Professional Notes

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^he P-3 Update-III The Right Solution?

By Jn

utcnant Maurice S. Joyce, U. S. Navy

^ⁿ*^te<^ States and many of its of _th_ej_r ^{les s}P^end substantial portions ^{,;j e ense} budgets and assets on

The ^ant‘submarine warfare (asw). bnj. _a Navy alone has nearly 400 and thg1 Sea"^^ased fixed-wing aircraft count_erP^ersonnel assigned to The m '⁶ ^^OV*^et subsurface threat, fleet f₀f^{lnStay of the} NATO land-based p-3 Q_rj years has been the Lockheed ^av‘°nics°^{n e<}^^U’PP^e<T with a host of Cou_nt • P^ackages, varying between ^6Ven T^>etween squadrons. S ^^Vp) community of the U. S.

Hick ?^S *⁷°^{ur var}iations of the P-3, of ¹ the p jr i

^On                            's now the most com-

ptoacj.    ^3r^^{e tec}hnology now ap-

fief_0re ^{S t}fl^{|e r}*pe old age of 20 years, file ^t'^{e our}selves completely to

est _ac0u Pfiate-IH and strap our new- Pute_t ^Stlc Processor to an aging com- °pti_0n ^ystern> there may be a better considerations, looks to be the modi­fiable option for the future. Recent P-3 purchases by Japan, Australia, and Canada tend to reaffirm this point of view. Curiously, though, each of these three countries has purchased dissimilar avionics packages. Canada has made the most radical departure from the P-3C by using an updated S-3A Viking avionics package in the Orion airframe. The re­sultant CP-1-40 Aurora* is a practical combination of proven systems that deserves closer scrutiny.

The Viking’s avionics package of­fered the Canadian Forces three char­acteristics the P-3C’s could not: total integration, redundancy, and flexibil­ity. For a country vast in size and lim­ited in ASW assets, these attributes were

Or' ■

S^’ Canadian, and U. S. planes pictured here (back row, left to right: British Nimrod, S'3j Argus, and U. S. P-3; forward aircraft, back to front: Canadian Aurora and U. S.- ^aU designed to hunt submarines, but the Aurora might be the best.

8s 1 August 1981

essential. The Aurora system integrates the operation of all acoustic and non­acoustic sensors under the control of the airborne central computer. The com­puter manages the man-machine inter­face for all stations and updates the multipurpose displays (mpd) at each tactical position with the latest infor­mation inputs. Redundancy is designed into the aircraft system with duplicate components throughout and degraded computer modes for multiple compo­nent failure. This is coupled with multi-station operation capability for every sensor. Redundancy and flexibil­ity are evidenced by the six keysets and displays in the tactical compartment which, despite separate tasks, are iden­tical and totally interchangeable even by aircrew members while on station. The diverse missions of the Canadian Forces, ranging from pollution moni­toring to ASW, dictated that their sys­tem must be flexible enough to adapt to a variety of tasks. Existing equip-

drawing existing S-3 and P-3 ^eXP^e _r

•                                             xxip

into a common program, ^wc                   ^

lot as a force unified to achie^{ve a} mon goal of ASW excellence.

-3A Tactical C°°"

404

,ftbe

the

Maritime Operational Training Squad^fC Canadian Maritime Air Group. While

ment and a special-purpose bomb bay canister design demonstrate the mission flexibility that this aircraft offers. Soft­ware flexibility and provisional memory expansion are growth potential advan­tages that exist now in the Viking/Au- rora system—like the P-3C had in 1969.

There are many advantages to be re­alized by modifying the Aurora weapon system to meet U. S. Navy vp require­ments. The first would be to establish equipment commonality within our own house. Presently, the VP and carrier-based ASW (vs) communities navigate different avenues to the com­mon end of a more advanced ASW sys­tem. The two communities seem to vie for funds and system improvements, yet each is plagued with shortages of critical components peculiar to an in­dividual aircraft model. By equipping existing P-3B and -C models with a modified S-3/Aurora system, compo­nents become standardized, and the resultant aircraft starts anew at the base of its growth potential. Most impor­tant, a new baseline would be estab­lished on which three different air vehicles could more easily and economically grow together. Improve­ments, like increased memory capacity, enhanced electronic support measure and radar systems, as well as integra­tion of the Proteus acoustic processor, could be incorporated in a joint pro­gram following the road already mapped for the S-3 weapon system im­provement program (WSIP). Such an alliance would certainly improve parts and spares procurement where our com­plex avionics systems seem to suffer most.

Commonality would increase opera­tional flexibility and effectiveness. The Navy’s ASW operation centers (aswocs) are heavily taxed to accommodate the myriad of aircraft models they must support. Further proliferation of avion­ics packages and specialized systems will diminish their capacity and ser­viceability. Conversely, a new baseline would advance a foundation for direct­ing necessary aswoc growth. Avionics ground support for the proposed air vehicle at VP deployment sites would enhance interoperability. Presently, these bases cannot adequately support sustained S-3 or Aurora operations and this could severely limit a force com­mander's battle options.

The U. S. Aurora proposal suggests the possibility for combined VP and VS training facilities. The VS community might investigate the effectiveness of over-the-shoulder training of tactical aircrew members, which access to an Aurora-type vehicle could give them. Such training might be a worthwhile supplement to the existing syllabus. Critical maintenance technicians could train on common equipment and be assigned more freely.

The P-3C Update-III entered follow- on test and evaluation (FOT&e) in April 1981. The S-3 WSIP is gathering mo­mentum, but its future seems to hinge

on whether we can dispel the ^rtcurr^ⁿ‘_t notion among some in the Navy the carrier is immune to submerg^ attack. We must also avoid a my°P^ view of the future of our airborne systems. The "Charlie” baseline performed well, but lacks the ^essen^_ characteristics evident in later £ tion technology. We should inV^eSt1^ the feasibility of converting ^e*^lStl_ej P-3B/C airframes to a Proteus-eq^ulPP^ S-3/Aurora system, and reexamine ^ number of Update-IIIs we will Regardless, we must establish ^a ^ work of adequately equipped bas give all our ASW aircraft the supr and flexibility their tasks deman ■

By procuring a modified . weapon system, the U. h.      ^

benefit from the same integrating^ dundancy, and flexibility as gy has, but on a much broader ^sca

Lieutenant Joyce was an S nator with VS-24 prior to reporting to the 404 Squadron, he has flown and *ⁿ on the CP-107 Argus and the new CP' ^ _lhc rora aircraft. In August 1981, he ^retuf ^ United States and duty at the VS SupP at NAS Cecil Field, Florida.

SWS Officers Don’t Feel Wanted

fgSO'

:he Navy. The path chosen t0 -₀r

nitial-input level rather than rr°

the

die'

el submarines.

selee‘^e

By Commander John L. Byron, U. S. Navy

The strategic weapon system (sws) officer community* is important to the Navy and deserves to think better of itself. In order to chart a future for this community, however, it is necessary to understand where it has come from

•In the January 1981 Proceedings, Lieutenant Commander McComb proposes, in his profes­sional note entitled "S.O.S. for S.W.S. Offi­cers," that significant changes be made to the status of strategic weapon system (SWS) officers and to the criteria for gaining command of nu­clear submarines. In doing so, he displays a frus­tration which probably speaks for the entire SWS community in the area of command opportunity.

and what problems it faces.

Initially, fleet ballistic missile (fbm) submarine wardrooms were manned with a mix of diesel- and nuclear- trained officers—the diesel-types serv­ing a tour in the weapons or navigation departments and then returning to die­sel submarines. Rapid buildup of the fbm force precluded the assignment of only nuclear-trained officers (there were simply not enough available), but this was the goal from the very first.

