de-

ex-

stroyers. American built, these

differ fro"¹

tremely successful ships their U. S. Navy and West counterparts principally in mou ^ two Ikara asw systems in P^ , _£ asroc. All ships of the class wi fitted with Harpoon surface-to-s^ur ^

missiles in the near future and are

SM-¹

three

Ge rfl'^sn anti#

ready equipped with Standard surface-to-air missiles. The

guided missile destroyers are sche ^u to serve well into the 1990s may be expected to undergo some ^ of extensive modernization and ⁰ ,

and thej

kind

tiy

u>

haul on the lines of that P^resen

planned for the later units of the Navy’s DDG-2 class. ^_rlf.

A major refit program for the ^ class destroyer escorts is presently

Nava'

conducted at Williamstown j Dockyard. The Parranuitta Stuart (de-48) are being °^verhn^.^ with improvements to hull, ^rn3^j_iey ery, habitability, and electronics- will receive the Dutch-built control system and be fitted with

to

32 antisubmarine torpedo tubes place the Mk-10 triple-barrefle ^ submarine mortar. Another innov,, will be the installation of the M^u

re-

ant*'

tion

note*

medium-range sonar, a system ^SP ^ ically designed for operation in th^e

in

v.u

ficult sonar conditions which P ^ around the Australian coast. The ^ (DE-45), another of this class, will not receive this moderm^za^ acted as the test bed for the sy^s hmas Derwent (DE-49) will ^rece'^V_nre' refit after the Parramatta has ,r of * commissioned. The final P^air ^ -_tns River class, Swan (DE-50) and ^ (DE-53), will be refitted some

time'¹

completion of the present work-

forC«

of

Submarines: The RAN has a ^lljj_eSel-

six Scottish-built Oberon-class ₍₀ •    • The n^fS

electric patrol submarines. ¹¹¹ j_ace undergo the submarine weapons

ons

program, hmas Otway, was

recoi

ni^¹

iof

sioned in 1980. This moderm^p. included the installation of the Atlas sonar and the Singer-Li ^ CCS Mk-1 digital fire control ^s^_tfd The latter is based upon the h^{re C} Jjl system used in the U. S. NaxT

es (SSN-688) class. The weapons to cl _^l,^arrie<^ ^by the modified Oberons in- ^u e Mk-48 torpedoes, and Sub Har- Portly be fitted.

Out '^{6 rt}^^t P^ro8^ram *^s being carried ^landn^{Sytlney at} ''hckers Cockatoo Is- ockyard. No replacement for the

W?0ti rloo~ u         1         i •             i

but ^{dSS haS} ^^et ^^een designated, $_t ^SUCCessor *^s under consideration. _0n ‘^{CS are} presently being conducted tv ,^{C br}*tish “Type-2400” and the _L^Ch. ^Walr«s class among others.

^"f’P^ort: The fleet tanker cl_ass^{S u}PPhi a modified British Tide- by _t^^an^^er’ ‘^{s t0} he replaced in service u_ncj_er ^{C brenc}h-designed Success, now I_sla j instruction at Vickers Cockatoo _a|_mos . ^ockyard. The Success will be tank ^ ^lc^^ent‘^cal to the La Durance-class _Sched^rS, ^{op tbe} French Navy and is se_COnd ^ ^t0 *°'^{n tbe RAN} ‘^{n 1}^84. A n_ani. , ^unit °f the class, as yet un- rni_Ssj ’.^w‘h also be built. The com- rese_ntⁿⁱⁿ® °^^tbe second ship will rep- a tw ^{1 ma})°^{r st}ep toward achieving Tk~°^Cean force.

i he j rv

be_CaiJSe ^{a u}'<^rance design was selected

Australia’s major ports from mine at­tack. To facilitate this, the navy ini­tiated studies to examine the feasibility of building a lower cost mine counter­measure vessel. The result is the pro­jected 30-meter minehunting/sweep- ing catamaran. Bids for the first two prototype units have been called for; the intention is for eight of these vessels to enter service before 1985.

The design is centered around a com­puterized minehunting kit fitted in a container which can be airlifted with ease and fitted within a few hours. Cat-

yard. She was commissioned in July

1979.

