The world’s first practical military helicopter, the Sikorsky XR-4 took to the air for the first time on 14 January 1942, just a little over a month after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although it bore Army Air Forces markings, the XR-4 and the R-4s that followed played a very important role in the development of present seagoing helicopters.
The U. S. Navy’s helicopter program also had its beginning in 1942. On 24 July, Rear Admiral John H. Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, issued a planning directive calling for the procurement of four Sikorsky helicopters for study and development by Navy and Coast Guard aviation forces. But before these helicopters were ready for delivery, the sinking of merchant ships in the Atlantic by enemy submarines had reached the point that it became necessary to exhaust every practicable means of combating the U-boats. As a result, Admiral Ernest J. King, who was serving in the dual capacity of Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, issued a directive dated 15 February 1943. which established a program for the “Test and Evaluation of Helicopters for Use in Connection with Ocean Convoys.” This directive ended with the statement that:
“The seagoing development of helicopters and their operation in convoys will be a function of the Coast Guard. To this end, Naval Aviators of the Coast Guard will be employed as practical in the early testing and evaluation of helicopters.”
Thus, the Coast Guard operated all of the Navy’s helicopters during World War II, except for those assigned from time to time to the Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River, Maryland, and other test facilities. A considerable number of naval officers and one Marine Corps flier received helicopter pilot training at the Coast Guard Air Station, Floyd Bennett Field, Brooklyn. In addition, several Navy enlisted men completed the Coast Guard’s helicopter maintenance course. One naval officer, Lieutenant William G. Knapp, was assigned wartime duty as a flight instructor at Floyd Bennett Field.
The only phase of the helicopter program that became well known during the war was the development of the rescue hoist and associated equipment. Most of the projects that the Coast Guard worked on during those years were of a classified nature and were not declassified until long after the Coast Guard had been returned to the control of the Treasury Department. By that time, most of the records pertaining to this operation had been buried so deep in the files that there was little hope they would ever be uncovered. Fortunately Lee M. Pearson, while serving as historian for the Naval Air Systems Command, began an intensive search during which he uncovered considerable material dealing with this segment of the Navy’s helicopter program. The information has been incorporated into the chronology of United States Naval Aviation 1910-1970 and has thus become a part of the official record. My own account fills in some of the details.
The helicopter program was assigned to the Coast Guard, because the Commandant, Vice Admiral Russell R. Waesche, not only believed that the helicopter would become an effective antisubmarine weapon but would also offer a solution to the offshore rescue problem. Yet many of the old Coast Guard seaplane drivers were very unhappy with this turn of events. They considered the idea that helicopters would someday replace seaplanes in offshore rescue operations as ridiculous. Many Navy and Marine Corps fliers were also cool toward any rotary wing aircraft because of the unsatisfactory results previously obtained with the early autogiros. To them, the helicopter was a weird-looking contraption with rotors, and was derisively known as “Igor’s Nightmare,” which was a backhanded reference to inventor Igor Sikorsky. The Navy had in fact gone on record in an official memorandum dated 14 January 1938, which stated that:
“Rotoplanes might be of some use in antisubmarine work when operated from auxiliaries. This appears to be a minor application, which hardly justifies expenditure of experimental funds at present.”
The conclusion expressed in this memorandum, based on Navy and Marine Corps experience with autogiros, was understandable. Many eminent aerodynamists, including Captain Walter S. Diehl, the Navy’s chief aerodynamist, had gone on record with predictions that a helicopter able to carry a useful load could not be built. The Wright brothers had much earlier become convinced of this during their early flight experiments, as indicated by the following 1909 account credited to Wilbur Wright:
“Like all novices, we began with the helicopter (in childhood) but soon saw that it had no future and dropped it. The helicopter does with great labor only what the balloon does without labor, and is no more fitted than the balloon for rapid horizontal flight. If the engine stops it must fall with deathly violence for it can neither float like the balloon nor glide like the aeroplane. The helicopter is much easier to design than the aeroplane but it is worthless when done.”
