This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
In 1973, one of our artists tried to guess what their new carrier would look like. The Minsk is what she actually looks like.
The guessing game is on again as we wonder what their even larger carrier will look like. The first such ship—they’re expected to build more than one—is likely to go into service during the 1980s. When she does, their navy will be far more formidable than it now is because of the advantage conferred by high-performance conventional takeoff and landing aircraft at sea.
T;
e‘gn s*ons
°day) Gorshkov’s “historical conditions” have rjer ^ ' ^he disappearance of the attack aircraft car- tl^ y°1Tl the Royal Navy and the dramatic decline in Petj ■ Navy carrier force levels have made a com- recQ Vt carrier building program feasible. Postwar l95QStruction was essentially completed by the late Pro^’ a°d since 1959 all sectors of Soviet military Tli^ion ^ave exhibited rapid growth.
'he 6 dec*s‘°n to build a new large-deck carrier marks tho ClJrrent dominance of the “big navy” school of of the t’ *n tde Soviet fleet. Historically,the structure
Corn lt’* ^*as reflected the relative prominence of the
science and technology, and a change in mis- assigned to the navy.” (Emphasis added.)
bef- ^0viet fleet (and of the Imperial Russian Fleet Pcting “big navy” and “small navy” doctrines.
small navy” school prevailed until the early
Ur>til Proponents predominated from the mid-
1950s
D,
vVnd;
class in 1961. It remains to be seen if there
Displacement (full load)
Dimensions
Length:
Beam:
Draft:
Complement:
Aircraft:
Main engines:
Speed:
Endurance:
e Soviet Navy has long recognized naval aviation air dVnc^‘sPensable to its missions. Its failure to build °f d - C Carr’ers ’n t^le Past ‘s attributable not to a lack y tSlre but mainly to economic constraints. In the IT>t--nt immediately after World War II, the require- tj tS postwar reconstruction forced a sharp reduc- letl ,'n Conventional arms procurement. As Oles Smo- T T *las noted in an article titled “Soviet Policy ec()nar Aircraft Carriers,” even if the Soviet Union’s sj had escaped destruction during the war, it
rj ^ w°uld not have permitted the large-scale car- offs t0nstruct‘on that would have been necessary to che navies of the United States and Britain. (jnjo°re recently, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet lat' °n Ser8ei Gorshkov has stressed the dynamic re- tj0 , SdlP between “balanced” naval forces and a nas economic condition:
"T’l
ne manner of balancing a navy is not fixed;
Certa‘n historical conditions it can change. e main factors governing such changes are the d political situation (new alignment of forces, jnj.ence °f military blocs, changes in regimes in &/7>Vl<^Ual countrres> ar>d so forth), economic capa- °f ani^ &rowt^ °f mihtary-economic potential
country, the development of domestic and for-
ch;
Th
193q - *
ljgl^ when new warship construction was limited to naVy„^ace forces and coastal submarines. The “big
Orin^16 ^eat^ Prem‘er Joseph Stalin in 1953- oljer & chis period, heavy cruisers were constructed, 0^ attleships modernized, and the keels laid for tnar, attleships. The era of Nikita Khrushchev cCpt C<a a temporary return to the “small navy” con- tril Unt*l the completion of the Soviet Navy’s first Ky ^°St~World War II cruiser design, the 5,700-ton will be an eventual return to the “small navy" concept. The critical factor may well be the response of the United States. As Ken Booth has observed in his important book Navies and Foreign Policy, “Whether or not the Soviet fleet becomes ‘second to none’ is in the gift of the United States.” Meanwhile, the new carrier will be a solid portent of an era of “big navy” dominance in Soviet naval affairs.
Characteristics and Capabilities: As far as is known, the first public report on the possible construction of a large Soviet aircraft carrier capable of operating conventional takeoff and landing (ctol) aircraft appeared in the 20 August 1979 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine. Estimated to have a displacement of about 50,000 tons and to carry around 50 high- performance combat aircraft, the ship may have nuclear propulsion. The 24 September 1979 issue of Aviation Week reported that U. S. satellites have photographed catapult and arresting gear tests with an aircraft that appears to be a modified MiG-27. Assuming a minimum displacement of 50,000 tons, the ship now being built will be at least 32% bigger than the largest ship in the current Soviet Navy, the Kiev- class v/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) carrier. Table 1 summarizes some of the major anticipated characteristics and capabilities of the new Soviet carrier. With the exception of the displacement tonnage, all values are calculated by means of standard naval architectural and engineering principles, or by analogy with U. S. aircraft carrier characteristics. Also, a conventional rather than nuclear power plant is contemplated. U. S. intelligence sources have recently estimated “that the first such carrier with its embarked airwing will put to sea by the end of this
Table 1 Estimated Characteristics of the New Carrier [1] [2]
decade.” Open sources offer no direct evidence on the number of ships that may be built. However, congressional testimony by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward, has at least left the inference that more than one such vessel is likely.
