The Influence of Burke’s Boys on Limited War

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When Admiral Arleigh A. Burke assumed the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in Au­gust 1955, the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” defense policy held sway. The cornerstone of this program was the assumption that U. S. nuclear superiority over the Communist bloc was the most important element of this nation’s military strength and a useful foreign policy tool. Nuclear weapons pro­vided a counter to the Communist powers’ over­whelming manpower resources. Additionally, the fi­nancial drain of maintaining large U. S. conventional forces was avoided. And fiscal considerations—balancing the budget, reducing taxes, government expenditures, and the national debt—were accorded a preeminent place during President Eisenhower’s tenure in office. Although an oversimplification of the Eisenhower de­fense policy, the term “massive retaliation” came to connote the chief, if not sole, American response to Soviet or Chinese Communist military activism.

The Air Force, with the nation’s preponderance of nuclear delivery systems in its long-range bombers and later its intercontinental ballistic missiles, was the prime beneficiary of this policy. The service was ac­corded a position of primacy in the limited allocation of resources by the administration. And the service’s air power doctrine, which called for striking at the heart of an enemy’s war-making structure, was easily meshed with Eisenhower’s defense concept. Accord­ingly, many Air Force officers were strong proponents of massive retaliation.

Conversely, the Army was perhaps the earliest and most vociferous opponent of this existing strategy. Army Chiefs of Staff Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor doubted the efficacy of a policy based on the threat or use of nuclear weapons when the small scale of a conflict or political inhibitions precluded their

36

use. With few forces or weapon systems ^sUltej_Jfy nuclear retaliation, the Army then played a secon role in the national defense community.                                                                        _en[

The Navy’s leaders exhibited neither the support nor opposition of their Air Force am ^ counterparts to the policy. Naval policymak^erS^_cS sistently stressed the multiplicity of the Navy ^s . _a

al

and their balanced capabilities. The fleet posses

cion'

wide variety of weapons and forces for conven ^ warfare: ship-and land-based aircraft, surface ^vvarSj₀y_ecl submarines, amphibious warfare ships, and d^eP^_f. Marine Corps units. The preponderance of ^£^^e

ating Navy fell within this sphere. At the same the Navy performed an important function

in

Eis^e(r

hower’s defense structure, with its emphasis

on

o'¹'

rimw

clear warfare. Aircraft carriers, the Navys P’J. ^ fighting ships, comprised a significant pa^rt _anJ U. S. strategic retaliatory resource. Fleet carri^erS their embarked aircraft had been progressive > y. proved to handle nuclear as well as convention*¹^ ons. This nuclear delivery capability would be ¹ ^j. enhanced with the planned deployment of Polaf¹^ listic missile submarines at the end of the deca _Q{ With an interest in preparedness for all to ^ warfare, naval leaders avoided a dogmatic apP

to strategic thinking. Reflecting the reluctance

roa^cl

fo*'

val commanders to categorize forces according cific functions, Vice Admiral Charles D. Grifhⁿ; _t| mander Seventh Fleet, at one point suggested, ¹⁰ ,. _g( to Admiral John H. Sides, Commander in ^L the Pacific Fleet, that:              c

”... those naval units assigned to the ^str^_ofCe, force will be painted red; those to the tactical^_oSe white; and those to the defense force, blue- ^ not heretofore assigned will be painted red, blue, will be assigned to the U. S. Navy, an

Proceedings / Aug¹¹

,08

^ usual, be the flexible, mobile, versatile work-

_rv°^{rSe un}'ts of the United States defense establish­ment ”■

This •    .

