A Blue-Green Opportunity: Carrier-Based Marine Air Wings

The Essex-class carrier Oriskany (CV-34) was already 26 years old when she arrived at Bremerton, Washington, to join the mothball fleet in October 1976. But we're still talking about her now, nearly five years later. With an air wing headed by Marine Corps A-4M attack planes, a reactivated Oriskany could give the active fleet a substantial boost in its ability to support amphibious operations. While congressional support for the reactivation is inadequate to make it happen this year, the idea will survive on its merits and continue to be an issue.

A bold new course for the Navy-Marine Corps team was set by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman with his decision in March of this year to use a marine air wing if the carrier Oriskany (CV-14) is reactivated. Three weeks later, Senator John Tower announced that the Senate Armed Services Commit tee had voted unanimously to reject the proposed reactivation. Cited as reasons were poor cost estimates; skepticism on the contribution of the Oriskany and an air wing of A-4M Skyhawks to improving offensive capability; the vulnerability of the ship to air and submarine attack; and personnel shortages.

The only course for increasing carrier force levels by the mid-1980s to counter expanding Soviet capabilities is reactivation of Essex (CV-9)-class carriers. New construction approved now could not produce another carrier before 1990-1991. The Department of the Navy should vigorously and expeditiously pursue reactivation of carriers Oriskany and Bon Homme Richard (CV-31) for 15 additional years. They would best be employed with our amphibious task groups in the potential cutting edge of the Rapid Deployment Force. These carriers would embark Marine Corps air wings, each composed of more than 40 A-4Ms, as planned by Secretary Lehman. Fifteen AV-SC Harriers and four SH-3H Sea King helicopters should be added to complete the aircraft complement.

The Senate Armed Services Committee denied money requested for the Oriskany in the fiscal year 1982 amended budget submission. The committee cited the increase in reactivation costs from the fiscal year 1981 estimate of $305 million, an initial rough cut, to $518 million as the reactivation package became better defined. Congressional confidence can be regained only by sharpening these estimates and contrasting the cost of this carrier with new construction ships of all classes. We must show Congress that more offensive capability will be added to the fleet, more quickly, at less cost, than in any other alternative. If the administration and Congress are serious about increasing naval force levels to 15 carrier battle groups and 600 deployable ships by 1990, the reactivations will be required. Improved readiness at reasonable cost fits the criterion of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who is looking for quick, effective, and affordable fixes that will put more teeth in the forces required to back up national policy. The House Armed Services Committee and Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Charles Bennett understand this mandate and are fully supportive of the Oriskany reactivation as proposed by the Navy.

The issues of air wing composition, concept of operation, and manning have largely been resolved by Secretary Lehman's marine air wing decision. What remains is the persuasive articulation of this choice. Air wing assets necessary for reactivated carriers are not readily available from within Navy inventories. Aircraft procurement programs have lagged behind requirements for the last 10 years; 12 active air wings are all that the Navy can now muster. We are short of pilots and are having difficulty retaining our petty officers. The use of Marine Corps aircraft, pilots, and maintenance personnel to fill this void is the only reasonable alternative.

If we attempted to pursue reactivation of these ships for use by Navy air wings, we would have several alternatives less desirable than Marine Corps aircraft. One is to use Naval Reserve assets, and another is to draw down active Navy air wings. A third is to wait several years for the generation from other sources of the aircraft, pilot, and enlisted inventories (137 officers and 1,050 enlisted for each new air wing). These alternatives would also require an expanded pilot training pipeline involving additional training aircraft, instructors, and support personnel.

The drawback to the use of Marine Corps planes and people is that by initially limiting the air wing to A-4Ms and AV-8Cs, the capability of the ship becomes so limited, relative to other carriers, that a new concept of operations is required. We must sell a new concept. We must convince Congress that these two carriers, with more light attack capability than other carriers, can be effectively employed in peacetime on a standard rotation as a presence force and as an integral part of amphibious forces and the RDF. They can also make occasional excursions to participate in battle group operations. The light at tack squadrons of existing Marine Corps air wings would be withdrawn from present stagnant assignments and assigned to their respective carriers. While their primary employment would be to support amphibious operations, these carriers and wings would also be trained and equipped to participate in conventional strike, mining, and nuclear warfare. As the enemy threat and defense conditions increase, these light carriers would migrate along with all other combatants into the protective antiair and antisubmarine sphere of big carriers and Aegis-equipped cruisers to provide strike augmentation.

This would be a permanent arrangement. As new nuclear-powered large-deck carriers come on line, the USS Midway (CV-41) and USS Coral Sea (CV-43) could move into the amphibious-support light carrier role. These replacements for the Oriskany and Bon Homme Richard would be modernized to support F/A-18 Hornets and AV-8Bs, thereby significantly upgrading the capability of amphibious support carriers into the 1990s. The Navy would have the highly capable big carriers it requires as battle group centerpieces. Modernization of the Oriskany and Bon Homme Richard to accommodate the F/A-18 is attractive and feasible but is not contemplated since this "gold plating" would make the reactivation cost prohibitive. Congress is already flinching at the $518 million level for each ship. Additionally, this course would weaken arguments for new large-deck carriers. We could have the two Essex-class ships by fiscal year 1984 for a total cost of about $1 billion—an affordable alternative.

