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This country has had a two-carrier task force in the Indian Ocean since U. S. hostages were seized in late 1979, but logistic support continues to he a problem for ships and planes operating so far from home. Diego Garcia (seen on the facing page with an P-14 refueling overhead) needs to be strengthened in order to accommodate the full fleet of ships we need in the Indian Ocean.
in
take’
doubt, we need to be there. We cannot know vance what form a threat to our security may The problem with a “trip wire” strategy is
ess»ve Not o"
will we have to oppose entrenched opposition-
ab
the time we can respond in force to any aggre 1 j action the results may be cast in concrete. Not
Some 19 million barrels of oil, worth more than half a billion dollars, pass daily through the Persian Gulf. The Indian Ocean region is also a testing ground against the continuing spread of Soviet imperialism. Every branch of the armed forces is involved, but the immediate focus is on sea power. Deployed naval forces can make immediate and powerful responses, and they serve as a visible symbol of U. S. determination. Without a fleet on station, the United States is in the position of a city dweller whose police department has a five-hour response time in the event of emergency. How effective a deterrent to crime would that be?
Two carrier task groups, a marine amphibious unit, and the small Middle East force are in place. As Admiral Thomas Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said, “Unfortunately this fleet is being created by drawing upon ships from the Seventh Fleet and the Sixth Fleet and thus further weakening two critical naval forces whom many observers consider already unable to perform all required missions.”
An Indian Ocean Fleet will neither surely prevent nor surely cause a war. But without it, our options are greatly reduced. Although the long-term outcome of any extended action strongly opposed by Soviet ground forces or land-based aircraft is in
the deterrence will be less visible.
The Northern Indian Ocean Environment: Alt „ known to mariners as the “kindliest of all oC£ the Indian Ocean generates seasonal tropical cy which rival any Atlantic hurricane. During southwest monsoon, which lasts from about Jufl . October each year, winds that average 25-35 kn July and August bring Sea States 4 and 5 °r. . and high swells, in the northern parts of t*ie. js arC Sea. Near the west coast of India the win coupled with torrential rain and low vlS1 Operating conditions at sea are difficult, esp ^j| for naval aviation. Helicopter operations from j ships may be impossible for long periods. SonW bases are a necessity. During the northeast mon* ^ from November or December through Mat
April, generally good weather is accompanr to moderate seas and moderate winds.
iedby
W
The North Indian Ocean area is hot. Air tera^^s ture in summer ranges in the high 80s with F’ above 100° and very high humidity in the ^ enclosed areas of the Red Sea and the Persian Crew operating efficiency is affected. Sound gates for long distances, but conditions for s^ ship sonars are often poor. High ambient nmse shipping lanes is a problem for passive detecti°n j terns. At a given time, 60 to 100 cargo ship5 tankers may be transiting the Gulf of Oman- - d bythe
Geography and Bases: Diego Garcia, usea ^ United States as the result of a 1966 agreement the British, is a low, palm-studded sand an 4 atoll with a characteristic central lagoon a miles across. Open like a horseshoe at the n jy end, it is about 36 miles around but averageS
,ero''
54
Proceeding*
/ July
one r
ir^ rt" mile wide and annually has up to 145 ConS rain. Dredged to 45 feet and with a newly Ctet* 5,000-foot jetty, the harbor can accom- a‘rcraft carriers. The 12,000-foot airstrip can anj ? ^arge cargo aircraft, such as C-5As and C-l4ls • ° P'-^ antisubmarine patrol aircraft. Incorpo- rpu - ,n.t^le base are facilities for 1,800 men, com- p>ot Cat'ons equipment, a 640,000-barrel fuel de- are rilUn'tions storage, and supply facilities. There
°r’gad * *U1 a 12,000-man marine amphibious
brigJPbes for _
for all" • Aircraft maintenance and servicing facilities sPace t^f>es aircraft are spartan, and more ramp are ** needed if B-52s and many more cargo aircraft heav• 1 anc^ rbere regularly. Runway length restricts loaded B-52s under some conditions.