)_eaje^lrJ^cbnation toward versatility enabled the naval _0n ^ ¹¹F^{> t0} accommodate the administration’s stress ^aniz- ^nuc^^ear option without viewing it as an or- Polic^atIOna^ threat. At the same time, the existing ^aace f ^ ^cons*d^ered adequate, given the global bal- ^ ⁰ power then perceived. b_eg_a^^rin£ 1956, however, a new strategic situation The ru° ^evo^^{ve> an}d it altered previous assumptions, the ¹⁶ ^aval Operations asserted at the end of tap L^{6ar t}hat the Soviets’ growing nuclear delivery sup_er- ^lt.T ^Would soon negate the advantages of U. S. iati_0n^l°!'^ltT 'ⁿ this area. The threat of massive retal- So_v; ’ ^{6 reasone}d, would be less persuasive when the th_rea|^S f^>0ssessed the ability to respond in kind. The fttpo ^rnutual destruction would prompt each su- tain i"^{er t0} heep the interminable conflict within cer-

m bn ■

mj_raj °^Unds, lest it bring on total conflagration. Ad- b ^ ^Ur*^e concluded that maintenance of a strong

^c°nv' ^StrateS‘^c nuclear establishment was necessary to C ^t^^le ^^ov*^ets that an attack on the United th_at ^Would be foolhardy. But he also recommended (J, ^ kjeater resources be devoted to strengthening suited to the conduct of limited war. The

^S; forces :

m_{0re n} ^c°ⁿcluded that this type of conflict was much

Th,

likely

to occur in the future/

of _eVer^^ear 1957 marked a turning point in the course ^s- Admiral Burke’s arguments about the in-

SoviJj ^ ^t^^1C *^ntercontinental delivery resources of the U, § . ⁿⁱ°n were given added significance when ^Cestecl ^lnte^*&cnce learned that the Communists had launch^{30 ICBM}' Then, in October, the Soviet Union earth ^ *^{ts b}P^utn*k satellite into orbit around the gav_e ■ ^thereby revealing to mankind that its rockets potential for conducting long-range nuclear The occurrence profoundly shocked the tabu '^Can P^e°pl^e> ^tbe Congress, and the defense es- m_any f^lent- In the near panic following the event, a gr_tat ^rnerl^cans feared that the Soviets had achieved The^ ^StrateS‘^c l^eaP that they actually had.

^naIysi_s

sputnik episode precipitated a wide-ranging

°f U. S. global strategy. The anticipated

_ ^a period of nuclear parity with the Soviet thr_6at ^Vltlated the policy of massive retaliation. The inst_r ^strategic destruction lost its validity as an Kf_av,^Urnent °f U. S. policy. Soon after Sputnik, the

^tlear

ⁿg Range Objectives Group, under Rear

-■ *^ra* 1Toy L. Johnson, concluded that in an era of parity, paramount U. S. objectives should be

^l£s / August 1981

'For footnotes, please turn to page 41.

deterrence of general war and the simultaneous main­tenance of American global interests. The planning group averred that accordingly, "... preparedness to fight and win a general war must subordinate itself to these objectives. Where the implementation of the Air Force [air power] concept makes general war more likely to occur and endangers U. S. security by alien­ating allies and diverting resources from conventional preparedness it is subject to challenge.”³

In the ensuing effort to fashion a strategy more attuned to this new reality, the Navy moved away from the basic positions still held by the Eisenhower administration and the Air Force. Admiral Burke pressed for reemphasis on the Navy’s flexibility to counter Communist aggression, whatever form that aggression might take. Naval officers and other the­orists, as reflected in writings of the time, began to warn that in the new strategic environment, the Com­munists would be induced to engage in limited con­ventional attacks and in local "brushfire” wars. To deal with these expected intrusions, a number of writ­ers advocated adoption of a policy of flexibility in the application of countermeasures.

