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dures than they could and should be. As a
New ships, such as the USS Radford (DD-968) and the USS Pharris (FF-1094), have more modern weapon systems than those on the World War Il-huilt surface ships which were surface force standbys for so long. The bad news is that today's crop of commanding officers didn't grow up in these ships and are in many cases having to learti things at the same time as their crews.
1. Purpose: To analyze the problems lying behin ^ relatively low state of tactical proficiency we been experiencing in the fleet and further to sU^()n that those factors will merit continued consider
as we move to raise our tactical professionalism. • s the
2. Background: Among his several key objective , Chief of Naval Operations has repeatedly calle an increase in tactical skills. Our crews seem cantly less proficient in tactics and tactical Pr
been
/ juiy1
Proceedings
'Ps and
Se conjunction with other hardware in other
ee ts implied, though because of my own background, !s on the surface Navy.
‘h,
fo,
training devices are being procured.
well adds t0 ^ar more tkan a rout‘ne 8et‘ program. Even so, it may not be enough. While
Can tinker with training pipelines and buy new abl ^ tra'n*n8 gadgetry, we will unquestionably be jp t0 gu*de the corrective actions most intelligently te^Ve kn°w why our core professional skills have got-
3 77,
e Technology Problem: The first big obstacle to ^ , lcec* and routine proficiency at sea today is the Vj Ware itself. Our principal combat systems are y all new. The massive modernization pro- are^s ^drn*ra^ Elmo Zumwalt kicked off in 1970 sea eann§ Emit. We have several new ship classes at backf m°re corr,ing- All our ships are being ltted with new weapons and sensors. Those new Pain an^ nCVV e9u*Pment may have their growing effnS’. but> by and large, they are very capable and Cated'Ve Systems- They are also much more compli- Were are use<^ *n rackcally different ways than rn e. tbe*r predecessors. Those techniques are not yet
Whe and habitual-
en I was a young officer serving in Gearing
had been;1!55 dCStr0y ers, I worked in a ship which Couideen ‘n use more than 20 years. It was unlikely I tnade make a mistake which had not already been nor about which a warning had not already 1 e . kasssed down the line as a lesson learned. When sta-sed my gun crew, I did so to procedural fi ards which hundreds before me had set and refew ' Not so any longer. There are probably only a str lcers now in command of active fleet de- intrQdrs who grew up in that class ship. In fact, the that u Ctlon °E new systems is proceeding so rapidly in e shore duty interval between two tours at sea aim 5ame sb’P class (a rare occurrence ‘tself) will Cant) !nVariat)ly see that ship equipped with signifi- days ^ ‘fferent hardware. All of us going to sea these rj,i are going there needing to learn new gear and
Th^ mistakes-
„h|c- *s also a second kind of new “technology” abru bas descended on us with some degree of bardwneS5" tbc fuHy integrated battle group. The it! cj are coming into use is designed to be operated
sh >S aircraft. The skills to achieve that high de-
^uthor’s kj . uyjt- Like many naval officers, I am more comfortable
‘bis Sfrftaff memoranda than articles for publication—hence,
C°^Mand U ^'te PaPer " format. No reference to a specific staff or gree of integration are just now becoming routine with doctrine and standards not quite yet firm enough for rote compliance. None of us has more than a tour or two of experience with the necessarily elaborate echelons of specialized and highly interactive commanders who exercise pieces of the battle group’s command. The classic officer in tactical command is now aided by several individuals and their staffs, embarked in several flagships, who exercise simultaneous control of selected facets of the operation. This multiple quarterbacking—necessary as it is—complicates traditional command to an extraordinary degree. One can no longer get in the battle line at the interval specified in the book and then withhold fire to the propitious “whites-of- their-eyes” distance in order to be found a dutiful and valiant captain. Now the commanding officer and his tactical action officer may prove heroic if they only pass a single target bearing to their senior in another ship or if they withhold fire until their boss is confident the unseen target is in fact foe and not a friend in a distant corner of the disposition.
