Comment and Discussion

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

These are difficult dilemmas. On °^ne hand, we cannot allow our forces ^ fr°^zen mro immobility by the of a potential but presently un- ¹ ely conflict; on the other hand, we must acknowledge that priorities in ^Urope long established and carefully

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force”

T. M. Johnson and R. T. Barrett, pp. 95-98, November 1980 Proceedings)

Richard A. Best, Jr. —Colonel Johnson ®ⁿd Commander Barrett perform a ighly valuable service for your readers y providing insight into the rationale f°r the newly established RDJTF. The concept has not as yet received the public scrutiny its importance merits, ^and as the authors acknowledge, there remain “many questions for the near ^and long term that need debate.”

Two concerns come immediately to mind. First, the authors note that in K ^Pf^rs'^{an Gu|}f region the RDJTF has ^{C e} primary objective ... to deter oviet adventurism, but if deterrence ^a'led, to have the capability to rapidly deploy the necessary U. S. combat forces.” The Soviets must have ⁿ° doubt that the West has vital ‘nterests in this area which will be Protected by force if necessary, and certainly the availability of rapidly de­ployable forces serves to reflect Ameri­can determination. However, the dis­cussion of the roles and missions of the R-DJTF contains two troubling assump­tions: (a) a U. S.-U.S.S.R. war could ^e limited to the Persian Gulf area, ^and (b) under some conditions, forces currently assigned elsewhere should be transferred to this area for a potential • S.-U.S.S.R. conflict. While such eventualities can be envisioned, we must recognize that any U. S.-U.S.S.R. confli_ct could be rapidly transferred to °rher theaters. If our forces were moved out of Europe, the U. S. and NATO position there could become even more vulnerable to Warsaw Pact Pressure even in the absence of actual

conflict.

supported by U. S. and Allied forces should not be undermined or dis­torted. It goes without saying that we cannot base plans on the assumption of having carriers and other major forces available in two different places at the same time.

A second concern is the inherent problems which would occur if a joint task force were to operate in the same general area as forces belonging to two or more unified commands. The crea­tion of a RDJTF should not serve as an excuse to finesse the vexing question of a unified command for the Indian Ocean region. The recent experience with an ad hoc command structure for the rescue mission in Iran demon­strates how important such matters are and how easily, despite the best of in­tentions, things can go awry.

Having ramifications far beyond the narrow concerns of DoD planners, these basic, even simplistic, issues in­volve priorities for foreign policy and for budgetary allocations. Now that the 1980 election campaign is over, there is a new opportunity to reassess our defense structure and to begin ef­forts to obtain the necessary forces for a reasonable U. S. military capability for Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf op­erations.

“Operations or Regulations”

(See A. G. Webb, pp. 52-57, October 1980

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander M. R. Adams, U. S. Coast Guard—I believe the very existence of the October Proceedings be­lies Mr. Webb’s contention that “There appears to be no room for a loyal opposition of individuals who desire to make the overall organization a better one . . . .” Several articles in the issue take a less-than-approving view of the Coast Guard and its pres­ent operations. As far as there being no room for dissenters within the serv­ice, I can only say that to date I have suffered no professional chastisement, official or otherwise, for my Proceedings

Contents:

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

Operations or Regulations

Needed: A Defensive Capability for Diego Garcia

(Soviet) Diesel Boats Forever

As I Recall . . .

Deep-Strike Interdiction

Civil Service Reform, Who Needs It?

The U. S. Navy: Naval Aircraft

Thinking About the Future of the Navy

Assault on the Liberty

Retention: The Pressure Is On

Torpedoing the Coast Guard’s Good-Guy Image

The Cop on the Beat:

The Cop on the Boat

Is Mahan Still Valid?

Tactical Employment of Soviet FPBs

Leadership

Moral Leadership

Commitment ... A Focus for Leadership

Soviet Ship Types

Their New Cruiser

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

contributions, though they have often not been of the “party line.”

Commander Leon Y. Wald, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—The author is correct ^ln his forthright statement regarding the diffusion of Coast Guard strength t>y the continuance of its historical can-do attitude which has been com­pounded by the reluctance of past Commandants to request additional funding for additional responsibilities. His thesis is in consonance with the comments of Commandant Hayes in ^rhc same issue that the service is over-burdened, under-manned, and under-financed.

These conditions can be partially remedied by the Coast Guard initiat- ^lng legislation to divest itself of those missions which more properly belong •n the civilian sphere. These are the mternational ice patrol, merchant marine inspection, water pollution de­terrence and cleanup, aids to naviga­tion, and ice-breaking.

The international ice patrol can be disposed of most easily. If ice masses cannot be tracked by heat-sensitive satellites, then any non-military air­craft could chart their tracks and ad- ^v,se shipping interests via marine radio broadcasts.

Merchant marine inspection existed for some 60 years as a function of the department of Commerce. The Marine Inspector was a Civil Service employee who had been appointed be­cause of his long experience in the Merchant Marine as a deck or engineering officer. The Marine In­spector status was the apex of a seago- ^lng career, and the inspector’s advice ^and opinions were respected by the most senior of professional seamen ^who considered him their peer. What ^a contrast to today’s Coast Guard in­spectors who must give officer license examinations in a multiple choice an­swer format because they are not suffi­ciently familiar with the subjects to properly evaluate an essay answer.

Aids to navigation were long the province of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, which had the aids erected and maintained by civilian employees. The arduous labor of clearing brush from around structures on river banks or in swamps is really not conducive to reenlistment programs of a military service.

A similar argument can be made for oil spill containment and cleanup. It would take a genuine hero to approach a tired, oil-soaked sailor and talk about shipping-over.

An icebreaker has only one purpose, to open frozen shipping lanes and ex­tend the navigation season. In this role, an icebreaker is not a combat vessel and does not require a military crew. A civilian crew permanently as­signed to the same vessel can only enhance its expertise. A military crew, enduring continual reassignments, is in a constant training phase. Since ice-breaking is a navigation feature, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers should be given the responsibility for doing it.

One is tempted to attack the search and rescue mission which places a tremendous drain on Coast Guard re­sources with no tangible result. A pol­icy of strict guidelines, issued by the Commandant, would end the quan­dary of how much search is enough.

These are not original ideas that Mr. Webb and 1 have expressed. They have surfaced in the Coast Guard many times. The response has always been that to divest ourselves of these responsibilites would be to lose billets at the mission and support levels. I have no statistics on which to base an assumption, but I surmise that the personnel recovered from these mis­sions and their support could, if as­signed to floating units, man a Coast Guard fleet double or possibly triple the present one. Thus, if given the hardware and operational funds, there is sufficient strength in the officer corps to staff enough vessels to control a 200-mile zone; There are more than sufficient seniors available for com­mand. No matter how much money is available, however, modern hardware and floating units cannot be procured overnight. One interim approach might be to produce floating bases ca­pable of 18-knot speeds from the Maritime Administration’s laid-up fleets. Large high-speed chase boats could be purchased from local motor boat vendors and surveillance helicop­ters could be acquired from the same sources that supply police depart­ments. Teamed together, these assets would create an immediate operational capability.

The technical advances in undersea warfare have gone by the Coast Guard. Let us accept this realization and the fact that antisubmarine warfare is a naval matter. The Coast Guard is a Federal Marine Police Force; that is how we function best, and that should be our primary mission.