The U. S. response to Communist actions might take the form of a tactical nuclear strike, conventional air and naval strikes, an amphibious landing, extended ground operations, or any combination of measures, dependent on the nature of the threat. The Navy was ideally suited to performing the tasks associated with the concept of “flexible response,” as it came to be known. Naval forces were characterized by their mo­bility, versatile weapon systems, capacity to support forces on foreign shores, and the ability to operate from international waters, thus avoiding a direct for­eign commitment. Indeed, one commentator sug­gested that the Navy be the “champion of limited war and of preparedness for it.”⁴ In 1957, Admiral Harry D. Felt, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, expressed a common view that the armed strength of the United States ”... should be designed and fash­ioned so that it has flexibility in time of war both as to its place of application and as to its degree of ap­plication. He added, “Those of us who have a hand in shaping the Navy of the future are . . . endeavoring to maintain the best balance of forces to meet the entire spectrum of possibilities.”⁵

In essence, however, in many limited-war scenarios only the use of nuclear weapons promised to bring the U. S. armed forces success on the battlefield. To defeat a localized, overt Communist attack against an allied or friendly nation, the assumption was widely held, if not universally accepted, that tactical nuclear weap­ons were required. The contrast between Communist conventional strength and U. S. weakness was too

37

The U. S. Navy of the late 1950s, exemplified by these ships operating as part of the Sixth Fleet, was one in transition. The cruiser Newport News (CA-148) and supply ship Altair (AKS-32) were essentially World War II types, while the Forrestal (CVA-59), right, was the first of the supercarriers. Carriers had a secondary role of strategic retaliation, but conventional warfare was still their primary mission.

and civilian theoreticians alike that the strategy uation which had evolved required a renewed emp on traditional naval weapons and forces.                                                                        ^_cSe

In the period after the Sputnik launching.

instability lead

perceived this development as part of a new

localized confrontations created growing »**'- j_efj various areas of the world. Influential naval ^e i

bal

great. As Admiral Felt later related, in speaking of possible conflict with the Chinese over Quemoy and Matsu during 1958, a conventional response to Chinese military action was never seriously considered in light of the disparity of strength between the con­tending forces.⁶

The reliance on these atomic weapons remained the policy to the end of the Eisenhower administration. At various times, the president expressed the view that tactical nuclear weapons should be regarded no differently from conventional weapons. In 1957, Sec­retary of Defense Charles E. Wilson stated that U. S. defense policy "... is based ... on the use of such atomic weapons as would be militarily feasible and usable in a smaller war. . . . In other words, the smaller atomic weapons, the tactical weapons, in a sense now become the conventional weapons.”⁷ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concurred with this concept.

On the other hand, constraints on the use of even tactical nuclear weapons had long been recognized and persuasively enunciated by naval strategists, who ar­gued that no clearer distinction existed between all­out general war and limited war than the use or nonuse of nuclear weapons. They reasoned that once this threshold was crossed, the chances of limiting and confining a conflict were drastically reduced. The So­viets could counter with their own weapons as well. And U. S. allies were decidedly cold toward the use of nuclear weapons in or near their countries.

A greater influence was the repeated demonstration from 1958 to I960 that the Navy would be faced with conflicts in which nuclear weapons, tactical or oth­erwise, had little or no utility. Instead, confrontations over Lebanon and the Taiwan Strait in 1958 and the crises over Berlin, Cuba, and Laos during the re­mainder of the decade convinced naval policymakers

onslaught by the Soviets, and by inference the' Communist powers, who, in the words of Burke, "... have the practical objective of the rest [of the world} upside down and then ^r ^ ing it in their own image.” The CNO believe ^.j| “. . . for the Soviets, the fulcrum of the strugg be in the underdeveloped areas of 6^ie World—from the Asian periphery, through _tC die East and Africa to Latin America. To *^a this move, Admiral Burke was convinced ^t*^lJt -₀n attack would be indirect because against territory peripheral to the Communisi ^ could seem ambiguous if it were in the form of g^r _[0 encroachment, of swift but limited action, ⁰ local rebels, or of pure subversion. ”^H

be-

The Soviet-allied Chinese Communists lieved to be the greatest threat. The Office ⁰    ^ ^

Intelligence reported that China had “assume different visage from that which had charact ^ her” previously in that “1959 saw a continuation^, intensification of the new ‘hard’ line of Chinese

munist foreign policy begun in early 1958-

At the end of 1959, Admiral Herbert G. Hop' ^ ^js Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet, expres^.^ concern to Admiral Burke that “. . . we are ^en _tli