The all nuclear-trained crew was nearly realized in 1967-68, but then, for various reasons, too few nuclear- trained junior officers chose to stay in

in impending severe shortage 0^_g0(nS officers in fbm submarine war vas to call upon non-nuclear officers to fill assistant weap°^nS _o()$ oillets, in training to become w _ef, department heads. This time, h°

:he source for these officers was

■d

The first group of 20 was ^ _{\{fi rom the Officer Basic Su ^ ichool Diesel Course in session 1 vi- lary-July 1968. Nineteen were >usly qualified in submarines as ^Is nen; the 20th had made two P

"'ere

Al:

so.

his d ^l,^l!Msu^^rnari^ne but had not gotten Nav ? P^r*^or to selection into the Pro > ^ⁿ**^sted Scientific Education (^NESEp). In fact, all 20 of this

tiearl * ^fir°^{Up were NESEPS}> as were y_ear7 'ⁿputs for the next several

^fleeted °           t^^ie ^^{rst t}^^ie 8rouP

‘hey st^UP t0 weapons officer- ^{In 1973}’

l_n igj^a_[)^te^ ^{t0 serve} as FBM navigators, input | ’ an<^ '^{n t}*^le y^ears after, the year ^CVe^ ^{was a}^^out 50 officers per

^In 1973,

fleet of ^resu*^c ‘^{n c}be formal develop­er toe sws community in its pres- lieutj³^ ^’^rst’ ^cbe fiscal year 1974 re"- ^cornrnander selection board, good °^Ut 'ⁿ *^ate 1973, was not trainej⁰¹^ ^Su^^mar'^nerS- More nuclear- passed °®^cers *ⁿ good standing were

^v'°us lj°^{Ver t}^^{an t}^^{le tota}^ f°^r ail P^re_ bo_afc|_s . ^utenant commander selection Potv_er (^5^^{S ent}i^re history of nuclear ^c°tne j ^t^^S ^^{rst t}l^{|e sws} officers to the nu^R^{2006 not} well. Though hroug^ ^{erS Were sm}all, the situation tha_tf:,^tt0l>8^ht two concerns: one was Ho_Se ^1Vlcl^ual^s were being passed over be_{etl o}^performance in sws billets had

0nfi       ^Very high quality; and sec-

that the°^Warrante<^’ *^c proved —was flUnit ^Cotlt*^nued imposition of com- Promotion quotas (cause of the

fiscal year 1974 board problem) would result in selection of nuclear-trained submariners at the expense of diesel and fbm submarine officers not so trained. The basic question was whether or not the sws path was a viable career pat­tern, and this question was raised in a private letter to a senior submarine admiral. This letter sparked the first serious review of the community since its beginning. (The letter also applied the phrase “Strategic Weapons Sys­tem” to this grouping of officers for the first time.)

Second, in late 1973, the Submarine Manpower and Training Requirements Division (OP-29) released a study of sub­marine officer requirements to the year 1985. The study made clear that sws officers would be a vital component of submarine manning at least through that year. It foresaw increased reliance on sws officers to fill assistant weapons officer, weapons officer, and navigator billets in FBM submarines as Trident built up, reaching a point of 100% sws officer manning in these billets in the late 1970s. In the mid-1980s, the study predicted, SWS manning at sea would be needed for assistant weapons officer and for one of the two depart­ment head billets, and this level of manning would not decline in follow­ing years. In all years, there would be a heavy reliance on sws officers to man submarine billets in staffs and ashore.

In 1974, as a. result of these devel­opments, the sws officer grouping be­came a legitimate career community. Decisions were made expanding the definition of “sws Officer,” defining the input sources, and formally laying out a viable career path.

The definition of “sws Officer” be­came “any submarine officer not cur­rently a nuclear-trained officer in good

the

clear-trained as well) who possess qualifications required in an

ons officer. In the process,

ualific*'

the

ac-

It is frustrating to witness top-

officers turning down good, care£t^fe. hancing assignments in order to ^re ^ Recently, 13 sws officers had c

asked in order to fill six executive ⁰       ^

billets for diesel submarines an ^ gf marine rescue ships. This year, _ the sws officers who screened (°^r Qf mand at sea turned it down, fai ^ commitment and unwillingness to^_s

on new challenges are the P^r° ^

i'ld

And the idea that sws officers sh be permitted even greater °PP^ortL1|jjn)! will never bear fruit if no one is to tackle the present challenges- The situation is made worse )

standing." This, then included for the first time straight diesel submarine types. The perception was that, with the diesel submarine draw-down, these officers would require the opportunity to serve in nuclear-powered submarines to gain needed experience in modern submarines and also that the fbm sub­marine officers should be allowed to compete for increased-responsibility jobs in diesel submarines, submarine rescue ships, deep submersibles, and in other such billets previously only avail­able to “pure” diesel types.

(The definition also took in another type of submariner, the “ex-nuke”— i.e., the nuclear-trained officer de­frocked from engineering duty. The presence of such individuals, the con­tinued reduction in numbers of diesel submarines, and the value of a strong community of SWS officers in FBM sub­marines prompted the recommendation that “SWS Officer” be limited in the future to describing only those sub­mariners qualified for, or in training to qualify for, FBM weapons officer. Thus, there would be three categories of submariners: nuclear-trained, SWS, and “other,” the latter incorporating ex-nukes as well as straight diesel sub­mariners.)

The Navy’s dependence on nesep sources for sws officer inputs declined. With the decision that sws was a viable career path came the conclusion that “quality accessions” (i.e., from the Naval Academy and NROTC program) would be permitted, 40% to be from these sources and less than 20% from nesep, with the rest to come from the Officer Candidate School and (from 1978 on) limited duty officer sources.

The SWS career path was spelled out formally and with clarity in the Un­restricted Line Career Guidebook, which has been maintained up to date in the years since. In short, the SWS officer community in its present form came into being in 1974 following spe­cific decisions made at the level of the Chief of Naval Operations/Chief of Naval Personnel.

The heavy emphasis on the NESEP source for sws officer inputs ceased none too soon, for the community was head­ing for an unusual retention problem of its own. Although nesep officers’ initial retention rates have always been exceptionally high, so, too, has been the proportion of those retiring on ex­actly 20 years’ service, at the point where, typically, their service as officers is about ten years. This phenomenon showed itself in the SWS community in the mid-1970s (and continues as an in­creasing trend to the present).

This trait, however, is found in NE- SEP-source officers in all communities, in all year groups. In the view of many, the propensity for retirement at the first opportunity is the major factor forcing the termination of the nesep program.

I believe that this widespread ten­dency for NESEP officers to retire at just 20 years’ service (historically, 70% of sws NESEP officers have done so) is a cause rather than a result of community malaise. I further think that conclu­sions drawn by NESEP officers regarding the sws career path often tend to be somewhat self-serving rationalizations of a decision to retire made for other reasons rather than the result of objec­tive analysis.

In 1973, a review of Poseidon reli­ability brought the fbm weapons officer under close scrutiny. Although it was concluded that the performance of the SWS officers had not adversely affected Poseidon reliability, there was indica­tion that, occasionally, some individ­uals were being assigned as weapons department heads who were lacking either the experience or the potential (sometimes both) to perform properly in the job. Exacerbating the situation was a woeful lack of command interest or knowledge in this crucial area. From this came the decision to develop and implement an fbm Weapons Officer Qualification Program, with the pri­mary purpose of ensuring that those assigned to the jobs were actually qual­ified to perform at an acceptable level.