“Coast Guard Compendium”

(See R. L. Scheina, pp. 155-163, October

1980 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Stanley J. Nor­man, U. S. Coast Guard, Commanding Officer, USCGC Biscayne Bay (WTGB-104)—On the lighter side, the Compendium at the end of the issue was excellent with one excep­tion. The USCGC Mackinaw (WAGB-33) is the queen of the Great Lakes fleet, but even she cannot have two home ports at once. The Mackinaw is home-ported in Cheboygan, Michi­gan. The Biscayne Bay calls St. Ignace, Michigan, home.

“Needed: A Defensive

Capability for Diego Garcia”

(See J. P. Hopkins, p. 15, October 1980

Proceedings)

Georg Johannsohn—Lieutenant Hop­kins overlooked some pertinent threats to Diego Garcia.

The Soviet Union could launch a preemptive missile strike against Diego Garcia with SS-20 intermediate- range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from locations in the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand at the southern border of Afghanistan. The maximum range of the SS-20 IRBMs, as estimated by The International Institute for Strategic Studies, is 3,107 statute miles. The SS-20 (multiple independently target- able reentry vehicle [MlRV]-con- figured) warhead has a yield of 3 x 150 KT (i.e., 3 MIRVs, each with a yield of 150 kilotons) with a circular error probability of about 300 feet. The throw weight of the SS-20 post­boost vehicle witli three warheads,

guidance systems, and penetration aids, deliverable over a given range, amounts to 12,000 pounds. This threat requires the immediate installa­tion of an anti-ballistic missile system on Diego Garcia. Land-based close-in weapon systems should be provided for the defense of Diego Garcia.

The Soviet Navy has a long tradi­tion in the development and use of the mine weapon, both offensively and de­fensively. Soviet naval warfare analysts consider, furthermore, the submarine to be the best minelaying platform be­cause of her covert capability. Admiral S. G. Gorshkov has stated, in his analysis of World War I, that the ex­tension of a mine threat by using the submarine “to areas which have been considered previously safe in this re­gard” was an invaluable tool against surface ships. Therefore, we can as­sume that Diego Garcia also will be­come a primary target for concealed minelaying operations of the Soviet Navy. In this context, a countermea­sure or sweeping effort would have to be made to try to find and remove the offensive mines. This threat requires the deployment of Western mine­sweeping capacities in the Indian Ocean. Alternatively, a move should be made to prevent the covert submarine-laid mining or to move it farther out to sea by planting anti­submarine deep-water mines. These mines would pose no threat to surface traffic and would be hazardous only to submarines which were either afraid to surface or were ignorant of the minefield plan. This approach would require the deployment of Western minelaying vessels to the Indian Ocean region.

“As I Recall ...”

(.See W. P. Mack, pp. 105-106, August 1980;

K. R. Haas, p. 95, October 1980 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Brian McCauley, U. S. Navy (Retired)—While clearing the mines from Haiphong, because of prisoner-of-war difficulties, I was di­rected to move Task Force 75 (23 ships) out of Haiphong Harbor at first light on several occasions. My first knowledge of each movement was usually about midnight or 0100 by an information copy of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff message to the Commander-in­Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander- in-Chief Pacific directing the action. Regardless of the urgency, there were always delays in passing the message through the chain of command. As a result, the only way I could comply was to act on the info copy, which I did. I was usually well at sea when I got a legitimate directive. Of neces­sity, I made this a practice on any ur­gent action.

Based on Admiral Mack’s experi­ence and mine, it becomes apparent that when the Navy is involved in ac­tions that are more political than war­like, the “chain of command” must be avoided and a direct link established between the policymaker and the ac­tion force.

“Deep-Strike Interdiction”

(See C. E. Myers, pp. 47-52, November 1980 Proceedings)

IF. Hays Parks—As a former benefi­ciary of the very accurate support of the battleship New Jersey (BB-62), I began the article thinking Mr. Myers

population per se. U. S. bombing P anning and practice never have con­^templated attack of the enemy’s civil- ^lan population. Not even the contro­versially worded Casablanca Directive ° January 1943 went so far. In- ^eed, a suggestion by British Foreign ecretary Anthony Eden in 1942 to concentrate on the attack of the Ger-

wight be able to shed new light on the air-versus-naval gunfire support cost-effectiveness argument. Instead, he tends to confuse the practices of in­terdiction and deep-strike interdiction ⁽⁾f the past, erring in large measure in his interpretation of those events and their consequences, while failing until the last paragraph to distinguish be­tween a nation’s capabilities as opposed to its willingness to execute deep-strike

interdiction.

While Giulio Douhet may have ^een one of the original thinkers re­garding strategic bombing (referred to y the author as deep-strike interdic­tion), Douhet’s theories of application differ substantially from the practice °f the Allied powers during World ^^ar II, or of the United States in Korea or over the Democratic Repub- ■c of Vietnam. Douhet believed not ^ln iiwiting aerial attack to strategic targets such as factories, supply de­pots, and lines of communication, but 'n directing the attack at the civilian

Wan population as such was rejected y the British Air Ministry as being 'nhumane as well as an inefficient use of military assets. Moreover, air power •storians generally have concluded ^fhat Douhet had little, to no effect on ^cbe thinking of U. S. and British air Power strategists in their development °f strategic bombing doctrine before and during World War II. Air Force ^ajor General Haywood S. Hansell, J^r-> who taught at the Air Corps Tac- ^Clcal School in the early 1930s and who subsequently worked on AWPD-1, che prewar plan that formed the basis '^,r hi- S. strategic operations against ermany, has stated that Douhet was ^unknown within Air Corps circles in chose days. Marshal of the Royal Air jmcce (RAF) Sir John Slessor, General ansell’s rough counterpart within Prewar RAF planning circles, has said che same regarding the RAF’s lack of nowledge of Douhet. Hence, I be­lieve it is inappropriate to place so much emphasis on Douhet and to refer to U. S. planners as “modern disciples of Douhet.”

Mr. Myers’s summary of the con­clusions of the U. S. Strategic Bomb­ing Survey (USSBS) is argumentative and incomplete rather than conclusive. He would prefer that the reader con­clude that the strategic air offensive over Germany was ineffective, inas­much as German fighter production increased over the course of the com­bined bomber offensive. Fighter pro­duction increased because of a tremen­dous amount of slack that existed in that production, slack which was taken up through the effective man­agement of the Minister of Arma­ments and War Production, Albert Speer. Similarly, the Germans "never slowed in the production of war mate­rials for lack of anti-friction bearings” because they had over-produced ball bearings early in the war, before strategic bombing took effect, and be­cause the Germans were able to make extensive purchases of ball bearings from “neutral" Sweden. What the USSBS could not quantify, and what the author has neglected to mention, is the tremendous amount of effort that had to be expended for the de­fense of Germany because of the Allied bomber offensive, such as labor for dispersion and camouflaging of indus­trial facilities, air raid precautions, and reconstruction; manufacture of fighters to the neglect of offensive weapons such as bombers and tanks; and diversion of weapons such as the dual-purpose 88-mm. gun in massive quantities from use on the Eastern Front to defense of German industrial targets.