DW0°'

A,

Sow

Ind‘^an

a new era of intensified cold and limited war m and South East Asia.” Recent events on th^e border, in Tibet, Laos, and Indonesia, impels wood to believe that the Chinese Communists _£] have now decided to use force and/or threat o

■diet*¹

d s^tal

as a major instrument of policy for the p^re' future.” The admiral advised that the United _e “dare not lag in meeting this new attack. To °P _g[

.t«⁵

area

H°P'

it, he recommended the deployment to the strong, mobile conventional forces. Admin¹' wood observed that “. . . it is obvious that important thing we can do for these [threa

rfl

38

Proceedings / Aug¹¹

st¹⁰

«*• during the next few years is to maintain a _area^Clently high level of U. S. military power in the for ^{aS ena}hle these governments to review their _er(-_uj^gn Policies free of the awful threat of their ‘pow- _be ^ne*ghbor.’ ” But the Pacific Fleet commander ^_sia⁽^^ane<^ ^the fact that “our forces in the South East

_rt ^{area to}day are inadequate.” He stressed that his Htiest _was Fl_e b,

_e                      • • not just a plea for increased Pacific

_ue ^0rces but a strong recommendation that there bill ^ITlar^^ecl improvement in the overall U. S. capa-

tO firtl-.*. _      1 . i    r              1       i ■ ■ l         •

^ ^t0 hght, and therefore to deter, limited ^trils area. ”¹⁰

war in

in» ^aVa^ ^leadets further concluded that merely ^ni; »o Com,

^e ^^ornmunists. Influential senior officers called

requirements was met during the last years of the Eisenhower administration. Although the administra­tion somewhat moderated its reliance on nuclear re­taliation and endorsed, albeit unenthusiastically, mea­sures to improve U. S. conventional forces and weapons, continued fiscal stringency deferred that en­deavor to succeeding presidents.

Believing that the fully deployed Polaris fleet, in conjunction with other U. S. strategic forces, would provide the country with a sufficient or “finite deter­rent” to Soviet nuclear attack, Admiral Burke re­peatedly called for greater emphasis on preparation for less than all-out nuclear war. As he had on numerous previous occasions, in 1959 the Chief of Naval Op­erations again stated before Congress that ”... we have adequate forces to deter a general nuclear war. However, we must also continue to provide for ade­quate forces capable of' deterring aggressive action throughout the entire spectrum of war situations."¹⁴

The remonstrations of naval leaders notwithstand­ing, the Eisenhower administration continued to ad­here to its policy of fiscal austerity. Defense Depart­ment expenditures during fiscal years 1957 to I960 represented only a modest rise, from $38.4 billion to 41.5 billion. And with the Congress engaged, follow­ing the Sputnik surprise, in a frenzied effort to mod­ernize, expand, and protect the nation’s strategic re­taliatory forces and to catch up with the Soviets in the space race, the betterment of U. S. conventional forces retained its lower priority for funding. Commander Malcolm Cagle cogently expressed the dilemma faced by the Navy: “The deterrence of the big war costs big money; the race for space costs big money; and there

react- mitiative

⁰ Communist inroads would surrender initi Communists. Influential senior officers c _0bspf,^m°^re assertive U. S. policy. Admiral Johnson

to

for

g_roJ^{Ve c}hat, “Communism is like cancer, it will ^che_ck^an<^ ^^estr°y unless positive action is taken to “q₀  ^{1<: anc}l eventually remove it.” He added that,

^munism cannot be minimized, it must be

•>- • ^terecl- The naval planner recommended that ^v>de ^Security policy be reoriented and ”... pro- tj_Ve °^r U. S. to take military action of a preven- Su_cb^natUre prior to direct involvement in hostilities. ec_ut: '

Oatio

Pmvision would assist in a positive way the pros-

a_Ctj₀°^{n r}h^e cold war and permit timely preventive ^ln limited war situations.”¹¹