Were the necessity to cope with new, and steadily changing, technology our only problem, we could orient our improvement programs around the somewhat straightforward requirement to move knowledge and skills forward with the technology. Regrettably, there seem to be other serious factors behind our symptoms as well.
4. The Center of Gravity Problem: In recent years, the officer corps itself has been changing. The kinds of things which absorb us in our careers clearly have shifted. While oversimplified perhaps, it appears that the center of the range of our professional skills has moved somewhat away from seagoing, warfighting expertise. We have evolved numerous management and technical subspecialties, each with its own pattern of progressive tours of duty. Successful sea duty tours in positions of increased responsibility are still mandatory for an officer. But, in actuality, it seems more that the kind of shore duty billet one gets and how well one does in it differentiate the superb officer from the average one from the also-ran. Selection board precepts and officer newsletters repeatedly remind us that performance in managerial and technical slots and duty in Washington are vital prerequisites to selection to senior grades. This reverses our traditional cultural underpinnings in which shore duty was considered an occasional and restful interlude between rounds in the main arena at sea. Now, it begins to seem, one can wipe out one's career at sea—and most readily enhance it ashore.
Further, our attention while we are at sea has itself
inSs / juiy 1981
59
Harpoon antiship missiles have introduced a new dimension of warfare to U. S. surface combatant capabilities. They have also imposed on deck officers the obligation to become proficient in new tactics so that the missiles may be used to best advantage.
might use modern information-processing technU to distribute and steadily refresh it. Our ze- ^ printing ever more naval warfare publications (N ^j
6. The Crew Stability Problem: In the final anab ^ the only tactical proficiency which counts is t
been skewed away from combat systems, tactics, and seamanship toward engineering and the propulsion plant. Looking back ten years to the beginnings of the engineering improvement program, we made then the first of a similar set of moves to beef up engineering expertise in the ships. Those actions were animated by a sudden recognition of relatively inadequate competence in the main machinery spaces. Senior officers started attending new maintenance and material readiness courses. New procedures and the inspectors to check them bloomed on all sides. Some would say the limited improvements we got were not fully worth the candle. In any event, our headlong plunge into engineering has in a decade of emphasis and discipline concentrated much of our attention on marine propulsion. If that plant does not check out in the next inspection, we know we
NORMAN
will not get that great job in the Pentagon next yeilf We stand at a similar juncture in the combat sy terns and tactical applications aspects of the sh'P^ Now we recognize an urgent demand to raise taCtl^e proficiency. Unfortunately, it comes just when tide of our professional skills is washing stt°n» ashore and leaving many of the demands for c0 ^ fence at sea centered largely around how water boiled and the propeller gets turned. Everyt ^ cannot be equally important. We have to ask 0 selves what is most important and what the ba' among our several competencies should be.
f The
5. The Reference Bonk Problem: Our offices °r Written Ritual have failed us too. That is parti) ^ cause those of us who populate the doctrine-wr* staffs ashore suffer from the same handicaps the cr do, and it is partly because we are abysmally ’ne^,tjlf. rapidly organizing and publishing doctrine at pace dictated by the rate of technological We have simply outrun the books. The ships are to improvise.
Our problem here is not really an inability r0 velop good tactical doctrine. We do a lot o( 1 work and do it reasonably well. Our problem ceI1 j. more on the mundane mechanics of organizing ‘ distributing information efficiently. We need leS commit another forest in Idaho to high-speed Pr' j than we need to consider the different levels kinds of information the ships need and ho"
• nique
,al & (MVf
is a brute force, fundamentally flawed, and approach which promises to continue to leave us tically disheveled.
an individual crew as its members identify a it, and prepare to pull the trigger. Our practice of ing each sailor individually through his tour m a • ^ remains an impediment to that team’s exp°rrise
60
Proceedings
/ July
j 9®1
k ly trained crew has mastery of an exceptionally tim ^ 1Catec^ an<^ interrelated set of skills. It takes e ar>d the use of many different training tech-
niqUes new
t0 get them there. It is also notable that the t]c tciulPrnent and the new requirements of the bat- s|^il|'rouP continue to raise the ante. The collective a combat systems team is becoming steadily
niore
exotic.