His analysis of U. S. bombing over North Vietnam is valid in its criticism of certain Air Force-Navy practices, such as “upping” the sortie rate as the result of interservice rivalry. That, however, is not a weakness of deep- strike interdiction but of its im­plementation. He errs, however, in stating that “more bombs were dropped [in deep-strike interdiction over North Vietnam] than in the war against Germany.” While more ton­nage was dropped over all of Southeast Asia than was dropped on Germany,

less than 10% of that total was dropped on North           Vietnam—

substantially less than was dropped on Germany. More tonnage was dropped in Southeast Asia because the military was forced by its civilian leaders to violate the basic tenets of deep-strike interdiction. More than a half century ago, the father of the Royal Air Force, Marshal of the RAF Sir Hugh Tren- chard, suggested that it was far more efficient to destroy the factory that produces 50 aircraft per day than to locate and destroy those aircraft after they have left the factory. Contrary to the urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Navy and Air Force were not permitted to destroy war-related re­sources in North Vietnam prior to their dispersal in the early stages of the war, nor permitted to make more intensive attacks at the top of the Hanoi-Haiphong “funnel.” To gain support for its opposition to the rec­ommendations of the JCS, bombing opponents in the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (International Secu­rity Affairs) commissioned a study to examine the feasibility of the bombing campaign recommended by the JCS. That study—Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic and Political Effects (RAND RM-5213-ISA)—instead supported the JCS position that attack of strategic targets in North Vietnam would have an effect on the war pro­vided those targets were attacked be­fore they were dispersed. The study was suppressed, and its conclusions ignored within OSD. Small wonder, then, that air power resources were frittered away bombing hundreds of miles of trails every day in the hope that something might be there. Myers correctly alludes to this in his conclu­sion that “neither conviction nor au­thority has been displayed by U. S. leadership in recent years,” and that is the issue more than deep-strike inter­diction as such. Deep-strike did not fail in Vietnam; the policy of gradualism never let it begin. What the Israelis were allowed to accomplish in 1967 (but not in 1973) is precisely what the JCS were prohibited from doing in 1965 and 1966. Ironically, it was Department of State intervention in and micromanagement of military affairs that had the greatest effect not

ere

-----

fV                  SAVE                 *3

y- Mail-order from Germany Z

ERC is an innovative Research, Engineering, Manufacturing company that has served Military and Commercial custo­mers for over 30 years.

We solve problems relating to securing, rapid deployment and handling of Military and Commer­cial equipment. ERC products include: Cargo Hooks for Helicopters,

Tie Downs (Web, Chain & Cable), Shackles, Rings, Fittings and Cargo Nets. Quick Response Capability ERC is geared for high- volume production, but can provide a flexible ‘‘Quick Reaction" to meet critical needs based on advance authorization for long lead items and acceler­ated delivery as required.

EASTERN ROTORCRAFT

Doylestown, PA 18901 •(215)345-0300 TWX 510-665-8128

—

a:

r 1:1250 Ships, over 1500 models to select. Also • ’ the new 1:2400 models. We have NAVIS, 1 r NEPTUN, HANSA, VIKING, MERCATOR. ( 3 DELPHIN, ATLANTIC, SANTOS, FLEET- 3 i LINE, SEXTANT, FRAMBURG, EAGLE, i • STARCAST, MICRO-FLEET & even DE- : ( GEN custom-made models, plus many others. ( [ In model railroading we carry MAERK- i 1 LIN, FLEISCHMANN, ARNOLD-RAPIDO, • ( TRIX, MINNITRIX, LILIPUT, ROCO. \ , RIVAROSSI. LEHMANN, FALLER, KIBRI, ■ ) BRAWA, BUSCH, HERKAT. HERPA. ' ( MERTEN'S, PREISER, POLA, VIKING, i 3 SEUTHE—everything in railroading. Also a 5 ^ large array of R/c equipment. We have the \ : experience and the know-how, gained : i through many years of service to the model ( | railroader, to assure safe delivery of your r j orders at the lowest possible cost.                                                        ;

V Send $1.00 for our complete catalog listing \ i and ordering information by airmail. •

r PRESTON HOBBY M0DELLE oHG •

3 P. 0. Box 2280—D86 Bamberg, West Germany 3 ^    Telephone 33333                        ^

only on the rejection of the 1965 JCS recommendations but on the Israelis’ reluctance to carry out acts of an­ticipatory self-defense in 1973. The question, then, appears not to be one of the viability of deep-strike interdic­tion, but of the inter-agency process of our government which permits agen­cies outside the Department of De­fense to hold sway over factors essen­tially military in nature and as minute as the selection and approval of indi­vidual targets, a decision-making pro­cess in which the JCS was not allowed to participate for much of the Vietnam War.

While I leave to mission planners the opportunity to comment on the author’s criticism of U. S. "Dr. Pep­per” methods of bombing over North Vietnam, it should be noted that the flying of established routes during daylight hours was only in large measure the result of political restraints on the attack of military targets in areas containing a concentration of ci­vilians. Those restraints were intended to avoid any collateral civilian casual­ties, an unreasonable limitation that far exceeds U. S. obligations under the law of war. The latter recognizes collateral civilian casualties to be an inevitable albeit unfortunate by­product of war, particularly when the defender uses his civilian population to screen military movement (as North Vietnam did). The political restric­tions imposed on U. S. air forces over North Vietnam were excessive, caused unnecessary losses of U. S. aircraft and air crews, and hopefully will not be repeated.

The author’s conclusion that “each potential enemy has an ‘Achilles’ Heel' ” is contrary to the conclusions of the USSBS. That survey supported the argument of Air Marshal Sir Ar­thur Harris, wartime leader of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command, that there is no such thing as a “panacea” target. While some targets may be more important than others, conventional strategic bombing, or deep-strike interdiction, is effective only if it attacks all parts of an enemy’s ability to wage war, whether industrial facilities, storage depots, power supplies, or lines of com­munication. In this regard, I find it difficult to understand Mr. Myers’s suggestion that targets such as a na­tion’s food supply be attacked in lieu of traditional strategic targets. In 1977, the nations of the world (in­cluding the United States) reached consensus agreement in Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions not to target food supplies, except food spe­cifically to be used by the military. While there are humanitarian reasons for this agreement, there was the prac­tical realization that if food supplies are attacked, the nation’s population will suffer in opposite proportion to its contribution to the war effort: the military will always be fed, and the war industry worker will be next in priority. Thus, while Great Britain thought it could deter the German in­dustrial worker from going to his place of employment by attacking his ability and desire to get there, Ger­man absenteeism was substantially less than that of the British worker threatened by airstrikes because the German worker had to report to work to receive his food coupons (there were, of course, other incentives). Even assuming food supplies can be located more easily than petroleum facilities, lines of communication, or power plants, their attack would be an inefficient use of deep-strike interdic­tion resources.

I cannot agree that “strikes against military facilities or war materials con­tiguous to urban areas are, in effect, attacks against the civilian population because of the inaccuracy generally as­sociated with bombing.” The bomb­ings of such targets, when finally au­thorized during "Linebacker II,” were highly effective with minimal civilian casualties, and certainly were not at­tacks against the civilian population. One analysis of “Linebacker II” found that ground casualties during that op­eration were between 1% and 10% of casualty rates per tonnage dropped on population targets during World War II. Moreover, it should be noted that the obligation to minimize civilian casualties is the obligation of both the defender and the attacker, rather than being the one-way street imposed on U. S. forces in Vietnam.