Bjy PAs that deploy to Diego Garcia from Subic Way ^ t^le Atlantic still have 1,900 miles to fly each it jsreach the Gulf of Oman far to the north, and lslari|jriot^er 700 miles past the salt hills of Hormuz to the head of the Persian Gulf. Most of the
P-3’s endurance is used up in transit, leaving little or no on-station time in the northern areas of interest. To be effective, P-3s must land at northern sites such as Ras Banas in Egypt, Djibouti, Masira in Oman, or at Bahrein to refuel. In-flight refueling could help, but crew effectiveness is diminished by fatigue on such long missions. Because of the distance, carrier aircraft in northern regions cannot use Diego Garcia as an alternate field. Egypt and Israel have offered us landing and refueling rights. The former Soviet naval base at Berbera, Somalia, is now available for U. S. use, and plans to improve the docking facilities are being considered. It is also proposed to dredge at Mombasa, Kenya, which today cannot accommodate U. S. carriers inside the harbor. Simonstown, South Africa, and Karachi, Pakistan are other possibilities. Most Middle East nations are sensitive to our presence, and thus we strive for low visibility. The on- again, off-again situations of the Soviets in Somalia and the United States in Bahrein are good examples
b'o,
°eedi
1°KS/ July 1981
55
of the transient character of basing rights.
As long as borders stay fixed, the Soviets have no dependable short sea route to the Persian Gulf. The Suez Canal route requires a 4,200-mile voyage from Soviet naval bases in the Black Sea. Around the Cape of Good Hope, the distance is 13,000 miles. From Soviet Northern Fleet bases it is nearly 13,000 miles to the Persian Gulf, and from Vladivostok in the Pacific it is 6,500 miles. The Indian Ocean route is the only reasonable year-round sea connection between European and Far Eastern parts of the Soviet Union. The Soviets’ problem of supply and support by sea exceeds ours. One major difference is that air and land routes from the Soviet homeland in an emergency are short. It is only 460 miles by air from
lak Island off Massawa in the Red Sea, and at A ^ in South Yemen. An open anchorage off the 5° Yemen island of Socotra is used by the Soviets.
The Soviets are waging a propaganda camp* e against U. S. bases. Their views are supporte some Soviet-leaning states. The Indian Minister External Affairs recently said that U. S. expansion ^ the Diego Garcia facility would “weaken peace stability in southern Asia.”
Area Forces: The Soviets usually have 20 in the region. Of these one-third to one
.24 ships •half ;lft
... .... ---- - , hips
combatants, including guided missile-armed
antisubmarine warfare vessels, and submarines-
UP
to 27 U. S. warships are on patrol and conduct ^ exercises in the area, trailed by Soviet intellif ^ collectors and occasionally overflown by a “Bear” or an 11-38 “May.” The high pace of actl takes its toll on men and equipment. Reefljist ^ rates are not improved by extended tours of sea . More forces must be assigned, and on a P1* basis, so that the burden is not borne by a Ueet is already operating near its maximum crapadicy- An Indian Ocean Program For The U. S. Navy- for a workable program are for the most part m P
today and have only to be executed with the b*1^ of the new administration, the Congress, an
ad
American people. For the long term, the statl°^ted of U. S. forces in the region must be supplentl
ofls
with military and economic assistance to area * ^
so that the developing countries can have
determination while raising their standard
of living*
jonir
A clear and consistent U. S. policy will g° a way. I propose the following ten-point plan: ^
1. Formalize the need for a two-carrier Fifth v . the Indian Ocean, including long-term °Per jer
tie"'
and maintenance budgeting. The fleet comm11
should control all U. S. forces in the area.
The
fi‘
the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic to the Persian Gulf and only 300 miles from Soviet-occupied Afghanistan to the Gulf of Oman. Aircraft-launched missiles could be a serious threat to U. S. naval forces there. Issues of overflight and air sovereignty rights are not likely to deter the Soviets.
Several countries of the Indian Ocean area are socialist or outright Marxist and have economic ties to the Soviet Union. India, the Malagasy Republic, Iraq, Tanzania, Ethiopia, the Seychelles, Mozambique, Maldives, Mauritius, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) all have Soviet bases or ports of call or are being wooed by the Soviets. The Soviets have bases in Ethiopia, at Dah-
fleet would report to Commander in Chief Fleet, in accordance with the Fifth Fleet colTI rtjjt structure which is already set up in Organizattott U. S. Navy (NWP-2).