Clearly, a firm recognition of the Soviet carrier’s most likely wartime roles and missions requires a substantial amount of additional intelligence, most of which will have to await the ship’s actual deployment. The following assessment is therefore quite tentative and is presented as a broadbrush “composite” of potential—but realistic—Soviet mission options. Only brief consideration is given to the ship’s possible contribution to the Soviet “naval diplomatic” role, although this will undoubtedly be a very important function in time of peace.
There is wide agreement that the Soviet fleet has the following wartime mission priorities:
► Nuclear strike and deterrence
► Destruction of enemy naval forces
► Interdiction of enemy sea lines of communication
► Support of ground forces
► Force projection ashore
Nuclear Strike and Deterrence: The primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to ensure the survival and effectiveness of its submarine ballistic missile force. The success of this mission requires the reduction of Western antisubmarine warfare (asw) forces in the North Atlantic and Northwest Pacific oceans that will attempt to prevent the transit of Soviet submarines into the open ocean. Key assets in the West’s ASW arsenal are the long-range land- and carrier-based asw patrol aircraft. The role of these aircraft, such as the U. S. Navy’s P-3C and S-3A and the Royal Air Force’s Nimrod, is to detect, localize, and attack submarines with torpedoes, mines, and depth charges. These roles are executed in support of broad antisubmarine missions such as the protection of aircraft carrier battle groups and merchant convoys, area searches, and submarine barrier patrols. Although none of the three aircraft types mentioned has a self-defense capability, these planes are currently able to perform their functions with virtual impunity. The presence of a Kiev-class ship could pose a threat of interception by “Forger” vtol aircraft; however, chances are small in view of the small number of Kiev-class units available and the limited combat radius of the “Forger.”
The vulnerability of long-range antisubmarine patrol aircraft will grow significantly with the sea-based deployment of MiG-27 aircraft. For example, if a deck-launched combat radius of 500 nautical miles is postulated for the MiG-27, compared with a radius
of 150 nautical miles for the “Forger,' the p°ten^ (circular) intercept area for the first aircraft is , than 11 times larger than that for the °r ^ (785,398 versus 70,686 square miles). As a of fact, the much larger aircraft complement 0 ^
new carrier versus that of the Kiev class (53 %'e^ about 12) means that a larger number of aircra be kept on station for a longer period or tinU'irrjcr reasonable to assume, for example, that the new *
will be able to place four MiG-27s on com a
y - “eS,corn
■ , ” f 100
pared with a maximum of two “Forgers at 1 _
tical miles from the Kiev. If an intercept radius 0 ^ nautical miles is assumed for the MiG-27 and a r: .
patrol (cap) stations at about 150 nautical miles
of 50 for the “Forger,” the area of CAP coverag^ ^
haps 100° for two “Forgers” stationed ahead Kiev. These measurements are hypothetical; they are believed to be indicative of the m threat to be faced by unarmed patrol aircraft-
be eight times as great. Moreover, four .