IJ(,gijV -             ...    __________

Com,! ^{bellef that} the U. S. response to the recent opp_Qs- ,^nist militancy should be direct and unyielding W_a$ ^Sl^¹⁰ⁿ anywhere on the “Free World” periphery rq_anj ^0ec! ^among other naval leaders. As Pacific com- ti_bei?^tS Admiral Felix Stump and Admiral Felt tes- ^ete ^et°^re Congress, the Quemoy and Matsu islands U £ ^Un‘mportant militarily, but they symbolized the jj^res°l^ve to prevent even minimal intrusion into tiled- ^sPhere of interest.¹² For the same reason, str_at ^lrninutive landlocked Kingdom of Laos took on g^^lc Importance to U. S. leaders.

^Var*0u '^^rnerican ability to influence events in the q_uired ^ls°lated and separated areas of the globe re- f_0rces ^strong, ready, quick-reacting conventional itig t_b ^tmral Burke feared that “. . . in emphasiz- of Ooclear general war, the Nation will lose sight ^CotHb ^necessity ^t0 maintain adequate strength to

try_ ^5 Umited wars in areas remote of this coun-

of*. ^Irruted wars requiring the United States control ^seas.”¹³

ets_b-^eneral ^agteement existed among the naval lead- W_ar 1?’■bat for the Navy to prepare to meet the limited v_e,g. ^{a en}8^es expected, a great rebuilding of its con- teq_u- ^rial strength was essential. To accomplish this Or,, ^ ^a significant increase in the defense budget cl_ear ^ater reallocation of funds from the strategic nu- ^0rces to multipurpose forces. Neither of these

⁸®din

^l8s / August 1981

39

will certainly be a limit to total defense funds." He feared that if the Navy’s multipurpose forces received only leftover funds, the fleet would decline in effec­tiveness. He concluded, “Even if we want to limit the war, we will be in a poor position to do so.”¹⁵ Captain Brown Taylor succinctly added that, “today . . . money is the heart of the debate.”¹⁶

The “problem of second priority,” as Commander Cagle labeled it, did indeed impair the Navy’s limited war readiness.^[1] A number of new ships, including three classes of nuclear-powered submarines, the air­craft carriers Ranger (cva-6i) and Independence (cva-62), and several guided missile destroyers entered the fleet during this period. On the other hand, after author­izing construction of the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the fiscal year 1958 program, Congress failed to approve follow-on carriers in the next two years.¹⁸

During the three-year period from 1957 to I960, fleet strength declined from 409 warships and 558 other ships to 376 warships and 436 other vessels. Some ships were modernized and overhauled. But la­bor, material, and other operating costs for ship con­struction and modernization rose significantly while the Navy’s budgetary allocation remained constant. Because a majority of the ships in the fleet had been built in World War II, the Navy was approaching obsolescence en masse. In 1959, Secretary of the Navy William B. Franke observed, “Only the ships at the very top of priority lists can be built, converted, or modernized.” He added that the quality of new ships was “excellent, but their number is insufficient to meet the replacement problem.”¹⁹

Commander Ralph E. Williams, an officer on the staff of the Commander in Chief Pacific, reflected Admiral Felt’s view that force levels could not be maintained within the relatively constant defense budget ceiling. The commander observed that, “On the present Federal revenue base, our military estab­lishment is simply insolvent.”²⁰ A similar condition existed with naval personnel. Between 1957 and I960, the Navy was reduced from 677,108 active duty men and women to 617,984. During the Taiwan Strait and Lebanon crises of 1958, the manning level in active ships was inadequate for sustained operations.