2. Increase the number of Navy carriers to l ’ ^ appropriate escorts, and especially antiair ft) ships. If 12 or 13 carriers were barely adequ . serve U. S. needs without the Indian Ocean ^ mitment, as previous defense chiefs have rcStl jo how, then, can 12 or 13 continue to be adequ today’s situation? We should implement the reaC /;) tion of the Oriskany (CV-34), the Kitty Hau'k service life extension program, and the Iowa ( class missile conversion or the equivalent. Uut . ^ phasis should be on fleet antiair defense rather ^ on the Harpoon antiship missile. We shou
56
Proceedings
of P^as'2e antisubmarine warfare capability i
in view
|a11C ever-more-serious threat from submarine- Hnine ^ antiship missiles. We need to station sweeping forces sufficient to keep the straits and
3 ^ the region clear.
ft’ith CreaSe C^e authorized number of ships equipped eratet'le Aegis air defense system by four and accel- i (° t^le shipbuilding program or modify two non-
4 ships to include Aegis.
added Up Some reserves to provide crews for the
Sen j Sh,ps and manning for support bases. Pay and a autv
sotinel
cy relief is needed for retention of senior per-
nQ , novv in short supply. The draft will probably rdn 6 ^ hast manning, but it should be
nei stllted as a readiness measure. The Navy person- tn fUt^or'2ation will have to increase by at least 5%
5 70ut 550,000. to
Crease naval aircraft construction rates in order tion^U^ t^le a<Jclitional carrier air groups. Reactivate^ ln'Storage aircraft such as Ads and A-7s is a 0n.bterni possibility. More F-l4s, E-2Cs, and carrier (5 ^livery planes (CODs) are needed.
ca^ i . area surveillance and command and control aPabilj
"T including satellite, long-range reconnais- towCc|aircra^, and antisubmarine detection, using Cjail . arrays and rapidly deployable systems, espe- 7 ^ ln rhe northern Indian Ocean. st0cktrease area ready weapon and ammunition anj ’ ernphasizing antiaircraft missiles, torpedoes, t\V()ITlar'ne assault ammunition to provide at least a 8. strn°nth Cfisis supply.
tbe ,atl0n two light marine amphibious brigades in 4ic^an Ocean. A 24,000-man ready force, of shir, a Part is embarked in amphibious warfare
san,
tronic, and aircraft maintenance and resupply with attendant support requirements. Cargo, tanker and pre-positioned breakbulk or roll-on/roll-off ships and warehouses must be added as compatible with the increased support burden. Expansion of the airfield storage, parking, and maintenance facilities to accommodate B-52s and major cargo aircraft in numbers is required. Permanent and hardened facilities should be considered, and we should pursue outright purchase of the island, if the politics permit it.
The Cost: The first year of the projected program will cost at least $6 billion in 1981 dollars and a substantial percentage of that each year afterward for continuing operations. Six billion dollars represents about $60 for each U. S. taxpayer in annual income taxes. It is about 8.5% of the proposed fiscal year 1982 Navy budget of $7 1 billion and is about 2.7% of the total fiscal year 1982 proposed defense budget of $222 billion.
President Ronald Reagan and the new administration have a mandate to increase our military strength. The Indian Ocean ranks with Europe in its immediate strategic and economic importance to the United States, but it has received much less attention. The Navy and Marine Corps are in the first line, ready to carry out U. S. policy. We must give them the means with which to do so.
‘•itx
9 ^ ^ould be baseCCe^erate plans to obtain and enlarge long-term cloSerr,ghtS- We need at least three additional bases t0 oil-producing areas than Diego Garcia, fuu/^ble for C-5As as well as three to five less
iov ' '
a reasonable goal
developed alternate fields.
ttrnilmprove Diego Garcia to support major long- aerations. It should include major ship, elec
Mr. Stone holds a B.S. in electrical engineering from Lehigh University and an M.S. in applied physics from Adelphi. His essay titled "The Trend in Naval Power” won the bronze medal as second runnerup in the 1976 Naval Institute General Prize Essay Contest. Mr. Stone is vice president and general manager of Sanders Associates’ Ocean Systems Division in Nashua, New Hampshire, specializing in design and production of antisubmarine warfare- systems for the Navy. He translates Russian and has recently published a series of articles on ocean control from a Soviet point of view in Military ElectroniisICountermeasures magazine.