Execution of this program by the type commander rather than by the Director, Strategic System Projects (SSPO), was thought to be the correct way to run it, with the initial estab­lishment of qualification criteria to be jointly agreed upon by both organiza­tions and with continuing technical assistance (examination questions, etc.) available from SSPO. An important ele­ment of the qualification program was

to be a formal recommendation by ¹

individual’s commanding officer- It can be judged that the q^{ua 1} ^ tion program meets its intent and se to identify correctly those indivi ^u of the sws community (and those

fbM weaP' it has abo become a career-enhancing 9^ua tion to attain where none simil*^ir isted before.

Regarding SWS officer retention, itial retention figures are based on proportion of officers remaining °”,^| tive duty two years beyond their i minimum service requirement. On^

basis, sws retention is excellent- t current initial retention figure is ^a ^ 50%, a value exceeded only by ^c ^ naval flight officers among unrestr

line communities. Right now, rh^e

•                                            •   •    keep¹¹¹'’

sws retention problem is in N ^r

nesep officers in longer than 20 )' There has never been a plan to ^ sws officers, nesep or otherwise, ^ years only and then to truncate career path. To the contrary, ^|C . _ut failure of nesep sws officers to ^cotlt'_[en. on the path that exists beyond tb^e ^ year point that is largely responS¹^^ current sws manning problems- r problems indicate shortages of ^s j ficers in lieutenant commander commander billets across the including at sea in FBM submarine

•-en- which beset nesep officers in tb^e community, not lack of opp⁰^¹¹¹¹

bel»^evC

norance—i.e., a willingness to j rancorous rumors rather than ? hard facts concerning the career ^ tern. The submarine detailers na

t|_at,^rate P^resentation which they up-

cati ^skow *ⁿ FBM off-crew lo- 'ns about every six months. It is a measure „r .1      .

last °^{r the Sltuatl0n} that ^at their _attc Presentation only six officers gj^{1 C} ’ ^ancl two of them left. kⁿ‘ cant career opportunities exist

f°t the

SWs officer beyond the ten-year

point Tu                 ucyunu tne ten-year

bill* ”^{Cre are} ^ command-at-sea

mand'' Th⁶^ ^{arC e}‘^{8ht drydock com}‘

of ^      1 "^{ere a}re numerous commands

ba$es at both commander and billets'¹' ^CVe^^S' There are 41 commander in Sul ^{ln su}bmarine staffs, tenders, and one i ^rnar'^ne liaison officer slots; every of ^{S a} 8°od job. There are a myriad beca °                ^asb^ore, especially now

m_arj^aSe shortages of all types of sub- oers at the lieutenant commander .j ⁰ⁿⁱmander levels. Moreover, pro- 'ctjH ^Stat*^st‘^cs hor ^SWS officers show ante °ⁿ °PP^ortunity at parity with naii_y^{triCted dne} °hh^cers overall. Fi- to the^⁵ °bh^cers have exits available engin ^Surb^ace warfare community, to and _t0^eer'^{n8 duty} officer community, Th° ^S1®ⁿ‘hcant sub-specialization, decide ^NESEP sws officer should first y°nd ^e_?^Wb>et:h^er he wants a career be- Put ■ , ^years service or not. Simply

and

rr»ot

sele,

is he

plan;

'Quid

ls on

wage slave or a player? If quitting at 20 years, he

accept the jobs offered, cash the

>nt:

and quietly retire. If he

best ° ^achieve and to serve, at his ^aPability, he should be prepared

^each

steP to accept the most chal- 'fiible ^{k ass}‘8ⁿment for which he is el- it. q ^{and t0} perform to his utmost in at ^a Practical basis, he should also, bis _q ^earhest opportunity, complete ^a Ihcations for command of sub­

^engint

>le

marines. If his commitment to his craft is not sufficient to motivate him, it would be a kindness to all if he kept quiet.

So, why don’t SWS officers think well of themselves or take a positive view of their standing and potential? I sub­mit that there are two answers. One is that those for whom they work di­rectly have largely ignored the need for career motivation of sws officers. 1 he career pattern is clearly defined, and the need of and opportunity for sws officers are well established; yet many of the SWS officers are resolutely marching in the wrong direction, quitting the Navy at the wrong time, and leaving in their wakes a sour, negative attitude passed on to those juniors left behind. These officers are amenable to leadership, but those charged with leading these offi­cers, with motivating them, with in­ducing them to want to do what the Navy needs them to do . . . aren t.

Primarily at fault are the command­ing officers and executive officers of the FBM submarines and the squadron and group staffs for whom the sws officers work. Their leadership of sws officers has not produced good results. Their weapons officers and navigators are a bitter lot, and they shouldn't be. They should want to stay in the Navy past their department head tours, and they don’t. The submarine force and the Navy need sws officers for full careers, not just to the junior lieutenant com­mander level. With diesel submarines soon to disappear from the U. S. Navy, it is imperative that we improve the situation in the FBM branch of the SWS community so that there will continue

to be a body of experienced, eager, and able submarine officers from which to assign individuals to those submarine jobs (ashore and afloat) which cannot be filled from nuclear-trained officer sources.

There probably never will be enough nuclear-trained officers to fill all sub­marine billets. In fact, even with SWS officers filling many of the gaps, there are not enough nuclear-trained officers to go around and some who are assigned to the most challenging job of all—command at sea—are probably not well qualified.

The second cause of SWS community frustration is the certain knowledge that some SWS officers could do a better job of commanding nuclear submarines than some nuclear-trained officers who have been or are or will be commanding officers. Commander McCombs pro­posal says essentially that. He is right. The SWS community is right. They must recognize, however, that there is no chance of achieving their goal in the present scheme of things. They are prodding a sacred cow.

Commander Byron, a member of the original group of 20 forming the core of the SWS com­munity, served from 1968 through 197 1 in the USS John Marshall (SSBN-611) (Blue). From 1971-75, he.was assigned to Strategic Systems Project Office. Subsequently, he served as navi­gator in the USS Trout (SS-566), executive officer in the USS Tang (SS-563), and commanding of­ficer of the USS Gudgeon (SS-567). Designated a Proven Subspecialist in Strategic Systems, he is now a student at the National War College.

^e Cuban Exodus Revisited____________ —---------------------------------------------------

1CUtenant Commander Michael R. Adams, U. S. Coast Guard, and Photojournalist First Class Raymon Fullerton, U. S. Coast Guard

p ^{6 tke} ^^ea8^an Administration’s Ug_ee p°^{rce on} Immigration and Ref- str_at ^{0 lc}y has begun formulating a e_ntr ^fey ffi^f dealing with the illegal and c"^^{0 tke} United States of Haitians C_0astr ^ans’ ^some questions about the tXod ^{Uard S r<de} *ⁿ ^ Cuban refugee These' °^{f 1980} remain unanswered. ^caus_e ^^Uest‘°ns must be addressed be­st^ °^{ne ne}ver knows when another ^etnanding operation will be

dropped on the service again. In an era when the Coast Guard is making some headway in pleading its case for more ships, planes, and people, it may have just torpedoed itself by proving once again that it “can do.”

► Did we make the job take longer than necessary?

The following are official Coast Guard figures. From 21 April through

30 April, 6,333 Cuban refugees en­tered the United States. The daily av­erage for that period was just over 700. From 1 May through 10 May, the total was 24,408 refugees for a daily average of 2,440. The daily average from 10 May through 20 May was 3,586, and the daily average for the next ten days was 2,797. By late June, the Coast Guard was keeping daily figures. On 20 June, 88 refugees entered the coun­

ida. To what end?