The most serious deficiencies in readiness occurred in the amphibious force, presumably the naval com­ponent most likely to support a limited war on land. The vessels in this arm were among the oldest in the fleet, but funds for material reconditioning or for new ships were rarely forthcoming in the competition with the submarine, air, and other surface combatant arms. At the same time, the Marine Corps was reduced from 200,861 personnel to 175,000. In June 1959, the Secretary of the Navy noted that the loss of personnel

had been so severe that “the combat effectiveness ^a staying power of each division and aircraft wing been decreased] by about 20 percent.”^-1                                                                             ₀f

To compensate for the generally marginal state the fleet’s conventional warfare forces, naval ^ea concentrated on developing promising ^conce weapon systems, and forces. In line with the req

ment for emphasis on forward deployment;

they

roject

rected their attention to the forces designed to P¹ power ashore. By the end of I960, the fleet ha tested the “vertical envelopment” concept, _{ combined Marine Corps helicopter and ground ^c0 ^ units with converted aircraft carriers Thetis B‘0              ,

90), Princeton (cvs-37), and Boxer (cvs-2t). As a ^re^.^ the CNO authorized construction of three new ^ designated amphibious assault ships (lph), win bodied the experience gained. The hvoJi»^ia I ^ Okinawa (lph-3), and Guadalcanal (LPH-7) entere val service in the early 1960s.

To provide these amphibious forces with a ^ panying troop and supply support and the at> ^ land over the beach, the Navy laid down three t⁰⁰^. amphibious transport docks (lpd), each capable ⁰ _f knot speed. By 1964, the Raleigh (LPD-0. ^^a>U ^ (lpd-2), and LaSalle (LPD-3) had joined the fl^ee^' _wjth Navy put into practice the knowledge acquire the operation of helicopter carriers, fast transp ^_re fast cargo ships, and Marine Corps forces as brigade” in the vast Pacific. In August 1966) ^an

the

phibious ready group, with its embarked 111

ed to

special landing force, was permanently assign¹ Pacific Fleet as a quick-reaction formation.              _s

The aircraft carrier had long been a primary ¹ ^ for projecting force ashore. With the advent Polaris submarine, naval leaders began to reemP^^ the importance of carriers to limited war. 1°

Vice Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, Deputy &¹g_fgs5 Naval Operations (Fleet Operations), told Co ^ that “from a Cold War through limited ^warS^_aVy’s all-out nuclear war” the carrier constituted the ^ ^

“. . . central ability to apply our seapower

with

in

e*'

1 vet 1

precision and discrimination that is requisite ploiting the avenues of the sea.” He added, ^°^V'_itory] that “. . . its contribution to the [strategic retalm _tS mission is strictly a bonus, and in no way ^d from its essentiality for naval purposes.”²" ^ _to Greater attention was given to adapting ^a*^rcra conventional warfare. The F4H-Phantom II. ₀{ as a fighter, was reconfigured to carry a heavy ¹ _t air-to-ground ordnance. Research and develop , efforts were begun on a multipurpose attack ^aI later designated the A-6 Intruder, and better h ^ ters for the Navy and Marine Corps. And wot begun on new or improved air-to-air missiles ^a°

40

Proceedings

/ Aug^ul

,_St ‘⁹

^lc^^ea that future wars would be limited in scope ^ration gained rather general acceptance during ^t'!"^ne> partly through the efforts of top naval lead-

this

ers

and

anf^r„^0un^ ^ordnance, including the Zuni, Bullpup, ‘ ^hrike missiles.

n , ^SuPport sustained forward operations, the fleet ^and ⁶ ^°^*^st*^{c s}h*ps to keep pace with fast task forces M_a ^Carr^ ^{a w}'de variety of supplies. As a result, the the 1 ^lnitlate<^ construction of a new class of ships, ^{aSt com}hat support ship (AOE), in August I960, the ^C7 ^t^^le Sacramento (aoe-i) entered the fleet in 1964, _visio 'P represented the latest advances in the pro­of underway replenishment. _n ^ese roeasures to improve the Navy’s readiness for _re ^{c ear} limited war were selective. But they rep- r_c._s - ^et^ ^ch^e redirection in naval thinking that had B ed from the strategic discourse of the late 1950s. ^erabl^{tCn an}d I960, the Navy added its consid- the ^{6 In}^^uence to the intellectual campaign within _Strat^nat‘°^nal defense community for a reorientation in ^c_at_a.^e^^lc P°hcy. The Sputnik launching provided the aft_er^^St ^^0r Admiral Burke’s budding efforts. There- th_e j ^naVa^ ^^ead^ers openly expressed their alarm over f_ace ^Ine in the fleet’s conventional strength in the

Th .^rnount‘ⁿ8 Communist militancy.