un nC Won<^ers whether we duck this problem in an Wli^'nsc‘0us belief that machines will handle the „a ? e engagement. They do not and will not. Our dr l tS an<^ comPuters are absorbing much of the re 'V()rk, to be sure; but they are also raising the tl()|U^re[|lent for highly skilled teamwork. Teams
3 stream of new faces. We simply cannot get th
Th
are
in a day, and they certainly are not built
tactical excellence we seek if we do not do________
1f.^i ak°ut the revolving door on the quarterdeck. g*c that the crew must be composed of a rea-
some-
? lo,
ahout ^ stahle set of players and the parallel logic CaPabl t^e cornPosit‘°n of the battle group are ines- stabil'e '^'t^lout a been appreciation of the time and ()Ur y 11 takes to grow competent teams, most of n cr work could well end up wasted.
7. -j-h
wj1() e m~Solution: There are those in some quarters conab,nS1Stently P^umP f°r the quick fix of a new Pm at_systems inspection board modeled after the thinkU S'°n ^xam*ning Boards. The flaw in that ^rernis ^ a fatal flaw at this point—lies in the Cotob'^ behind the call for a “gestapo” to police thf ” systems. The presumption seems to be that tj0tl rt"s iust need the discipline of a major inspec- preni.° hirce them to get their acts together. That
rt>anned ^ C'U*te wron8- ®ur crews may be thinly cate<j | an<^ tinder-experienced, but they are dedi- httn ' °^a ’ an^ hardworking. They have simply not train' ®1Ven all the necessary tools of doctrine and Wep ^ an<^ standards to be able to do the job as flatter5 cou^- Our problem is much more a able disciplining the staffs ashore to produce us- otie S' ^ Itself, a periodic inspection might well lh<)tne^ a reasonahle and valuable option. For the irig ^ ’ We cannot exercise it directly without hav-
ypassed the real work at hand.
pr0,, "m,nendation: Our record with the get-well
raise tactical professionalism are unquestionably good and are starting to pay off noticeably. Nonetheless, we need to avoid another of those lurches. Instead of having the Navy initiate a new “program,” I am proposing that the officer corps should start publicly thinking and talking about the problem of maintaining and improving our tactical war-fighting skills. From that self-consciousness will come both more ideas and the sense of proportion we need. I am leery of recommending any exact prescriptions; rather, I would expect a series of prescriptions to grow out of a heightened level of thinking on the subject. We need very much to generate and to sustain an open, constructive critique of our tactical improvement actions as they gain momentum.
9. Conclusion: Our Navy, like military forces of all kinds, has historically lapsed in tactical readiness after one war and then freshened up in the next. Mobilization for a new war fueled a massive influx of money and people, our adrenaline started to pump, and the whole naval establishment was revitalized. These days, however, our responsibilities for deterrence, our nuclear weapons, and the rising probability of being suddenly thrust into a “come-as-you-are” war mean that we can no longer rely on mobilization to recharge professionally. In effect, we are already mobilized. We do need to move now to hone our skills so that Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov and his staff can start lying awake nights wondering just how they are ever going to cope with a U. S. Navy which relentlessly fields tactically polished crews.
bei
£ram
ring
in
engineering ought to be sufficiently so-
horul'0 dampen any confidence that our current ac-
ill to *
raiSt* tact‘ca* proficiency will add up to per- tngjne ’. conclusive solutions. After ten years, the ifiecj Cr‘ng readiness programs are still being mod- ^•aticT^ Wt ^aVe Pus*ie<^ c^e whole profession off
' "i the process. Our many actions to date
to
Following an assignment as the combat systems readiness and training officer on the staff of Commander Naval Surface Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Seaquist recently assumed command of the USS David R. Ray (DD-971). He has also worked on the OpNav staff and in 1975 was appointed a federal executive fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Commissioned in 1964 from Officer Candidate School, his sea duty has included service on board the USS Northampton (CC-1), USS Damato (DD-87 1), and USS O'Han (DD-889). He has previously commanded the USS Beacon (PG-99) and USS Bnmstein (FF- 1037).
e<iin
8s / juiy 1981
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