provide protection through 360°, compared wit \ ^
order
• • • (destroy
of importance is the Soviet Navy’s mission or ^ ^
tie groups, underway replenishment groups,
Destruction of Enemy Naval Forces: Second m
ing the opponent’s naval forces, including carr‘e|
marine forces. Submarines and long-range armed with antiship missiles (and torpedoes submarines) are the principal antiship weapons Soviet naval inventory. Missile-equipped surface
for
in
the
the
coif'
A,
' *--------------------------------------------------- . , •
batants are the third leg in the Soviet antisrup ^ but they are anticipated to play a secondarj^^ mostly in the waters contiguous to the Soviet i.e., Barents Sea and the seas of Japan and D ^ The main reason for the expected limited mg ^ role of the Soviet Navy’s surface warships
overwhelming striking power of U. S. aircraft forces. As will be noted later, the Soviet surface ^ self-imposed limitation on operating range is ^ to become more flexible with the introduction new carrier. ^
At present, long-range Soviet Naval Aviation bombers provide the Soviet Navy with its most ,jeS antiship strike weapon. Carrying two antiship < ‘ ^ each, current mainstay SNA bombers, such a ^ “Badger C” and “Badger G,” and, more re^a to
the “Backfire,” have a combat radius
of 1,5°°
ble
of
2,000 nautical miles and are reportedly caP‘l firing their missiles against targets from 200 naU miles or more. >0ff
The combination of long-range bomber and stan^j'- antiship missiles has at least two important ^ ^
nesses. The first is that even at launch rangeS as 200 nautical miles, the missile bomber is vu
lneral
bl£
st>9
Pressures of combat, could seriously degrade the
Th Veness a long-range bomber missile strike. fyaVal 6arr‘er under construction will provide Soviet ^°mbe Vlanon w*rh the option of escorting its strike Urr>brellc Wlt^ tact‘ca^ a*rcraft beyond the protective a of Soviet land-based fighters alone. Two
jng '^'Performance interceptors such as the F-14. Fir- naUtic » us combat air patrol station at, say, 150 tfack a ^es from the aircraft carrier, the F-14 can aWa ltS ^oen'x missiles out to targets 100 miles 0w while the enemy bomber is still outside its b0rni aunch range. The second weakness of the cult 0nS"range missile combination is the diffi- mech °. accurate targeting. The principal guidance h0rn-anisrn on Soviet antiship missiles involves radar missi,ef ^n'c*al target information is fed into the target h COmPuter’ based on detection of the intended the lar ^ ^‘luncbing aircraft. Generally speaking, only tectabkCSt tar^ets’ t^lat 's> aircraft carriers, are de- Thjs C at ranges of more than 200 nautical miles. prox- 016305 that the missiles are fired against the ap- ar>ajn le ^°cation of a surface combatant force—not active t 'n^‘v‘^uai ships. While in flight, the missile’s count/a^ar hominS un‘t 's susceptible to electronic chaff eLIJ:leasures, such as jamming, deception, and and 1CSe tecbnical weaknesses, plus the confusion
effi
NATO land-based interceptors. The second method would have the escorts engage the opposing carrier- launched interceptors in the target area itself. The first use of Soviet carrier air power could severely complicate one suggested solution to the U. S. Navy aircraft carrier shortage, namely the use of land-based interceptors on Iceland and in the Far East to exert attrition against transiting Soviet bombers.
If, alternatively, the Soviets use fighters from the new carrier to help the missile bombers penetrate the opposing surface force air defenses, the latter may be saturated by.the sheer number of targets. It appears inevitable that regardless of the defender’s engagement priorities—bombers, bomber-launched missiles, or fighter-escorts—the number of bombers and missiles that will get a “free ride” will be greater.
Interdiction of Enemy Sea Lines oj Communications: The scale of the Royal Navy’s effort in 194 1 to trap and sink the German battleship Bismarck, is indicative of how the deployment of even a few new large Soviet aircraft carriers could force U. S. and allied navies to commit forces far out of proportion to each carrier’s intrinsic capabilities. The possibility of Soviet carrier operations in the North Atlantic puts an altogether different complexion on U. S. reinforcement strategy for Western Europe. At present, the main threat to the North Atlantic sea lines of communication is posed by Soviet submarines. Antisubmarine warfare is expected to be the principal mission of allied naval forces on convoy protection duty. The aircraft carrier is not considered to be a “cost-effective” ASW platform, and her contribution to the defense of merchant convoys against submarines is thought to be marginal. A Soviet carrier threat to the North Atlantic sea lines of communication will force a major reassessment of allied convoy strategy. For example, given that there simply will not be enough large-deck aircraft carriers to escort every one of the many convoys that will sail, the United States and its allies may have to reintroduce something like the World War II escort carrier.
Support of Ground Forces and Force Projection Ashore: These two missions involve naval gunfire support,
P-3 patrol planes can now fly over Soviet naval vessels with virtual impunity. The situation could he vastly changed if the P-3s were challenged by high-performance aircraft from a new Soviet carrier.
of Soviet intentions in times of crisis. The PteS js of a carrier task force sends a different set oi than does that of a grouping without an air caPa^rrjeS The deployment of sea-based strike aviation (
lacked-
with it the immediate threat of power projectin'1 Soviet naval presence forces have hitherto lacke ■ ^
it
for
gling with U. S. Navy combatants may cease least two reasons. First, the embarked air jj,
afford Soviet naval forces a standoff tactical su
shore bombardment, air strike, and amphibious operations. Historically, Soviet naval activities in support of these missions have been limited geographically and in scope to the support of ground forces on the seaward flanks of the main front line.