The remaining patrol boats are under construction in Cairns. The Warrnam- bool will be completed this year and will be followed out at short intervals by the remainder. The last is scheduled for commissioning in 1985. A further batch of up to ten patrol boats is pro­jected. These will probably be of the Fremantle type, but it is possible that some will be completed for transfer to neighboring powers under defense aid schemes. Twelve Attack-class patrol

abl,

represented the most favor-

ical|y ,'^nat'on of size, being specif- gr_0ut) ^es'8^ned to replenish an escort Supply ^an<^ ^econorny °f personnel. The of 2o5^y>reSentfy requires a complement only _l5o^While the Success will require Edition ' ^Wlt^ accommodations for an Under ^na- ^ P^ersonnel on passage or ^ Gaining.

Sir j ^ '^‘^ous: The Tobruk, a modified

_is Ocelot. _t

tlen,- ’^type landing ship (heavy),

^canng _c

.^South

Nevir completion in Newcastle, missi^b.Wales, and will be com-

this

>hi_blni„

year. She will join the Mo_ret(^L,^,10us squadron based at Hmas ° *ⁿ ®^r*^sbanc, Queensland. The °^cean„ ^Wl11 he the ran’s first true th; ⁸⁰¹¹

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

^ln8 amphibious unit

tesetv_e /^ears' hive operational and one ^St'tUte i?^{rCe be}avy landing craft con­sign _Sta ,^{C re}rnainder of the force. De- ^^acerne_n'^{CS 3re} 'ⁿ hand for their re-

X

^sel_s

Ke

°ⁿ"-class

Warfare: The three

aging

mine countermeasure ves-

icem ^Vs^ ^are m urgent need of re- Vesfetr^¹'             ^{a num}her of other

Pla<

tai_:

ned

navies, the ran has main-

hfe ^a ,^State'°f-the-art mine war-

rior^Capabil to

to

*ty, but it is now the inten­

ds:

mcrease the MCMV force so as

^1Sess the

potential to protect all

amarans without containers can be em­ployed on inshore minesweeping. The minesweeping catamaran is the sub­ject of some overseas interest, partic­ularly among Australia's Southeast Asian neighbors.

The second aspect of the mcmv pro­gram concerns the provision of a ca­pability for deep-water minesweeping. An option could be the modification of oil rig support vessels or large stern trawlers for such duties.

Patrol Boats: The program for 15 42- meter fast patrol boats is well under way. A prototype unit, hmas Fremantle (P-203), was built in Lowestoft, United Kingdom, at the Brooke Marine Ship-

When the Melbourne leaves active service, her A-4 attack aircraft will he beached. The replacement carrier will likely join the fleet in 1986.

boats should remain in service for some years, a number being allocated to the reserve forces. Preliminary studies have been conducted into the possibility of the construction of larger patrol vessels to meet the requirement imposed by the declaration of the 200-Mile Aus­tralian Fishing Zone and evolving law of the sea conventions.

General: Additional options for fur­ther developments are under consid-

to

the missile in the River-class P^ES Swan and Torrens could carry the poon.              _[s for

The requirement clearly ^eXlS surface units to be fitted with form of adequate close-in missh^e || fense system. Although all the FFGS eventually carry Vulcan/Phafan*

rfl^aa

lose'

Australia is well on its way toward building a two-ocean navy. HMAS Adelaide (F-01) is the first of the U. S. - built FFG-7s to enter service. HMAS Swan (DE-50), a modified River-class escort, is similar to the British Leander- class frigates. HMAS Otway, the first of the Oberon-c/ass submarines to complete a weapons update, now sports a new bow sonar. HMAS Supply (AO-195), which no longer carries the twin Bofor 40-mm. guns forward, will be replaced in 1983. HMAS Fremantle (P­203) and HMAS Adroit (P-82) represent the RAN’s two classes of patrol boats. The RAN’s lineup of helicopter types is pictured on the opposite page: (from top to bottom) Mk-50 Sea King, Wessex 31B, Iroquois, and a Bell Kiowa.

eration. These include the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier and the struc­turing of the fleet around a two-task group force. The resources of the ran are relatively limited, and a two-carrier fleet would certainly be created at the expense of other projects.

The alternatives include the con­struction of a second landing ship and expanding the helicopter-carrying ca­pacity of other ships in the fleet—e.g., the Saccesr-class tankers could be mod­ified to carry more than one aircraft.