Finally, Mr. Myers asks: “Did the B-52 bombings of Vietnam, during which we suffered a significant loss of strategic forces, have a stronger effect than Henry Kissinger’s offer of bil­lions in reparations?” I question, first, whether a 2% loss rate is “signifi­cant, whether in normal loss rates, replacement costs vis-a-vis “billions in reparations,” or as compared to the ‘gnominy of payment of undeserved reparations. One of the individuals di­rectly involved in the Paris Peace talks before and after “Linebacker II,” how­ever, related to me that “prior to Linebacker II’ the North Vietnamese were intransigent, buying time, refus- ^lng even to discuss a formal meeting schedule. After 'Linebacker II’ they were shaken, demoralized, anxious to ^talk about anything. They finally realized they were at war with a superpower. If there was any bewil­derment, it was with our reluctance to use that power earlier.”

That seems to be the final conclu­sion of Mr. Myers’s article, and it is that resolve, rather than the theory of ^eeP-strike interdiction, which merits greater consideration.

Civil Service Reform,

Who Needs It?”

(See H. Shaynes, pp. 90-93, September 1980 Proceedings)

C- Sharp Cook—I agree with Harvey Shaynes’ conclusion. The problems of Personnel management and compensa­tion are many and are not easily solved, especially in a large organiza­tion such as the Navy. To perform this task satisfactorily requires a tune-consuming and dedicated effort °ⁿ the part of all" those responsible for

supervision.

A case in point is the centralization °f job evaluation for positions rated at ^^s-13 and higher. In the middle 1950s, I played a small role in getting this process decentralized, largely be­cause many of us believed it was not working satisfactorily with the com­plete responsibility centralized in each °f the naval district headquarters.

% concern in the 1950s was sci- euce, engineering, and technology, ^areas in which the Navy is even more dependent now than it was then. In establishing four senior scientist posi-

Pr tions in the Nuclear Radiation Branch of the U. S. Naval Radiological De­fense Laboratory, I had prepared posi­tion descriptions at the GS-13 level for individuals to perform and supervise programs which would (a) measure the ionizing radiations from nuclear weapons, (b) determine the nature of the shielding needed to protect per­sonnel and equipment from these radi­ations, (c) investigate, initiate, and improve a solid-state dosimetry pro­gram for the Navy, a relatively new technique at that time, and (d) pre­pare and develop a general dosimetry and radiological physics program.

The position classifier for the 12th Naval District who evaluated these de­scriptions knew absolutely nothing about science and technology. During one week of 1953, I spent about half my time trying to describe to her the type of responsibilities and duties these individuals would have. The standard response I kept receiving was, “But he will supervise only five people.” Her experience had been al­most exclusively with administrative positions and the one criterion which she seemed to use for rating a position at a GS-13 level was the number of people under the supervision of the in­cumbent. This experience was indeed very frustrating.

In 1955, I was given the additional task of being one of our laboratory representatives on the policy board of the Board of U. S. Civil Service Ex­aminers for Scientists and Engineers (sometimes known as the Navy Labo­ratories in California and/or the Pasadena Board). At the meetings of this organization, I found that man­agement personnel of all the Navy laboratories in California were experi­encing the same frustrations regarding the establishment and evaluation of positions within their organizations.

After several discussions of the problem, we decided that additional action was necessary if the problems were to be solved. Fortunately, the Civil Service Commission sponsored an annual meeting of what it called the Associated Boards for Research and Development Personnel, which consisted not only of our board but also of the boards which served the Navy laboratories on the East Coast, the National Bureau of Standards Board, and the National Institutes of Health Board. At these meetings, each board would present papers in which the speaker discussed problems and solutions which were appropriate to his operation. We decided that it was time to bring the problem of posi­tion classification to the attention of a broader audience, and as a result, our paper for the meeting of 16 March 1956 was: "Report of Pasadena Board’s Committee Survey of Classifi­cation Problems.” I will always re­member that meeting, especially since I presented the paper for the Pasadena Board. The custom was to give the speaker a mild applause after his talk and then to pass to the next speaker. Apparently other people had been ex­periencing similar problems, because at the conclusion of my talk, in which I attempted to present both problems and solutions to problems, dead si­lence prevailed for a moment and then a voice from the audience cried out “Amen!”

Shortly thereafter, classification of positions was decentralized. I believe that our efforts had something to do with the ultimate action. I also believe that our laboratory personnel office acted very responsibly in its classifica­tion of positions after it received au­thority to act in this capacity. If man­agement people perform their duties in a competent and responsible man­ner, the proliferation of higher grades would never occur.

“The U. S. Navy:

Naval Aircraft, Part 2”

(See N. Polmar, pp. 119-121, November

1980 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander D. J. Hackett, U. S. Naval Reserve—I understand that Congress has approved $20 mil­lion for long-lead time items required to reopen the Kaman SH-2F production line, and Mr. Polmar reports that the Navy plans to order 48 of the aircraft in the 1980s. These actions apparently have been taken in order to supply LAMPS I airframes for cruisers and frig­ates that are not suitable for the follow-on LAMPS III system. While I believe that more aircraft are required

While the technicalloperational evaluation 0/ LAMPS III is scheduled to commence this month, the Navy is requesting funds for more SH-2F LAMPS Is. Pictured are the major LAMPS III elements—the SH-60B Seahau k helicopter and the new frigate, USS Mclnerney (FFG-8).

to meet the Navy’s ASW objectives, the decision to buy new SH-2Fs to fill this requirement is wrong.

The SH-2F is an adequate helicopter for its stated mission. However, it is based on 1950s’ technology and has experienced three major model changes since it was introduced in I960. These changes have upgraded the aircraft from an 8,800-pound, single-engine utility bird to a 12,800-pound, twin-engine ASW plat­form. Because of the model changes, the airframe has almost no room for continued growth. It is not at all un­usual for aircraft flying ASW missions to leave the flight deck over maximum gross weight and with center of grav­ity limits exceeded.

A full load of sonobuoys and fuel necessary for hot ASW prosecution will put the helicopter over these allowable limits. In addition, the last H-2 was built in 1963, so it is certainly nowhere near state of th^!e art in de­sign, maintainability, or reliability. Direct maintenance manhours per flight hour typically exceed 20 with a good maintenance crew and that does not count the additional time required for corrosion prevention, washing, etc.

As a former LAMPS pilot, I think the helicopter community is caught in a squeeze between the surface people and the folks who run the air navy. The ship drivers don’t care about which helicopter they get, as long as they get enough to fill their decks. On the other hand, my impression is that NavAir folks do not want to be bothered by helos. They’re so busy with “go-fasters” that they’re willing to take an antique they know rather than something new and better. A lot of people liked the F-8, but I don’t think there would be any real support for reopening the F-8 production line.