What the Coast Guard was ^ ently unwilling to admit to R^se that the job was, for the most P^ done: that we could stand down, _[0 to our pre-crisis level, then at | an only slightly enhanced norrna^ ^ of operations. By September an               5

tober, we were fooling only °^urS and squandering our resources.            •.

Was this just a Coast Guar ^ sion? Did our senior officers alon^e

try; 21 June, 114; 22 June, none.

In fact, from 19 June through to the end of the Coast Guard’s involvement in the operations, on no single day did the number of entering refugees exceed 300. In other words, the refugee influx by the end of June was less than half of what it was at the outset and well less than one-tenth of what it was dur­ing the peak period.

The Coast Guard claims that the in­flux decreased because of “intensive” Coast Guard patrolling to stop vessels from leaving the United States bound for Cuba. Those actually on scene read­ily admit that anyone really interested in getting to Cuba from Florida could get there by skulking through the Ba­hamas. The Coast Guard patrols were effective in the straits and along the U. S. shoreline, but boats still got through.

More significant, in August and Sep­tember, there already were many boats in Mariel, Cuba, to transport Cubans to the United States. In early Septem­ber, the Coast Guard estimated that 50 vessels engaged in refugee activities remained in Mariel. In short, the ef­fectiveness, or lack thereof, of the Coast Guard’s patrols seems to have been of little influence in stemming the tide. Rather, it seems that by the end of June Castro's government was controlling the exodus and deciding when and how many people would be leaving. Be­tween mid-April and 30 June, 115,000 Cuban refugees had entered the United States. In the next four months, only 10,000 more arrived.

The numbers show, then, that the boatlift had effectively ended, at least on a massive scale, by 1 July. This contention is supported by examining the reaction of the press (coverage dwindled dramatically after early July) and statements by some Members of Congress. (A letter from Representa­tive Mario Biaggi [Dem., N.Y.] re­ceived in Coast Guard Headquarters in August stated, “in the midst of the sealift the Coast Guard still attended [authors’ emphasis; note past tense] to its other tasks. ...” Other phrases in Biaggi’s letter make it clear that he was referring to the operation in the past tense.).

On 26 June, the Seventh Coast Guard District Commander sent a mes­sage to all units under his command assuring them that: “Our job is far from over ...” and “Our experience

finished

with the sealift is obviously not ^

. . .” and “Even as we remain ei^, committed to this specia lift. ...” The following day, ^ commander of the Coast Guar _ lantic Area sent a similar message ing, “It is extremely important present operations continue. • • ' Why was it necessary for these mirals to convince, even exhort commands to continued ^e®^)rt j₀;_ng answer seems plain: the crews ^ the job and the supporting units j were giving up airplanes, boats, ^ people to maintain these ongoifg^y forts were convinced from what j read, saw, and experienced firs¹ that the operation was essentially ⁰ j The days of substantial life-saving sinking boats were over. The Navy ^ almost completely dropped out operation. But still the Coast ^ maintained a massive presence m

Clrl

era^i^t0 ™^a*ntain this high-level of op-

ions' The authors believe that the answer rn u

fL„ ^{0 the}se questions may lie in ► »j)^{nSWer t0 c}he next.

0 was in charge?

'tself^C ^°^ast Guard has always prided j₀L °^{n lts} ability to do a variety of (rad'^serv‘^ce has long had a <j_{0 a}^ltI0^ ^sending its people out to ^ith 1° ^an<^ ^exP^ect*ⁿg them to do it This ^{ltC 6} °^{r no a}dditional guidance, 'he i?^ract*^ce has helped develop among °ffic °^aSt Guard’s officers and petty i_n j^^{rs a} Ptide and belief that they can, )^ust about anything on the

the Cuban exodus was ^and A ^{an a s}‘^mpl^{e case} of doing a job itite °'ⁿ^ '^{t r}*ght. It was a political, _quir;_d^atIOnal affair which probably re- of ^ ^arua certainly got the attention ^hite ^^eP^artrnent °f State and the the _P^{6 House}- No one can deny that br_an^^ecut‘^ve and perhaps legislative have ^{6S c}^^e government should In „_L ^actlve interest in such matters, hi

the

1Qtvev CaSE C^^e                       operation,

hey_0nJ^r’ t^^lat interest apparently went Pltcati ^^0un<^^s international im- p₀j_n ns and domestic policy to the ^Sctr_rie<;|^W^^ere White House personnel the t0 directing the conduct of , °Perati,

In

tions.

,_er^ear>y fday, the Coast Guard made th_at a P^roposals to the White House ^rnig_r'^V°^U^ have eased/speeded the im- natj_0n °ⁿ °f Cuban evacuees into the st" These proposals included the M_arj_e"ⁿ8 °f a Coast Guard cutter in fo_r t. ^Process people before they left of PTT '

sev.

United States or the stationing

cutter

to _m just outside Cuban waters tr_at)s 1 and pick up people and then tun_at^P?^{rt t}f^|ern to the States. Unfor- al_s^ ^events overtook the propos­er,, Castro refused to cooperate.

Wh                                             -

b(;_Cai^^{en f}he Coast Guard’s proposals

Ho_Use^{C Unw}orkable, senior White les_s "⁰,^fficials began to propose other, P^robl -^{a e solutions} to some of the Fo_{r e}^{6rnS resu}lting from the exodus. o_fth -Pie, at one point, a member

l^^hi"

shit) r ^tfa^ g°^vernment hire a cruise Cr^.^re Uncle Sam would find a

the f 7 ^nite House staff suggested that

t^eel; '^Vlt^¹ hundreds of

filled ^Ine willing to give up a ship

____________________  j 1,200 per

Was aCak’^ns for the good of humanity Question never addressed), send

her to the middle of the Florida Straits, and transfer people from the small, overloaded, poorly constructed vessels in which the refugees were leaving Cuba to the cruise ship which would then bring them to the United States. Fortunately, Coast Guard officers were able to convince the executive branch that the risks involved in such a plan were too high.

But the bigger question remains: Why, and to what extent, should the executive branch of government, in this case a staff (as opposed to the cabinet) with little maritime experience, dictate how the Coast Guard does its job? Cer­tainly, the president and his officers have the authority and must give the orders. But how far should they go in dictating courses of action? They ap­parently could not see the folly of the cruise ship plan. Therefore, one has to question their understanding of the in­tricacies of delicate helicopter opera­tions and other at-sea functions. Does not the Coast Guard, with its history of responsible officers, have the obli­gation to say, "Yes sir, we’ll take care of it,” and then simply do the job while insisting that there be no further, spe­cific guidelines? Should not the experts be allowed to do their job with no in­terference?

► Who kept the home fires burning?

It is an accepted fact that summer­time is the time of year in which the Coast Guard earns its money vis-a-vis search and rescue (SAR). With the onset of fair weather, the folks in northern climes get back in their boats and go to sea. Unfortunately, many of these people are either poorly educated in the ways of mariners, or their boats break, or simple bad luck catches up with them, and they need help from the Coast Guard.

In 1980, though, June, July, and August saw Coast Guard units up and down the East Coast stripped of their boats and people to support the Cuban exodus operation. When these people left their parent units, the folks re­maining behind had increased work­loads to maintain the boats and planes and do the Coast Guard’s normal jobs. There is no question but that the crews who stayed “home” had a tough time of doing their SAR mission in 1980. Doubling up of duty, standing port and

starboard watches, and long hours be­came more the norm than ever for those who stayed at their units during the Cuban operations. Their recognition is yet to come.