At present, the Soviet naval establishment includes an estimated 12,000 “naval infantry” forces. For mobility, these forces rely on just over 100 amphibious warfare vessels which, in wartime, could be augmented with merchant ships. Amphibious exercises are conducted regularly in all four major fleet areas and usually simulate counter-amphibious operations against Western landings. Although there has been some Western concern with the possibility of more offensive and distant amphibious assaults, it is held that current Soviet capabilities are limited to landings in areas with little or no opposition.
The deployment of the new Soviet aircraft carrier will remove a major obstacle to a much more effective Soviet “fleet-against-shore” capability in general, and a more expansive amphibious landing potential in particular. Soviet amphibious experience in World War II, compared with the success of Western landings, makes Soviet naval writers fully aware of the importance of air superiority over the landing area.
Carrier aviation will give the Soviet fleet the “balanced forces” to carry out what Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov asserts is the principal purpose of a modern navy: operations against the shore. The new carrier could seriously threaten the security of a number of islands that the U. S. and allied navies now depend on to support a war at sea. Particularly vulnerable are the Lofoten off the Norwegian coast, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands between Iceland and Scotland. Less threatened because of the distances involved are the Azores, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and the Ryukyu Islands, which include Okinawa, south of Japan. With the exception of Okinawa, these islands have few or no defenses.
Soviet seizure and occupation of Iceland would be a particularly grave setback for NATO war strategy. A few of the large new Soviet aircraft carriers standing off the Icelandic shore could provide fighter coverage for a preliminary bomber attack against U. S. tactical air units at Keflavik Air Base. Next, planes from these
Soviet carriers could provide coverage for the 0 ^ on amphibious landing. Once the island was se<^vjet second-echelon forces could be airlifted from rhe^ tQ Union, and aviation units could be ferried °v assume the permanent defense of Iceland. Soviet^ ^ trol of Iceland and the airspace around it ^ a
sentially isolate Norway. If the island were us ^ forward base for submarines, the allied effort to ^ tain the Soviet submarine threat to North ^ shipping would be immensely more difficult- ^ ^ Northern Fleet submarines would no Ion get make the long and dangerous transit throug ^ North Cape choke point and the Norwegian $ea s cause of the reduced transit time, more subm® ^ could be kept at sea simultaneously, or alternat* ^ patrol ranges could be extended. Granted that a^tr0| counter invasion might succeed in regaining fS over Iceland, it is by no means clear that t^ie atj0nS could be spared from the main theater of °Pe in Central Europe.
Peacetime Missions and Capabilities: The P°sse an of a large-deck carrier capability is likely to j‘ ^oSe important influence on the Soviet conduct 0 ^
activities that are commonly labeled “naval macy:” the influencing of foreign governments ^ ceptions and behavior through the nonviolent ^ onstration of naval strength. The very novelty [() Soviet Navy’s first large-deck carrier alone is n change Western as well as Third World calcu
2tl^S
34
Proceedings / Augul
,St
like the important superpower standoffs s*nCeejjs, 1967 Six-Day War between the Arabs and a crisis ten years from now may see the U- S- rather than the Soviet fleet, in the role of ‘ det Tactically, the Soviet practice of close inte*
e occasion of a future fleet-versus-fleet standoff.
ne
^ildian’,°n^y sPeculate at the possible “confidence's implications of Soviet carrier air power
S0Vleetne- flexible response” capability might tempt policymakers to seek overseas advantages with
^Potential to seek battle with U. S. carrier forces
tngafIl0re nearly equal footing than ever before. When
tyjll h'n^ t*1C ^ov‘et carrter fleet, U. S. carrier forces
of a jave at least one important disadvantage: the lack
clay pj n£~range standoff missile capability. Present-
Cap^.' blavy and allied long-range antiship strike
ra0ge ltIes depend on the delivery of relatively short-
for)g ^‘ssiles by manned tactical fighter-bombers. As
shiM [3] ^oviet surface force defenses are limited to ‘Pbr
lance
ran ^ trac^*ng capability. Secondly, the longer the C Str'^'n8 power of carrier aviation will obviate for CuUfrent necessity for Soviet warships to compensate Ca . Clr lnforior striking range by "hugging” their b0r^r °PP°nent. By the same token, Western air- ^corri SUrVe*^ance °f Soviet naval units is likely to escort'C a 'eSS lcisureIy task; the photographs of F-4s foeir In^ 0VerflyinS “Badgers” and “Bears” may have Crir„ COuntcrparts showing “navalized” MiG-27s ac- ^Panying P.3s.