In 1931, the Bureau of Aeronautics had purchased three experimental XOP-1 autogiros from -the Pitcairn Autogiro Company. One was flown aboard the USS Langley (CV-1) by Lieutenant A. M. Pride on 23 September 1931 for takeoff and landing tests. Another was evaluated by the Marine Corps in field operations in Nicaragua. But neither service was satisfied with the results. In 1935, the Navy had Pitcairn remove the fixed wing from one of these aircraft. This modified aircraft, the XOP-2, became the Navy’s first heavier-than-air aircraft without a fixed wing, but the change did not make the aircraft acceptable. Another attempt was made to develop a satisfactory rotary wing aircraft by having the Pennsylvania Aircraft Company modify an N2Y-1 fixed-wing trainer. The modification included the installation of a rotor with cyclic control. It was designated the XOZ-1. Tests on this aircraft were completed on 9 August 1937 at the Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, but it also failed to meet the Navy’s requirements. The Army Air Corps had shown a great deal more interest in the autogiro than the sea services, but it had a poor accident record.
In Germany, Dr. Heinrich Focke had designed a helicopter with two contra-rotating rotors mounted on laterally displaced outriggers. Its control was so precise that it was demonstrated by flying inside the Sports Palast in Berlin by Hanna Reitsch, Germany’s foremost aviatrix. In this country there were skeptics who were sure that the Germans were playing some kind of a trick. But there were also believers. The Platt-LePage Company of Eddystone, Pennsylvania, had already begun designing a helicopter similar to the German machine. The Air Corps was interested in the Platt-LePage project from the beginning, but it did not have the money to pay for such a development. At about that time, however, Representative Frank J. G. Dorsey from Pennsylvania introduced a bill in Congress for the authorization and appropriation of funds for the purpose of developing the autogiro and procuring a sufficient number for service tests. Fortunately, the bill passed on 30 June 1938 was not limited to autogiros. It authorized the appropriation of $2 million for research in the development of rotary-wing and other aircraft. This act placed the administration of these funds under the control and direction of the Secretary of War. An inter-agency board, representing all of the possible users of rotary-wing aircraft in the government, was set up to aid in the formulation of plans and requirements.
It was nearly a year before funds were made available to implement the program, and even then only $300,000 was appropriated. Bids, which had been solicited for the construction of a helicopter, were opened on 15 April 1940. Commander William J. Kossler of the Coast Guard, recently named to the board, ruled that Platt-LePage won over Sikorsky, because its design was considered the most practical. Sikorsky’s proposal was for a single main rotor helicopter, which he had first flown on 14 September 1939 in tethered flight. Less than a month after the bids were opened, he was flying his helicopter in free flight. It now seems incredible that the board could have chosen the complicated twin laterally displaced rotor design over the relatively simple Sikorsky configuration, but it didn’t have the advantage of hindsight that we now enjoy.
Sikorsky continued to make impressive progress during 1940 without government support. It began to look as if the board had backed the wrong horse, because the Platt-LePage XR-1 was still a long way from its first flight. In fact, it did not make its first tethered flight until 12 May 1941, six days after Sikorsky had established a new international helicopter endurance record of 1 hour, 32 minutes, and 26.1 seconds. On 17 December 1940, just 37 years after the Wright brothers made their first powered flight, the inter-agency board met again to take another look at the Sikorsky proposal. The board agreed that two helicopters of different designs were better than one, but by this time more than two thirds of the money appropriated for the program was already spent, leaving only $50,000 that could be applied to the Sikorsky proposal. United Aircraft agreed to put up another $50,000, but it was evident that the cost of the development would probably run as high as $200,000. The balance would have to be raised later.