“Thinking About the Future of the Navy”

(See S. Turner, pp. 66-69, August 1980;

W. V. Kennedy, p. 101, October 1980;

D. J. Kenney, pp. 124-127, November 1980 Proceedings)

Commander Harlan K. Ullman, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Du­pont (DD-941)—I would propose that any definition of the Navy’s strategic rationale must expand upon Admiral Turner’s requirement for “sea-control” and include the specific task to defeat or neutralize Soviet forces even in their home waters. And, as a minimum operational and deploy­able force posture, we should maintain sufficient forces in the Atlantic and Pacific to threaten simultaneously, if we choose, one main Soviet operating base, such as Kola or Petropavlovsk, in each of these oceans.

From both geopolitical and tactical perspectives, maintaining our ability to threaten Soviet forces even in their homewaters would be enormously im­portant. First, the Soviet response would continue to place budget prior­ity on defense of their homeland. Given the absolute necessity accorded that mission by the Soviets, it would not be surprising to see resources di­verted from exploiting opportunities elsewhere. Second, such a capability provides the United States with a di­rect linkage between conventional and strategic nuclear levels of conflict, and, from the Soviet view, the uncertainty of predicting how the United States might use that linkage if war were ini­tiated reinforces any deterrent value of that threat. From a U. S. perspective, this strategic rationale could be readily subjected to measurable force re­quirements, providing us with the necessary capabilities while remaining within reasonable expectations of the limits of our budget. In addition, the type of capabilities required for threatening Soviet maritime power with destruction would include sea- lane defense and projection of power ashore in other areas. These tasks, however, would have to be approached consecutively and not simultaneously because of the size of our Navy.

“Assault on the Liberty”

(See D. Blalock, pp. 108-109, March 1980;

D. E. Keough, p. 85, June 1980; V. L.

Brownfield, S. White, G. D. Oldham, E. H.

Katz, pp. 24-33, September 1980; T. H.

Moorer and W. C. Eveland, p. 85, December

1980 Proceedings)

Eliot H. Sharp—I’ve read quite a few sea stories, but in my 77 years I’ve never read one as gripping as James Ennes’s Assault on the Liberty. I’ve fol­lowed that story for many years. Mr. Ennes has written a book I regard as terrifying in its vivid descriptions and as terrifying in its implications of the cover-up by our government for purely political reasons. It makes the Watergate cover-up seem like a Sun­day school picnic. Every American should read it and learn what an “ally” can do when its interests are involved.

(Continued on page 77)

Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 22)

and

the

^e nuc/sub reject is not a “new” per- _e^ne problem. My personal experi- ^Ce *^s that about 75% of the nuclear _Sa'|!^Ver attrites turn out to be 4.0 ^rs- The nuclear power program 35^^C ^^{aVe a} pl^anne<i attrition rate of ⁰ to be able to dump/pump out v-the gents it does. If the indi- _ajj ^{a ls} a legitimate attrite, he usu- _na^ adjusts; but some of the discipli- j'_r attrites are real shafts (dropped tl/¹¹¹ P^ro8^fam—one-hour unau- ^°ti2ed absence, superior academic t_er°^fCP’ ^and they are indeed very bit- Th ^an^’ *ⁿ °P‘ⁿ*^on’ justifiably so. fa ^{e Su}^^>rnar*^ne disciplinary reject is a W( l^an<^ ^t*^{le nuc}*^ear power folks don’t g_e°^{f v}ery hard to keep or help the ^ ^C> they just reject. He is not very Ppy when the surface community _th^ts h>m. I really think the problem is the submariners believe they ^{n c} have the time or the expertise to

Perceptions. I might inject that

detention: The Pressure Is On”

J- F. Kelly, pp. 40-45, April 1980; D. P, ^an Ort, _p. 20, June 1980; D. R. Putnam,

P' 22, July 1980; B. D. Cole, pp. 75-76, ^ul,ust 1980; B. H.Putnam, pp. 125-126, "P'ember 1980; J. F. Downs, pp. 84-85, Member 1980 Proceedings)

Commander Joseph Keeley, U. S. Navy, xecutive Officer, Recruit Training Com- ^*nd. San Diego—My initial reaction ⁰ Commander Cole’s comments was ^ⁿ8er. Who is this gent, and how did Wb ^{eCOme suc}h ^an expert on recruits?

^en I finished his comments, I ap- _e^^C|^lated his frustration and his appar- ^ac^ °f information with respect to qualifications for enlistment sta versus Navy physical fitness bp | ^ar<as’ ^and also sensed an incredi- evel of intolerance for the young- _tj^{tr w}^o is on his own for the first ^{e an}d learning (but not with or ^ Commander Cole). ^c does not make sense to try to as ^{Ut <}”^ornrnanci^er Cole’s comments, they _are pp personal experiences

carry out the administrative discharge process (they will say just the time). We are a convenient admin, funnel. But on to recruits.

The current stated mission of re­cruit training is as follows: To conduct a training program which will:

1.     Effect a smooth transition from ci­vilian to Navy life.

2.     Foster patriotic behavior.

3.     Affirm the individual’s dignity.

4.     Encourage high standards of per­sonal responsibility, conduct, man­ners, and morale.

5.     Create a desire for self-improve­ment and advancement.

6.     Provide the recruit with knowl­edge and skills which are basic to all Navy personnel.

7.     Develop pride in unit and the Navy and a desire to observe appropri­ate naval customs, ceremonies, and traditions.

8.     Provide the Department of the Navy with personnel possessing an ef­fective level of physical fitness.

How long does it take to do it? This is obviously a question in a number of minds both in and out of the Navy (including GAO), and I’m not sure there is a good answer. Pre­suming we would have to do a study, there would be a requirement for some period of stability to do the evalua­tion. The length of boot camp has changed eight times between 1970 and 1978 as follows:

would be 9-10 weeks. The only reason it didn’t change to 6 weeks in 1979 was because Congress refused to buy

the DoD recommendation for such a change. DoD appears to be far more willing to take chances with quality and retention than the Navy or the Congress. In fact, the budgetary pro­cess determines the length of boot camp.

A 1977 study costed out 1978 Navy recruit training at 840 million bucks. To save $100 million in the defense budget, Navy boot camp went from 9 to 8 weeks. If you talk to the seasoned veteran (probably about Commander Cole’s age), he’ll tell you that in the old days boot camp was 12-13 weeks long. In 12 weeks, you can do a lot of weeding out of prob­lems, shed excess weight, get a lot of teeth fixed, and do a great deal to build up a kid’s self-esteem. The women and men who are assigned as company commanders at boot camp are top performers and professionals, but they are not carnival or big-top qualified. They do the job and do it well, and most of them believe they are putting out an exceptionally moti­vated and enthusiastic recruit who has begun a very successful transition from civilian to sailor. He understands what supervision is, and he expects it. When he doesn’t get it, he makes a judgment: “No one cares what I do.” If any of you out there think that the youngsters of today are self-starters, striking for Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy or Chief of Naval Opera­tions, or are even interested in looking down the road five to ten years from now, you are deluding yourself. Some are, but most are interested in the near-term issues and immediate gratification.

As in most cases when training is shortened ashore, the burden shifts to the fleet. The new sailor who reports aboard really needs a good sponsor and guide, a good indoctrination program, and a high level of supervision until he is locked into where he is and what

maintaining our image is imp'

ior»^fl

id»

gets merely on the basis of a low ^cl j

he is doing. Most of the individuals associated with boot camp believe the training period should be lengthened, and be more physically and mentally demanding. The chances of these changes being made are slim to zero.