The advantages outnumber and outweigh the disadvantages. On the positive side, this concept would:

• Improve U. S. amphibious warfare capability by ensuring well trained and readily available close air support.
• Demonstrate Navy support for the amphibious mission and Marine Corps objectives.
• Provide in the shortest possible time two additional carrier decks to increase presence, war-fighting capability, and flexibility of current forces, particularly in the rapid deployment role.
• Put vertical short takeoff and landing aircraft (V/STOL) at sea to extend previous experience and to provide a forerunner for at-sea employment of the AV-8B by 1985. If V/STOL has a future at sea, it must get a start.
• Be consistent with Senate Armed Service Committee view of light carrier prototype.
• Reduce or eliminate host nation basing and support requirements.
• Provide additional flag and medical facilities in combat theaters.
• Add more deck space to an amphibious task group. The proposed airwing would be 70% as large as previous Essex-class air wings, providing deck space for other aviation assets, as available. This could include mine countermeasure aircraft that are not easily included in current amphibious warfare plans.
• Provide two fighting units that may be more capable than the Soviet carriers Kiev and Minsk equipped with the "Forger" only.
• Use aircraft, parts inventories, and maintenance personnel that are available now. Marine Corps air assets are available to support the concept:

• Reduce or eliminate the requirement to place about $1 billion in parts, support, and test equipment in the maritime prepositioning ships.
• Continue the marriage of marine aviation support/aircraft maintenance personnel with carrier maintenance facilities and personnel that is now regularly accomplished on a squadron basis and can be expected to be accomplished with ease on a wing basis. A-4s have a 20-year record of carrier compatibility and AV-8s have also been previously deployed on board the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) and the USS Guam (LPH-9) and are now deployed to the Mediterranean on board the USS Nassau (LHA-4).

The blue-green opportunity is not without drawbacks. Some of them are as follows:

• The Oriskany and Bon Homme Richard have age, size, space, and equipment limitations that will restrict their employment. There are no longer any elite' or early warning aircraft available or suitable for this size deck. The only fighters which could be used with these ships are F-8 Crusaders; a number of them have been mothballed in the desert, but their condition is so poor that their rework for active service is not recommended.
• Reactivation would be expensive and modernization to accommodate F/A-18s would be prohibitive.
• The use of A-4Ms in active air wings into the 1990s would delay their transfer to the Marine Corps Reserve, now scheduled for 1986. Breakout of A-4Ms and AV-8s to support this concept would destroy current marine air wing composition and integrity and reduce strike forces at Iwakuni, Japan, and Okinawa to F-4s and A-6s.
• The A-4Ms would require expensive carrier modifications that might take two to three years to accomplish. Current maximum carrier landing weight is 14,500 pounds (2,000 pounds of fuel); with strut modification maximum weight would be increased to 16,500 pounds. Titanium forgings are required, and modifications can be expected to cost $700,000 per aircraft. (Only 24 A-4Ms are currently configured for carrier operations, but A-4Fs could be employed at any time as an alternative).

• The concept would require a turnaround on a Marine Corps and State Department mind-set with. regard to forward deployed shore basing. The commitment of light attack squadrons in effective operation and contingency plans will require reassignment or cancellation.
• The availability of SH-3Hs antisubmarine helicopters is critical; without a minimum of six.SH-3Hs per air wing ASW capability would be very limited.
• Essex-class carriers would have operational limitations in Sea States encountered in the Indian Ocean.
• To accommodate reactivation, other carrier overhauls might have to be delayed by two years or more.
• Providing ships' companies for two "new" carriers would impose strains on our already limited personnel. Each of the two ships would require approximately 118 officers and 2,085 enlisted men. But Navy retention is improving, so this is a solvable problem. It must be if we are to build our forces.

Improved readiness and force level increases are not easily or cheaply attained. While this proposal offers an opportunity to achieve both, tough decisions, hard work, and scarce dollars will nevertheless be required. Conditions are optimum for success in convincing Congress and obtaining supportive decisions and funding. Now is the time to get the 14^th and 15th carriers back in the force; to relax inflexible commitments mired in Okinawa sand and Japanese mud for more than 30 years; and to put Marine Corps air strength where it belongs—on the move with the troops.

Captain Taylor received his B.A. degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1965 and is a 1975 graduate of the Army War College. After completing flight training as a naval aviation cadet in 1957, he served in several light attack squadrons (VA-12, VA-125, VA-113, VA-174, and VA-46) before assuming command of VA-46 in 1973. He flew 200 strike missions over North Vietnam and accumulated 1,000 arrested landings and nearly 6,000 flight hours as a carrier pilot, culminating in command of Carrier Air Wing 3 on board the USS Saratoga (CV-60) from 1975 to 1977. He commanded the replenishment oiler Kalamazoo (AOR-6) until September 1980 when he reported to his present assignment in OpNav as deputy to the Director General, Planning and Programming (0p-90).