As mentioned at the outset of the article, the Sikorsky XR-4 flew for the first time in free flight on 14 January 1942. The flight test program proceeded so rapidly that by early April, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Gregory of the Army Air Forces felt sufficient progress had been made so that the XR-4 could be demonstrated to the inter-agency board. The first demonstration was therefore scheduled for 20 April 1942 at the Vought Sikorsky plant at Stratford. Connecticut. The XR-4 had only nine and one half hours of flight time by the 20th, which was a cold, gloomy, overcast day with moderately strong wind gusts. Only a few of the board members showed up. Of those who were present. Commander Kossler was probably the most enthusiastic, because he had become convinced that the helicopter would provide the eventual solution to the Coast Guard’s offshore rescue problems. He invited Commander W. A. Burton, Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard Air Station at Floyd Bennett Field along to witness the demonstration. Another interested observer was Wing Commander Reggie Brie of the Royal Air Force. He had arrived in the United States on 20 September 1941 for the purpose of stimulating interest in use of autogiros on board merchant ships for combatting enemy submarines. Brie had successfully operated a Cierva autogiro from the Italian cruiser Fiume in 1935. He was scheduled to begin tests with the Pitcairn PA-39 autogiro on the British merchantman Empire Mersey, when he received an invitation to attend this demonstration of the XR-4.
Les Morris, Sikorsky test pilot, demonstrated forward, backward, and sidewise flight and slow twisting flight at low altitude between the rows of trees. Then he climbed to 500 feet, followed by a highspeed run at 300 feet above the ground. After making a few tight turns, he put the aircraft into a power-off glide and recovered with power near the ground. He then proceeded to demonstrate precision maneuvers and quick stops. Next, a rope ladder was lashed to the side of the cabin. Les lifted off and climbed straight up until the helicopter was hovering about 25 feet above the ground with the bottom of the ladder just clearing the ground. Then a man started climbing up the ladder while the helicopter remained almost motionless. When he reached the top, he climbed into the cabin, and pulled up the ladder.
Commander Burton submitted an enthusiastic report to headquarters:
"The helicopter in its present stage of development has many advantages of the blimp and few of the disadvantages. It hovers and maneuvers with more facility in rough air than the blimp. It can land and take off in less space. It does not require a large ground handling crew. It does not need a large hangar. There is sufficient range (about two hours) in this particular model to make its use entirely practical for harbor patrol and other Coast Guard duties.”
Based on the recommendation, Commander F. A. Leamy, Aviation Operations Officer in Coast Guard headquarters, pushed for the purchase of Vought Sikorsky helicopters for training and development purposes. He was unable to muster any support from the service’s engineer-in-chief and assistant commandant. Apparently, the Navy wasn’t interested in spending money on aviation at that point unless it could be shown that the aircraft had combat capability. Some Coast Guard aviators paid lip service to Kossler’s idea of using helicopters for rescue work, but he sensed that they were really unconvinced.
In June 1942, Kossler came to visit me at Floyd Bennett Field, where I had just been assigned as executive officer. I soon became a member of the Coast Guard’s informal helicopter promotion team. When Kossler’s assistant, Lieutenant Bill Kenly, came to the air station for lunch a few days later, he casually remarked that he had an appointment with Sikorsky at Bridgeport. In less time than it takes to tell about it, I volunteered to fly him there for the meeting.
Dr. Sikorsky and his chief engineer, Michael Gluhareff, proved to be very charming hosts. They spent hours discussing the possible uses of the helicopter. Sikorsky put on a very convincing demonstration by repeatedly landing his VS-300 helicopter within an inch or two of a given point. This feature was very important to the Coast Guard, because almost all flight operations from cutters in Alaskan and Greenland waters had to be made under rough water conditions from open roadsteads.