The search and rescue mission is only one of the Coast Guard’s assignments. An ever more visible task is that of law enforcement and, more specifically, drug interdiction. Until the Cuban operations began, the Seventh Coast Guard District was a hotbed of activity because of drug smuggling. But sei­zures dropped to almost nothing dur­ing the summer of 1980. Just how in­effective the Coast Guard was at enforcing the smuggling laws during the Cuban operations became obvious in November when the number of sei­zures soared dramatically as soon as the Coast Guard’s ships and aircraft re­turned to “normal” duties. At one point in November, a single cutter had three seized vessels; she could literally not get to port without stumbling across another doper.

The above, of course, is an old story: The Coast Guard does not have enough ships, aircraft, and personnel to do all the jobs it is expected to do. But the Cuban operations not only highlighted that fact, they significantly detracted from the Coast Guard’s ability to do the other things it should have been doing.

Coast Guard records indicate that $55.3 million was spent for operations involving Cuban refugees during fiscal year 1980. The Coast Guard received $13.3 million in fiscal year 1980 to deal with the Cuban refugee problem and has asked Congress for an addi­tional $42 million for what it calls “Cuban Recovery” remuneration.

Of that money, $3.5 million has been earmarked for ongoing operations in the Florida Straits to turn back and/ or assist the flow of hopeful emigrants. In addition, $4.3 million of the re­quested “recovery" package will be set aside for maintenance which was either deferred or demanded by the increased level of operations. The remaining $34.2 million will be used for training, additional maintenance, and for the acquisition of three Navy tugs.

► A job well-done or a grab for glory?

The Cuban exodus started in earnest in mid-April. It officially finished at

If we learn nothing else from Cuban operations, we should learn ^

We can and we do good work. B^ut

ride out"

seek on' •ak-

the end of October. By 3 June, all Coast Guard personnel involved in the op­erations were authorized to wear the Humanitarian Service Medal. By mid- October, two rear admirals had been awarded the Legion of Merit for their participation in the operation “from 24 April to 5 July.”

The questions here are: Why were ribbons being handed out for an unfin­ished job? Why was anyone even think­ing about awards when there was still work to do? Why were admirals, es­sentially staff personnel, receiving awards while the “boys in the trenches” got nothing more than pats on their backs and a “well done?”

Indeed, Coast Guard people did a fine job, and many of them deserve a lot of recognition. (For example, a hel­icopter crew hoisted, at one time, 23 people from a sinking boat during the Cuban operations. To date that crew has received nothing.) But when the service starts handing out (and receiv­ing) the “goodies” before the job is done, the very motives of the service quickly come into question. Even our most ardent supporters are likely to look askance when we start patting ourselves on the back for an unfinished job.

There are a number of lessons to be learned from the Cuban operations of 1980. First, the Coast Guard is no longer able to do everything it is sup­posed to do. If we have to herd refu­gees, then we cannot catch dopers; if we are going to pluck people from the waters of the Florida Straits, then oth­ers will have to wait for help in Buz­zards Bay. The year of 1980 proved beyond any doubt that the Coast Guard is stretched entirely too thin.

Second, the uppermost echelons of the Coast Guard hierarchy owe a lot to the people in the field, and for the most part, they know that. Still, the men in command must see to it that the people in the field are given the widest latitude to do their jobs. We all know that operational Coast Guard people are capable and skilled. They must be left alone, though, to do their job.

Finally, we all need to rid ourselves of our drive for glory. Ribbons look pretty on the uniform and everyone likes to have an admiral congratulate

him, but it should be obvious that the majority of people in the Guard satisfaction comes from a J¹ well-done, a life saved. We must ^

our jobs first, and congratulate ⁰¹

selves later.                                           ^

this^;

are not infallible. Even as we p selves, we must be ready to our mistakes and overcome our ^we‘

A 1970 graduate of the Coast Guard S^a' Commander Adams is now the Executive ^ of the USCGC Dependable (WMEC-626)- ^ ^ a frequent contributor to the Proceedings> ^a ^ ceived the Naval Institute’s Award of an Author in 1981.

f Abil^efie

Raymon Fullerton, a 1973 graduate o ^ ^ Christian College, with a Bachelor of $^c‘^e ^ Mass Communications, is presently ^         ^

Coordinator for the Coast Guard Band, served as a writer, photographer, and ^ production manager. His professional ^ “Public Affairs: We’re Missing the Boat ^ published in the Proceedings' October cial Coast Guard Issue.

Needed: A Quick-Response Logistics Transport

By Horace J. Alter

I                                                       ■                            .

Flight in surface effect over the

is now possible because of modern

's-i¹, ,tact‘^cil1

approaches to avoid radar detec

tioⁿ

Troops based in the United States are on the alert and ready to meet a war crisis. But, there is a catch: insufficient transportation to get them to a war. As one Army general said, “We need a ride to where the war is.”

Currently, prior positioning of troops and materiel at strategically lo­cated bases and of depot ships is under development and augmentation. This is not, however, a satisfactory long- range solution for providing a strong and practically invulnerable logistic supply line which is capable of rapidly delivering the Rapid Deployment Force into a combat zone. The present approach has many undesirable fea­tures, including: the uncertainties as­sociated with maintaining bases on for­eign soil; the magnitude of the inventory and cost of duplicating sup­plies throughout the world; the dete­rioration and obsolescence of materiel in a stockpile; and the difficulty of re­plenishing bases and depot ships by trans-oceanic pipelines during a con­flict because of the threat posed by en­emy submarines.

What is needed to implement the Rapid Deployment Force and retain its ability to react with speed and flexi­bility on a global basis is a quick-re­sponse logistics transport which could both replace the ship as the carrier of large volumes of out-sized cargo and provide the long-range rapid delivery of the airlift transport. The vehicle which can do these things is the surface effect airborne ship (seas).

The SEAS employs an aerodynamic wing attached to a ship-like hull or catamarans. This combination design

flies in close proximity to the su ^ ^ obtaining the benefits of “g^roun feet” to achieve a high transport , j_e ciency. A large seas would be ^caP^a. of transporting great quantities o ‘ military materiel over trans-o^^

distances, and return, at speeds ⁵ ■ The

passing those of surface ships- ¹¹ ume carried would exceed that o t ent airlift transports.

The increase in lift (L) and def¹^ in drag (D) on a wing that is _fl close to the surface have been ⁴  ^

and used for a long time. Over such flight is relatively danget^^

in­

struments and automatic controls- nap of the earth flight is used in ^tal -j_e and support bomber aircraft and m

ct

.st *

re|_a ^ans"°ceanic flight, the surface is sto ^IVC^ ^stable and level, except in _shj ^seas- The surface effect airborne wh' k²⁰ °P^erate *^{n sea} states up to 6, _t0 2() _f^IS ^'^t0 47-knot winds and 12- _{0ut t}^^{0ot waves}- It should be pointed _0c ^{at ver}y heavy sea states do not ^Sona[ ^rCquently ^an<^ that they are sea- _We , ^q'*^le SEAS can avoid heavy i_t ^Cr ^7 Hying above it or around

Th

no ^{6 Sur}face or ground effect phe- ^airb ⁶⁰³ *^S ^^eP‘^cce<fl ‘ⁿ Figure 1 for an SUtfarp⁶ ^^hlcIe flying in and out of t_Vater, ^enect. Flying close to the the ^{r S Sur}^^ace> the l/d, a measure of Pto ^transP°^rt flight efficiency, is ap- i_n ^^lrnately doubled. The seas operates ^Vehi ^ ^re^*^on °A the curve where, if the a _sj^{C e a}PP^foaches the surface, there is

°Ppos^* ^Cant ‘^ncrease *ⁿ lift, and the f_rorr)^Slt® ^ct results as the distance ^{f e} surface increases. Flight in