In the meantime, I suggest to Commander Cole that he try to re­member how emotionally mature he was at 17 and to stop broadcasting how the generation gap is getting to him. He really hasn’t pointed out any­thing new'. He should dig out the August 1961 Proceedings and read pages 134-137 in the professional notes department. Captain Kaufman and Lieutenant Meyer conducted a practical experiment in disciplinary psychology. It is good reading, and it makes one think and wonder about just how good it was in the old days.”

“Torpedoing the Coast Guard s Good-Guy Image”

{See M. R. Adams, pp. 137-139, October 1980; W. D. Kline, pp. 81-82, December 1980 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U. S. Coast Guard, Commander, Second Coast Guard District—Commander Adams’s concern should be applauded because it indicates that we do have profes­sionals capable of self-examination— professionals who are deeply involved with charting the future of our serv­ice. That is healthy! The situation, however, may not be as grave as the author states. Let us look at his pri­mary question; “What are we trying to do with our law enforcement pol­icy?” I will also attempt to answer a strongly implied question: “Why do we continue to arm our boarding par­ties when it is offending the public?” These comments are based, in part, upon my observations from the van­tage point of Chief, Office of Opera­tions, U. S. Coast Guard Headquar­ters, during the period 1977-79 when significant law enforcement policies were developed.

The article reminds me of a similar viewpoint which I heard voiced by some Coast Guard personnel in Viet­nam during that war. The reader may recall that the Coast Guard was called upon to assist the U. S. Navy in Op­eration Market Time, the purpose of which was to interdict supplies being delivered to the Vietcong by sea. As the war progressed, it appeared logical for Coast Guard Market Time forces to provide naval gunfire support (NGFS) when requested and particularly where Navy NGFS ships were not available. Thus, Coast Guard NGFS became a frequent activity. Later, some Coast Guard units extended interdiction ef­forts to include covert small boat op­erations close to the shoreline, during which some of the enemy were killed. It was hazardous duty. Finally, Coast Guard units became involved in riverine operations. During these combat operations, some personnel became convinced that we were ac­quiring a “black hat” image. Their fears did not become a reality. Admit­tedly, most of the public is still una­ware of our participation in Vietnam. On the other hand, those groups which I have addressed never ex­pressed shock when I told them of our share in the “shooting” war. It ap­peared that they understood that it was our duty to do what we were called upon to do.

The case of intensified law enforce­ment and armed boarding parties, however, is closer to home. Will it change our image? That remains to be seen, and the results are up to us. I believe that the Coast Guard’s image will remain favorable if we keep the public informed and if we conduct ourselves professionally during law enforcement operations.

The United States is faced with an immense drug problem which is hav­ing a dreadful effect upon our country. Besides contributing to the ruin of many of our youth, it is resulting in a very large balance of trade deficit, es­timated by some to be on the order of $2 billion per year. It is big business, the proceeds of which are benefiting organized crime. Drugs are our third largest import, ranking behind oil and automobiles. Therefore, it should not be surprising that it is national policy, supported by both the executive and legislative branches, that the Coast Guard, the primary maritime law enforcement agency, take strong and effective measures to interdict that il­legal trafficking. “What are we tif⁽ to do with our law enforcement P icy?” Simply carrying out nati^l’^f' policy. Until that trade is legal'² and our orders changed, we must^cl‘ tinue pursuing that task. Alth<j*

that is our problem to resolve- would be frivolous to tell the ‘ B^oi that we cannot press a hard lm^e drug smugglers because it rfif make us look bad! Besides, what o' organization would do the job?

Admittedly, the conviction rate¹ smugglers is poor. However, be$ the judicial branch is having a P^r‘ lem is not a valid reason for the t¹' Guard to slack off. We would ^f want the local police departmen¹ stop attempting to apprehend C^>:

viction record.                                         v

The “hidden agenda” in this ^L‘ ₀ cern over law enforcement “policy \ the arming of boarding parties and¹ ■. current use of force policy. During _t period in which the latter was d^e' ^ oped, there was heated opposition _n the proposals for; (1) the arming boarding parties and (2) the us^e

m

^b°^arding ^ _iit ^Xp^{8 deba}ted. Why?" i_n„ ^rirnar»^Iy, there are people, includ- *"^i0f officers, who simply do not the °^{rCe t0 use<}d- Some object on

^need^i°^Un^^{S t}*^{lat wea}P^{ons are not} b_0a ' Some believe that armed

(j_en^^lnS parties will result in acci- p_art-^S' ®rhers concede that boarding ^es should be armed as needed,

but [i,

which ^never suggest criteria on ^t0 base that need. A few object

* ^v»c

^hy

ning shots and disabling fire _ties'^{nst eva}ding vessels. Boarding par- _Usj ^{are now} armed. The option of _er(,ⁿ^ ^warning shots has been ex- j_n^SS ' recently, the command-

dis- |°| ^{ICer a 95}-^fo°t P^atr°l boat laid f|_a^ablltl8 fire into the hull of a U. S. ₀f ^Vesse‘b Subsequently, several tons _th_Q^rn^*’*i^Uari^a were confiscated. Al- b_ej^{U8 r}fi^at policy is in place and (, j- ^USe<^’ ^rfi^e question of armed beirL'j⁸ P^art‘^es> *ⁿ particular, is still

Ofl £L .                                                                                 4AWV.VJ. ax »v_ w V7l_/jC\»L

W_ea .^e ridiculous grounds that the V ^f'ⁿS of sidearms serves as a t_{et Q}^Cfulfillment. Finally, the mat- bave ,^barna8^{e to} °ur image is cited. I _m^ad all of those reasons stated to w*^rsona%.

^ere the boarding parties armed over the foregoing objections? It was done for the safety of those men who must board and search vessels and apprehend felons. My personal posi­tion for the arming of boarding parties is analogous to the need for strong armed forces. Strength deters aggres­sion. I certainly do not agree with the thesis that “by arming ourselves, we make targets of our crews." Or, look­ing at it another way, an armed felon might not use force if the arresting of­ficer is unarmed. Just recently, four unarmed citizens were killed in Mis­souri, solely because they were wit­nesses to a robbery. Let’s consider a similar scenario in which an armed smuggler with a multimillion dollar load of cargo is stopped by an un­armed 4 1-footer. Knowing that only the 4 1-footer crew stood between the smuggler and a fortune, would anyone desire to trade places and become one of the unarmed boat crew and take a chance on the generosity of the smug­gler? I would not! Admittedly, there are no cases of unarmed Coast Guard personnel being killed under such cir­cumstances. The purpose of the arms policy was to prevent just that situa­tion from happening—i.e., before a benefit/cost ratio could be generated.

On the other hand, I agree fully that adequate training is mandatory and that substantial improvements in training are needed. Training provides for the proper use of force and the minimizing of accidents. It is also the basis for professionalism. Concur­rently, we must tell the public what we are doing and why our boarding parties are armed. If we are effective in our public relations, the public will recognize that the Coast Guard is doing another job well and will accept our armed boarding parties just as they accepted the armed highway pa­trolman. Despite the revolver, the lat­ter is known to be of help on the highway. Likewise, despite the sidearms, the Coast Guard will con­tinue to be known as the rescue expert at sea.