The purchase of a new type of heli­copter for the fleet is perhaps the most pressing RAN requirement needing a decision which must be made within the next few years. With the arrival of the FFGs, the RAN is faced with the dilemma of whether to wait for the very expensive LAMPS ill Seahawk helicopter or instead to opt for other, perhaps less sophisticated but less costly designs. Since the Royal Australian Air Force is also in need of a new helicopter, there is also the attractive possibility that some kind of combined, perhaps Aus­tralian-built purchase could be made, with all the accompanying economies of scale. Another option is to continue to purchase the Westland Sea King. The problem is extremely complicated, and it is presently impossible to deter­mine which particular choice will be made.

By 1990, the RAN may be expected to consist of one helicopter/v/STOL air­craft carrier, three modified Charles F. Adams-clzss DDGs, six FFG-7- and mod­ified FFG-7-class guided missile frigates,

four River-class destroyer escorts, ^ fleet replenishment ships, six con tional patrol submarines, one dest tender, a landing ship, and a ^vaf of smaller units.                       ngt

In the next few years, the surface

will receive a surface-to^:surface w capability with the installation ⁰ .. jje poon in the DDGs and FFGS. _t there presently are no plans ^rn 1110 terns, no announcement has been concerning the provision of the

⁰ ^^ear>

^rePlacer^^{n System} f°^r the ddgs or the ^shorc._ra ^Cnt the very elderly Seacat

■ ^sibT ^{System in the DEs}- >n^cl_ude  for the patrol boat force

^Surf_£

ace

^acquisition of a surface-to-

*h,

^Sele<

triissile system for installation

eted

^and

Ram_<

Value

units of the Fremantle class.

°P^>PO;

Patrol

however, continues to stress of light forces in surveillance

atound Australian waters as

^Sttack _Cra° ^th^e*^r employment as fast

'topter^ ^Stuh'^es are in hand for a hel- fsed _as'^carryfog ice patrol ship to be * ^research platform and as a Nc j. ^Vessel for the Australian Ant­'s ^alte_a(j^tSearch Expeditions. The RAN '^Ce°pe_r " ^accumul^ating experience in ^stas_0r) In the 1979-80 summer

ⁿ the Antarctic, Australian of-

ficers served in a U. S. Coast Guard ice­breaker, the British ice ship HMS En­durance, and on board the Danish mer­chant ships chartered by the Australian Government for the resupply mission. When completed, the Australian vessel will be a tremendous addition to the ran’s scientific research capability.

The base facilities for the RAN are no longer concentrated entirely upon the Southeastern coast. HMAS Stirling is now a major fleet base, and a chain of patrol boat bases is being established around the northern coasts. Although Sydney remains the home port for the bulk of the fleet, the allocation of sup­port facilities is now much more in coincidence with strategic require­ments.

Provided that satisfactory solutions

can be found to the problems apparent in regard to the replacement helicopter project, whether or not to have fixed- wing aircraft at sea and close-in missile defense systems, the programs dis­cussed here should meet the perceived requirements of the Royal Australian Navy in the 1980s and 1990s. For the first time, the RAN will be capable of deploying forces simultaneously in the Indian Ocean and on the East Coast—a “two-ocean” navy.

Lieutenant Goldrick is currently serving on board HMAS Tarakan (a Ba/ikpapan-dass LCU), and Lieutenant Jones is on board HMAS Brisbane (a Charles F. Adams-dass DDG). Both authors have previously written for the Proceedings and have contributed to Jane's Fighting Ships.

ADT As You Like It! ________________

By Lieutenant Commander R. R. P. Spencer, Royal Australian Navy

The scene is the operations room (combat information center) of Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Perth (DDG- 38) off the Eastern Australian Coast, carrying out a night encounter exercise against two other destroyers. At the ship weapons coordinator's display console, a firm surface distant radar track keeps having an automatic tenta­tive track being generated next to it. Suddenly, the assumed merchantman increases speed to 30 knots and splits into two—the orange force DDs! It transpires that they had been in close replenishment formation in an attempt to disguise their coordinated ap­proach. But the dedicated black box tracker had detected them as two far before the naked eye could detect them in the prevailing super-refraction conditions.

This example of the impressive per­formance of the radar video processor (CV 2834/UYA-4 [v]) is now the accepted standard in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) as fitted on three guided missile destroyers (Perth, Hobart, and Brisbane) and has made a major impact upon the detection-and-tracking capabilities of the radar sensor systems carried thereon, and consequently to reduced reaction times of their Tartar systems.