40

35

a

i. 30

S' 25

w 20

10 -

-L

I

I

.5                                                                .6               .7                .8

Distance above Surface (h)/Length of Wing Chord (c)

1.0

Fi8u_{re 2}

a combat area 5,700 nautical ^ j away or to an unrefueled rad'

3,400 nautical miles. The would land in combat-ready ^c°ⁿ', approximately 47 hours after ern^

th^e

ing from the United States

met distance, and in 29 hours_:

radius distance. Figure 4 is a ^r ^ payload curve for a seas flying ¹⁰ out of surface effect.

ment in an infantry division ^t0

large fuel cells. With the latter board fuel pumping station transfer fuel to a beach farm-

allow the SEAS to quickly load an ⁰

load troops and their materiel- ^

feature is important to a quick-resp

logistic transport where a fast

round from a dock or beachhead ^|S

f PilC»‘

sential. The doors in the bow o hull permit the largest piece of ^ecl

for

air-

et>^c

erif

lies

for

surface effect makes the vehicle inher­ently stable in height above the surface. A wing flying close to the surface also produces an increase in its effective as­pect ratio as compared with its geo­metric aspect ratio. Aspect ratio is the ratio of wing span length to wing chord length. A high aspect ratio is effective in increasing the range or distance that an airborne vehicle can fly.

The SEAS transport shown in Figure 2 has a gross weight of 900 tons, a cargo load of 405 tons, and with a fuel load of 200 tons, an unrefueled radius of 3,450 nautical miles or a total range of 5,750 nautical miles, seas is not limited to operations close to the sur­face. It can operate out of ground effect and retain a reasonable, but lower ef­ficiency with reduced range. The trans­port has a cruising speed of 125 knots and a maximum speed of 260 knots. It is designed to take off in sea state 3 (3- to 5-foot waves) and land in a sea state 6 (12- to 20-foot waves). The transport has a low aspect ratio (2.5), a large chord (150 feet), and an end plated 14% wing. The deep wing sec­tion provides cargo stowage space. Two shallow-draft ship hulls, one on each side of the wing center line, are em­ployed. The two-hull version is favored over a single hull because of the for­mer’s superior beaching and rapid load- ing/unloading characteristics. Four large cargo doors, two in the wing and

one in the bow of each hull, P^f0V' ^c the rapid roll-on/roll-off capability e sired in military transports. Table a performance summary of the SEAS.

The two hulls provide floatation an^ stability on the water. Their 5-5-H< draft provides good beaching chara teristics on shores having a 1:20 A hydraulically operated ski is l°^cate^ in the bottom of each hull to facil^0a ^ quick takeoffs. Fuel is contained in sep arate multiple partitioned fuel cells ¹ cated in the hulls beneath the carp

floors-                                 hen

At 900 tons, the SEAS is large w ^ compared with conventional airp ^ (e.g., C-141A, 172.5 tons; c-5A, 3                                      _

tons), comparable in size to a ■> freight train (931 tons), and sma ^ terms of a 77,000-ton aircraft ^carrl^_ Table 2 compares geometry an P ^ formance of SEAS with a “Marin^er class merchant ship.          s

Self-contained roll-on/roll-off ^rarn

loaded on board. Wing doors ^are loading troops and smaller equip⁰¹ A sample loading for an airborne ^ vision is shown in Figure 3-         „

can also be used as a fuel tanker, above the submarine menace, a ^ threat to slow-moving ships. Fue be loaded as a roll-on/roll-off l°^a ^ ^ rolling liquid transporters or carrie ^

wo⁰^

Studies indicate that an Army ^ borne division and all its equip⁰¹^ can be transported in one nio^vC01 by 35 surface effect airborne shiP^s

divisi°ⁿ

idi^£i°ⁿ

for the

ng^e'

Quantity

Loaded

Item

Total cargo

weight            804,600 lbs

Ptei

'Positi,

the

St

^fhat °^rrny leather and high sea states are   operation of the seas

i_t ^0t frequently encountered. In fact, _Clen^Ppears that a high transport effi- a_n(j^C^ ^Can be achieved 75% of the time flyj_n^a ^frsion could be completed by '''hen °^Ut 8^round effect seas” tj_es ^necessary, without large penal-

Th

Cap , . ^SEAs can provide the following !T}ql •, ^Itles necessary for an effective, ^ j_t* ^e> global logistic supply line: fr>rce^Cf^{n trans}P^ort and maintain U. S.

►   I_t^{S W} fr°^m the United States.

eq_uj ^Can transport all items of military ba_t ■ ^rnent needed for sustained com-

►   p'^{n 0ver}seas areas.

lines ^re<^^Uces the vulnerability of supply threat"¹⁰^ *^tS ^°£*^st*^{c ta}*l ^{t0 a} hostile

Util; ^'thmizes the size and cost of the

►   | ^tarV inventory. ^reduces the size and number of

toning bases required through-

world.

ei_er, [^e^^uces the dependency upon for-

Pj bases

^sP°ns^Pr°^V'^^{eS a} high-speed, quick-re- Vi,r ^{6 ca}pability with relatively low t ^^erability.

air_c r *^ess vulnerable than high-flying ^{ra c} to radar detection.

► It can be beached in most areas of the world, thereby further reducing the need for foreign naval bases and air­fields.

►  It eliminates the long logistic tail of ships required to transport the out- sized cargo and support materiel for combat troops.

In summary, the surface effect air­borne ship is capable of getting there “firstest with the mostest.”

Mr. Alter is a graduate aeronautical engineer having earned his degrees at the Daniel Gug­genheim School of Aeronautics at New York University. He has had 45 years experience with aircraft companies designing military airplanes for the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. Some designs of postwar military and commercial air­craft which Mr. Alter initiated are still in use.

The Facts Behind the Thunder

By Samuel L. Morison

As readers of the Proceedings are well aware, the many arguments for and against reactivating the Iowa-class bat­tleships have received a great deal of attention. Some of the arguments are logical and factual, while others are illogical and unfactual. This discussion will attempt to sort the wheat from the chaff.

First, there is the matter of costs. For reactivation of the New Jersey (BB-62), the Reagan Administration’s fiscal year 1981 supplement to the Carter Administration’s budget, in ad­dition to other things, called for $88.0 million plus $3.0 million for research and development to begin reactivation. This bill was signed by President Rea­gan on 5 June 1981. The Reagan Administration’s fiscal year 1982 budget amendment calls for an addi­tional $237.0 million to complete reac­tivation of the New Jersey and another $88.0 million to begin reactivation of the Iowa (bb-61), plus $2.0 million for additional research and development. As of the writing of this feature, the bill had been approved by the House- Senate Conference Committee and only awaited formal approval by the House and Senate before being sent to the president for signing. However, ap­proval was being held up by the tax cut debates in Congress. Approval is almost pro forma and should present no problem. Funds to complete the reactivation of the Iowa are to be re­quested in the fiscal year 1983 pro­gram. Plans call for the reactivation of the Missouri (BB-63)—planned for the fiscal year 1984 program—and, fi­nally, the Wisconsin (bb-64)—planned for the fiscal year 1985 program.

As for the reactivation and modern­ization schedules, the New Jersey was scheduled to leave Puget Sound Naval Shipyard on 27 July, under tow, for Long Beach Naval Shipyard where she will be reactivated. The ship is sched­uled to be recommissioned in January 1983.