Lieutenant Thomas A. Nies, U. S. Coast Guard—Commander Adams has de­livered a scathing indictment of Coast Guard law enforcement efforts which is not supported by solid analysis, and

many of his facts are suspect. Unfor­tunately, he has accurately portrayed our miserable training organization. Admiral Hayes points out, in his interview in the same issue, that the way to focus management attention on a problem area is to create a flag billet in Coast Guard Headquarters respon­sible for solving that problem. Yet, the Commandant has failed to estab­lish a training division in spite of two fatal accidents and widespread ac­knowledgement of our failings in this area. Unless a dedicated and organized training establishment is created, the fears of Commander Adams and others will materialize.

The Cop on the Beat:

The Cop on the Boat

Richard J. Mills, Chief of Police, Sher­man, Texas—The common theme of many features in the October issue was that the Coast Guard was ill prepared and untrained in the role of law enforcement. A secondary point of view seemed to be that a number of Coast Guardsmen did not wish to handle law enforcement duties.

While I am not a member of the U. S. Coast Guard—I am a police of­ficer, with almost 20 years’ experi­ence, and a member of the Army Re­serve, with more than 12 years’ service—I offer the following.

Perhaps the Coast Guard could re­cruit into their Reserves new members from community law enforcement groups. Such a program would bring into their service men who already have a liking and training for law enforcement and who, by their join­ing, would show a willingness to serve in the military. In addition, most police agencies have a strong search and rescue mission of their own and this would easily coordinate with the Coast Guard’s search and rescue role. Large numbers of these personnel would not be required. Law enforce­ment reservists could be assigned to Coast Guard cutters for their annual two weeks of active duty. There they could serve as a trained nucleus for the boarding party and train full-time, ac­tive duty Coast Guardsmen in law enforcement. In their weekend drills, they could also serve as training in­structors to the regular Coast Guard personnel. I would guess about 2,600 such reservists could easily improve the Coast Guard’s law enforcement role and also aid the entire Coast Guard by increasing the number of trained reservists available for emer­gency service.

“Is Mahan Still Valid?”

(See T. H. Etzold, pp. 38-43, August 1980;

D. J. Kenney, pp. 124-127, November 1980

Proceedings)

Laurence C. Allin, Maritime Histo­rian—The global dimensions of the sea have changed since Mahan’s time. They now extend not only from shore to shore but into the inner deep, into the ionosphere, and into space. They include real and machine times which enlarge and change these dimensions. But in the final analysis, these inte­gers do not change the equation. If one is to move goods and services across the oceans or seek to win wars, he must command the sea either through the blissful means of in­ternational agreement or the harshest means of war. In these respects, Mahan is still valid. He should still command our studied attention.

“Tactical Employment of Soviet FPBs: Parts I and II”

(See M. N. Vego, pp. 95-98, June 1980, and pp. 106-111, July 1980 Proceedings)

Captain W. J. Ruhe, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The two-part feature on Soviet FPBs is highly useful in generat­ing an interest in the operations of fast patrol boats, particularly the Soviet’s missile-firing craft—i.e., the “Osas” and the new hydrofoils. The doctrine for the employment of these FPBs, however, remains problematical, even after Mr. Vego’s explanations.

Why? Because in actual practice the Soviet-coached Egyptian and Syrian FPBs in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 violated almost totally the Soviet mis­sile boat doctrine outlined by Mr. Vego. Moreover, Soviet missile boat doctrine today would be considerably different than that identified by him. New and improved technologies

should now be aboard the Soviet FPB* which were not recognized in Mr- Vego’s analysis. Such technologic would seemingly create different modes of employment than those he pictured.

Admiral Benyaymin Telem, Com­mander in Chief of the Israeli Navy i*¹ 1973, has written of the missile boat battles in the 1973 War. In these en­gagements, according to Admit³ Telem, the Arab missile boats were not operated in formations and were not paired as they might be expected to be from reading Mr. Vego’s art'- ^ cles. All of the Arab boats apparent^ .. operated their radars continuously ^3t sea, were widely separated in their pa­trol mode and during firing, opened fire at about 23 miles (Mr. Vego* doctrine called for 11-13 miles firing range), the boats did not rapidly d*^s' engage after firing, and allowed them­selves to be closed to Gabriel missih range (about 11 miles) despite little o^f no differential in speed between op­posing small craft—and got sunk!

From these examples of deviation* from Mr. Vego’s postulated doctrine' one might conclude either that th^c Arab boats were badly handled, ^0< that they were deliberately operating in a different mode of employmen¹ than that outlined by Mr. Vego. Ml guess is that the latter is true.

The Arab boats (“Osas” an¹* “Komars”) were apparently close ^t0 the shore when the marauding Israel¹ boats approached. Off Latakia, Syr*³' the Syrian missile boats launched the*⁽ missiles at a reported 23-mile rang^e Admiral Telem notes that the "sal^v° of six ’Styx’ missiles approaching fro*¹¹ the southeast. . . . was recognized be­fore the enemy missile craft which h³“ fired them had been detected.” Sin¹¹ the Arab boats’ search/fire control' dual-mode radar is no more than 3^ feet above the water, there is litrl^f probability that the low-silhouette I*^- raeli boats could have been detected °^! tracked by the Syrian FPBs from -■ miles away. This would indicate th*^lt both radar tracking and fire control were supplied to the Syrian craft by * Syrian coordinating center ashore. Th^e Israelis evidently were forewarned ^c this missile attack by the firing com' munications sent to the Syrian craf*

is-

no-

ile

of

>F

)flS

1C.

:h|

of

ng

iff¹

viy

nd

to

ieli

iff’

eif

?^e‘ 1 vo

off

be-

i»d

iC^

ol'

30

;tl^£

Is-

0<

23

bo¹

rol

v

of

ifl'

iff-

’Sequently, the Israelis fired their

ⁿ °^rrnation going to the missiles to

°frect for observed drift errors.) The

^Sfaelis, then, used chaff decoys and radi_rai , • ,

_cj ¹ tactical maneuvers to move . ^ar of where the missiles should have ^,nt«cepted them. (It was this demon- tated capability of FPBs to decoy ^ay the “Styxs” which apparently

^{a es} Mr. Vego conclude, “the ‘Styx’ missii             .               ^J

' “es were not designed for and

‘ ⁿ°t be used effectively as weapons Sainst small and fast-moving targets ^as an enemy’s FPBs.” It appears ^ ^e that the “Styx” was originally and _s^^St designed for attack against big ^^Ut ‘^{c must} he recognized that is ^ ^^x" ^useid hy the Arabs in 1973 ^not the same as the one in present |,^e' today’s weapon is far more capa- ^e> being a second-generation weapon *th a 43-mile range.)

th^⁶ ^^Sraeb boats continued to close ^e Syrian FPBs, avoiding another kh° ^^t7^x" ftfissiles, and finally, ^e first radar contact with the tfy missile vessels)was established

bed ^,an^                 ^were P^os*tively identi-

■ Admiral Telem relates how,

sub: j_l-^{3 r}*^e3 missiles at 20,000 meters and t three Syrian FPBs which eventually • (Notice that the radar perform- ^cu of the Israeli boats is more in line that of FPB radars under normal

Editions.)