CCrta. SUcccessor to the Kiev will introduce new un- po\v *ntles ’nt0 the already complex U. S.-Soviet naval °ron fle^Uat'on’ be ‘r at the strategic planning level, 0, ofthenfidence building in the sense that acquisition Soviet
8feater boldness"
£
of t|^e ^Plications for U. S. Strategy: Since the defeat ti0t ^ special Japanese Navy, the U. S. Navy has T^g a^en confronted by a carrier-capable opponent. roore fence a “legitimate” sea-based air threat for Navys an ^ years has necessarily influenced U. S. anfl StrateSy> doctrine, and the design of combatants f>rirnaeaP°nS ^avy aircraft carriers are viewed
ag^y as ‘force projection” elements; air strikes ^anA targets are considered their primary role. bo^b^*1 deet air defense against missile-carrying mainsers bas become increasingly important, it re- s'tateja SeC0ndary’ supportive function that is neces- Witb- Primarily by the operational need to close strik- ^°viet bomber range so that the primary air ThemiSSi°n may be executed, the 1 ernergence of the new Soviet carrier will renew abiijtrn^0rtance rbe struggle for sea control—the Ptev ^ C° Use rhe sea for one’s own purposes while of tbetln£ tbe enemy from using it for his. Defeat ^Conn:PP°nent'S main battle fleet is the essential poSses . ltlQn for establishing control of the seas. The the k '°n a carrier force will give the Soviet Navy
Can [arne SUfface-to-air missiles (SAMs), allied aircraft unch their missiles with relative safety from
outside sam range. Conversely, the Western aircraft carrier-based defense-in-depth forced the Soviets to develop much longer range standoff missiles. The Soviet adoption of a carrier-based fleet defense will force the U. S. Navy to either (a) greatly improve standoff missile ranges, or (b) conduct and win an air battle prior to carrying out the strike mission. Taking the second course of action will present some difficult tactical choices, such as: how many aircraft can be sent on the strike mission while still providing an adequate fleet defense in the event of an enemy counterstrike? Or, what should be the ratio of strike aircraft versus escorting fighters whose role will be to engage the Soviet interceptors?
It is clear that the relative priority of different U. S. Navy missions in a major war will be heavily influenced by the forthcoming Soviet carrier. Defeat of the Soviet surface fleet to assure control of the North Atlantic and Pacific sea lines of communication will be a prerequisite to conducting amphibious operations and carrier air strikes in direct support of allied land operations. NATO reinforcement plans for the defense of Norway could be affected with particular seriousness. NATO recognizes that only prompt and substantial outside reinforcements will give the Norwegians a fair chance of effectively resisting a Soviet attack. Since the bulk of these reinforcements must arrive by sea, the presence of a Soviet carrier force astride the North Atlantic sea-lanes could force a possibly fatal delay while the issue of local sea control is decided.
Conclusion: This article has attempted to raise some of the most important issues that would be raised by the deployment of a “true” Soviet aircraft carrier capability. The judgments expressed are subjective and necessarily based on speculation. A number of important issues have not been addressed; for example, how Soviet sea-based aviation might help overcome the traditional Russian fleet problem of geographic dispersion. The appearance of the new carrier will certainly put into doubt the commonplace Western judgment of the Soviet surface fleet as a “single-shot,” “sea-denial opponent, rather than as a legitimate aspirant for sustained sea control.
50,000 tons 870-898 feet
109 feet
3,300
53 modified MiG-27s
steam turbine, 175,000—200,000 shaft horsepower
32—33 knots
6,200—9,200 nautical miles at 20 knots
2,500—3,700 nautical miles at 32 knots
Mr. Breemer came to the United States from the Netherlands in 1962. He received a B.A. degree in political science from the California State University at Long Beach in 1970, an M.A. degree in international relations from the University of Southern California in 1972, and completed doctoral work in the same discipline at USC in 1973. He is now working as a senior research analyst with Presearch, Inc., in Arlington, Virginia, where he is involved in the study of naval warfare problems.