Reactivation and modernization of each Iowa will occur at the same time. The Phase I modernization and update

are planned to include the following:

► Installing the new AN/SLQ-32 elec­tronics countermeasures system

► Updating the ships’ air-search ca­pabilities by the addition of the AN/SPS- 49 radar system

► Extensively modernizing all existing electronics and communications equip­ment

► Upgrading habitability

► Converting the ships to Navy dis­tillate fuel

► Adding eight Tomahawk cruise mis­sile launchers (32 missiles, total, with ranges of more than 300 miles)

► Installing four quad Harpoon sur­face-to-surface missile (SSM) launchers (16 missiles, total, with ranges of 50 miles)

► Adding four Phalanx close-in weapon systems (one plan calls for one each on either side of the bridge and one each on either side of the after Mk- 37 director, all on the main deck in former 40-mm. gun tubs)

► Modifying existing systems and add­ing new equipment to meet current lighting, sewage, and environmental standards

During reactivation, four five-inch mounts will be removed to make room for missiles and to prevent gun blast over-pressure damage to the missile launchers.

A Phase II modernization for the lowas is currently being considered. If undertaken, it would likely occur dur­ing a ship’s first overhaul, which would be approximately three years after re­commissioning. It may include remov­ing most if not all the five-inch guns and replacing them with vertical launchers for additional Tomahawk missiles. Also, eight of the newly de­veloped 30-mm. GAU-8 close-in weap­ons systems (Ciws) might be added (four of them replacing the previously added Phalanx ciws). Three NATO Sea Sparrow basic point defense missile sys­tems (bpdms) might also be added. The Phase II modernization also may in­clude the replacement of the after turret with a flight and hangar deck that would cover the after third of the ship

and run up to the after end of the sU The aircraft facility and at'

perstructure. might include two elevators

commodate up to 25 vtol aircraft The Navy currently estimates ¹ the outlined reactivation and Phase

modifications to the New Jersey

that

will cost

about $329 million in fiscal year

1982

_                                                     battk'

ships to sea and fully modernized, that they can exist in a modern wart* ^

dollars. To get two Ioua-class

environment, will likely cost

between

$700 and $900 million, because

second bb will require more

the

work than

the New Jersey. In comparison, to ^ one ship of the Virginia-cla.se> g^ul ^ missile nuclear-powered cruiser

•alent

tely

closest modern U. S. Navy equ*^v‘ ^ to an Iowa, would cost approx*¹¹¹⁵ 2 $ 1.2 to $ 1.6 billion, in fiscal year dollars, and take six years.

Secretary of the Navy John Le has given guarantees that the r vation and modernization of the ^ Jersey will cost no more than the t $329.0 million appropriated.

approved the reactivation/moder tion project on that condition, u start to escalate, the Navy will ¹ have to start cutting back °n planned improvements because^ would be difficult to go back to gress and get more money.

Operating costs must also b^e c dressed in any general discuss*⁰⁰ "costs.” When the Navy ^or*®*j^g() requested funds in the fiscal ye^ar budget to recommission the it was estimated that it woui about $12.9 million dollars a yeaI^ keep her at sea. Using an esti j 15% inflation rate, by 1983, the ano ^ operating costs of each Iowa

\NewJ«ti' ald ta**

will bC

about $15.0 to $18.0 million- Another argument used against

reat"

shiP^s

tivating the lowas focuses on the ■ ages. It is reasonable to expect

uninformed people to judge a ship .

from the date she was commiss*⁰^. ^ Using this approach in the case 0 ^ New Jersey, since she was commi^sS1 in 1943, makes the battleship 3$ ) ,^| old. However, it is not the ^nurrie age of the ship that is critical; i^nS

2.5-inch

s_tr0y_prr T °f three Spruance-class de

m°^re tha;

‘"tor_m 17 e . hav_e     inches thick; the turrets

sides ^'^'inch thick face, 9.5-inch ^Co,I1Pa⁴ ^'^'inch thick roof. In TJ. s *P^s°ⁿ’ the Arkansas (CGN-41), the ^avy s latest large combatant,

h_er^{S tbc}.^sb'P ^s service life. In terms of

aboJrTf^{6 llfe}’ ^{the Neu}’J^ersey ^{is onl}y

a . y^eafs old. The service life of °_n P ^ls defined as the wear and tear ^equi t ^{C s} hull, machinery, and ty|_1{|^^{rnent re}sulting from active use

oetwee_n 17               ,  _r

vic_e l_ef_t ^and years of active ser-

P0WerW ^^{et us} examine the offensive c_0fnp ^anc^ ^survivability of the lowas as of surf^{fe W}'^{tb 0ur best} modern class craf_t ^ ^combatants—excluding air- the addition of the j^Ules already discussed, one lg ^{C ass} battleship, even minus her inch > Projection weapons. The 16- ^8Uns can fire a shell 23 miles at

^ges'T ^tW'^{ce tbe s}P^eed of sound. sib)_e |jr° ^t0 60 miles may be pos- dey_ei₀ ^r°^cbet'^assisted projectiles are inch ^ ^ancl employed for the 16- B ^UtlS'

fired a^ ^C° ^tabe hits f^rorn 16-inch guns soufjj ^nearly three times the speed of attitor’P ⁶ l°^Was are the most heavily belt _r ^sb'P^s afloat. The side armor *^nches^U^^s ^^rorn 1.6 inches to 12.1 1.5 j_n , ^lc'^ci rhe main deck armor is 'Oches- ^ ^tb‘^c^’ rhe second deck is 6.0 The barfi¹ ^ ^ ^tb’^rc^ deck is 0 - 5 inches. ⁽he fi₀ ^ettes- from the main deck to

rtafp.^tt0rn’ start at 17.3 inches and , “Se i

'rr'ifor- ⁰^ control tower armor is a

^sh_0u, ^'^Se<^ 'ⁿ June 1981, these views Jers_ey °^U “ ^^^ase l-tnodernized New ^rtq_c, ■ °^r h’^Wa is likely to appear after Nation.

^r°ce,

,bably

not sufficiently hardened during struction. The force of the groun

con^-

fling

anf

fiom^e

one of the government's “econo' confined her to the “mothball

As to the ship’s effectiveness, marine or a soldier who served in

•thi^

lives.

has no armor. The only other armored ships in the U. S. Navy are aircraft carriers, but their armor is thinner than in the Iowas and is mainly in the flight decks and around the engineering plants.

A persistent argument about recom­missioning the battleships has revolved around manpower requirements. The Navy estimates that it will take ap­proximately 1,567 men to man each ship. First, it should be taken into ac­count that the skill levels for the sailors needed to man the lowas are not as high as for some ships—particularly nuclear- powered ships.

In the case of the New Jersey’s reac­tivation, many former Navymen and naval reservists have already volun­teered for the crew. One former crew­member of the New Jersey, who served during her third tour of service, wrote to Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, saying,

“The proudest moments of my life were when I recommissioned USS New Jersey. . . . assisting the yard workers in getting the plant running and then taking her through her trials. ... I am now once again saying perhaps I might be able to assist in getting her running for you and my country once again. If, Ad­miral, you might possibly use my services, I would be proud to serve you.”

In addition, Congress has recognized the military’s manpower problem in the last year by passage of the Nunn- Warner bill, the Doctors Bill, Fair Benefits package, and an 11.7% across- the-board pay raise, with another 5.3% pay raise pending. These actions have contributed to raise retention rates.

To conclude, many high-ranking naval officers believe that if the Navy were to receive all four battleships to­morrow, they “could man them­selves.” In fact, Admiral Harry D. Train, Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, has gone as far as guar­anteeing the necessary crew of 1,500 men for an Iowa.