P 'Mhy didn’t the Syrian boats, after ra^^ ^t^^le‘^r missiles well outside of the ge of the Israeli’s Gabriels, then _a , ^a hasty retreat? But, rather than ^Cr*be bad tactics to the Syrian FPBs,

it might be surmised that the Israeli boats were electronically disguised so at least some of them looked like big ships, thus confusing the shore-based command. Consequently, the Syrian FPBs were allowed to continue to close their targets for a second salvo of “Styx” at shorter range. It was then too late for evasion (but not for use of decoys, had they had them), and the Arab boats then came under the Is­raeli’s missile fire.

In the FPB missile battle off Damietta, Egypt, on 8 October 1973, the Israeli FPBs “spotted an approach­ing group about 25 miles away.” An hour later, “at 48,000 meters the Egyptian vessels opened fire with their ‘Styx’ missiles.” (This unusual radar performance by both sides might be explained as resulting from an environmental ducting of radar waves. But, still, the Egyptian FPBs and their tactics indicate that they were being directed by a shore-based control cen­ter using shore radar information. Again the Arab FPBs (separated from each other by several miles) failed to beat a hasty retreat and allowed them­selves to be closed to the Gabriels’ range. At 20,000 meters the Israelis opened fire and “within a few minutes three ‘Osa’ vessels were badly hit, two of them exploding and vanishing from the radar screen. The fourth ‘Osa’ ves­sel seemed to have remained unscathed and escaped.” (Again there was no evidence of the Arab boats using mis­sile decoys.)

The wide separation of the Egyptian missile boats when going into battle seems to be the best evidence that the Soviet-coached Arab craft were not constrained by the close-formation FPB doctrine sketched out by Mr. Vego.

That was in 1973. The Arabs were then using a near-obsolete weapon— the original “Styx.” Today, the second-generation “Styx” should have some built-in counter-countermeas­ures; it should have a better terminal-homing capability with dual-mode operation; and it should be more accurate in its trajectory. The Soviet FPBs should have both chaff and flares aboard for decoying enemy mis­siles. And, the FPBs’ antiair capability should be significantly improved with the addition of fixed or shoulder- launched “Grail” surface-to-air mis­siles on board. Thus, the doctrine and capability of the Soviet FPB for fight­ing, even enemy FPBs, must be dif­ferent than that described by Mr. Vego.

In order to ensure surprise in attack (a doctrinal requirement, particularly for missile attack), the Soviet FPB is likely to be used today as offset artil­lery. Either early warning aircraft or a shore-based radar/control center would direct with one-way communications the FPB’s missile fire. In this manner, the FPBs can remain covert, fire from widely separated positions, yet provide massed fire with their 43-mile weapon on important targets or groupings of targets, and then evade counterattack more easily. In addition, using geo­graphic positioning and referencing for targeting, FPBs assisted by satellite or other airborne communication relay system can be in widely diverse posi­tions and still coordinate, without shore-based help, a concentration of weapons against enemy targets. To­day’s missile-firing FPB is not likely to be constrained to the doctrine and tac­tics shown by Mr. Vego.

Leadership

Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, U. S. Navy—The Naval Institute, for many years, has been publishing articles on leadership, many written by young, inexperienced officers. The fact that the Institute has found it necessary to publish articles on this very same sub­ject for so many years causes one to wonder what good these articles do.

Leadership is an esoteric concept which cannot be defined—particularly by young and immature officers.

The principles of leadership are the same in the military service as they are in business, in the church, and elsewhere:

a.    Learn your job. (This involves

study and hard work.)

b.   Work hard at your job.

c.    Train your people.

d.   Inspect frequently to see that

the job is being done properly.

I recommend that the Naval Insti­tute call a hiatus on leadership articles for a decade or so. No harm will thereby be done to the U. S. Navy or to the commonwealth. In fact, some good may ensue. Readers of the Pro­ceedings will not be faced with more of the same sophomoric drivel.

and how the weak find strength will do well to go to that reservoir of expe­rience for truth and knowledge. When Jim Stockdale speaks, we should lis­ten; when he writes, we should read, clip the article, and read it again and again as we strive to understand what must be done for society to move ahead in a more civilized manner. The lessons of the Hanoi Hilton are par­ticularly pertinent to those who would lead men in combat—another form of extremis. Further, they apply to other leadership situations, such as com­mand of a ship at sea.

That Jim Stockdale should choose morality as his sine qua non for leader­ship is of special significance, particu­larly to those who are made responsi­ble for the “morale, physical well be­ing, and general welfare” of those under their charge—the legal charge for commanding officers of ships of the U. S. Navy (Article 5947 of Title 10, of the U. S. Code). Too fre­quently, particularly in a progressive, permissive, peaceful society, the otherwise moral leader succumbs to the temptations of pleasure or personal gain.

Because the nature of warfare in­cludes killing and destruction, some contend that warfare is immoral and that those who participate in the mili­tary profession must also be immoral. But those who have survived combat, whether on the beaches of Normandy or in the cells of the Hanoi Hilton, know that the military profession is probably the most moral of all profes­sions because survival depends on moral behavior. It depends on the ability to trust your companion, your subordinates, your superiors, your leaders, and most particularly, your­self. That “special trust and confi­dence,” again the legal hallmark con­tained in an officer’s commission and a petty officer’s appointment sheet, are what produces the integrity of the pro­fession. And it is from personal integ­rity and the cohesive integrity of a group that one can fashion progress and victory.

It is interesting how the services seem to be approaching the teaching of the role of ethics in the leadership function. It has been taught in many ways, from simple platitudes (“don’t question, just do as I say”) to formal philosophical teachings embracing the full gamut of the morality issue. One interesting feature to be applauded at the U. S. Naval Academy is the in' corporation of the leadership subje^ct with that of law. In the leadership courses, there is great emphasis on ethical behavior, starting at the freshman year. To have that subjt‘^ct incorporated with the study of law ^lS most appropriate, for it is law that keeps mankind civilized—and moral behavior is fundamental in keeping and protecting the law. Society owes much to Jim Stockdale, Bill Law­rence, Jerry Denton, and their host of Hanoi Hilton comrades for enduring such travail to demonstrate again, ^s° vividly, the importance of this basic feature of civilization: moral behavior in the exercise of leadership.

“Commitment ... A Focus For Leadership”

(See M. A. Coleman, pp. 72-73, August 1980; R. S. Dearth, pp. 102-106, October 1980 Proceedings)

Lieutenant R. Stephen Bloch, V• Naval Reserve—I agree that there is^a crying need in the Navy for the sort o> commitment and devotion to duty that Ensign Coleman espouses.

Having recently returned to acti^ve duty after almost 12 years' break ^iP service, I was struck—and aP' palled—by a lack of unity and espf¹[1] [2] de corps in the Navy. There seems ^t0 be a real decline in the quality of to­day’s sailor, with a strong emphasis of “me-ism.”

The emphasis on making the Na^v)' a “nice place to be” is destroying i^[S fiber. With a wholesale easing of dis­cipline and the emphasis on meeting personal needs, we end up with ^a seemingly second-rate organization. I*¹ short, I’m afraid many of our sailed would go the other way when “th^e going gets tough!”

As Ensign Coleman points out, W^e must regain a spirit of loyalty and de­votion to duty and country. We mus¹ return to a more disciplined Navy' with professionalism and a spirit °> service to country.