.............  " ¹

hol_d',^Strategi^c thinkers. Concurrently, the idea took stood ^{at Stron}& conventional forces deployed forward o_r         best chance of deterring Communist attacks

de_ci ■ ^e*^eat'ng them in a manner dictated by U. S. '°n-makers. The Navy’s advocacy of the flexible

response concept did much to establish it as a tool of U. S. policymaking.

The defense and foreign policy establishment of John Kennedy adopted these strategic concepts during the presidential campaign of I960. These ideas soon formed the core of the new administration’s theoretical approach to the perceived Communist military threat. In January 1961, however, the forces to implement these abstract concepts did not exist in any great strength. To rectify this situation, the Kennedy administration instituted a revitalization and aug­mentation of the U. S. armed forces’ conventional warfare capability. This program eventually provided the Navy and the other services with the ships, planes, weapons, and men to support an increasing commit­ment to the conflict in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Marolda received a bachelor of arts degree in history from Pennsylvania Military College in 1967 and a master of arts degree in European diplomatic history from Georgetown University in 1971. He is now working toward a doctoral degree in U. S. history at the George Washington University. His military service with the U. S. Army included troop command in the Republic of Vietnam and assignment to the staff of Military Revieu• magazine. For the past nine years, Mr. Marolda has been a staff historian with the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C. He is now coauthoring volume II in the official series The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict and has compiled the Guide to United States Naval Administrative Histories of World War II.

^l508loz

December I960, Seventh Fleet chronological, Post War

„ ^essage r

^eet Rn ^0rnrnander Seventh Fleet to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific

^ett_er            ^^aval Historical Center (Hereafter NHC).

File ij , ^ ^t0 SecDef, serial 012P00, of 6 November 1956, Originator’s ⁵0p4 ^ MSS, NHC.

-^rrierT10’ Adaptation of the National Military Posture to the Era ^^tCei*ib ^f         ^ Suggested Navy Position,” serial 0008P93 of 3

^l95?, A16-10 Folder, 1957, OP-60 File, NHC.

/yⁿ^^Cr ^^al^colm W. Cagle, USN “Sea Power and Limited War,” '^'raTu ^lmtltute Proceedings, July 1958, p. 25.

F^r°^Ceedin                              TF»^e Potential of Our Nuclear Age Navy,”

^Jo^th^’^{January 1958}’ PP- ¹¹²> U3.

\e (q ⁿ Fdowe, Multicrises, Seapower and Global Politics in the Missile

^^uotecT^br,dge’ ^{MIT Press}’ ^197!)’ ^pp- ²⁶²’²⁸²-

fij..^ln ^^avid H. White, editor, Proceedings of the Conference on War Utte_r Charleston: Citadel, 1976), p. 135.

^Ugust ^le‘ °F Naval Operations to Flag and General Officers, of 22 O^jj                Post War Command File, NHC.

^39 ^al°^r Political/Economic Developments in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,

' Me« ^ Review, April I960, p. 212, Post War Command File, NHC.

rv ^essa£e _r                                                                 ,

yW_atj₀ ’ ^°^mrnander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet to Chief of Naval ■lO ®42155Z November 1959, CinCPacFlt Messages, NHC. Flati_s £)' ^*^rector» Long Range Objectives Group to Director, Strategic ⁱ95s_{> s}‘^Vlsi°n, serial 00014P93 of 29 October 1958, 5500 (A8) Folder, ^t[^ategic Plans Division File, NHC.

Hard k I.                                                                                , .

" Betts, Soldiers. Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge:

hoc,

^:6etlin

‘gs / August 1981

41