On my return to Brooklyn, I began preparing a report to headquarters. Since I was aware of Kossler’s setback in his attempt to stress the value in the helicopter as a rescue aircraft, I decided to emphasize its use as an antisubmarine weapon to be carried on board vessels in convoys. The British also switched emphasis to the helicopter. Wing Commander Brie’s tests with the autogiro on board the Empire Mersey had been successful, but he was so impressed with the performance of the XR-4, that he recommended to his superiors that the helicopter be adopted for antisubmarine protection on board British merchant vessels.
I submitted a memorandum to the commandant on 29 June, and it reached him in due course, after proceeding through channels. I described the flight demonstration at the Sikorsky plant and wrote:
“The life saving and law enforcement possibilities of the helicopter have heretofore been especially stressed. However, this machine can fulfill an even more important role, that is in providing aerial protection for convoys against submarine action, an important function of Coast Guard Aviation.”
The memo went on to say that any vessel in a convoy, on which a platform 30 feet square could be mounted was a potential carrier for helicopters. They could be refueled from even the smallest Coast Guard patrol boat by lowering a hose. The view from both seats was excellent, and if a suspicious object were sighted on or below the surface, the machine could be stopped over the spot to investigate. The object would not be lost by circling and maneuvering to maintain position as when flying in fixed-wing airplanes. If contact were established with an enemy submarine, she could be bombed with greater accuracy than could be obtained by the conventional types of aircraft. 1 also pointed out that the helicopter was the ideal craft for rescuing personnel from torpedoed vessels. I enclosed an artist’s concept of a helicopter rescue from a burning tanker; it showed men climbing a flexible ladder hanging from the helicopter and extending to the deck. It also seemed practical to lower a rubber boat to the surface to permit persons in the water to crawl aboard. Then, with the boat still suspended below it, the helicopter could lift the boat clear of the surface and set it aboard the nearest vessel. I pointed out that the helicopter could also be used to locate and destroy drifting mines. My memorandum suggested that five of the XR-4s, then being built for the Army and due to be in production early in 1943, could give far greater protection for a convoy than a similar number of blimps or airplanes. This type could carry a crew of two, a 325-pound depth charge, radio and other equipment, and fuel for about 4 hours, when scouting at 25 to 60 miles per hour, the most economical speed, although 100 miles per hour could be attained if necessary.
Commander Burton’s endorsement of my proposal pointed out that:
“The Army has demonstrated its belief in the value of the helicopter by contracting for a number of the present models. Unfortunately, the Navy has not shown any great enthusiasm for this type of aircraft. It is therefore, an excellent opportunity for the Coast Guard, with a very modest appropriation, to initiate and proceed with the naval development of the helicopter.”
Commander Kossler noted that in addition to the 13 helicopters the Army was procuring for liaison, observation, and experimentation, the British were procuring some on Lend-Lease. He added that he had “. . . good reason for believing that if requested, the Army would turn over a few of its machines to the Coast Guard.” This specific proposal was approved by the commandant, and the Coast Guard’s helicopter program was under way.
Some months later. Admiral Waesche decided to go to Bridgeport to see the helicopter for himself. Thus, a demonstration was arranged for the commandant and several of the ranking officers from headquarters. They arrived on 13 February 1943- and during the flight demonstrations that followed, Sikorsky flew the VS-300 while test pilot Morris flew the XR-4. Having two helicopters demonstrating precision maneuvers and their possible use in antisubmarine warfare was most impressive. “Igor’s Nightmare,” which had been something of a joke around Bridgeport, was at last being given serious consideration. Even the Inspector of Naval Aircraft at the Vought-Sikorsky plant allowed that “The helicopter might be all right for the Coast Guard.”
Admiral Waesche was completely sold. On his return to Washington, he conferred with Admiral King. As a result of this conference, Admiral King issued the directive which placed the responsibility for the seagoing development of the helicopter with the Coast Guard. For the next three years, the development of the helicopter was the most important job assigned to Coast Guard aviation. But it was no easy task. Even with the full support of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, the program ran into many obstacles. It did, however, succeed in laying the groundwork for the Navy seagoing helicopter programs which followed.