Then there is the argument that some of the battleships have too much wrong with them to be reactivated cost- effectively. Rumors continue to circu­late that the Iowa and the Wisconsin were extensively stripped to provide spares for the New Jersey when she was being recommissioned in the Sixties in Philadelphia. It was also reported that a fire in the Wisconsin's superstructure caused extensive damage. In both cases, however, the facts do not support all the stories that have developed over the years relative to these incidents. The Iowa was stripped of some parts to speed the New Jersey's second reacti­vation. But, in no case was the strip­ping extensive. The stripping that was done allowed the New Jersey to be reac­tivated more rapidly than waiting for the Navy supply system to go through all its red tape. At any rate, parts taken from a reserve ship have to be replaced through the supply system. So, today, there should be no major shortage of parts on any of the battleships. As for the fire in the Wisconsin, it was a small fire that damaged some cabling and circuitry in the wardroom’s overhead. The damage was minor, but it was not repaired because it occurred during the process of inactivation.

We also have the celebrated speed restriction of the Missouri which, de­spite the Navy’s denials, is probably fact. On 17 January 1950, while leav­ing Hampton Roads, Virginia, she ran aground at a point 1.6 miles from Thimble Shoals Light near Old Point Comfort. She traversed shoal water a distance of three ship lengths from the main channel. Lifted about seven feet above the waterline, she stuck hard and fast. The damage started on the star­board side, near the keel at frame 99 running outward, at an angle toward the bilge keel, ending at frame 114. To quote the damage report, “scoring between frames 99 and 100; sharp in­dentation and two small eight-inch ruptures between frames 100 and 102; ragged hole approximately 20” wide at largest opening between frames 102 and 108; scoring and dished plating from frame 108 to frame 114. This damage opened tanks B-29-F, B-37-F and B-43-F to the sea.” The damage is di­rectly under enginerooms number one and two and fireroom two.

After consulting with a marine en­gineer and two naval architects, the best circumstantial evidence seems to indicate that the Missouri has up to a 5-knot speed restriction. Photographs of the ship’s hull show the main star­board strength beam, the keelson, ^ct^ in various ways. Even the slightes bend could cause the foundations o ^c engines on the starboard side to mo' a thousandth of an inch. The mote t ^ shifting of the keelson, the more ¹ causes misalignment. Once a k^ee is bent and causes the engines to mj| align, it is virtually impossible to ^u repair the damage.

The misalignment theory is f^urt ^ supported by the existence of a ^cra in the after 16-inch turret barbett^ Discussions with a metallurgist examination of records indicate that^ hairline crack resulted from the that the barbette armor was p^ro1 and pressure on the structure o ^c barbette probably caused the hair ^ crack to open up. The use or ^ after turret in fire support mis during the Korean War likely ^caU ^ the crack to widen further. This eta

and probable misalignment were

contributing factors in the decisi⁰^ lay up the Missouri some two to years before the other ships of the c Some have suggested that the ^ Jersey was brought home from Vi^et and put back in mothballs alter 20 months of service because the s 1

16-inch shells were not hitting body. First, the New Jersey came t‘“ . to refit for a second deployment, ^ she was on the verge of making ,• ⁶                                om‘^eS

fleet'

ask* nam with the New Jersey.

Marine Sergeant Robert G^aU‘ ^ “You [New Jersey] are doing ^ ^ to improve the morale of the on the beach than anything ^e the war. Everytime we go on P _t someone says: ‘The big one >^s ^ there. Nobody better mess or she will get them.’ You are sa ^ lives out here . . . American and we thank you.”

Army Captain Charles S. F‘^nC^’l\j “The Communist troops ^cefta^i don’t like to come out when Jersey is firing. One of our big£ j problems flying into a Red-m> ^ area is the antiaircraft fire w^e

to active naval service cer- ^and the Iowa’s return all but cer-

thp \t^C '^{S anal}yst believes that perhaps ^cNaw cK«..u  f

g                                                ------- rawMj VC-/WOH) <uiu

^ (CA-139) instead of two more sa_tii_e ^:P^S- These ships are quite ver- tfltrn' ^tecl^u'^re fewer people to man and ’ ^carry more modern equipment, anH                 cost less than the Missouri

• ^the Wisconsin

to reactivate. With

t\Vo

^Vatl°n monies for these would _r   ta better chance of getting

S Congress than those for reac-

nS a third and fourth Iowa. mi_Ss- ^nas to consider that to recom- m_0ri °ⁿ. ^r^^e Missouri will cost more T 'ⁿ fiscal year 1981 dollars, than

^Ut’ ^a^^ter New Jersey got on station ^^vtt here and started shooting, she

Ion ^^r°^un<^ ^^{re t0 a} minimum. As

th^ ^ ^°^{U are} '^{n area an<}^ ^firinS. flak ^°^mrnun'^sts hole up with their

machines and antiaircraft weap­ons Tu- ■      ^r

¹ ms gives us more freedom in

is h °^Ut ^^{etter ta}rgets. New Jersey ^{est a}t rooting out and destroying ^nemy bunkers. The 8-inch, 155- tji^' ^an<A 105-mm. land-based ar- th ^ma^^{e a} small impression on ■ ^{C an}d, compared to what the 16-

^c does, it really clears out the area."

V^Jth u

i ^{the a}Pproval of returning the

^w Jersey tain, *

^taitl- this ;

tivat' ^ ^s^^ou^ also consider the reac­ts ^ the Des Moines (CA-134) and

battle*shTc

be _rg ^{BS aric}l two CAs, the Navy would activ_e ^rn'ⁿ£ '^ts most able heavies to th_{e r} ^serv‘^ce- Therefore, requests for

f^iyhS,

tflroi tivat

any of the other bbs because the cracked barbette will have to be replaced (unless the Navy wants to accept a reduction of capability), extra care and attention will have to be paid to the propulsion system, all the 40-mm. gun mounts will have to be removed and ancillary equipments and spaces adapted to other use, and the electronic and communi­cations systems will have to be modi­fied more heavily than the other lowas. Is it worth the money?

A strong case can be made for bring­ing back the Wisconsin, however. If reactivated, she could act as a rotating reserve while the Iowa or the New Jersey is in overhaul. This would enable the Navy to keep two lowas on the line at all times.

Whether one, two, three, or four lowas are reactivated, what the Navy has in the Iowa class is a quick way to increase its war-fighting capability, at a minimum of cost, until new construc­tion can join the fleet in significant numbers. The battleships are highly survivable platforms that, with the ex­ception of the nuclear-powered ships, have the greatest endurance of any ships in the Navy. They have a potential flag­ship capability second only to the Blue Ridge (LCC-l9)-class amphibious force flagships, which are dedicated flagships and now being employed in a fleet com­mander role. There are currently no plans, however, to use the lowas as flag­ships. The lowas can operate indepen­dently at sea, with their escorts, and can provide a naval presence in the Third World which would release car­riers for other duties. Finally, they have the heaviest firepower afloat in the world, just what the Marine Corps has been asking for to support marines in amphibious operations.

Over the past 10 to 12 years, the Navy has lost the supremacy and re­spectability it once had and had long taken for granted. The reasons are many, but two of the primary ones are the failure to build the necessary ships to maintain the Navy’s operating levels and the failure to do the first led to stretching the Navy so thin that de­ployments were extended which caused personnel hardships. These conditions were aggravated by the Carter Admin­istration’s many failures to provide for the welfare of the U. S. military ser­vicemen. With the assumption of power of the Reagan Administration, there is an opportunity, maybe the last, to restore the U. S. Navy's supremacy. But until new ship construction pro­grams can catch up with the Navy’s needs, we have to use the assets that are available. Not to do so would be the height of folly and impracticality.

Mr. Morison, the editor of the U. S. sections of Jam's Fighting Ships, prepares the Proceedings' an­nual Changes in Status of Ships feature and makes frequent contributions to the Proceedings.