The RAN’s involvement with the radar video processor/automatic detec­tion and tracking system (RVP/ADT) began in 1972 at the NTDS Develop­ment and Evaluation Site, Mare Is­land, California, prior to installation on board HMAS Perth as part of her modernization program to NTDS. From June to July 1975, RVP/ADT trials were conducted as part of the total combat system proving trials off the coast of Long Beach, California. Then came three-dimensional low- angle trials with the AN/SPS-52 radar before the development of full RVP automatic control and surface tracking in 1976. The radar sensor configura­tion of the RAN DDG is a three-dimen­sional AN/SPS-52, a two-dimensional AN/SPS-40, and the two-dimensional AN/SPS-10, with the RVP selectively processing their data, one radar at a time.

During 1974-75, although the sys­tem was working well and displaying good accuracy, it became obvious that the controls, while versatile, were most cumbersome. Three variable- action button (VAB) arrays were re­quired on the OJ-194 consoles, and the main mode of operation was for man­ual initiation of tracks before auto­matic tracking commenced. The track management scheme was rather in­volved, and there was no provision for surface tracking. With an operator’s manual, it was a good research and development system, but not for sailors!

Thus, the RAN began an improved program to make the RVP system a truly automatic detection and tracking system. First, the controls were simplified and made easy for the operator to understand (one VAB ar­ray), and the computer program con­trolling the CV 2834 RVP (a module of the ship’s operational program hosted in a two-bay AN/UYK-7) was rede­signed to allow for rapid automatic control of RVP sensitivities with man­ual override if and when desired. Ad­ditionally, three-dimensional radar processing was incorporated in order to use the AN/SPS-52 to provide auto­matic height input, and improved automatic surface tracking was made viable using the AN/SPS-10 radar. To cope with the operations in a poor Link-1 1 environment, adaptations also were made to the software to provide for efficient track management. These enhancements have assisted the operator’s task greatly, to the extent that the RVP operator’s actions consist of choosing the radar to be processed, achieving the optimum video on that radar, and depressing the VAB’s “on” and the RVP’s “auto control” buttons. Occasional reviews are only then re­quired to check performance and ad­justment processing areas as dictated by tactical, geographical, or environ­mental conditions. The operator is then free to carry out any other detec­tion, tracking voice radio reporting, picture compilation, or classification tasks.

The RAN experience has indic^at^ that the RVP (used continuously’ sea) is kept in automatic control of the time. Plotting tables and ^c<> ventional radar displays are not for surface tracking. Resultant tion, course, and speed of ^con

roo¹¹¹

tha»

emanating from the operations

to the bridge are generally better

plotting-table or some fire-contr ^

lutions, and win most comp^e

• The true

surface-plotting exercises, n®

the officer

the watch and the commanding are kept informed, as surface ^traC y_i is a continual task while under

value of the system is evident ^ normal steaming where the

kin?

ehereas air tracking is

more

in-

jjgflt

frequent. Target resolution is ^e5tce at long range, and a vastly ^sUP^,,| detection capability over rna ^ operators is obtained on the ord ^ j

probability of detection

in<

crease

sevenfold on a given opportunity ^ decrease in weapon reaction ₍j,_e most succinctly demonstrated J

fact that with RVP on and all sy in the automatic mode, the det^e range required to obtain a high P bility of a kill at minimum rang^e_c0|ji- one Tartar missile on a Mach 2 ing target would be appr°^x* half that required in the totally ual mode.          _r0|-

Other command and con j oriented automatic detectm⁰^^

tracking systems, existing >ⁿ ’ yji, • ' '

developmental stages, are

AN/SPS-48C, sensor inte

rface

sen: >as^{s 1}

iSOf

system (SIDS), and the Aeg^lS system. The former two encomp' integrated package of radar mated detection and tracking display and management                             a

comprising a tailored radar s dedicated computer, and disp ‘ _[fl,o soles and operators. The l^atte^ _ust' (with the exception of AN/SP^ (i the simpler building block, ^e 2834 and a computer to P^r° "JV automatic detection and trackiuS.^r RVP, when assigned to a P^ar _cjoii radar, will perform its ADT ^u^.₂ js

lUt°'

efl¹’

and provide tracking data would the manual operator.

to

As P¹